Order of Battle – July 1943
Battalion Headquarters.
CO – Lt Col IH Good.
Adjutant – Capt TJ Sweeney.
IO – Lt SH Sharp.
MO – Capt G Byrne (RAMC).
Padre –Capt JA Treacey (RAChD)
RSM – RSM Cairms
Intelligence Sergeant – Sgt Jenkins.
Provost Sergeant – Sgt Miller.
Medical Sergeant – Sgt Reeve.
Medical Corporals – Cpl Willis, L/Cpl Mulqueen.
Headquarters Company.
No 1 Platoon (Signals).
Signals Officer – Lt HD Miller.
Signals Sergeant – Sgt Brannigan.
Signals Corporal – Cpl Thurston.
No 2 Platoon (Anti Aircraft) – Defence of Battalion HQ.
Platoon Commander – Sgt Connelly.
Section Commanders –B/M Taylor, L/Cpl Cook.
No 3 Platoon (Mortars).
Platoon Commander – Capt Da Gibson.
Platoon Sergeant – Sgt Coduri.
Detachment Commanders – Sgt Dawes, Cpl Maslin, Sgt Boynes, Cpl Milne, Sgt Goldsmith, Cpl Allen.
No 4 Platoon (Carriers) – Carrying Ammunition and Wounded and Towing A/Tank Guns.
Platoon Commander – Capt JG Adams.
2 i/c – Lt H St G Gallaher.
Platoon Sergeant – Sgt Murphy.
Section Commanders –Sgt Budd, Sgt Sweeney, Sgt Kinnard, Cpl Davies, Cpl Young, Cpl Roach, L/Cpl Pinnock.
No 5 Platoon (A/Tk).
Platoon Commander – Capt AH Palmer.
Troop Commanders – Lt RA Wigger, Lt J Grennan.
Platoon Sergeant Major – CSM Piper.
Platoon Sergeants – Sgt Wallace, Sgt Bennett, Sgt H Jones, Sgt Monk.
Detachment Commanders – Sgt Mitchell, Sgt Flavell, Sgt Sweetman, Sgt McCarthy.
No 6 Platoon (Admin).
Pioneer Corporal – Cpl Woolf.
Coy HQ.
CSM Allen.
“A” Echelon.
I/C – Major PM Mahon.
MTO – Lt AF Mace.
Orderly Room Sergeant – Sgt FM Jones.
CQMS – CQMS Allworth.
Petrol – Cpl Webb.
Cooks – Cpl Bye (ACC).
“B” Echelon.
2 i/c – Major The Viscount Stopford.
QM – Lt EB Gardner.
RQMS – RQMS Hewitt.
Rations – Cpl White.
Post – Cpl Newcombe.
Armourer – Sgt Archer (REME).
Fitters – Sgt Heffernan (RAOC).
Boots – Cpl Chipperfield (RAOC).
PRI – P/Major Franklin.
“A” Company.
Coy HQ.
Commander – Major JK Cantopher GM.
2 i/c – Capt MDGC Ryan.
CSM Orr.
No 7 Platoon.
Commander – Lt ALF Orr.
Platoon Sergeant – Sgt Cook.
No 1 Section – L/Cpl McDonald.
No 2 Section – Cpl Lloyd.
No 3 Section – L/Cpl Bex.
No 8 Platoon.
Commander – Lt GE Buss.
Platoon Sergeant – Cpl McKeown.
No 4 Section – L/Cpl McGibney.
No 5 Section – L/Cpl Shimes.
No 6 Section – Cpl Wade.
No 9 Platoon.
Commander – 2/Lt AE Crampton.
Platoon Sergeant – Sgt Madigan.
No 7 Section – L/Cpl Chaplin.
No 8 Section – L/Sgt Swift.
No 9 Section – Cpl Bliss.
“A” Echelon.
CQMS O’Bourne.
“B” Company.
Coy HQ.
Commander – Major HCS Lofting.
2 i/c – Capt MC Bonham-Carter.
CSM – CSM Hall.
No 11 Platoon.
Commander – Lt T Berry.
Platoon Sergeant – Sgt Betteridge.
No 1 Section – Cpl Guy.
No 2 Section – Cpl Davidson.
No 3 Section – Cpl Taylor.
No 12 Platoon.
Commander – Sgt Thompson.
Platoon Sergeant – Cpl Gladwin.
No 4 Section – L/Cpl L Dyer.
No 5 Section – L/Sgt Avery.
No 6 Section – L/Cpl R Dyer.
“A” Echelon.
CQMS Budd.
“C” Company.
Coy HQ.
Commander – Capt WE Brooks.
2 i/c – Lt WK Byrne.
CSM Boyt.
No 13 Platoon.
Commander – Lt JD Searles.
Platoon Sergeant – Sgt Kilkeery.
No 1 Section – L/Sgt Peck.
No 2 Section – Cpl Cranston.
No 3 Section – Cpl Lander.
No 14 Platoon.
Commander – Lt TW Coghlin.
Platoon Sergeant – Sgt Parfitt.
No 4 Section – Cpl Donley.
No 5 Section – Cpl Jackson.
No 6 Section – Cpl Lewendon.
No 15 Platoon.
Commander – Lt M Marin.
Platoon Sergeant – L/Sgt Jordan.
No 7 Section – L/Cpl Deverell.
No 8 Section – L/Cpl Blair.
No 9 Section – L/Cpl Mitchell.
“A” Echelon.
CQMS Sheehan.
“D” Company.
Coy HQ.
Commander – Capt Sir James Henry Bt.
2 i/c – Capt JR Strick.
CSM – Sgt Hayes.
No 16 Platoon.
Commander – Lt JS Leahy.
Platoon Sergeant – L/Sgt Ratcliffe.
No 1 Section – Cpl Jacomelli.
No 2 Section – L/Cpl Maynard.
No 3 Section – Cpl Fry.
No 17 Platoon.
Commander – Lt M Power.
Platoon Sergeant – Cpl Makin.
No 4 Section – Cpl Johns.
No 5 Section – L/Cpl Bruce.
No 6 Section – Cpl Murphy.
No 18 Platoon.
Commander – Sgt McDaid.
Platoon Sergeant – Cpl Finch.
No 7 Section – L/Cpl Mears.
No 8 Section – L/Cpl Daish.
No 9 Section – Cpl Field.
“A” Echelon.
CQMS Pakenham.
9 July – Alexandria
0745 SS Karoa sailed and joined the D3 convoy of twelve ships sailing for Syracuse.
0900 The Commanding Officer addressed all officers and told them that the Bttn was going to land at Syracuse if things went according to plan or, on the beaches, if they did not. He then explained the Army Commander’s plan in outline and explained that as we were part of the reserve Brigade of 50th Division our role at that stage was still uncertain.
0915 The Commanding Officer spoke to the Bttn who were assembled on the forward well and with the aid of a map drawn on a ping pong table gave a brief resume of his talk to the Officers, after this every man was given a copy of the Soldiers’ Guide to Sicily, Maps were distributed throughout the day there being thirty eight different sheets of different scales.
Meanwhile, all officers visited the Information Room where the IO explained the known information which, apart from the maps and photographs, consisted of the operation order and the Divisional Intelligence Summaries.
July 10 – At Sea
The convoy sailed on undisturbed. The information about the operation was explained to the Senior NCOs in the Information Room throughout the day and on the following two days all NCOs and a number of riflemen visited the room in addition to Officer and NCOs of the other units on board. As the fact that the invasion of Sicily had begun and was known to all ranks, some of its progress was eagerly awaited. During this and the following days until the Bttn landed, repeated attempts were made to hear the army broadcasts as ordered in the operational instructions but nothing was heard. However, the Bttn got news from the BBC and from a neighbouring ship SS Rohna, which was able to pick up 13 Corps’ broadcasts and sent them across the Karoa by lamp.
The situation was marked up on our maps in various places so that everyone could see what was happening.
July 11/12 – At Sea
The Karoa sailed on towards Syracuse and was still completely undisturbed rather to everyone’s surprise. All possible preparations to land were made on the 12th such as the extra issue of ammunition, stacking packs etc.
July 13 – SS Karoa
0800 The convoy made its correct RV with HQ ship and received the final orders to dock. Shortly after eight o’clock, a large number of other ships began to come in sight and the land became visible through the mist. After a short time, it was possible to see Noto and Avola off which a large number of ships were lying. The convoy turned north when a short distance from the coast and moved up the coast past Syracuse. Then it steamed slowly round in a circle whole the ships peeled off and went into the harbour one by one.
The Karoa was the first British merchant ship to enter Syracuse and was brought in by old Sicilian pilot, who was put on board by a Royal Navy launch. He was in shirt sleeves and an old straw hat and caused some amusement shaking hands with everyone he met.
1100 The Karoa docked without mishap.
1120 The Bttn disembarked and was met by a number of staff officers all very agitated to get the decks clear quickly.
The Bttn formed up in the quay and marched off to the assembly area which was about five miles out. It was exceedingly hot especially as the Bttn was carrying extra ammunition, all the mortars and extra wireless sets and signal equipment.
1305 The Bttn arrived in the assembly area 087310 where is was met by Lt McCabe, who had landed on July 10th with 151 Brigade. The assembly area was among almond and olive trees, which afforded good cover and here the Bttn remained for the night. The civilians from the surrounding areas were very friendly to British troops.
July 14th – Syracuse
0800 Bttn moved by march route from the assembly area towards Mellili. Not one of the Bttn transport had arrived so a rear party was left to collect it and bring it up when it arrived. It was a very hot and stuffy day, the Bttn was carrying heavy loads and had only the mess tin ration and there was a lot of traffic on the roads – these things combined to make the thirteen mile march a particularly strenuous one and there was a number of cases of heat exhaustion.
1450 Bttn arrived in the new assembly area 009432 near Mellili.
During the evening and night, the assembly scale of transport which had been landed safely in Syracuse by Z lighter in spite of the fact that the next ship to them had been sunk, arrived in the assembly area.
July 15th – Mellili
0815 Bttn moved by march route tit e Brigade concentration area near Carlentini 921523. This was under cover in an orange grove and there was a plentiful supply of water.
1600 Enemy reported approximately 1500 strong in area Carmito 8963 by 168 Brigade.
1715 Enemy strength estimated at two coys, mixed Italian and German rather disorganised. Germans thought to be paratroopers.
July 16th – Mellili
0630 Bttn commenced a “mopping up” sweep across the area between roads Lentini – Agone and North Contramaglitto 9452 with “A” on right, “B” centre, “C” left and “D” in reserve. Bttn HQ following the axis of advance of “D” Coy.
0715 DR reported that one platoon 1st KOYLI (8 Division) were already engaged in mopping up in area south of Carlentini Agone (9757). Shortly afterwards, some of these people were encountered.
0930 “A” Coy found a large number of parachute containers and a large amount of German equipment and ammunition in valley round square 93559456. No live enemy found.
All coys reported road Carlentini – Agone Clear.
“A” Coy captured 3 German parachutists and 11 Italians at 938568.
Area cleared up to road Lentini, north east to coast It as not possible to clear area completely in the time as the front was so broad.
A fighting patrol (1 officer, 15 men) went out to recce 888688 Passo Cavaliere. Arrived at 0300 hrs. Found no bridge but what appeared to be a prepared ford with solid sloping banks. River about 20 foot wide. The Dattaino river is dry here and crossing not held, only enemy activity a small German patrol passing west of crossing. Patrol fired on by us at 0315 hrs. No reply. Patrol returned safely.
July 17th – 895615
Fighting patrol went out to bridge 878698 and came under heavy attack when attempting to get through the dense reeds on bank of Dittaino. Captured one German PoW. 2 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, Herman Goering Division. Returned safely.
Bttn rested in its area overlooking the battle.
Brigade Commander gave out verbal orders for the Brigade night attack on Fosso Bottaceto to take place at 2200 hrs this evening. Briefly, the Brigade was to attack with two Bttns up – 1 London Scottish right, 1 LIR left, 10 Royal Berkshires in reserve, supported by whole Divisional Artillery with one A Field Regiment and one Medium Regiment superimposed and two regiments of self-propelled Priests’ guns. In addition, Divisional MMG Bttn (2 Cheshires) were to support from Zero and LAA to fire directional tracer on flanks of the attack.
The objectives given were the Fosso Bottaceto and thereafter it was expected that either the reserve Bttn or another Brigade would pass through. As the attack progressed and when the objective was reached, 69 Brigade were to swing out westwards on the left of 1 LIR to widen the breach. The brigade frontage was extremely wide and the Bttn frontage of attack covered from (incl) the main road to approximately 1500 yards westwards.
The Brigade Commander’s orders were given out in a cave in the rocks at 1 LS HQ in which there was room only for three people and were finished at approximately 1515hrs. No artillery or MG reps were present.
Brigade Commander then gave outline orders to Bttn ‘O’ Group who had assembled meantime, together with orders for move of Bttn up to the assembly area. The gist of Bttn orders were that the Bttn would attack with three Coys up – “A” right, “C” centre, “D” left; B Coy, who were one Platoon short, being in reserve ie no scouts in front. Platoons; two sections up, each section in line. One 3” Mortar Detachment in support of each forward coy, three Mortar detachments in reserve, 4 Platoon to provide one carrier for each coy for carrying stores, ammunition and tools.
5 Platoon to be ready to move one troop forward to assist in consolidation. MMG Platoon, under command, to move on centre line in rear Bttn HQ. Taping etc of start line with standard drill laid down.
Transport to remain in the Assembly Area until it could be brought forward after the success of the attack.
Bttn Commander shown ground for first time by Brigade Commander from view point 934659, some 1000 yards south of the river. From this view point, once could no more than a general view of the ground. However, it was stated that units of the 151 Brigade would have guides to meet us in the Assembly Area at about 1800 hrs and be able to point out details of the ground from forward of the river. Artillery, Sapper and MMG Commander in support of Bttn were to meet Bttn Commander in Assembly Area.
Bttn Commander showed ground to his ‘O’ Group from same view point. ‘O’ Group then returned to Bttn.
Bttn moved off toward the Assembly Area. ‘O’ Group also went ahead to the Assembly Area.
On arrival there, it was found that 8 DLI did not know that we were coming nor even that an attack through them was definitely taking place that night. Their FDLs were some 200 to 300 yards short of their reported position. This meant that protection would be required to cover the guide party in the marking of the FUP and Start Line.
The Assembly Area was close vineyard giving low cover from view only. It was under direct observation from the front as were the approaches to it down to the river from the south side. In front of it was a lane between banks and some old enemy wire forming part of the bridge defences. The whole area had seen considerable fighting at close range and had been much shelled by both sides for some days. It was strewn with dead and quantities of equipment and remains of vehicles. The movement of any wheeled vehicles into or out of it was extremely difficult and they were virtually confined to one narrow track in and out.
In view of the fact that the Start Line was now so close to the Assembly area, an FUP was dispensed with and the Bttn, on arrival, formed up for the attack in the Assembly Area. ”B” Coy provided cover parties for the IO’s marking party and by 2130 hrs, the Bttn was formed up though difficulty was still being experienced in getting vehicles with ammunition and tools to the Coys. As the Bttn moved over the river between 2030 and 2100 hrs, the enemy shelled the area of the bridge with HE and air bursts but caused no casualties and only very slight delay.
At approximately 2130 hrs, information was received that as it was believed that the enemy had gone – this information was the result of an Armoured recce during the afternoon carried out by a Squadron of 44 RTR and carriers of 1 London Scottish and 10 Royal Berkshires – the attack would now be silent and that the artillery programme would remain laid on to be called for if necessary. In any case, the full barrage would come onto the objective from 2315 hrs to 2330 hrs and then lift to 400 yards behind the objective and remain there for 15 minutes. It was estimated that the infantry would arrive on the objective at 2330 hrs.
There was just time to get this information out to the Coys and to remind them to be well up behind the barrage when it lifted over the objective and the Bttn then moved forward to the Start Line.
At this stage, there was some difficulty about getting loads from vans and getting those vehicles, which were to move up behind the Bttn into their correct places but this was overcome by sending the W/T Truck and RA W/T vehicles out onto the main road from where they were to come in and onto the axis of advance by another side track a bit further up. The carriers to move in rear of the Coys being already in the lane in front, ready to follow up.
By 2155 hrs, all Coys except “A” had reported to be in position ready to move. There was no sign of “A” or their guides near the Start Line either to the front or rear. The Commanding Officer decided to wait a short time for them and then if they did not appear, to move “C” and “D” Coys over to the right towards the main road and bring up “B” Coy on the left, hoping that eventually “A” Coy could be found and brought up in reserve.
At 2200 hrs – Zero Hour – it was apparent that the orders about the Silent Attack had not reached all concerned for the Light AA gunners, who were to fire directional tracer to the flanks of the attack in the original plan and also the MMGs, began to fire on their tasks. No other gun fire came down however, nor did this bring any reply from the enemy positions.
At 2210 hrs, as “A” Coy had not materialised, the CO ordered “C” and “D” Coys to ease to their right and “B” Coy to move up on the left and take over “D” Coy’s objectives. As “B” Coy were behind the left rear, this was simpler than moving “B” Coy across the rear of the Bttn frontage in the dark to take over the original “A” Coy task.
At 2215 hrs, the Bttn crossed the Start Line moving forward at 100 yards in 3 minutes, the Light AA and MMGs continuing to fire throughout this time. Shortly afterwards, the MMGs stopped but the Light AA continued until about 2245 hrs.
The advance continued uninterrupted and at a fast pace until about 2245 hrs when “C” Coy on right reported that they had found “A” Coy immediately in front of them. A pause was ordered to adjust this situaution and the Bttn reformed into the original formation, though “C” Coy and “D” Coys remained rather further to their original right than was intended, which led to some slight crowding on the right later. It transpired that “A” Coy, seeing the Bttn on their right moving forward as soon as they reached the Start Line, had assumed that they should move forward too, to keep touch with them but had omitted to keep touch with “C” Coy or leave any word of their action.
The advance continued without interruption until the leading Coys were within about 400 yards of the first objective at 2345 hrs when the barrage opened on the objective as ordered. The Coys moved up rather closer and waited for the barrage to lift at 2330 hrs. As the barrage lifted behind the objective, the Coys went forward and “A” Coy had just penetrated the enemy wire, having cut gaps, when all the leading Coys came under very heavy automatic fire from posts in the first and second banks, including what appeared to be oil flares thrown by hand from the posts, which fell among the leading troops and fully illuminated them. Enemy mortars joined in and also two guns of light calibre opened fire from each flank. At the same time, mortar and gun fire was brought down in the vicinity of Bttn HQ and the reserve Coy, which had just reached the line of the ditch about 940708 and the vicinity of Massa Della Palma respectively. Enemy MGs fired on fixed lines also covered most of the open ground most effectively.
After a short time, the Coys worked their way forward and dealing with the enemy in their way, gained the first objectives. They then came under even heavier fire from posts in the second objective and were able to make little further progress in any strength though elements of “A” Coy reached the second objective but were unable to stay there for as long as they were subjected to intense fire from both flanks and also from the right rear. This was due to the fact that the Bttn on the right had met unexpected and very heavy opposition from a wood on their front, which had been reported empty and which may had been ordered to bypass and mop up later. This opposition had prevented them from getting up on our right except from a very small party, which joined “A” Coy. Owing to this, the enemy was able to bring considerable fire from that area on to our right flank from our right rear. The Bttn left flank was still opposed and considerable fire was coming from there also.
By 2400 hrs, however, the leading Coys were re-established on the first objective though it was difficult for Bttn HQ to find the exact situation as both “A” and “D” Coys’ R/T set had gone off the air. The set working to Brigade had never caught up Bttn HQ – in fact it was found that it had gone astray and run almost into the enemy position where it got struck, came under heavy fire and had to be abandoned. The Artillery Officer, following it, found himself in a similar situation but managed to get touch with the forward Coys and gave most valuable assistance with gun fire at a time when it was badly needed. Touch with Brigade was later established by means of a 48 R/T set carried by the Bttn, which was brought onto Brigade frequency.
By means of Regimental concentrations of gun fire and fire from the Bttn 3 inch mortars as well as fire from Coy’s own weapons, it was possible to keep the enemy fire down sufficiently to enable the Bttn to maintain its position, the situation was still precarious as both flanks were still exposed.
This situation was maintained during the next two hours or so while constant attempts were made to find out from Brigade what was the position of 1 London Scottish on the right. This proved to be impossible by wireless and as no information was coming forward from Brigade, the IO was sent back to gather information. As the situation was still very confused, he was able to gather little beyond the fact, already painfully clear to us, that 1 London Scottish had not been able to reach their objective but just how they were situated was very obscure. During this time also, the CO of 7 Green Howards visited Bttn HQ to find out our situation before beginning his movement through our rear with a view to attacking outwards to widen the bridgehead on our left. He was told the situation and moved off to launch his attack.
This attack began at 0100 hrs with a barrage coming down on the 93 Northing grid line and moving westwards. Unfortunately, “B” Coy appear to have had some men west of this grid, in spite of instructions to the contrary and suffered some casualties from our own guns. It may well have been however that the barrage opened slightly east of the grid line as the map in this area was not accurate.
Little information was received of the progress of this tack either but it became evident after some hours that it had not been successful and the Green Howards withdrew again to their original positions in the close bridgehead from which we had begun our advance.
At about 0330 hrs, as no information was coming from the brigade, either about the general situation nor were there any instructions as to whether the Bttn as to try and maintain its position after daylight, the Commanding Officer visited Brigade HQ to try and clarify the position.
The situation at this time was that elements of the forward Coys had a hold on the first objective but any attempt to get forward over the bank was met by heavy fire from the second objective and no further progress could be made without a very considerable additional support and neutralisation of the fire coming from both flanks. If the Bttn maintained its position, it would find itself at daylight on a clearly defined feature, very close to the enemy positions, with both flanks exposed and under close observation and with virtually no cover from this flanking fire. The forward Coys had suffered pretty heavy casualties and were getting short of ammunition and it would be quite impossible to replenish them before daylight – trucks could not get across the irrigation ditches and five carriers had already been knocked out or got ditched in attempts to get forward. This situation was discussed with the Brigade Commander and it was decided that the Bttn should withdraw so that the FDLs would be on the approximate line of the irrigation channel and track running east and west through 937701.
This decision was made at about 0330 hrs and the Commanding Officer at once returned to Bttn HQ and issued orders that “B” Coy should try to cover the forward Coys out; with what Artillery and Mortar fire could be brought to bear, from its position in the area Massa De la Palma. “A” and “C” Coys to withdraw to the approximate line of the ditch mentioned above and hold from (inclusive) the main road to about 400 yards west: Bttn HQ to hold FDLs on their left; “D” Coy, whose situation and strength was obscure, to pass through and hold positions about ditch and track junction 937696. As soon as the forward Coys had passed through “B” Coy to move back and occupy positions covering the left flank between the two ditches. All Coys to be back in position by daylight. Mortars to cover the withdrawal and then be prepared to deal with any follow up by the enemy from positions already occupied in the general area of the Bttn. “C” Coy Commander, at this time the only Coy Commander of the forward Coys with whom communications were still intact to coordinate the withdrawal of the forward Coys.
These orders were issued by R/T and runner at about 0400 hrs and it was realised that they gave little time before daylight for their execution but the risks to be run by some of the movement not being by daylight being considered to be preferable to the certainty of extremely heavy casualties if daylight found the Bttn in its present situation
In fact, the majority were back in the new positons as daylight broadened out but for some hour after daylight individuals and small parties continued to come in, together with some walking wounded. For some reason, this movement during daylight was unmolested by the enemy although they had tried to pin down the forward coys in the initial stages of the withdrawal.
Coys reorganised quickly in the new positons and it was found that the casualty situation was as follows:
“A” Coy:
Major Cantopher Coy, wounded and evacuated.
Captain Ryan 2 1/c – missing.
Lieut Orr: – missin, believed killed.
Lieut Buss – missing, believed wounded.
CSM Orr – wounded an evacuated.
ORs – approximately 1 Platoon strength casualties, including many NCOs.
“B” Coy:
CSM Hall and 4 ORs killed, approximately 8 ORs wounded.
“C” Coy:
Lieut Coghlin – missing, believed wounded.
Lieut Marin – wounded and evacuated.
Approximately 1 Platoon strength OR casualties.
“D” Coy:
Captain Sir James Henry – missing, he returned later in the day;
Lieut Power – killed;
Captain Strick – slightly wounded;
Approximately one Platoon strength OR casualties.
HQ Coy:
Approximately twelve OR casualties from Signals, Mortars, Carriers.
Comments.
- It seems that the original planning for this attack should have taken account of the approaches to the proposed Assembly areas. These approaches were under direct observation from the known enemy positions at a range of about 400 yards, but he could well have had them under observation from very much closer as our own FDLs were reported to be more than 800 yards north of the Primosole Bridge – they were in fact not more than about 500 yards north.
Zero being at 2200 hrs and daylight continuing until about 2100 hrs meant that the movement into Assembly Areas had, perforce, to be carried out in daylight and would have been seen by the enemy no matter how wide the dispersal of the units moving down to the open slopes south of the river. The enemy must therefore have been in alert for some development on this part of his front.
- The report of the armoured recce during the afternoon that the enemy had gone was taken as sufficient reason for the change to a “silent” attack. It is understood that this report was based on the tanks not being fired on during the recce.
There are two points about this, which spring to mind. If the tanks were not fired on, should they not have gone on even right on to the Fosso Bottaceto to see whether in fact the enemy had gone and were not merely withholding fire, which would do tanks no harm until they came into the range of an A/Tk weapon? Alternatively, should not the report of the armoured recce have been confirmed by ground recce.
- It appears that there was either bad delay in communications or faulty staff work regarding the implementing of the decision to change the plan to a “silent” attack. It is understood that the decision was made at Divisional HQ at about 1600 hrs, yet it was only at 21300 hrs that the Bttn Commander was informed of the change and the order never reached either the Light AA nor the MMGs before zero. The result of this was that the opening of fire by the Light AA and MMGs can have done no more than place the enemy on alert that something was about to happen, without in any way subduing him as the attack went forward. It is felt that such an important change of plan must be despatched by swift and certain means.
- Great difficulty was experienced during the advance and subsequently in keeping in touch with Brigade by means of W/T as the 11 Set vehicle could not move directly across the ground in the early stages and in fact subsequently got lost. It is not a suitable set for hand carriage and no time was available to transfer it to a more suitable cross country vehicle. Luckily, the Bttn was in possession of a No 48 set, which was carried and this was eventually able to establish communication with the Brigade 11 Set. It would perhaps have been more satisfactory had it been able to work to another 48 Set at Brigade HQ.
It is felt that under the circumstances a telephone and cable, “walked out” behind the Bttn HQ as it advanced, would have been of great value, the R/T sets being brought into use only if the line had been cut.
- The carriage of the No 38 Sets in Platoons during the attack led to their loss as men found that they made getting through wire and obstacles very difficult and when fire came down the first inclination was to slip out of the harness which was hindering them in getting through. In the dark and excitement of the moment, the set was lost. It is felt that a better use would have been to keep the sets at Coy HQ as duplicate links to Bttn. Later, on capture of the objective, they could have been set out to Platoons if necessary.
- The Bttn standard night attack drill worked well but it is vital that no coy should move off on its own merely because a unit on its right is moving forward without informing Bttn HQ. It should, of course, keep touch with the troops on its flank.
- It was found that the carriers cannot compete with heavy loads if it has to negotiate ditches in the dark unless these are very easy ditches with gradual sloping banks.
- It is thought that if some means carrying the mess tin and ration in a small side haversack could be devised, rather than the present small haversack carried on the back, the passage of wire and other obstacles by the riflemen would be very much easier. If one dispenses with the present small pack altogether the men may well have to do without food of any kind for very long periods following an attack of this nature. There is no other place for him to carry them with the necessary amounts of SAA, grenades etc, it has to carry for fighting.
July 18th to July 31st
During this period, holding the line in two difficult positions – first west of the main road and then east of the main road. The plan during this period was to hold and occupy the enemy on the Divisional front, while the main thrust went in on the west.
As far as the Bttn was concerned, there is nothing of special interest to report. Patrols were active each night that the Bttn was in the line. Each night, it was found that no attempt had been made by the enemy to repair the gaps made in the wire during the original attack nor had he reoccupied the positions on the nearer bank which had been the first objective although he continued to hold the further bank in strength and also the wood which extended down the east flank towards the sea. No attempt either made by the enemy throughout this time to bury any of our dead, who were lying in close proximity to his positions although he buried his own.
At no time did he do any patrolling and it was always possible for our patrols to move about the area between the lines unhindered except by fire from the enemy weapons firing on fixed lines. As he invariably used tracer at night, it was possible to avoid these fixed lines after a little experience of them. Apart from the use of innumerable flares, which he put up at the slightest provocation and often for no apparent reason, he showed no inquisitiveness regarding the activities of our patrols.
One patrol remained out until daylight very close to the enemy positions as it was thought that he might be going away that night. An indication of this was the discovery of a pile of “S” mines dumped ready for laying near his wire. This dump was successfully blown by a party under Lt Crampton the following evening. Some casualties were suffered during these patrols including one OR killed.
On the 22 July, the Bttn was out of the line for one day and was again relieved on the night of 27/28 July and went into Brigade reserve south of the Primisole Bridge.
17th July
1800 As a result of verbal orders by Brigadier KC Davidson MC, the Bttn left the concentration area 895615 and marched to the bridge over River Simeto 042675.
2045 Bttn concentrated in area held by 6th and 9th DLI among the vineyards on left of the road 936685.
2215 Bttn crossed start line which was 200 yards approximately ahead of our FDLs. Order of Coys left to right; “D”, “C”, “A” and “B” Coy in reserve.
2345 Forward Coys were about 100 yards from objective, which consisted of wire and prepared positions along and in front of the Fosso Bottaceto. Bttn came under fierce fire from all types of automatics.
2355 Three leading Coys immediately attacked the position and established themselves on it. “C” Coy being the first Coy on objective. “B” Coy went to a position behind and to the left of “D” Coy.
2400 The enemy kept up fierce fire from extreme left and also from the east side of the road. They brought mortars into action and it was some time before Bttn HQ was able to find out the situation. The Coys held on although suffering heavy casualties.
18th July
0045 The CO moved Bttn HQ from ditch at 939704 to ditch at 936701 as it was fairly heavily under fire and communications were very difficult. He also wanted to make contact with Brigade HQ as the Bttn was not out of touch owing to the wireless set having got lost in the ark and was bogged and pinned down near bridge on objective and had to be abandoned.
0105 OC 7th Green Howards visited Bttn HQ to ascertain the Bttn situation before beginning an attack north westwards from 93 grid line with the object of taking the ground bounded by the railway on left (west) and Fosso Bottaceto on north.
0110 Enemy opened fire on the mortar carriers and Bren carriers in the rear with 88 mm guns and heavy mortars. Mortar Platoon Commander’s carrier was set on fire and the tracks blown off two others.
0200 By this time although no information had come through it was clear that 1 London Scottish had been held up and not reached their objective thus leaving the Bttn right flank exposed.
0400 Orders for the Bttn to withdraw from present held positions to line of ditch 937702. Bttn HQ personnel remained as a defensive force in ditch whilst Coys returned. “C” Coy retired to left of ditch.
0415 All Coys had returned to new positions.
1510 “D” Coy took new positions in ditch at 935675 from Bttn HQ who moved back to 849696.
19th July
0100 Paratroopers reported to have landed in Brigade HQ.
0750 Enemy 20 mm A/Tank firing to left flank.
0810 Artillery fire brought down on suspected gun position. Gun silenced.
0930 Large enemy gun (105 mm) fired on to Simeto bridge area.
1230 “B” Coy – report 6 Green Howards position at Massa Giandino 915710.
1400 Royal Berkshires – report activity in Copse 955705. Two pill boxes suspected at 956696.
1650 Long range gun fired one round on 957696.
1705 Long range gun fired one round on 955705.
2000 OP – Smoke screen being laid by enemy in valley 9173 area.
2005 OP – Enemy activity observed in Torre Galliera di Sotto 948705.
2030 A party of 25 RAF personnel arrived at “A Coy line after having previously driven up the Catania road ahead of the FDL. Their 3 ton lorry was hit by an 88 mm gun and set on fire.
2035 Patrolling for the night subject to confirmation from above:
“A” Coy: 1. To discover if enemy ae in area of road and track junction 943709. 2. If they are not, how far south of their main positions are they? 3. Estimated strength of enemy localities on the road. Time for this patrol not before 0100 hrs.
“C” Coy to discover 1. If enemy occupy pill box at 939713.2. What other posts are there in the vicinity. To return by 0103 hrs.
“D” Coy: Joint patrol with 6 Green Howards.
“B” Coy to contact patrols with 6 Green Howards via track junction 933706.
2115 OP – One white Verey light fired by enemy on his right and another on his left near Catania road. Verey light were fired at odd intervals along whole front.
2215 Flare activity on left followed by exchange of LMG and MH fire between enemy and 6 Green Howards
20th July
0300 Large barrage of artillery fire on enemy positions on our left and well forward.
0515 “A” Coy – Patrol from previous night discovered that the gaps in the wire through which the night attack passed on 17/7 had not been repaired. May indicate new enemy fixed line.
1110 “B” Coy – three rounds enemy mortar fire burst to right and in front of “B” Coy.
1120 “D” Coy – enemy mortar fire hit carrier in front of “D” Coy.
1145 Target engaged by artillery fire.
1400 IO summoned to Brigade HQ for conference.
1530 RA – Enemy gun believed to be 88 mm fire across Bttn front. RA put down concentration.
1610 RA – Report from distant OP that enemy gun destroyed by artillery fire.
2000 “C” Coy moved back to area.
21st July
1030 Four men seen working outside pill box 946714.
1750 Six air bursts over Royal Berkshire area from 88 mm gun.
1853 Enemy heavy mortar fire on party of East Yorkshires at 924695.
2215 Bttn relieved in line as follows: “A” Coy hand over to “C” Coy 10 Royal Berkshires. “D” and “B” Coys hand over to “C” Coy 8 DLI.
2315 Bttn moved out by route march to become reserve Bttn at 960669 where Bttn HQ was established.
22nd July
1215 Two large explosions from direction of Gerbini aerodrome. May be fuel dump blown up.
1300 Two more large explosions from same area. High smoke columns. Enemy believed to be destroying dumps on aerodrome.
1830 Orders issued for Bttn to relieve 10 Roya Berkshire Regiment on night of 23rd.
23rd July
2100 Guides and coy representatives visited Berkshire position prior to taking over.
2300 Bttn moved by march route to take over from Royal Berkshires.
24th July
0045 Bttn arrived and relieved 10 Royal Berkshire Regiment on left flank. Coys took over position as follows: “A” Coy 943696, “B” Coy 947697, “C” Coy 950692, “D” Coy 948692. As during the previous afternoon, the Royal Berkshire Bttn HQ had been hit by heavy mortar fire, it was considered inadvisable to take over some location at 949692. Bttn HQ was established in ditch at 949685. The OP was taken over at 949692 (Farm buildings).
0445 “A” Coy – a patrol of 1 officer, 18 ORs set out on a fighting patrol to 944713. They discovered that the gaps in the wire made during the night attack on the 17th had not been closed. The patrol was not seen until it reached the wire. The first bound was found unoccupied by the enemy but positions on second bound remained same and enemy was present in strength.
The patrol suffered in casualties: 1 killed, 4 wounded and 8 missing. The Germans holding the positions were reported to be all large men. Suggests that enemy troops had been changed. Stretcher parties noticed a difference in the enemy’s behaviour, also, for they were not fired on when going forward to collect wounded. The Germans themselves were out this side carrying in the wounded. (Germans who fired on patrol wore KD and grey berets. May suggest that enemy troops have changed. Recent behaviour proved enemy fired on wounded and stretcher parties).
0720 OP – Six men observed carrying mortar bombs 955705. Artillery shelling target.
0730 OP – Enemy A/Tk gun tractor and camouflaged vehicles located in approximate area 944708.
1035 Enemy fired five mortar bombs in area 947698.
1610 enemy fired mortar bombs in area farm 949692.
1616 RA OP – Large explosion 937716.
OP – Four large flashes seen from OP grid bearing 2 ½ degrees. Believed to be Nebelwerfer (six barrelled weapon throwing canister like shells about 7,000 yards). Reported to Brigade. Artillery fired on target and believed put it out of action.
2115 “A”, “B”, “C” Coys sent out listening patrols to 942708, 947709, 957692 respectively, to cover mine laying by Res, assisted by 1 London Scottish on right. Mines to be laid were from 939700 to 945704 and from 952698 to 955695 and from 955695 to 955688. Party for mine laying did not achieve their aim and only about 150 mines were laid on the right and none on the left.
25th July
0515 Patrols reported nil except “C” Coy who located a sniper in Torre Galliera di Sopra 947709.
0800 OP – One man seen to jump up from trench and disappear into the wood. Berating 47 degrees. “C” Coy informed.
0815 Two men from “A” Coy to push forward to recce and discover movement of enemy. “B” Coy to push two men to Torre Galliera di Sopra 947709 and “C” Coy to push two men out to wood on right. Here, patrols to investigate and check report from 151 Brigade that no enemy observed on front.
0825 OP – Four gun flashes close together observed on bearing of 347 degrees, distance unknown but about 20 miles away.
0845 OP – Gun flash observed in bearing 354 degrees.
Artillery informed, No explosions heard or seen.
1010 “B” Coy OP – “B” Coy patrol now in pink house 947709 and are held up by MG and rifle fire. Artillery informed of enemy position.
1040 “B” Coy – Enemy MG fire on “B” Coy from small road 948708.
1200 “B” Coy – Artillery scored six direct hits on red line 948708.
1255 “C” Coy – Forward OP have heard chopping in the wood.
1400 Enemy gun fired two rounds over towards Lower.
1420 “B” Coy – Mortar fire by enemy brought down on ”B” Coy positions.
1500 “B” Coy – Report that they shot a sniper a 946708.
1945 One air burst and four mortar bombs fell 300 yards left of “B” Coy’s positions.
2000 Situation at 2000 hrs; Divisional order to lay minefield as for previous night but Brigade order requires ferreting patrols to keep in contact with the enemy.
2100 Large explosion in wood on left.
2220 Artillery fire brought down on target Skunk as “B” Coy were troubled by fire (MG).
2225 Three small explosions on a bearing 356 degrees from Bttn HQ.
2230 Three more explosions on a bearing 8 degrees from Bttn HQ.
2250 “B” Coy – Four more small explosions on bearing of 345 degrees from Bttn HQ. Party sent out to collect sniper: heavily mortared and machine gunned.
“B” Coy patrol found that the red house 948708 contained a large pile of burnt equipment and three wireless sets rather larger than 18 sector suspiciously stacked and suspect booby traps. Main opposition came from 947709.
26th July
0600 “D” Coy moved from present location to 945689. Minelaying (as for previous night) was carried out successfully and no opposition was met. Enemy heard talking loudly in south end of wood.
0940 Cattle straying into minefield area 955690 and six exploded.
1005 Very large explosion in area 935713.
1045 Another large explosion in same area as before.
1050 Yet another double explosion in same area.
1915 “B” Coy – enemy opened fired with mortars and M/Gs in forward positions.
2020 “B” Coy – enemy mortaring Pink Buildings but have been unoccupied all day.
2045 Seven successive explosions of terrific power about 4 miles way on a bearing of 325 degrees.
2110 Large fire started in same direction of explosion. Minor explosions occurred in fire. Continued throughout night.
27th July
0620 All coy patrols reported safely back.
0715 Mortar fire on OR.
1200 “B” Coy – Patrol advanced and reached Red House 948708 unopposed. They brought back two German telephones, a wireless set and picks and shovels. No enemy movement observed for Penitentiary for past two hours.
1245 OP – A man seen walking along trench along Bund at 955702. Trench cannot be deeper than 4 feet. Enemy post confirmed in suspect position. Man wearing khaki uniform. “C” Coy warned to send sniper put.
1750 Enemy mortar fire on area south of buildings 949692.
2230 Bttn was relieved by 1 London Scottish. Bttn marched out of line back to rest area at 963669.
28th July
1620 Three Italians detained by carrier platoon commander for interrogation as being suspicious characters. On interrogation, one man, a farmer, stated he had left Catania this morning. He stated that Catania was in British hands and fighting was still going on. Germans using vicinity of central station as supply centre. About 40 German tanks (Mk III or IV) left Catania between 1030-1100 hours for Biancavilla or Misterbianco. Man sent to G3I for further interrogation.
1430 RA report at 953709 two or three Germans stripped to waist re-tracking corn shearers. Ops at 947708 and 957715 engaged by artillery fire.
2100 1 London Scottish report smoke laid by enemy on their front and 1 officer and 30 German troops seen moving in wood.
2230 1 London Scottish report that smoke was own mortar bombs blown up and men were apparently own troops.
29th July
1600 Brigade – Report from PoW that parachutists were to be dropped tonight. Area not given.
2215 Brigade – OP No 11 received. Intrep up to 1810 hours received.
2333 “D” Coy – Dud on delayed action. Shell dropped about ½ mile from “D” Coy area in direction of coast.
30th July
0015 Recce party of 6 DLI arrived to recce the Bttn area. Bttn recce party went to new area 9664.
1400 Transport beginning with No 4 platoon started thinning out to new area.
2305 Bttn reported in, in new area 9664.
31st July
0710 Four large explosions in enemy lines – probably a bomb dump 927744.
Special Order of the Day:
• ”We have taken part in our first battle of this war as a fighting team after a long period of waiting and training. It was a hard battle, entered into after hard marching, and was that hard and most exacting operation of war—a night attack. It was followed by several days in the line under exhausting conditions. I should like you to know that in my opinion, and that opinion is shared by others, the battalion has proved itself a successful fighting team. In that team I include our affiliated battery of the 90th Field Regiment Royal Artillery.
• We come out of the line with the knowledge that we have the guts and the necessary, though not yet complete, technical skill, to face future operations with confidence that we shall achieve success and maintain the high fighting traditions of the Regiment. The battalion reached its objective after hard fighting, and the fact that we were unable to stay there at daylight was due to circumstances beyond our control.
• It will interest you to know that enemy maps captured subsequently disclose that the position was the main Hermann Goering Defensive Position for the defence of the Catania Airfields. It was manned by units of the Hermann Goering Division, who are regarded as among the most formidable of the present German Army, and by parachutists of the Luftwaffe, who are specially picked men. We have left our mark on them without any doubt at all.
• It was most heartening and gratifying to feel the way all parts of our team worked together from the very start of the operation, in the way we have trained to do, under the new and tense atmosphere of actual battle. The display of sheer guts and the vigour and dash in the attack by all ranks were magnificent and make individual mention well-nigh impossible, but I feel that a very special mention is due to the Medical Officer and Battalion Medical Section for their magnificent efforts to succour the wounded.
• With you, I deplore the loss of our comrades and friends—we shall not forget them. We may all be proud of our conduct in this; some of the very best gone too: Bill Coghlin and Bunny Orr, I shall miss more than I can say, and Michael Power, too. Bill Brooks was magnificent and has been awarded the Military Cross, and Sergeant Madigan and Piper Brightman the Military Medal. But I am sure there are lots of others who are equally deserving of awards but they were just not seen. They were all grand, and I am as happy as can be about the outcome and full of confidence that whatever we are asked to do we shall be able to tackle it and give a good account of ourselves.”
Yours ever, I. H. GOOD
22nd July 1943.