The Plan.
As I have said before, various attempts had been made from December onwards to break through the Garigliano, the Rapido (Gari), Cassino and the Monastery. None of them had achieved more than a limited success and all had really failed in their object. The time had now come when this sort of thing had got to stop. This time, it must succeed right up to the hilt, and we were to be the hilt.
In outline, the plan was to attack between the Monastery and the sea, a frontage of about nineteen miles. Everything to the north of this was to be held as lightly as possible so that we had a big concentration of troops and everything else available. When I was in the 5th Army on this front in the winter, it had seemed to me that on two or three occasions when we achieved a “break in” under most difficult circumstances, that the breakthrough could have been made if only a fresh division or two had been lined up behind to go through at the right moment. They always attacked on too broad a front to do this. Places were captured with great gallantry and suffered serious losses but results might have been better. This state of affairs was not going to be permitted this time.
In the Liri Valley, the Poles were to attack the Monastery from the north west, in fact from those hill positions that the Skins used to sit on, and also to break through the mountains in a south westerly direction with the idea of cutting Route Six behind Cassino. The 4th British and 8th Indian Divisions were to force a frontal crossing over the Rapido (Gari). The 5th Army, with the French and American Corps, were to strike up in a north westerly direction capturing Mount Maio and Ausonia with the idea of turning the southern bastion of the Liri Valley between San Giorgio and San Ambroglio. The Americans were to strike north west from the Minturno – Castelforte area. A very effective deception plan was also being run about this time, which suggested that the Canadian Corps were going to land on the Lido di Roma. I believe this took in the Bosche completely and he retained invaluable reserves to meet this bogus threat. The people in the Anzio Bridgehead were to stay put until out advance had really got well under way. They were going to debouch when we got somewhere near Frosinone.
To return to our particular sector. We were to break through from the bridgehead formed by the 4th British Division, while the Canadian Corps were to do the same through the 8th Division. We were to swing to the right, with the idea of eventually joining up with the Poles on Route Six about Piedimonte, while the Canadians were to go straight ahead towards Pignatoro and Pontecorvo, which would automatically link them with a successful French push. The ultimate concentration, therefore, converging against the Liri Valley from all directions was getting on to be something like two armies.
Preparing for Battle.
We left for our first concentration area at Presenzano on the evening of the 10th and, by 0400hrs on the 11th, the brigade was harboured there. Presenzano was not a bad concentration area at all in that it was well out of the range of shot and shell, and perhaps more importantly, the racket of our gun positions.
Our group consisted of all the normal people, Rollo Baker with his 17th Field Regiment, Arthur Welden (‘Whiskers’) with his 254 A/Tk Battery, ‘Ding Dong’ Bell (the Gentleman) with his 280 Light AA Battery, Ronnie Denton and his 214 Field Company, Bob Lyttle and 152 Field Ambulance, Philip Marshall with Dog Support and last but not least, the very welcome addition of the 16/5 Lancers. It was a good crowd and all of them had only one aim in view and that was to help everyone else. It was in this atmosphere of splendid cooperation that the battle started and continued throughout its duration.
Allied 4.2 inch mortars in action at the start of the final offensive on Cassino.
Sometime before the war, I heard a distinguished General lecturing on infantry and tank cooperation. He summed up his discourse by saying that if either or both parties were blighters, then cooperation could never be brought about, but if both chaps were good fellows, cooperation would always exist. This is the fundamental secret, above all else, of successful cooperation.
The Pipe Band had been left behind to finish off engagements to play at hospitals, but when it seemed likely that we might not move for a day or two, I sent for them. They played round the battalion areas the night before we moved.
Ion Goff asked me to have supper with the Irish Rifles the evening after they arrived here as a goose was on the menu. There was a sad story about this. The wretched bird had walked over, full of confidence, to pay a call on some unscrupulous rifleman who had seized and then slain it. Shortly afterwards, some Medium Gunners came round asking if anyone had seen their goose. It wasn’t long before they spotted its corpse. It was an awful moment. The goose had been their regimental mascot since before Alamein and was the pet of everyone. They all doted on it. The generous rifleman prepared to sacrifice their dinner and offered it back. This added insult to injury. The idea of eating their goose seemed sacriligeous to the gunners. It was a real tragedy – but Ion Goff and his warriors enjoyed their dinners.
Shortly before midnight on the 11th of May, the great battle of the Gustav Line began, and we came onto four hours notice to move at 0900hrs the next morning. Ours was the first Brigade Group in the Division to take the field, 11th Brigade were to be second and 36th Brigade third. The Divisional Commander and I visited each battalion in turn on the morning of the 12th and talked to all the troops. He told everyone what our role was to be and explained the battle generally. He then retired out of earshot to give me a chance of saying a few words that I thought members of the Irish Brigade would like to hear before an all out party of this nature. Everyone was in excellent heart and there was a feeling of considerable confidence.
At 5am on the 13th, I was summoned to meet the General and learned that the situation was now such that our breakthrough role might be launched. We were accordingly ordered to move at first light on the 14th to a forward concentration area behind the Rapido (Gari). We set out for our last drive up Speedy Express. We were to tuck ourselves in behind Monte Trocchio. This mountain was a strange tooth of a thing, the last of three high bumps which we passed as we went along the valley. I had seen it captured by the Americans in January. The congestion was something terrific in this area. There were hundreds of guns all over the place, which were brassing off all day long. The Germans, needless to say, were shooting back. The racket of shells passing in both directions was considerable. The fog of war was on.
My old 12th Brigade, now commanded by Algy Heber-Percy, whom we had all known as CO of the 3 Grenadiers in North Africa, was operating in the bridgehead across the Rapido (Gari). Algy had all sorts of ideas about where his warriors really were, and every time he got a report of even one German, he would order up 8 inch Howitzers to shoot this straggler up, and then aeroplanes to go and bomb him. I thought he was doing all this dangerously close to his own chaps but I gather no harm came of it. I did, however, make it clear that once I had crossed the river, I would like him to confine those attentions most rigidly to his own front.
With regard to the use of aircraft at this time, close support bombing was running in a very excellent way. A senior Air Force officer sat on the top of Mount Trocchio overlooking the whole battlefield. He called himself ‘Rover David’. Rover David kept what he called a cab rank. This cab rank was a bunch of fighter bombers that hovered about in the sky waiting for someone to give them a fare. On call, they plunged immediately onto their prey. In this way, bombing was nearly as quick as shelling. If they did not get a call during their tour of hovering, they went off and loosed their load on whatever target they had a fancy for, before going home.
The smoke canisters were doing great business at this time too, and very necessary they were. The bridges we had put across the Rapido (Gari) were all in full view of the Monastery or San Ambroglio, or both. In fact, that smoking had to go on so long as the Germans held the Monastery, which was for several days yet.
I think that the day we spent behind Trocchio was one of the most unpleasant of the whole party. It was not that we had casualties, but there we were, a mass of men and vehicles all in the open, keyed up for we know not what, having great difficulty in getting firm information and with an appalling racket going on all the time. I always find that anticipation is almost the worst part of those things and we had plenty of scope to saviour this to the full. We had expected to get, at any rate, recce parties over the Rapido (Gari) in the early morning, but there had been bridge trouble and they were held up for about a couple of hours. We got their report back by 1000hrs that the tracks were very bad and there was going to be some difficulty in finding areas for transport.
At this stage of the proceedings, the bridgehead varied in depth from 500 to 1500 yards. Our attack was largely planned tactically from defence overprints and air photographs. The Germans had had several months to prepare their positions and they had made a very thorough job of them. Their Gustav Line covered the River Rapido (Gari). The Hitler Line, which was supposed to be the real thing, ran from Aquino to Pontecorvo, some nine miles to the rear, and between the two were a series of defended localities, very thoroughly prepared. If the Germans had had all this time to prepare these positions we had had the same time to photograph their development, and in spite of elaborate attempts to camouflage, these defence overprints proved to be almost infallible.
In the early days in North Africa, we had experienced what it was for the other side to have air superiority. Even the odd vehicle moving by day was in danger of being shot up and German reconnaissance planes were continually over, keeping an eye on us and bombing anything that seemed worthwhile. What would have happened if the Germans had enjoyed any form of air strength at this time, I shudder to think. Those vast concentrations around Mount Trocchio and elsewhere might well have been all smashed up before anything happened at all. As it was, one practically never saw a single reconnaissance plane during the hours of daylight. Our Air Force had achieved absolute mastery. It is well to pause and remember that these battles could never have achieved the results they did if the Air Force had not done such a very fine piece of work in preparation.
The order of batting in the brigade was the Skins, the Irish Rifles and then the Faughs, each with their own squadron of tanks. The first problem was to get the Brigade Group across the Rapido (Gari) to a concentration area in the bridgehead on the other side. The Skins moved across first and were in position by 1300hrs. The situation all morning was still too obscure for the General to make a plan but, by one o’clock, I got some orders. I had kept my ‘O’ Group with me until I could tell them what was happening, and so I held one of my few Orders Groups and put them all in the picture. It was still a slightly blurred picture; but at any rate, we had been given an objective. Bala Bredin, who had remained behind with me, went off to join his battalion after the ‘O’ Group.
Under escort men of the 6 Bn. Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers a batch of about 40 German prisoners captured on the left of Cassino.
Across the Gari.
Throughout the greater part of the forthcoming battles, we seldom operated with more than one battalion at a time and initially the Division was on a one battalion front. The Poles’ attack on the Monastery had unfortunately rather misfired. It had been hoped that by now the Monastery would have been in our hands. This was not so. That wretched pinnacle was frowning down on us with many a German OP concealed within its tumble down walls. It was smoked almost continuously and the valley was shrouded in smoke from smoke canisters. It is, however, difficult to deny total observations from such a dominating spike. The Poles had suffered serious casualties and had practically no reserves. They could only shoot one more bolt, and that bolt must succeed or the whole operation be jeopardised. The final attack on the Monastery could not, therefore, be made by the Poles until the threat to the Germans in the Liri Valley was such, that success would be almost certain.
The country to the west of the Rapdio was a mass of minor features, visibility was seldom more than 500 yards and often considerably less. It was perfect country from the Germans’ point of view. A tributary of the Rapido called the Piopetto ran in from the west just about where we were concentrating. Its bend to the north east just before joining the Rapido entailed our having to bridge it. An indifferent track called ACE Route ran from the Piopetto bridge, along the north of that stream towards Aquino. This was our axis. The main north and south roads from Cassino cut it, one to San Angelo and one to Pignatoro, and a certain number of smaller tracks also cut it. All these, of course, were usually mined.
The General had given us four bounds: ‘Grafton’, which was the Cassino to Pignatoro road, ‘Pytchley’, ‘Fernie’ and ‘Bedale’. Trust a cavalry general to produce names like these. We were to pass quickly through one ‘hunt’ to another. The Skins’ objective was ‘Grafton’, and the 2/4 Hampshires of 4th British Division were on their right. The West Kents were supposed to be somewhere in front of them. There was a gap on their left where 8th Indian Division was still struggling in San Angelo and below it. It seemed quite impossible at this stage of the battle to find out where flank formations really were – even their brigadiers were frequently wrong. This state of affairs made our COs’ job difficult; we knew better what the German dispositions were than those of our friends. The 2/4 Hampshires had been ordered to take Massa Vertechi at 1745hrs.
Bala Bredin had completed his orders by 1700hrs from an OP overlooking the River Piopetto from which he was fortunate in being able to see about 800 yards. There was not enough daylight left and the information on all subjects was so vague that an attack that night was not feasible. The Hampshires’ attack appeared to be successful, but reliable information about it was scanty. In the meanwhile, the remainder of the brigade was concentrating in the bridgehead west of the River Rapido. The Irish Rifles were established by 1530hrs and the Faughs by 2100hrs. Brigade HQ were in a deep Bosche dug out at the junction of ACE Route and the Cassino to San Angelo road. During those operations, only Tac HQ moved forward, and it was kept as small as possible and seldom, if ever, exceeded the size of the Cairo party. Sometimes for a short period, there was just John McClinton and myself. We usually had a tank and the old ‘ark’ that had been pinched from Kendal Chevasse’s boys in Goubellat in Christmas 1942, and very useful this piece of amour was.
I met Ion Goff and Bala Bredin at the Brigade HQ road junction and learnt what there was to know. It was not a very healthy spot with the occasional whizz bang and old machine gun bullets flying about. We were able to button up things for the next day and I gave the Irish Rifles their probable role.
At this juncture, we can take up the story of the Skins in detail, as recorded by them:
“Patrols were sent out after dark to the top of Massa Vertechi and towards Massa de Vendettis to gain information about our own troops and the enemy respectively. A patrol was also sent northwards but after going about 1,000 yards found nothing, except one lost West Kent, and returned. A patrol to the south contacted the Irish Rifles.
(NA 14891) Sherman tanks assemble for an attack during the assault on the Gustav Line at Cassino, 15 May 1944.
The Skins capture Grafton.
Everything was peaceful except for a few mortar bombs, and the battalion was sleeping soundly in a perimeter position guarding our own squadron of the 16/5 Lancers until at about midnight when a message arrived from the brigade to the effect that the highest authorities considered it essential to the success of the operation as a whole, for the battalion to capture the line of ‘Grafton’ by dawn.
This was a bombshell, which caused everyone furiously to think, and produced one of the more morose and sleepy types of ‘O’ Groups at about 0030 hrs. There were several factors to be considered. Firstly patrol information had established that the Hampshires were in possession, but slightly precarious possession, of Massa Vertechi. Secondly, patrols reported the near end of Massa de Vendettis clear of enemy. Thirdly, only a few of the Hampshires’ tanks had got over the river Piopetto, as one had got stuck in the mud on the far side of the existing crossing place and completely blocked the crossing. Fourthly, the moon did not rise until 0130hrs and would not be effective until at least 0200hrs.
However, the original plan was adhered to, commencing at 0300hrs. The chief cause for concern was that the tanks would not be with us at the crucial time, ie at dawn. The sappers were working away at building a new bridge, which would not be ready before dawn. Ronnie Denton and his lads were as indefatigable as usual in bridge building.
At first, things went very quickly and well. By 0400hrs, both leading companies were on Massa de Vendettis without opposition and the other two were passing through. On approaching Massa Tamburrini at about 0445hrs, both leading companies came under machine gun fire and the advance slowed down. At dawn, the two companies found themselves about 70 yards from the enemy positions in the standing corn, with a thick blanket of fog all around and enemy tanks nearby. One enemy tank nearly ran over a platoon commander in the fog. These morning fogs were a feature of the next few days.
Meanwhile, the sappers had succeeded in building a new crossing, the Squadron Commander came up on foot to the forward platoons, while the tanks were guided over the bridge at 0800hrs through the fog and across the marshy fields by battalion guides to just behind the forward companies. All this took time and the forward companies were told to hold on where they were and not to attack further until the tanks arrived. At 0855hrs, the fog lifted and the tanks came through the corn, artillery concentrations came down, and the infantry rose to their feet and joined the tanks as they came through. During the hour or two between dawn and this attack, sharp exchanges of small arms and 2“ mortar fire were taking place around the houses of Tamburrini, while the enemy DF fire was growing in intensity.
By 0930hrs, Tamburrini, amidst much Tommy Gun work and tossing of grenades out of Sherman turrets, had been taken, and dead and live Germans were to be seen in increasing numbers. Three 75mm anti-tank guns were captured, together with several machine guns.
A hasty plan for phase three of the attack was now made, which entailed attacking the high ground at point 86 and consolidating the line of ‘Grafton’.
For five minutes at 1000hrs, the Divisional artillery dwelt on point 86, while two regiments of SPs fired airbursts over the enemy defences south-east of point 86. At the same time, the entire squadron of tanks smothered the observed positions of the enemy with HE and machine gun fire. At 1005hrs, B and C Companies literally charged over the valley with the tanks and established themselves amongst the dug outs and ditches south east of point 86.
A large anti tank minefield was encountered at this stage and several tanks were immobilised and later destroyed by enemy SP anti tank guns firing from the west and north-east. D Company was brought up from Massa de Vendettis and went on through to establish themselves at 1150hrs just across ‘Grafton’ to the north-east of point 86. At 1110hrs, B Company moved onto ‘Grafton’, south-west of point 86, while C Company remained on high ground to the south-east. A Company had, since the early morning, been turning Massa de Vendettis into a strong base position where they were joined by the supporting arms of S Company who experienced some difficulty getting over the marshy ground by the river.
A Company was then moved into reserve, just north of Tamburrini and Bttn HQ moved up to a position approximately 200 yards south-east of point 86.
The battalion reported all objectives captured by 1210hrs, and it is doubtful whether any troops could have taken it by dawn in the circumstances. The battalion, with the squadron of 16/5 Lancers and some very effective artillery support killed approximately twenty Germans, took sixty prisoners, captured five anti tank guns and numerous small arms and knocked out 2 SP guns and 1 Mk IV tank. The tank was knocked out on the left flank down towards the river, while one of the SP guns was knocked out about 400 yards in front of the battalion’s consolidated positions on ‘Grafton’.
Casualties had been comparatively light for an attack, which breached the first real hole in the Gustav Line. They amounted to two officers (Lieut Jackson and Lieut Milner) killed, Lieut Baxter and Lieut Phillips wounded, nine other ranks killed and 57 wounded.
The remainder of that day, 15th May, was spent digging in and hourly expecting counter attacks. The enemy harassing fire gradually grew to a pitch which has seldom been surpassed in the African, Sicilian or Italian campaigns. Artillery, SP, mobile guns, mortars and Nebelwerfers all concentrated their fire on our positions and the valley leading up to point 86. All companies and Bttn HQ suffered casualties that afternoon, though D and B Companies perhaps caught it worst.
By 1600hrs, all supporting weapons were up with the exception of two 6 pounders, supplemented by two 17 pounders of the Divisional Anti Tank Regiment. Our squadron of 16/5 Lancers were rallied back in a little re-entrant by Bttn HQ. They had done magnificently but had lost five tanks and some good men. A counter attack plan was organised with the tanks and the reserve company, A Company.
Several of the carriers, including two company ammunition carrying carriers, stuck in the deep ditches on the way up the valley towards the battalion, but ammunition was replenished.
Wounded were carried about 400 yards from the RAP to a jeep point. Much assistance was obtained from German prisoners, who were put to carrying wounded. During that day and the next, no less than 150 cases were treated by the Bttn MO belonging not only to the battalion but to the London Irish and Northamptons, with a large number belonging to the enemy.
It is of interest to note that there was no sign of the West Kents or of any friendly troops on ‘Grafton’ when the battalion first arrived. There were enemy both north-east along the Cassino road and southward across the River Piopetto. In the evening, friendly pressure from the north-east made itself felt and some Germans were driven southwards into our hands believing that the road still to be open. The village at Kilo 36 on the road to Cassino was still occupied by the enemy until nightfall when they withdrew pursued by mortar fire and fire from the Bttn machine guns”.
Consolidation.
By midday, the Skins had shot their bolt after a magnificent performance. Theirs had perhaps been the most difficult operation to lay on of those that occurred during the next few days. They were still up against the crust of the Gustav Line and information was very hard to come by. Their flanks were exposed. It was a great tribute to leadership on everybody’s part that that battalion carried out their difficult task so successfully.
As soon as the Skins had finished, the Irish Rifles moved forward behind them to concentrate for the second push.
The Divisional role may well again be stressed here. Our job, besides breaking the Gustav Line, was to cut Route Six beyond the Monastery and Cassino and link up with the Poles near Piedimonte, thereby forcing those German garrisons to pull out or surrender. There is no point in getting a bloody nose against places like that if they can be turned.
Aftermath of the ‘O’ Group – artist David Rowlands.
About 3 o’clock, I got a message from Bala Bredin that all was not well. Rollo Baker and I drove off in our tank to find him. Much to our dismay, we found that Ion Goff had been very badly wounded. He died soon afterwards at the MDS. Ion had handled his battalion with tremendous skill and energy during the past few months, and he had imparted much of this and his own personal bravery to all the lads in the battalion.
When I saw him the evening before, he had been full of confidence and cheer over the part he was to play and looking back on it, it was a matter of considerable pleasure to me that I had congratulated him that evening on all he had done and on the fine state that the battalion was in. His loss was a very sad one and it reflects the greatest credit on the London Irish that in spite of losing this trusted leader on the eve of one of the biggest battles they had ever fought, it, in no way, detracted from the magnificent performance they were to put up the next day. I wish Ion had lived long enough to know about it, but I do not think he ever doubted that it would be otherwise.
Shortly after, I met Bala and John Horsfall arrived to take command of the Irish Rifles. I was able to put them both into the picture for the next move. Just about this time, John Loveday, commanding the 16/5 Lancers was also killed, which was a very serious loss both to us and to them. He was a very good chap, who I had known well as GI in 46th Division. It was a most unhealthy valley that we were all waiting in and many discouraging casualties occurred there during the day, but there was nowhere else to go. Not many minutes passed during which something was not landing in among the chaps. Fortunately, they were pretty well dug in.
The Irish Rifles’ assault on Sinagoga.
The Irish Rifles task was to seize ‘Pytchley’. Their task would be a bit healthier than the Skins had been, as 11 Brigade was coming up to attack on their right and the Derbyshire Yeomanry were going to move west to the south of the River Piopetto.
They were the only participants in the brigade so I give you their own account:
“The battalion came under heavy fire on the FUPs. Colonel Goff was killed early on, also the CO of the 16/5 Lancers. Geoffrey Phillips was also severely wounded and, in all, some forty five casualties had been inflicted by nightfall including Ken Lovatt, our signals officer. The Second-in-Command arrived up about 3pm and we fixed zero hour for 730pm. We met the Brigadier, who explained the position very clearly and then we got the latest news from Colonel Bala Bredin of the Inniskillings. The difficulty was getting the battle laid on, doing the necessary recces, briefing and so forth, for the shelling was very heavy indeed. At 630pm, however, the battle was postponed until dawn the next day so that it could be combined with the punch by the Lancashire Fusiliers on our right flank and also so that a decent barrage could be laid on.
We had a very fine team for this battle and the names of the various chiefs should be remembered for they gave us very faithful service. There was Paul Lunn Rockliffe, John Lockwood and Bob Carey of the 17th Field. Angus Dubbs and his merry men of B Squadron 16/5 Lancers, Butters and Budd with their 17 pounders. Shilledy, otherwise known as Shillelagh, of 4.2″ mortar fame and Ronnie Backus and his tanks of the 17th/21st, who towed our anti tank guns into action, not to mention Freddie Cullen and his Vickers guns, who somehow always seemed to find their way to the worst spots.
The night was disturbed and noisy, though some chaps got some sleep. At first light, we held a fresh ‘O’ Group in a German 88 position. Here we were reasonably secure and had a decent view of the first part of the forthcoming battle. The brief plot was to attack astride the road to Sinagoga with H Company in the centre, G to the right and E on the left, each with one troop of tanks. Pioneers followed on the centre line to de-mine the road for the reserve tanks and tank guns etc. One of the difficulties was a minefield across our front on the other side of the Pignatoro road, which was covered by Huns at close range and entailed a preliminary operation. We incidentally had a laid on barrage of several hundred guns to help us and the Lancashire Fusiliers on our right.
The battle began at 9am and the barrage came down with a crash that made coherent thinking difficult for some time. The show started off ok, though G and E Coys very early on were heavily involved and temporarily held up by Huns firing from the cellars of the houses. However, the teamwork was very good. Many Germans were trapped in their dugouts by the barrage and our chaps were among them with bayonets before they realised the barrage had passed on. In other places where our infantry was held up, the positions were blasted to bits by HE from the tanks’ 75s. Many of the German gun crews were caught away from their guns by the barrage and were then unable to man them. Others, when they opened fire on the tanks, were shot down by the infantry. The show never really looked like stopping.
(NA 15048) Original wartime caption: German prisoners coming in through the London Irish positions.
One of the main sources of trouble was the left flank across the river, which was entirely open and throughout the battle we were under consistent and heavy fire from this side by MG 34s, 42s, mortars and tanks. The 16/5 Lancers gave, however, more than they got and registered many direct hits on located points and set fire to several AFVs of various types as well as blowing up two ammunition dumps. Many Bosche were seen to fall running from their positions. H Company, under Desmond Woods, eventually broke into the village of Sinagoga, where a ferocious hand to hand fight developed, which lasted for over an hour with the Bosche defending the buildings with grenades, MGs and Schmeissers. There was also an SP 75 behind the one of the houses, which was sniping our leading tanks. Corporal Barnes and his section led an attack on this AFV. Corporal Barnes, himself, went forward alone covered by his Bren gunner in the face of intense fire and killed one of the crew with a grenade before he was killed himself – a most gallant act.
Shortly after this, the garrison of the village started to surrender and, by noon, the whole of the objective was in our hands. G Company, in the meantime, were having the hell of a battle with a local Hun counter attack in between themselves and the Lancashire Fusiliers – No 2 Troop here bagged a Mark IV at a range of fifty yards. After about an hour, this was cleared up and contact with the latter established. E Company, on the left, meanwhile had pushed on well past the objective and gained a group of houses overlooking the river. This proved to be most valuable in neutralising the counter attack that came in from that side in the afternoon.
From zero hour until dark, the battalion was subjected to very heavy shelling and mortaring that very rarely stopped. During the attack too, the German MG fire was more concentrated than anything I had seen previously. Fortunately, the latter was not as well aimed as in the days of old and our companies were highly skilled in the use of ground. By 2pm, Butters and his 17 pounders had arrived somehow and also Ken Daly and Sergeant Ogilvie, with their three inch mortars, were getting busy in the village, and Paul was stonking everything he could see.
During the afternoon, the counter attack from the south developed with all manner of fire going both ways. On our part, we had two of our support Vickers destroyed with their crews and also one of our 17 pounders had a direct hit killing or wounding all the gun crew. On the other hand, we put down an ‘Uncle’ on the appropriate area and the 16/5 and the mortars, also E Company shot up everything they could see. The attack never really progressed though some Bosche got into the corn between us and the river. The area afterwards was full of burning relics and several vehicles were brewed up, at least one tank was destroyed and an observed German mortar took a direct hit from a 75.
During this time, both H and F Companies were patrolling forward towards ‘Fernie’ and, by dark, had disinfested the area to a depth of six hundred yards in front of us. By this time, the counter attack had also fizzled out; all was under control. Our own casualty list in the attack were five officers and sixty ORs, five of the Anti Tank Troop and eleven from the Support Group. The tanks also had a few minor casualties. Mike Clark, who was killed, was a very sad loss and much loved by his platoon as were Sergeant Mayo and CSM Wakefield. The bag included 120 prisoners of varying species, at least a hundred Bosche were buried on the battlefield that had been slain within the positions. No search for others was made by us. Nine tanks or SPs were counted and there were other probables, also mortars, A/Tk guns, vehicles, ammunition dumps, and small arms galore. Patrolling during the early part of the night was very active and a few more prisoners were pulled in.”
Further consolidation.
Air photographs were of inestimable value during these and subsequent battles. They had marked on them and numbered certain obvious reference points that could be identified on the ground. My aim was to have sufficient copies of these for issue down to company commanders. FOOs, and troop commanders of tanks. These photographs were also held at the gun positions. The rapid calling of fire could thus be done very quickly by anybody who had his photographs handy and, if the photographs were gridded, maps were quite unnecessary. They were invaluable to me in determining objectives and their reference points have a very quick, simple and secure way of passing orders and information over the air.
(NA 15046) Original wartime caption: The Inniskillings passing through the London Irish Rifles positions to their starting line.
We used wireless exclusively during these early days of the advance. Line would have been quite useless with all the shelling and movement of tanks. Our wireless communication was excellent throughout, thanks to Ronnie Laming and his signallers, especially the chaps who manned the sets at Battalion HQs under pretty hair raising conditions. We all got pretty good on the wireless and learned to express ourselves briefly and to the point. I remember on one occasion being asked what the intention of the battalion was tomorrow and making myself quite clear by saying ‘Fart and fly forward”. What the German intercept services thought of our methods, I do not know, but the General told me that we had badly misled our own J services, whose job it was to listen in to forward nets and pass back what was happening to Corps or Army. It seems they never could make head or tail of what we were at and they were most indignant about our air photograph reference system for which they had no clue.
About this time, I insisted that the COs in an infantry-cum-tank battle should exercise command from a tank. When I told John Horsfall he had got to do this, he seemed most dubious about it, but since then has become a complete convert. At first, the commanding officer and squadron leader shared a tank. Later, we found that it was better for the CO and Battery Commander to be together. The advantages of this tank riding was that a CO could get around in some degree of safety and exercise command far more thoroughly than he would ever have been able to do on his feet. It also provided two additional links of communication for the commanding officer during his battle. He was in touch with his adjutant, all the available guns and the tanks.
The Skins did no fighting during this day, the 16th, although there was a good deal of shelling in their area. That evening, owing to the successful operations of the day, the Skins were able to close in and have a good sleep.
The next item on the programme was for the Faughs to capture ‘Fernie’ on the 17th. Up until now, they had fortunately been able to have a reasonably quiet two days and very little shelling in their area. They were able to occupy the comfortable dug out accommodation, constructed with such sweat by the Bosche. I was very glad, in that respect, that the Faughs had moved up on this night as we had a very unpleasant air raid during the night in the area, where they had just left and around the Brigade HQ. Rollo Baker was just outside our dugout when it started and he had got into a slit trench with his driver.
An AP bomb lit on his driver’s kit which was on the lip of the trench and about two yards from where he was. They both had a lucky escape. Collins, my wireless operator, was sitting in the old ark just about in the same place, passing some lengthy sitreps in code at the time. These very unpleasant bombs were falling all round him, but he went on with his message without so much as a falter in his speech. The only casualties we suffered were to the crew of my tanks, who were lying beneath it and got a few splinters.
The Faughs reach Route Six.
The Faughs’ job, as I have said, was to capture ‘Fernie’. At the same time, as this was taking place, the Lothian and Border Horse were to operate on our left flank with their Shermans and strike out on our left front through and well beyond Piumarola.
(NA 15027) Original wartime caption: Tanks in battle positions while Monte Cassino is bombed and shelled.
I give you the Irish Fusiliers’ own account of the next few days:
“At midnight 16th/17th May, we moved up to the FUP behind the Irish Rifles FDLs. Here we met Lt-Colonel JH Coldwell-Horsfall MC, who had just assumed command of the battalion after the unfortunate death of Ion Goff. There was no doubt that he was pleased with his chaps, who had attacked magnificently after a very sticky start.
C and D Companies, Lawrie Franklyn-Vaile and Jimmy Clarke, were to lead beneath the colossal barrage, with B Company, Dicky Richards, and A Company, Jack Phelan from the UDF, in reserve for the next bound. At 0700hrs, the barrage came down and in went the forward companies supported by a squadron of Shermans of 16/5 Lancers.
Poor Lawrie was killed within fifteen minutes of the battle beginning and his loss undoubtedly affected his men, who had learned to adore this commander, and who so completely gave himself to the well being of his men. However, the first objective was taken and consolidated with all supporting arms within two hours, and even the Adjutant moved up, so the rifle companies felt that things must be getting pretty safe by now. A and B Companies then went through at about midday and fought all afternoon until securing key points, which practically dominated Route Six – the sole remaining escape road for the enemy in Cassino.
Jack Phelan had good cause to be thankful whenever he looks at his map case. This, he was carrying between his arm and chest when it was lacerated by a burst of MG 34, which failed to tear his denim and chipped the lens of his field glasses. Or perhaps I should say when he looks at Neville Chance’s map case, because Neville was rightfully the owner of this battle scarred piece of equipment.
D Company followed up behind A Company and eventually consolidated in a group of building whence by night, they sent a patrol under Lieut JV Baker to disrupt the traffic on Route Six. This Jimmy Baker did, with considerable success and our mortars thoroughly enjoyed a night shoot. The Army Commander has since told us that our brigade’s attack through the Gustav Line and up to Route Six undoubtedly hastened the departure of Heydrich’s parachutists in Cassino and the Monastery – some of whom we caught, in any case. One was a lad of eighteen, a stretcher bearer, who was highly delighted at being captured, because up in the hills, the Poles and the parachutists didn’t go out of their way to take PoWs.”
The Irish Rifles support the Skins.
The Irish Rifles also had been involved on our left flank.
Their account of this particular phase is interesting:
“At this stage, the Inniskillings were put into attack south from behind the Faughs to clear up the Piumarola area, which was strongly held and included tanks and paratroopers withdrawn from Cassino. Our task was to come in on the left of the Skins and hold the river line.
(NA 15033) Original wartime caption: Tanks move forward towards the next objective after they 2nd Bn. London Irish Rifles had established themselves in positions on either side of the lateral road.
This battle was well underway by mid afternoon with the Germans plastering the road to Piumarola with an intensity that left memories of 622 quite cold.
The Skins, of course, waded in, in their usual fashion and as we came up on their flank, the only company who met serious opposition was G Company, which was commanded by Peter Grannell since Geoffrey Phillips took it. G Company got involved with some paratroopers and a very large SP but the latter was shot by a tank and after a brisk scrap, G Company took a number of prisoners and established themselves. E and H Companies got in without opposition except shelling.
The latter never stopped in intensity until dusk by which time the Hun artillery was pulling out in front of the Skins, and most of their OPs in the bag. We counted over a hundred prisoners coming back – mainly from 1 Para Division, and there was even a few of our old friends, the Hermann Goering boys. However, it was an unsatisfactory day for us personally, as it was mostly take and not very much give. We got about 15 Huns and an OP and lots of loot but we lost twenty five good chaps.
After dark, E Company landed a small German patrol from the north. The great loss of the day for all of us was Colonel Bala Bredin of the Inniskillings. He was shot through both legs but remained in command until the final assault, propped up on the front of the jeep.”
The Brigade Group and all the people in it had done an outstanding job in breaking through the Gustav Line.
Messages of appreciation had reached us from the Army Commander and Corps Commander, but I would like to produce here the Divisional Commander’s personal message to us and the messages I passed onto the battalions and our supporting arms.
Copy of a personal message from the GOC, 78 Division, Major-General CF Keightley CB OBE to the Brigade Commander, 38 (Irish) Brigade.
In the field – 20th May 1944.
The Commander in Chief, General Alexander, and the Army Commander have both sent their personal congratulations to the Division on its fine achievements during the past few days.
I endorse these congratulations with all my heart.
As the leading brigade of this division over the River Rapido, you set the speed of the advance of the division, and from the high standard you set, we never looked back.
Each of your battalions has had its battle, and in each case, battalion objectives were gained and passed. This is a fine record and reflects the greatest possible credit on every officer and man who went through the battle.
In spite of very heavy mortaring and shelling, those men who failed this great divisional team of ours were few. This is an indication of a high spirit of the battalions and I will see to it that those who run the most risks and still stick it in our battles get the consideration they deserve.
During the past 10 days, this division formed the left pincer in the attack on the Monastery and our successful and rapid advance was largely responsible for its capture.
During this advance we have –
Captured over 400 prisoners.
Killed or wounded over 300 enemy.
Knocked out or captured over 400 enemy tanks or SP guns.
Captured a considerable amount of equipment.
In addition to this, it can only be guessed what effect this advance had on loosening up the French and Polish fronts by necessitating the rapid removal of reserves from their fronts to deal with our threat.
Such actions all help to hasten the end of the war and all who have been through it may justly feel proud of the part they have played whatever that part may have been,
Signed
CF Keightley, Major General, Commander, 78 Division.
Messages of Congratulation.
(NA 15031) Original wartime caption: Men of the 6th Bn. Inniskillings moving up.
Personal Message from Brigadier TPD Scott DSO – Commander, 38 (Irish) Brigade.
In forwarding this message of well earned congratulations from General Keightley, I can only add that everyone has done his job absolutely splendidly – just as I know, they would. The motto ‘It all depends on me’ has been most fully justified by everyone and remains the secret of success.
I cannot too highly of the magnificent spirit and fighting qualities shown by all of you during the first very difficult days of the advance that brought us here.
More is yet to be done, Rome is the main objective, and the Army knows that the Irish Brigade and all the magnificent fighters in its three famous battalions are certain to rise to any occasion.
Nec Aspera Terrent.
Quis Separabit.
Faugh a Ballagh.
Field 21st May 1944.
Signed
TPD Scott, Brigadier, Commander 38 (Irish) Infantry Brigade.
(To Supporting Arms).
With regard to the attached generous message sent to us by General Keightley, I would be most grateful if you will convey to all your officers and men that we attribute a large measure of our success to the magnificent assistance and cooperation, which you gave us throughout the recent battle.
Thank you very much.
Field 21st May 1944.
Signed
TPD Scott, Brigadier, Commander 38 (Irish) Infantry Brigade.