Attack on Sanfatucchio.
On 20th June, I went out on a reconnaissance with John Kerr, John Horsfall and Colonel Bob Purvis, the CO of the Canadian tanks. After I had put everybody in the picture, I had a look around from one or two viewpoints.
This part of the country afforded most excellent OPs from my point of view. One could see the battlefield from several different view angles. The best view was from the Faughs’ castle on the lake, which looked right into the grain of the country. From there, with the aid of air photographs, I had as good a chance of seeing what was happening as I was ever likely to get. The General would have liked to have joined me there, but his communications would not allow the chance.
11 Brigade were having a hard struggle. The Lancashire Fusiliers had done their best to take Sanfatucchio but had been unable to and were having a bad time from mortaring and shelling. The Northants lay on their right, between them and the lake. The whole front was hardening. The 6th Armoured Division was held up on our right in front of Perugia, we were held up, and so were the South Africans and the French. The Huns were making a stand and they seemed to have a lot of men to do it with. They were fighting in a most determined fashion. It was no longer a question of just driving down the road.
The Irish Rifles moved forward to their forward assembly area before dawn on the 21st, with a squadron of Canadian tanks in support. Brigade HQ was at Panicale. At seven o’clock, the Skins moved forward to a concentration area about Macchie. The remainder of the tanks were also in this area. The Faughs concentrated about Panicerola. The stage was set for what proved to be one of the bloodiest battles we had yet taken part in and one of the most successful.
I went to see John Horsfall about 7am, at a brick factory, where he was making his final preparations. From what he had learned from Mackenzie, commanding the Lancashire Fusiliers, it was evident that he was in for a fairly tough day. He was as confident as ever and his plan was the best for a difficult and exposed advance.
Here is his story:
“Our task was to break through at Sanfatucchio and strike as far north as possible. Little did we guess. We thought we were in for another show like the Ripi advance. It turned out to be far worse than the assault on the Gustav Line.
The stage was set on Wednesday 21st June and we set off at 0215. The final orders were given out from the brickworks at La Chiusa, while the battalion debussed about a mile south of Macchie on Highway 71. At the former place, we met Colonel Mackenzie of the Lancashire Fusiliers, who put us in the picture and it was there that we began to realise just what we were in for.
Our fellow conspirators included, besides Douglas and his B Squadron, some of Ronnie Denton’s sappers, a troop of M10 SP guns, Freddie Cullen and his Vickers’ guns, Shillelagh and his mortars and of course, Paul, Allen and Bob Carey with all the artillery within reach. Finally, we had Butters and his 17 pounders of 254 A/Tk Regiment.
The kick off for the battle was most unsatisfactory as all possible lines of advance were overlooked by the Bosche in the town, who had a view rather like looking down on a billiard table. Furthermore, a proper set piece fire plan could not be laid on as the forward troops of the Lancashire Fusiliers were too close to the target areas.
The initial plot was to establish in the rear of the town by outflanking it from the west, and then assaulting the town from the north. This provided the best cover and was also good tank going. Further, there was a detached block of buildings on that side, which we thought would fall easily to a combined attack with tanks thereby providing a means of unhinging the rest of opposition.
Zero was at 0730hrs and, apart from some delicate shooting with one troop ranging with single guns, there was no supporting fire. B Squadron led the ball, while E Company had the task of getting to the town and F Company of seizing the higher ground to the north. Heavy shelling began as soon as the forward movement started and both companies and the tanks ran into concentrated MG fire from many directions as soon as they crossed the railway. The tanks, meanwhile, reached the top of the ridge and there was no immediate trouble from Anti Tank guns to the north and east.
However, by 930hrs, Douglas had got some of his tanks to their objective behind the town and this in the end proved decisive. By 1030, E Company, supported at point blank range by one troop of tanks, blasted their way into the first block of buildings after very bitter fighting at close quarters. Their own casualties were heavy but the majority of the defenders were exterminated. A few wounded prisoners were taken.
In the meantime, F Company were having a frightful battle at very close quarters with Bosche in large numbers in the corn. At the same time, Douglas and his tanks were blasting the town to bits from behind.
Paul, meanwhile, maintained a smoke screen over the centre of the town until he had no smoke left and then all our artillery weight was switched onto the Felice cemetery and Pucciarelli ridge area, which were troubling F Company and Douglas particularly.
Ronnie Boyd and E Company were fighting a very gallant action in Sanfatucchio gradually storming the village house by house with most stubborn resistance by the enemy. Many, who tried to escape, were shot by the tanks. The German OP party in the church tower were eventually killed after a shot by Douglas’ tank had blown out part of the tower and the spiral staircase below them.
By 1pm, resistance in the town collapsed after four hours of violent hand to hand fighting. About fifty dead Bosche were found in the town alone. E and F Companies had suffered heavy casualties. Both were then told to sit tight and hold their gains, while Paul put down ‘Uncles’ on the next objective. H and G Companies, who at this stage had not been committed, were then ordered forward, H to attack the cemetery and G to disinfest the area around the town, which was still crawling with German MGs.
Throughout the whole of the battle, all our support weapons had performed prodigiously. The Vickers’ Platoon was in action in the Sanfatucchio houses within an hour of its capture, while the Mortar Platoon was lining up their weapons in the main street and square. The town itself, of course, was being plastered with everything the Bosche could procure. The 6 Pounder Platoon under Fitzgerald had also rendered remarkable service by driving their portees and guns up the main road to Pucciarelli at zero hour, off limbering at 400 yards under fire from a good many MGs and getting into action over open sights. The effect of this fire was that the Bosche in Pucciarelli were entirely suppressed during the critical opening stages and were able to give no assistance whatsoever to their pals in Sanfatucchio. During this early part of the battle, they fired over four hundred rounds of AP and HE.
H Company began their assault on the cemetery at about 230pm. One of our troops had already penetrated very close to the church there and were blasting away at the defenders and a little later on, our troop of M10s got into action too, though they were mainly engaged in suppressing the Bosche on the flanks. H Company eventually broke in after half an hour hand to hand fighting inside the church itself and within the cemetery. By this time, the 3″ and 4.2″ mortars were in action dealing with the Bosche on the ridge and crossroads and beyond the cemetery. The Germans counter attacked the latter at about 330pm, but many were caught by the 17 Field and the mortars. Even so, a fight with grenades and pistols ranged along the cemetery wall for some time. Webb Bowen even shot one Hun at the range of less than a foot. Unhappily, John Hunter was wounded at about the same time.
By 4pm, the cemetery area was fairly firm and F Company was put in to seize the crossroads north of the cemetery and E Company was ordered to try and get a foothold on the Pucciarelli Ridge. At this stage, all three companies had lost about a third of their strength and our tank losses had been very heavy. In fact, Douglas had only seven left. Happily, Douglas himself was ok.
E Company took the crossroads after two hours fighting in the corn and orchards, where they killed and captured a lot of Bosche. George Dunseath was killed when leading his men in a charge across the corn at several Bosche MGs at very close range. One of the tanks put up a very gallant show here motoring down the road Besa-ing the corn from the flank in front of F Company. Finally, of course, it was hit by an 88.
While this was going on, E Company was assaulting a group of buildings on a ridge having successfully cleared the intervening houses. These, they finally broke into at dusk having then forty men left. Just as it was getting dark, both E and F Companies were counter attacked. Both attacks were broken up by artillery and mortar fire and the tanks near the cemetery also had a very good shoot. Even so, a number of Bosche broke into the buildings held by E Company. After about an hour, these were all killed or captured.”
When they were attacking, I had a very welcome and unsolicited testimonial of their magnificent spirit from 11 Brigade. The Lancashire Fusiliers had telephoned back to say how full of praise they were for the way in which the Irish Rifles had gone in. It is a rare thing for one battalion to praise another in a different brigade and I think this was one of the highest tributes that they could have received, especially coming as it did, from such a fine fighting battalion as the Lancashire Fusiliers.
Pucciarelli Ridge.
In the early afternoon of 21st June, the Skins were directed on Pucciarelli. to the right of the Irish Rifles. They met a fair amount of opposition there during the morning.
I went to see John Horsfall about six o’clock in the evening. I had started off with John McClinton driving my Dingo, but we pulled up fairly quickly on our hocks when we saw what was coming down on the road in front, and changed on to a tank. We found John Horsfall very depressed at not having got on any further but why he should have been, goodness knows why because his battalion had put up a remarkably fine performance. When I had convinced him of this, he became as cheerful as his rather uncomfortable situation allowed. He was in among some wine casks in the bottom of a dilapidated house. An occasional unpleasantness lit on the road outside. One salvo of these knocked out my tank driver and John’s jeep. The situation was well under control now in spite of the intermingling of Bosche shells with our own, and I left him feeling pretty confident.
John Kerr had been in touch with John Horsfall during the morning as we had foreseen the Skins’ probable role already, and he was able to give out his orders for the attack soon after midday. He had A Squadron of Canadian tanks in support. The Skins’ zero hour was originally 3pm, but owing to the counter attack against the Irish Rifles, which required all the available artillery assistance, it was put off until a quarter to five.
There was a good deal of shelling in their areas as they moved off but fortunately most of it fell behind them. The tanks smacked up the houses the Bosche were in or where their presence was suspected in fine style. A certain amount of enemy machine gun fire was causing trouble to the leading companies. The tanks were good at dealing with these. Calls for artillery fire from the leading company were answered well and quickly. Roy Irwin (UDF), commanding A Company, was badly wounded about half past six.
By 8pm, all the troops from the anti-tank battery were sent up to help as only three of their own guns were now in action. The situation was very tricky. The Bosche in some houses, the Skins in others and some between them and the Irish Rifles. John Kerr, driving along in his tank, had a very lucky escape from a Hun, who fired at him with a Schmeisser at short range and cut the strap of his headphones in two. An enemy patrol tried to get into the village at 11pm, but was soon seen off.
About midnight, a jeep containing two signallers and a 19 set, drove through the Skins’ forward position and went on for about a mile into the German lines being held up by a Bosche sentry. The driver immediately went into reverse and they rushed backwards down the road zig sagging to avoid bursts of Schemisser fire. The jeep eventually overturned down a six foot drop. The driver and one signaller got back, the other was probably captured. Lieutenants Horgan and Roach and seven other ranks were unfortunately killed. Eighteen others were wounded. The Bosche lost 60 killed, 12 PoWs and a large number wounded.
We received orders on that afternoon for seven per cent of officers and other ranks to leave on an advance party on the 25th. There could only be one meaning for this – a rest area of some sort. It requires quite an extra effort of guts to go in really hard when you know pulling out is in the offing. That extra effort was not lacking.
At six o’clock the next morning, the Skins were counter attacked by about forty infantry and SP gun supported by the usual artillery and mortars. The SP gun shot into houses doing considerable damage. A house, from which two of our MGs were firing, was badly damaged and set on fire, burying the guns. Some close fighting ensued but the enemy did not get beyond the edge of the village.
The Irish Rifles had been having some patrol activity too.
The biggest scrap took place with Colin Gibbs’ company. A lot of German shells were coming over. Something had to be done about the Bosche still sitting in houses between the Skins and the Irish Rifles. The Irish Rifles described the situation as follows:
“The battle was by no means over as the Germans were in considerable numbers in and around us and between all our companies. They were in particular strong in two big groups of buildings on Pucciarelli Ridge between us and the Skins. While they held that vital bit of ground, not only were we both very insecure but any further forward movement by either battalion was impossible. Accordingly, we resumed the battle here at dawn. We could only spare for the task one platoon of G Company and three tanks under Lieut Sherriff, the whole under John Gartside. There were only about seventy determined Bosche holding the place. The attack started at about 8am with some spectacular shooting by all our mortars and the 17 Field. The tanks crept along the ridge through the olive trees and started to blast the houses.
They worked their way into the gardens and yards and in fact did everything short of climb the stairs. John Gartside then took his chaps in and systematically cleared the area up house by house and room by room. They then repeated the process further on until we linked up with the Skins. Twelve Germans were killed in the buildings, seventeen taken and very many more wounded. A considerable number were shot trying to escape through the corn. We lost one tank from an 88.”
A fairly large scale counter attack started to threaten the Irish Rifles but it never came to anything, as the Bosche were caught in the open by our defensive fire and suffered very heavy casualties. Their stretcher bearers were kept busy for the rest of the day.
The Irish Rifles story continues as follows:
“All the afternoon and evening was a continuous fire fight and, at every locality the Bosche was known to be in was systematically plastered, while he equally systematically shot back. At 6pm, however, the Bosche in front of F Company began to pull out and Colin Gibbs succeeded in oiling is way forward into a very important group of buildings five hundred yards north of the crossroads. Having got there, however, they were attacked by a Bosche company and a close range dog fight developed, which lasted some hours. The 17th Field did a masterly shoot here, which was made very tricky by the close proximity of our own chaps. The 3” also shot with great effect after very careful ranging with smoke.”
Pescia/Ranciano.
The 23rd June was a modified edition of the previous day on both the battalions’ fronts. Repelling counter attacks, winkling Bosche out of houses, keeping up pretty intensive harassing fire with three inch mortars and four point two inch mortars was the order of the day. Bosche prisoners later confirmed that we had done a lot of damage by this.
The intention for the next day was for the Faughs to attack Pescia and Ranciano supported by a squadron of tanks and a barrage. John Kerr and the Skins were to operate on their right and gain ground overlooking the Pescia River, while the Irish Rifles were to cover their left flank by fire. 11 Brigade were operating on the right, along the edge of the lake. The Faughs moved to a forming up point in the Irish Rifles area on the evening of the 23rd and launched their attack at 0530 hours the next morning.
The Adjutant describes it as such:
“B and C Companies led the advance with the objectives, respectively Ranciano and Pescia. It was slow, hard fighting and every piece of ground was contested. The tanks working with us, our old Canadian friends, did grand work in helping the forward companies on to their objectives. They disabled one Mk V Panther and knocked out two Mk IV Specials. Dicky Richards got into Ranciano in the late afternoon, after a suitable fire plan had been devised and put into execution. Neville Chance and C Company were in Pescia by then and it was merely a question of them holding off a couple of local counter attacks. Enemy artillery and mortar fire in this battle was heavy and his nebelwerfers were constantly whining towards us.
The Adjutant’s group had an unfortunate experience, which might have been catastrophic. These ‘warriors of the base’ thought they were well dug in and were getting down to a bit of “well I wonder what’s happening to old B Company now” when there was an almighty crash and a great chunk of masonry took leave from three walls of the house. Jack Phelan, the reserve company commander, confessed afterwards that he thought we “had had it” and that a Tiger was sitting on our doorstep. Jerry Chambers, the Signals Officer, was wounded in the arm, somewhat painfully but, fortunately, not seriously. The Adjutant was sitting in the first room talking to the Brigadier on the 22 set and was very rude and didn’t say so much as ‘Out’ and Fusilier Watson was knocked over by a flying cupboard but was otherwise unhurt. The general move then was downwards from the first floor on which we perched, but Fusiliers Clark and Morris sat on the top floor, while this distant tank put another three rounds of 88mm through the house. Very thick skinned some chaps. This was also the occasion when the CO’s jeep received a direct hit with AP shot, but was not put out of commission”.
The Irish Rifles played their part too and here is their account:
“The next day, 24th June, the Faughs launched their attack through us on Ranciano. F Company were in an awkward spot as their positions were dangerously near the barrage opening line. Zero was at 0530. The barrage was perfect and the Hun DF came down on us fortunately, rather than on the Faughs, who were doing the attack. F Company had seven direct hits and one carrier and portee went up. Fitz’s anti tank guns did splendid work and finally polished off the reminder of the Bosche that had troubled them the last two days, bringing down a lot of the buildings on top of them. 18 prisoners were taken here. In the meanwhile, our tanks were supporting the attack from Pucciarelli Ridge and they shot up everything they could see with Besa and 75.
However, the effect was largely spoilt by the smoke and dust of the barrage; also our positions, being so prominent, drew very heavy open sight fire entailing frequent change of position. However, perhaps it had the advantage of drawing a lot of fire from the Faughs, who by 3pm had taken both Ranciano and Pescia after a hard struggle. Tanks at the cemetery had a very good shoot earlier on killing a captain, a CSM and several others. Meanwhile, Peter Grannell and G Company had moved onto the ridge north of F Company. They distinguished themselves that night as a patrol to the west captured twelve Bosche.”
To help the Skins for their part in this attack, two of their companies were relieved on the previous afternoon by the Northants. A Company of the Skins made good progress from the start, their chief trouble being from machine gun posts, which was effectively dealt with by the tanks. Soon after, seven enemy artillery fire had increased. He was using some heavy stuff. This Skin company was making quicker progress than anybody else on the right or left and so John Kerr used C Company to follow them up and watch their right flank. By 0930, A Company had reached its objective. This company had a pretty foul time and were being shot at by Bosche tanks and artillery but they did a very good day’s work.
The Faughs were to bear the main brunt of the day’s battle. They fought extremely well, meeting considerable opposition and inflicting heavy casualties. Their tanks supported them nobly. All thinks considered they had very few casualties, a total of 40, and no officers killed. In PoW alone, they counted 85.
Two amusing incidents occurred about this time.
A bold Fusilier from the Skins was bringing back a German officer prisoner. This Bosche spoke English quite fluently and was having a conversation with his captor. After a bit, the German enquired where the Skin came from. He told him that he was native of Dublin. This information caused the German a certain amount of surprise, and he asked why, if he came from Dublin, he was fighting at all. The reply was typical ‘Ah, we’re no particular who we fight for’. Not long before a rather similar incident had occurred where the reason the Irish fight was given as ‘Sure, we didn’t want to see the English beat”.
The other amusing incident which occurred happened with the Faughs. The hero of this episode was Fusilier Hobden, a native of Dublin, who was a 38 WT Set operator in C Company. During their attack on the 24th, when things had got rather confused from enemy shelling, dust and the general fog of war, Hobden had been some great work on his own, keeping his company in touch with the tanks. In the course of his activities, he got separated from the rest of his platoon. He looked into the house hoping to find them, but instead of his platoon being there, he was met by seven armed Hun, one of whom, at once, covered him with a pistol. Nothing daunted, he at once brought his 38 Set and aerial to the ‘on guard’ position, threatening his nasty looking bunch. Goodness knows what they thought he had on, but they dropped their weapons and surrendered to a man. One up to Dublin.
Relieved from the Line.
The brigade had now shot its bolt. We were to clamp down where we were and 36 Brigade was to go through.
It had been a very hard battle these few days. It was as hard as the Gustav Line and, what was worse, we were not expecting it.
(NA 16438): This batch of prisoners included ten officers. The officer nearest the camera commanded a battalion of a Grenadier Regiment.
There was also this advance party business. I really think that in spite of all this, the end of our 270 mile advance was marked by as fine a demonstration of leadership and guts as one may expect to see anywhere.
That evening, 36 Brigade crossed the Pescia and our job was now only to give them a firm base until they got on and cover the left flank of the Division.
The next day, 25th June, I went round to see the battalions, and especially James Dunnill to congratulate him on the Faughs’ battle of yesterday. He was out when I got there but, as he was expected within about half an hour, I waited with John Horsfall for his return. When he did not get back by midday, I went back to Brigade HQ, not really thinking very much about it. It takes a long time to visit one’s companies on these occasions. In the evening, John Horsfall rang me up to say he was getting very worried as James was still not back. Patrols had been sent out to try and find a clue. He had gone off to visit his companies in a tank with Duffy Anderson, the battery commander, and Gamble, the acting IO. It was beginning to look as if might have taken a wrong turning and got among the Bosche. Knowing James’ resourcefulness, I decided not to worry about it, unless he was still absent in the morning.
Next day, by dint of questioning local Italians, German prisoners etc, it became pretty clear that they had all been caught in the neighbourhood of Badia. Turning up that road was an easy mistake to make and lots of us have done stupider things and got away with it. He had just been unlucky. The great point was that they all seemed to have been unscathed. We have since had notification that James is a prisoner of war. I hope it will not be for long. He had been with me for so long that his loss, even though he was safe, was a bad blow. He had done magnificently with the Faughs, first of all commanding B Company and later as CO. He was a great loss to them. He was always cheerful, confident, and never ruffled.
There were no Field Officers left in the Faughs at this juncture and all the companies were commanded by South Africans, who had done this brigade great service since they came to us. Brian Clark, the Adjutant, became CO for the time being.
This day, the 25th, was a fairly peaceful one for us, though the Faughs did get a certain amount of shelling in Ranciano. The Irish Rifles swung out to their left to La Villa and held there, with their tanks in support. The 17 pounders remained with the Faughs, but they got no target.
I would like to say a word about Whiskers’ 254 Anti Tank Battery. Throughout the advance from the Gustav Line, they had been continually in action, consolidating gains made and taking over when the tanks pulled back. They were an indefatigable lot, and always in the thick of it. Whiskers and his officers used to make their recces often well before the situation had stabilised so that they would get their guns up the first possible moment. I remember meeting ‘Butters’ one day early on looking a bit dishevelled. He told me he’d just been dug out after being buried by a 210. It didn’t stop him getting his guns into action soon after that.
The roads in this part of the country were not quite so scanty as they had been, and our REs were not quite so pushed. A Field Company is inclined to buy it the whole time. Although Ronnie Denton and his sappers were supposed to work primarily with us, they really got pulled in for everybody else as well, because the amount of RE work was always great. We tried to give Ronnie’s men adequate infantry protection, but sometimes they used to get a bit enthusiastic and one found them plying their trade well ahead of anyone else. ‘Tiger Lil’, their tame bulldozer, was always to the fore. It may have caused the Bosche to pull back on one or two occasions, mistaking it for some new and powerful secret weapon bearing down on them. I remember one day when I was with Ronnie Denton, looking at his work, seeing a large pillar of smoke rising from the top of the hill in front. Knowing we had none of our own side ahead of us, I enquired rather anxiously what it was all about. ‘Oh’, he said. ‘It’s our chaps drumming up.’ As it was a large German cooker they were using, I suppose the Bosche mistook them for their own side. I have yet to meet a Field Company like this one.
The next day, the Irish Rifles extended their left swing to San Biagio and Badia. The forward move by the rest of the Division had been going satisfactorily. The Skins were relieved of their operational role and they came back into reserve. That night, we were able to pull back the Irish Rifles too.