1st Battalion, Princess Louise’s Kensington Regiment – The Final Offensive in Italy.
The commencement of April found the battalion fully deployed over the Corps front in preparation for the attack on the Senio line. On the left of the front, two Heavy Mortar platoons from ‘C’ Support Group, equipped with the new American Mortar, were in position supporting 2nd New Zealand Division. They had been given the task of neutralising known enemy positions in the area west of Cotignola. In the centre, ‘B’ Support Group was deployed with an additional two MMG Platoons from ‘D’ Group under command. Their job was to help positions on the Divisional front on the north bank of the Senio. On the right, two Heavy Mortar platoons of ‘D’ Support Group were to give left flank protection to 8th Indian Division, paying particular attention to the south east corner of the town of Lugo. A coordinated fire plan was worked out for all three Groups and, by 9th April, the stage was completely set for the beginning of the attack. A Battalion Control Point was established by the Commanding Officer in the central sector, actually at ‘B’ Group’s Tac HQ on the morning of the 9th April. Promptly to time, the first gun attack on the Senio position opened up and, thereafter until late at night, every weapon, the Battalion had deployed, was firing almost continuously. The complete fire plan was shot through.
DF fire from the infantry of all three Divisions came tumbling over each other through the telephone wires. It was the Battalion’s pride to be able to say, after the attack, that every call which was received was speedily and effectively answered.
The breaking of the Senio position, being completed, the Battalion joined in the general surge forward towards the Santerno river. Here, 8th Battalion, the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were given the task of enlarging the bridgehead formed by 8th Indian Division over this river. Continuous support was given by ‘C’ Group for this operation and all platoons leapfrogged forward with the infantry until, on the 12th April, a more or less static position was reached, overlooking the bridges on the Sillaro river. From these positions, the first observed mortar fire was put down, previous shoots in this operation, having been predicted.
Following a few days lull, while 56th London Division on our right caught up with 78th Division, the attack on the formidable Argenta bastion developed. 5 Northanptons were directed at the town and were supported by the MMG platoons of ‘B’ Group from positions about 900 yards from the cemetery. A further attack was developed by the 2nd Battalion¸Lancashire Fusiliers in the direction of the Fossa Marina during the evening of the 16th. Here, the Mortar platoons of ‘B’ Group were continuously in action firing DF tasks on areas where the enemy was forming up for a large scale counter attack, the Lancashire Fusiliers afterwards reported that many casualties were inflicted on the enemy by this mortar fire.
The 17th found the infantry still pushing on against bitter resistance, the town of Argenta by now being cleared. Once again, ‘B’ Group MMG platoons were given the job of securing the open flank of the infantry spearhead. A difficult night occupation was carried out by all platoons of ‘C’ Group and, thereafter, the platoons leapfrogged forward with the leading battalions of the Brigade. A surprise counterattack developed from the exposed left flank at Bevignante and the Mortar Platoon. in position there, was able to give valuable assistance to 5th Battalion, Buffs in beating the attack off. The front was now extremely fluid and, until 23 April, all of ‘C’ Group platoons gave effective support to 36 Infantry Brigade in their rapid advance.
The momentum of the attack was now maintained by pressure from 38 (Irish) Brigade and, after a determined stand at Portomaggiore and along the Po di Volano, the enemy had only spasmodic resistance to offer. The whole of ‘D’ Group was continually in support of the Brigade and many first class shoots were carried out. In particular, in the area of Ruina, a column of enemy vehicles was most effectively dealt with by the MMG Platoons. The attack forged steadily ahead and, by 25th April, the flood banks of the river Po had been reached as the Division’s final objective.
Throughout the whole of the operation, all platoons of the Battalion were in continuous action, supporting every Battalion in the Division in turn. Some idea of the weight of fire put down by the Battalion can be gained from the following expenditure figures:
For the period 9th – 26th April 1945.
4.2in Mortar bombs – 12,206 (approx 136 tons of HE).
.303in Mk viii Z – 314,750 rounds.
Operations of ‘A’ Squadron The Queen’s Bay with 1 RIrF over the River Santerno.
This account describes the concentration of ‘A’ Squadron with the 1 RIrF in the Santerno bridgehead on the afternoon of 12th April and their joint advance northwards on the following morning.
On the afternoon of April 12th, the bridgehead over the Santerno in the area of Mondaniga was firm and ‘A’ Squadron was ordered to cross the river in order to exploit the success with 1 RIrF the next day. They were to be on the left of a northward advance by 38 (Irish) Brigade, while ‘B’ Squadron and another Battalion were to be on the right. ‘A’ Squadron arrived in the bridgehead approximately an hour before dark and, when the infantry arrived, formed up with their respective companies.
After dark, a report was received from 38 Brigade that the Germans were withdrawing and 1 RIrF was ordered to follow up during the night. Accordingly, ‘C’ Company on the right and ‘A’ Company on the left began the advance in the early hours of the morning on either side of the road running north from Mondaniga. It was arranged that the two leading troops should start in time to overtake the Companies by first light. The tanks used the road and, as it was getting light, reached the road junction 1,500 yards to the north. Thence, 2 Troop proceeded towards the north west, but 3 Troop took the turning to the right and continued north east.
After another mile, 2 Troop reached the point where the road crosses the Scolo Fossatone. The bridge had been blown and, since the ditch was wide, deep and full of water, there was no hope of tanks crossing until bridging equipment had been brought forward. One platoon of ‘A’ Company was engaging a party of Germans beyond the ditch, but the Troop could do nothing to help them so the Troop Leader advanced north east parallel with the ditch until he approached the next track, a thousand yards ahead. There, he was met by small arms fire from a group of houses by the track. He engaged these and, at the same time, asked on the Squadron net for some infantry to come and clear the houses. This was arranged with the Battalion Commander and, consequently, a platoon of ‘A’ Company arrived and 6 prisoners were captured, but snipers were still firing from the cover afforded by the west bank of the ditch. The Troop Leader burst a shell from his 76 mm gun on top of the bank, which stopped the rifle fire and a patrol, which crossed shortly afterwards, discovered three German dead. It was then 0900 hours and, as ’B’ Company was preparing to pass through ‘A’ and ‘C’ Companies, the Troop Leader walked over to the fresh Company Commander.
After parting from 2 Troop, 3 Troop moved up to a house 1,000 yards to the north, where ‘B’ Company were relieving ‘C’ Company.
At 0930 hours, the Troop Leaders left Company HQ to return to their tanks, having arranged to continue the advance in 15 minutes time. At 0945 hours, the Troop Sergeant of 2 Troop began to move forward along the line of the ditch, with an infantry platoon following about 30 yards behind. They had only gone about a quarter of a mile, however, when they encountered LMG fire from some buildings called Arginello on their right flank. The platoon took cover, while the troop sergeant began to engage and the troop leader, who had been supporting from the last group of houses, came forward alongside the leading tank and shot up Arginello with both small arms fire and HE until several buildings and a haystack had been set alight and a number of Germans had been seen running away. Then the Troop Leader advanced to within 50 yards of Fiume Nuova, lying on the next lateral track northwards. There were signs of movement in the hamlet so the leading tanks sprayed it with MG fire until the platoon came up and cleared the houses. Three prisoners were collected and the inhabitants reported that a further fifty Germans had left only a few minutes beforehand.
In the meantime, 3 Troop on the right supported the infantry up to the line of the same lateral road. By 1130, the infantry were ready to start on the next bound and supported by 2 and 3 Troops worked up the east bank of the Scolo Fossatone.
4 Troop was in reserve at the beginning of the day but, before long, it was ordered to support ‘D’ Company, which was to advance on the west side of the ditch. But before the tanks could cross, an ‘Ark’ bridge had to put in and, for that to happen, considerable work by a bulldozer was necessary.
‘D’ Company, therefore, had to go on ahead alone. It did this at 0930 hours and the time was 1015 before the crossing was completed. Just as the bulldozer was pulling away, it was fired on by a tank or SP gun from the direction of Conselice, which the Germans defended stubbornly for most of the day. The Troop leader appreciated that he could not cross except under cover of smoke, so it was arranged that the 2nd Captain’s 105 mm tank, should build up a screen for 4 Troop. This manoeuvre was accomplished successfully and, once across, the troop leader found himself again under cover of thick vineyards. After a short search, he found the Company Commander, who had encountered no serious difficulties in his absence. Before long, ‘C’ Squadron passed through and began a rapid sweep up the left flank between the ditch and the railway.
By the middle of the afternoon, the day’s advance amounted to some seven thousand yards. This had been achieved with extremely few casualties to the infantry and without the loss of a single tank. Yet, there had been plenty of enemy machine guns, which might have troubled the infantry and bazooka men, who could have hampered the tanks. The successful advance, accompanied by the capture of about 100 prisoners was due to excellent cooperation between infantry and tanks, by which each arm eliminated the potential sources of danger to its partner.
9 Lancers – Advance to the Po, 24th/25th April 1945.
The following is an account of the final action fought by the ‘Kangaroo’ Force, consisting of the 9th Lancers, with under command, the 2nd Battalion, London Irish Rifles, carried in the ‘Kangaroos’ of A Squadron 4th Hussars, B Squadron 4th Hussars and E Battery 11 (HAC) RHA with SP 25 pounders. This force was used as the exploitation force for 78 Division during their advance from the River Santerno, through the Argenta Gap and up to the River Po.
The Plan.
At 1400 hours, 24th April, the ‘Kangaroo Force’, which was concentrated at Fossalta, was ordered to advance through the FDLs of the Infantry, who were held up on the general line of the Canale Naviglio and exploit westwards to Route 16 between Ferrara and the Po.
It was planned to move with two Squadron-Company groups up to start with and, later on when from the map and air photographs it appeared that the ditches allowed, to push up a third Squadron Group.
The Advance.
At 1415 hours, the Regimental Group, which consisted of 156 tracked vehicles and some 50 ‘A’ Echelon soft skinned vehicles moved off from the concentration area and, at 1500 hours, the two leading Squadrons began passing through the Infantry FDLS.
Almost immediately, both Squadrons reported that they were engaged with the enemy and being troubled by snipers, bazookas, Spandau fire and the odd SP gun.
For the first two and a half hours, the advance was extremely slow and Squadrons were only doing one thousand yards an hour. Once more, it was evident that we would have to fight in order to reach the objective. However, from now on, the advance proceeded apace and it was evident that the enemy crust was broken. Both Squadrons reported that they were pushing on fast but there were constant reports of AP shot coming from the front and both flanks. A Squadron, on the right, were picking up prisoners all the time and, once again, feeling embarrassed by the number. They eventually decided to leave one rifleman guarding over 50, including 3 Officers at a farmhouse and some of S Company were despatched to collect them.
B Squadron reported that they were running into more and more AP and then announced that they had knocked out one Mark IV and one SP 75 mm in the Boara area and a patrol from Recce Troop reported that the bridge over the Scolo Conca and Canale Bianco at P del Diavolo were intact. They had great difficulty in getting up to the second one owing to heavy stonking. On this information, B Squadron 4th Hussars and F Company were brought forward: they went past very quickly and got into positions between A and B Squadrons. From now on, we advanced three Squadrons up with RHQ behind B Squadron 9th Lancers and C Squadron and H Company bringing up the rear. There was only now one hour of daylight left and all squadrons reported that they were being engaged by AP shot from all directions – C Squadron, behind, reporting that AP was coming in to them from their right rear. The odd AP shot was also landing in RHQ.
B Squadron’s leading troops had now reached Malborghetto and reported three Mark IVs moving fast down the road northwards, 900 yards away. Shortly afterwards, they reported that two of them were brewing and the third had got away but was hit and had smoke coming out of its tail. The third one was afterwards found holed and abandoned about two hundred yards off the road with two of the crew dead. Sgt Edmunds had scored a right and a left with two shots right through the turrets and Cpl Nicholls had disposed of the third. A magnificent piece of shooting. Several of the crew were dead and Sgt Riley from his Recce Troop Honey had a good Browning shoot at the others bailing out. A Squadron, on the right, now reported that 3rd Troop had brewed two Mark IVs and that AP was coming at them fast and furiously from every direction and they were heavily engaged. B Squadron was also heavily engaged to their front and left front and there were two Mark IVs knocked out. For the last hour of daylight, both A and B Squadrons were very heavily engaged. Both Squadrons were pinned by AP fire and they were constantly reporting knocking out German tanks and SP guns. AP shot was flying in every direction.
Once more, the 9th Lancers were engaged in a major tank versus tank battle. At last light, both Squadrons were still pinned. B Squadron had knocked out seven Mark IVs and two SPs and A Squadron, three Mark IVs and two SPs. A Squadron had one tank holed through the turret, killing the gunner and slightly wounding the Troop Leader.
We were now ordered not to go on to our objectives but to concentrate where we were and be prepared to go off either north east to two crossings over the Po, where there were supposed to be pontoon bridges, possibly still intact, or to go south west to Ferrara and contact 8 Indian Division. Two slightly different roles. The Regiment was therefore ordered to concentrate in and north of Malborghetto. This was an extremely difficult operation for A Squadron and B Squadron to perform. Both squadrons were still pinned. Even though it was now night, there was a full moon and the whole countryside was lit up by burning farmhouses and Mark IV tanks. Any tank movement brought a hail of AP shot and our tanks, when they moved, were silhouetted against the burning farmhouses. However, by moving one tank at a time, all Squadrons managed to get concentrated by midnight and all sounds of battle had died down. At this time, A Squadron captured intact a Mark IV tank in a farm, 200 yards from their concentration area. The engine was still warm and it was doubtless one of the tanks which had been firing at them. Once again, the 9th Lancers group was sitting, surrounded by a ring of fire and destroyed German equipment.
We now got definite orders to proceed to the River Po at Francolino and Borgo, where it was suspected that the German positions were still in operation. It was now after midnight and this was a tall order as the Regiment had already advanced 10,000 yards against heavy opposition since 1500 hours and this entailed a further advance of 5,000 yards, retracing our steps part of the way.
There was no information about the enemy except what we knew ourselves. ie that there were still a considerable number of tanks and SP guns to our north and it was suspected we might meet heavy opposition. We ordered, therefore, a patrol forward to the two objectives with a platoon of infantry leading in each case backed up by a troop of tanks and the rest of the Squadron and Company backing them about 500 yards behind. A careful fire plan was laid on with the Divisional Artillery including Mediums covering the whole of both routes. This could be called on when required. At 0200 hours, A Squadron and C Company advanced north towards Francolino and B Squadron 4th Hussars and F Company north east towards Borgo. This advance proceeded smoothly, but slowly, with the infantry walking the whole way and, by first light, both companies were established on their objectives having met only light opposition on the way and having taken a number of prisoners. There was no sign of any pontoon at either place.
On checking up in the morning, we found the whole area between Ferrara and Francolino littered with German tanks, SP guns and equipment of all sorts. Apparently, 26th Panzers were taken completely by surprise by the arrival of the ‘Kangaroo Force’. They had started to withdraw in front of us and eventually decided to stand and fight but, after losing ten of their tanks by our accurate fire, the remaining crews became so demoralised that they deserved their tanks and vehicles and self destroyed them between 2000 hours and midnight. This was confirmed by the civilians on the spot.
Not since Alamein, have the 9th Lancers so beaten up a German Tank Regiment. Almost the entire tank strength of 26th Panzers must have been destroyed. Ten of their tanks were knocked out by our AP, the remainder became so frightened that the crews of two of them bailed out and gave themselves up and eleven bailed out and destroyed their own tanks.
During the day and night, we had advanced 15,000 yards; destroyed, captured or overrun much equipment.
This amounted to:
10 Mark IV tanks destroyed.
2 Mark IV tanks captured intact.
4 SP guns destroyed.
11 Mark IV tanks (found abandoned and destroyed by the enemy on the southern banks of the River Po at Francolino).
1 SP gun.
2 Large Mortars destroyed.
1 20 mm gun overrun.
230 prisoners taken (including 2 Officers including 1 MO).
10 Royal Hussars – Portomaggiore to the River Po.
On the 20th April, the Squadron moved to a concentration area near Portomaggiore with the rest of the Regiment. At tea time, a warning order came through, “B and C Squadrons get ready to move”. Guides were later sent back and we eventually moved up with them, at about 1830 hours, and just after first light, we arrived at an assembly area, a little south of the Fossa di Porto.
The big picture was roughly this – it had been decided to pass the Irish Brigade through 11 Brigade that evening. A bridgehead was to be established over the San Nicolo Canal during the night and the advance continued on the 21st. It was essential that the Royal Engineers bridge the canal before first light, to get the armour across. The Skins were to be on the right, supported by B Squadron, 10 Royal Hussars and the Faughs on the left. The whole attack was to be supported by a creeping barrage as the line of the Canal had already been found to be strongly held by the German infantry.
Our intention was to have two Troops, each supporting a Company across the Canal in the area, Montesanto; 2nd Troop with B Company on the left, 4th Troop with C Company on the right. The railway line was the boundary between ourselves and the Skins; our left flank would be quite unprotected, as the Indians would not be up. Troops were allotted to Companies, A to 3rd, B to 2nd, C to 4th and D to 1st.
The Faughs were doing well. By 0500 hours, they had, with the aid of the barrage, crossed the canal and had both the leading Companies firm by 0700 hours; they were supported by their respective Troops and the bridgehead was now secure and about 800 yards deep. A number of prisoners had been taken and no immediate counter attack appeared likely but the German defensive fire was devastatingly accurate and persistent. At about 0800 hours, 3rd Troop crossed the canal to join their Company, who were to move out to the extreme left. A little later, 1st Troop and reserve Company moved into Montesanto itself.
The whole area was, unfortunately under observation from each flank , from high church towers in the villages of the district (oddly enough, almost all the towers were of a similar pattern, with higher towers than normal, making most wonderful Observation Posts in this flat rather open country). As a result, it was extremely difficult to move about without a heavy stonk and, of course, a hail of AP – most unpleasant!
During the morning, we improved our positions and deepened the bridgehead a little and were fortunate to lose only one tank which, in a rapid endeavour to avoid AP, reversed into a hollow, where it stuck fast. The enemy certainly can’t have been short of ammunition for they plastered the whole area, liberally and frequently; the village of Montesanto, the crossing and farms south of it receiving the greater part of it on our sector. 1st Troop pushed out 300 yards on the north flank.
At about 1400 hrs, the ‘Kangaroo’ Force (9 Lancers and 2 London Irish Rifles) arrived: they were to go straight through us and the Skins and continue the advance; unfortunately, they were somewhat held up at the canal crossing, which was most uncomfortable for them and us, to say the least. At last, they were over into Montesanto, turned right at the Church, under the railway, through the Skins and off towards Voghenza.
By this time, the area south of the crossing had become an inferno, so Battalion and Squadron Headquarters moved quickly across into Montesanto: not a round was fired at us once we got into the village. Twenty minutes or so after, large numbers of shells of all calibres thundered down on Montesanto, followed by repeated doses every ten minutes for nearly an hour. Almost all the vehicles were hit by flying shrapnel and the air seemed full of dust and rubble – by happy chance, nobody was killed but the Fusiliers had a couple of men wounded. At last light, the whole Squadron moved back to the other side of the Nicolo Canal and leaguered for the night.
In the meantime, the ‘Kangaroo’ Force, well supported by the Royal Air Force had pushed right ahead and, by 0100 hours, had taken their objective (the bridges at Cona and Quartesana) and the 11th Brigade were to pass through and attack Baura and Fossalta on the 22nd.
The following morning (April 22nd), C Squadron moved to a leaguer area north west of Voghenza. It was a rest day of the 10th Royal Hussars and the Irish Brigade but this was rudely interrupted by a ‘Lightning’ shooting up and, indeed, bombing congested traffic approaching Voghenza – luckily, we had all been off the road several hours and thus were merely spectators.
In the evening on the 23rd, we assembled once again at the Battalion HQ of the Faughs, where we met what now seemed old friends and were provided with the customary brew.
Orders – Tamara was reported clear by 56th London Division and so A Squadron and the Skins were to move north through Tamara and on to Saletta and, there, strike west for Ruina. B Company would lead, followed by the 4th and 3rd Troops.
We moved off at 2300 hours and all seemed to be going according to plan except that the Fascine tanks were unable to cross the Po di Volano on account of their width until the leading elements of A Squadron approached Saletta with the Skins to find it quite definitely occupied – hand to hand fighting ensued and, subsequently, two A Squadron tanks were bazooka-ed! We were ordered to get off the road south of Tamara and hold ourselves in readiness to advance when the situation cleared a little at Saletta – we were now feeling quite bazooka conscious.
By 0500 hours, the Skins had sorted out Saletta but it was already obvious that the Germans intended to stand and fight and, at all costs, keep open their escape route across the Po for the time being. At 7 o’clock in the light of day, the advance continued. C Company was ordered to Saletta and 1st Troop (Lieut Elliott) brought up to support it. Just before 0745 hours, 1st Troop reported that there weretwo horses proceeding down the road from Saletta to Tamara, which were captured en route, and put in a stable. One of them, a chestnut mare, later named Gold Bridge, has been with the Regiment ever since and been placed a couple of times in Army Race Meetings in Austria and Northern Italy.
The situation was still rather complex to say the least, a couple of Spandaus still fired from time to time and the ping of rifle bullets, presumably from a sniper, whistled about one’s ears. 1st Troop advanced to the bridge north west of Saletta, the Krauts in this sector seemed to be pulling in their horns and the Troop did considerable execution among their fleeing remnants but C Company were heavily mortared in their move from the bridge, sustaining not a few casualties and were naturally rather put out of their stride.
D Company and 4th Troop (Lieut Harrison) then moved up through fairly thick cover on the road to Ruina. 4th Troop reported that a tracked vehicle could be heard ahead but, apart from intermittent shelling, there didn’t appear to be much opposition so they were ordered to proceed with D Company; this they did, but lost 4 B (Cpl Dellow) a few minutes later, knocked out by a Mark IV Special, the crew bailed out and managed to get back safely. D Company seemed to be able to proceed but, at the same time, definitely reported that they could hear tracked vehicles.
4 A (Sgt Moore) now advanced with them, carefully selecting a different route to that taken by 4 B but, short of the Canale Fossetta, they spotted two men removing the camouflage from a 50 mm Anti Tank gun. The tank Commander ordered his driver to reverse and immediately laid his 17 pounder on the target, which, fortunately, was almost directly in front of him and quickly fired the round he had “up the spout”. Within a few seconds of firing, his own gun was hit on the barrel from a different direction and rendered useless – the 50 mm too had been hit first time and never fired a round. The enemy now commenced to fire everything he had – 4th Troop’s nose was in a hornet’s nest to say the least. Squadron Headquarters’ 105 mms and B Battery put down smoke and a depleted 4th Troop was retrieved. D Company returned, virtually unscathed! 3rd Troop now took the place of 4th Troop.
It was now obvious that the opposition ahead was rather more than a demoralised rabble, if anyone had thought that such would be the case. As the ‘Kangaroo Force’ was shortly to make another advance somewhere out on our left, our duty at the moment was plainly to retain the initiative and keep the Krauts very much occupied in holding their bridgehead.
At Squadron Headquarters, we climbed the Church tower at Saletta from which we got a most wonderful view, at the same time realising what the Germans had been able to see at Montesanto and were still seeing – the countryside to the Po banks and beyond was stretched out before us like a vast carpet! The whole area was continually being subjected to a hail of fire and unpleasantness from both sides. The RAF were particularly aggressive during the afternoon – continually stropping up targets in houses and hedgerows and, on a number of occasions, bombed the area of the Po banks and the main road to Venice and the north on the other side of the river.
By 2030 hours, light was falling and we were able to move the Squadron back to a leaguer in Saletta, where we spent a noisy but, fortunately, uneventful night. During the night, vehicles could be heard moving back and there were a series of explosions, which seemed to indicate that the Germans were pulling out. The Faughs made good progress during the hours of darkness and, by dawn, it was obvious that the Bosche had packed it in and, by 10 o’clock the following morning, we had reached Ruina, finding all their positions abandoned and on to the Po banks without a shot being fired at us. The Faughs routed out the odd prisoner here and there, though the majority of the Germans, who had not managed to withdraw across the Po, had either been caught by the sweep made by the ‘Kangaroo Force’ or made their way in the crossing place near Zocca, where they now found no means of crossing and were subsequently captured.
The whole area was full of destroyed tanks and guns, the river bank and surrounding country was littered with stores, ammunition, guns and other Wehrmacht equipment, much of which was still in working order, though Motor Transport had noticeably been destroyed. There was a Veterinary Hospital, which had been abandoned like the thousands of horses, which we found amongst these miles and miles of wreckage and stores. No wonder, Tedeschi had made such a fight of the last battle with all this equipment at stake. Later that day, we moved to join the rest of the Regiment at Ferrara.
Within two days, we knew that the entire German Army in Italy had surrendered to Field Marshal Alexander and, that for the Eighth Army, at last, the war was over.
48 RTR – Over the Santerno and the advance to Conselice.
The final offensive in Italy was the first time that the 48th Battalion, Royal Tank Regiment had the hour to fight with the 78th Division. The result of the affiliation was the successful advance from the Santerno to the Sillaro and Reno and the bursting of the Argenta Gap. This short account deals with the former as it was the first of a series of infantry – tank advances that were to prove so successful during the next three weeks.
The Battalion had supported 21 Brigade of 8 Indian Division across the Senio and up to the Santerno and was leaguered in the Lugo when orders were received on 11th April that the Battalion was placed in support of 36 Brigade of 78th Division. Lt Col PWD Sturdee, commanding the Battalion, visited 36 Brigade in the afternoon and Squadrons were affiliated as follows: ‘A’ Squadron to 5 Buffs, ‘B’ Squadron to 8 A & SH and ‘C’ Squadron to 6 RWK. Liaison was carried out during the evening and the Battalion officially came under command 78 Division that night.
Early next morning, ‘B’ Squadron moved to 8 A & SH’s location and troops tied up with companies and both ‘B’ Squadron and the rest of the Battalion were, at short notice, to move all day.
At 1345 hours, orders were issued at Argyll’s HQ for operation ‘Archie’. ‘B’ Squadron and 8 A & SH were to cross the Santerno and to attack north west to enlarge the bridgehead already made by 17 Indian Infantry Brigade with 12 Battalion RTR and to allow 38 (Irish) Brigade, with 2 Armoured Brigade, to assemble for their break through to the north. The attack started at 1800 hours. The objective was the S Fossatone and the tanks started on the west side of the river. At 1930 hours, the infantry were on the objective with no casualties and no resistance. A small number of PW were taken and a few enemy killed. Owing to the lack of resistance and the reports of the local civilians that the enemy had pulled back, it was decided to exploit boldly forward and capture Conselice before dawn.
6 Troop with ‘B’ Company, therefore, advanced to Zeppa Nuova about two miles to the west and 8 Troop with ‘B’ Company to Zeppa Superiore, about 300 yards to the north. On arrival here, the Squadron, less 6 Troop, were formed up in order of march – 8 Troop, Squadron HQ, 10 Troop, 7 Troop and ‘R’ Company riding on the tanks. It was now dark but artificial moonlight and the flares of a bombing programme to the north made visibility good. This task force, followed by the reserve companies, on foot advanced with the first objective, San Patrizio. Before starting, the bridge, 300 yards short of the village, was shelled to encourage demolition parties and three wounded Germans were found in the ditch on arrival there. Along the whole, advance small packets of enemy were rounded up ad taken prisoner – the total bag for the night’s work was over seventy.
San Patrizio was reached and cleared before midnight and the infantry dug in. Further orders were then asked for and the force was ordered to seize and hold two bridges to the west of San Patrizio, 7 Troop, with one platoon, went to the northern one and 8 Troop, with a platoon, to the southern one. Both met opposition from parties guarding the bridges but both bridges were intact and were secured by 0130 hours. 7 Troop shout up a bridge demolition party, who tried to sneak up the canal bank and fire the prepared charges. During the night, a Rhinoceros 88 mm SP gun swanned into the village hopelessly lost and out of touch with the situation and was promptly put in the bag – completely equipped and in good running order. The crew was taken prisoner, very surprised and indignant at losing their vehicle.
At 0430 hours, 6 RWK arrived, followed by ‘C’ Squadron and, at first light, they passed through 8 A & SH and ‘B’ Squadron to attack Conselice. By 0630 hours, the infantry were within 500 yards of the outskirts of the town, where they met heavy opposition from enemy in farmhouses. The Squadron Leader decided to make an armoured recce and, at 0715 hours, 2 Troop were ordered to move up the road running north east from San Patrizio as far as the crossroads east of Conselice. They reached C Raffi, 800 yards short of this crossroads by 0825 hours with little opposition. This Troop was then halted to watch the east and north east approaches of the town. At about 1100 hours, the Troop was ordered forward from their position to attack a house 300 yards to the north, which would be taken over by the right company when cleared. The enemy was well entrenched in this house and, during this small engagement, the troop leader’s tank was hit and brewed up, killing the officer and some of the crew. The enemy attempted to salvage the tank but later were prevented by our own artillery and air. The enemy lost two anti tank guns, their crews being killed. The shooting by these tanks was first class as, on later inspection, a 6 pounder shell was found embedded in the muzzle brake of one of the guns. Meanwhile, 1 Troop, in support of the left company, had spent the morning shooting up enemy positions that were giving the infantry trouble. This company and Troop were under very heavy fire and the Troop Leader was wounded early in the afternoon but the Troop Sergeant reorganised the troop and continued to give the infantry support until relieved by 4 Troop. At about 1645 hours, one platoon, occupying a house, was completely surrounded and this troop went to their assistance. The situation was restored by 1730 hours.
During the morning, ‘A’ Squadron had moved up with the 5 Buffs to San Patrizio. Battalion HQ had also moved with 36 Brigade HQ to farmhouses north of Zeppa. The enemy were still not clear from the area east of Conselice and north of Zeppa and ‘A’ Squadron had to send 1 Troop and 2 Troop out with 2 companies from the 5 Buffs to clear the area. As they moved up with the infantry on the tanks, they were cheered by Battalion HQ as they passed, who then felt a bit more comfortable with someone else between them and the enemy. A few PW were taken – 36 Brigade took twenty when they moved into their farmhouse.
The enemy was doggedly holding onto Conselice and a combined attack to clear the town was staged for the night 13/14 April with a troop from ‘C’ Squadron supporting a company of 6 RWK in an attack north-east of the town. The attack went in at 2100 hours and, by 2230 hours, the area of the cemetery at the crossroads had been reached. The company of the RWK, with its troop of tanks, entered the town at 0400 hours.
On the left, ‘B’ Squadron and 8 A & SH had the task of securing the left flank, while ‘A’ Squadron, with the Buffs, attacked north-west of the town. The attack went forward slowly and surely, supported by concentrations from field and medium artillery. Just before midnight, ‘A’ Squadron were on their objective and civilians passed on the information that the Germans had left half an hour before. Several tanks and SP guns had been seen passing towards the west. The town was quickly occupied and, there, the battalion remained for two days before being called upon to take part in the next phase.
Royal Artillery – The Breakout and Follow Through.
The divisional plan for 11 April was to get the Division concentrated by Brigade Groups in the vicinity of Lugo, ready for the break out. The appreciation for the divisional artillery was to get it into action so that its guns would cover the break out, individual regiments being deployed as adjacent to their own brigade ‘wedding area’ as possible.
Arrangements were made for regimental recce parties to meet the BMRA to the south east of Lugo shortly after first light. Movement and recce were restricted by cratered roads and mined areas. Recce parties of 138 found themselves in the area of a local infantry battle in the immediate west of Lugo, where a stubborn party of Bosche were holding out in the cemetery although the general line of contact was on the Santerno some 2.500 yards further west. This was the first of a number of occasions in this phase, when regimental recce parties, in an endeavour to get range in hand, carried out their work within small arms range of enemy rear parties.
An administrative problem, which presented itself at this stage, was ammunition supply. Of the 850 rpg dumped for the Senio assault battle, only some 600 rpg had been fired. The under expenditure was due to the speed of the advance; no repetitions had been called for and the forecasted barrage towards the Santerno on the morning of 10 April, being no longer required, had been cancelled. There were, however, great advantages in starting off a break out battle with ammunition on the ground well forward and it was decided to place on regiments the primary responsibility of collecting their own dumped ammunition and ferrying them forward. The decision entailed much hard work and very long hours by regimental ammunition echelons but the effort enabled the Divisional RASC to build up well forward the next Forward Ammunition Point.
The afternoon and evening of the 11th was spent on planning and re-planning but it was not yet the moment for the Division to go into action. Meanwhile, Main Division and HQRA had moved to, and were established in Lugo. It was not an ideal place as the screening effect of the high buildings made wireless communications difficult and the many street crossings made safe line laying a very slow and laborious business. Further, as was almost to be expected, the town received during the night 11th/12th a certain amount of harassing fire, one 15cm shell bursting in the HQRA officers’ mess at 0345 hours on the 12th. It not only cut all lines between the exchange and the offices, but destroyed a prized NAAFI spirit ration, drawn only the previous afternoon.
Eventually on the afternoon of the 12th, the attack of 78th Division was launched, a two regimental lane barrage, with additional regiments and some medium artillery superimposed, being laid on to carry 36 Brigade through and beyond the Indian bridgehead. This fire plan, simple in form, went anything but smoothly. In the first place, delays in the move of the armour to the assembly area resulted in more than one change in the time of zero and, secondly, faulty information as to the position of the troops of the Indian Infantry Brigade on the left of the one through which 38 Brigade were to pass, led unfortunately to some shells on the extreme left of the barrage falling amongst the right forward troops of the left brigade. However, progress after this sticky start was good.
From the break out onwards, the pace was so hot, the (inevitable) changes in plan so numerous and the closeness of the final decision on top of the time to take action, that paper practically ceased to issue from HQRA telephone lines being correspondingly hotter and the air a good deal fuller. Much that was done in this period stood or fell by the efficiency of the line layout and, as the lines stood up to the strain, nothing failed.
Royal Engineers, 78 Division – The Advance from the Senio to the Po.
March had been a month of preparation. Days were spent in experiment, demolition of floodbanks, use of assault equipment, rapid bridging methods – all presented problems that were studied and re-studied until the questions they posed were answered and the answers proved. Early April saw the tension increase. There were speculations about the weather, about the enemy’s morale, about his intentions. One thing alone was sure, this was to be the last offensive.
78th Division did not take part in the attack that breached the Senio line. Their role was to be the classic one of exploitation.
On April 10th – the day after the attack began, 237 (H) Field Company built a 60 foot Bailey bridge across the Senio. That day and the next, the Division poured across the river into the concentration areas around Lugo. For the sappers, there were craters to be repaired and mines to be lifted. At this time was instituted a custom by which a Sapper officer each day made an air reconnaissance of the ground to be covered by the day’s advance. Extremely valuable information on demolitions and obstacles was obtained in this way and enabled a comprehensive plan to be made for the day’s work.
On the night of 11th April, the Santerno was crossed and 78th Division passed through the bridgehead established by Indian and New Zealander troops. The breakout was made by two brigades – 36 Brigade attacking westwards towards the Torrento Sillaro, while covering the flank of 38 (Irish) Brigade’s main drive north along the line of Fiume Santerno. Good progress was made by the infantry and tanks and the sapper companies supporting them repaired craters and established the brigade axis. The situation was frequently confused. One sergeant from 256 Field Company, removing charges from a captured bridge was justifiably surprised when a bridge was blown up only 50 yards away and far behind the leading troops.
On the 13th April, 214 Field Company – with ‘E’ Assault Squadron of ‘A’ Assault Regiment attached to them – made an ‘Ark’ Crossing of the Scolo Fossatone. Maintenance of roads – for Up traffic, Down traffic and tanks – became as it was to remain – the main problem. Several occasions saw sapper units being shelled, casualties fortunately were light but they included a hit on a bulldozer that wounded two operators and immobilised the machine.
On the 14th, 36 Brigade was on the Sillaro and 38 Brigade was on the Reno, 214 Field Company spanned the partly demolished bridge over the Scolo Conselice with two 50 foot Bailey bridges, after an ‘Ark’ had enabled the leading tanks to cross before it slipped askew. A reconnaissance of the Reno was attempted but was prevented by enemy machine gun fire.
The advance had been so rapid that many minefields were overrun, still with their marking signs on and wire around them. In one case, ‘Flails’ were used to make a track to the river’s edge but this track was not developed.
The following evening, after several other sites had been closed and then cancelled, bridging began alongside the railway bridge and, by afternoon off the 16th, a 110 foot bridge with its long and difficult approaches was opened to traffic.
Meanwhile, the 11 Brigade had crossed the Reno lower down in the 56th Division area and had begun to attack on their left. The reconnaissance flight, these days, looked down on an area that was bounded on the west by the Reno and its swamps, on the east by Lake Comacchio and the marshes that fringed it. Across the narrow strip of land of land between them – some four miles wide – in the ruins of Argenta and along the tank proof Fossa Marina, the enemy had prepared his major line of resistance. By the 17th, against fierce and determined opposition, this line was broken and Argenta was ours. ‘Flail’ tanks had made a gap in the minefields, enabling an ‘Ark’ crossing of the Fossa to be made. The next day, 237 Field Company replaced this ‘Ark’ by a small Bailey bridge.
236 Field Company were also supporting 11 Brigade in their attack. The truck, in which their OC and another officer were travelling, was blown up on a mine but neither were wounded and each insisted on remaining at his post. This company began to open the roads through the much damaged Argenta.
These were hectic days, the situation changed so rapidly that it was seldom possible to plan in advance with any certainty. Plans were formulated, effected and countermanded (Didn’t you know? It’s all been changed). For the sappers particularly, the administration problems raised were vast and never ending. Simple matters, like marrying a bulldozer to its transporter of getting diesel to some mechanical equipment that was far from its parent unit – all such things had to be foreseen and catered for. If, perhaps, these problems fell particularly hard on 281 Field Park Company, there could have been no unit more competent to cope with them.
By the 19th, our troops were meeting strong resistance along the line of the Fossa di Porto. The enemy had committed the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division in a last effort to stabilise a line somewhere, somehow. But by nightfall, infantry were across and still advancing. 214 Field Company bulldozed the crossing of the twin canals – during which operation, the officer in charge was wounded.
In the night, bombs were dropped on the area HQ RE and 281 Field Park Company.
A great amount of work was still being done by the RE to open up roads and keep them operating. On the 20th, 256 Field Company built a 70 foot bridge south of Portomaggiore and the next day – after having been held up by a most insistent pocket of enemy – built a 100 foot bridge in that town. 237 Field Company bulldozed a crossing of the San Nicolo Canal, enabling 38 Brigade to take up the chase. 214 Field Company, supporting 2nd Armoured Brigade, built an 80 foot bridge at Runco after they too had been held up a pocket of enemy near the inter divisional boundary. This company also filled in several craters in Quartesana during the night.
The 22nd saw the Division established on the Po di Volano. A few infantry crossed the river in assault boats and, behind this very slender bridgehead, the sappers began to build a large bridge, which was necessary. Work was begun by 256 Field Company shortly before dawn on the 23rd and the bridge – a 130 foot Double/double Bailey – was completed by 237 Field Company by nightfall. For reasons that must remain forever untold, it was christened “Lucky Diver” bridge. Despite the nearness to the enemy positions, there was relatively little shelling and no casualties.
The next day saw and Indian summer of German resistance as they tried vainly to get their troops back behind the Po. By dawn on the 25th, all resistance had been smashed, the Po reached all along the Divisional front and the area thoroughly swept for the last enemy in hiding. Companies opened the axes and the tank track up to the Po. 256 Field Company constructed a Down route over the Po di Volano, building for this purpose a 120 foot bridge, the central 80 feet being Double/Double with 20 foot at each end Double/Single. As a corollary to the “Lucky Diver“ bridge, this was christened “Happy Mermaid”.
78th Division now passed into 5 Corps reserve.
On the afternoon of the 25th, a company passed beneath the command of each neighbouring Division; 237 Field Company going to 8th Indian and 214 Field Company to 56th Division. Their specific job was to help in the assault crossing of the Po; but since this was unopposed, 214th Field Company found their primary task was road maintenance. Subsequently, both they and 237 Field Company operated rafts across the Po.
256 Field Company, meanwhile, began to collect together all the enemy bridging equipment left by the river side. Later, an improvised bridge – Bailey on German pontoons – was to be built. On the 29th, both 214 and 237 Field Companies returned to the Divisional area and the CRE’s command.
Thus, three weeks after the opening of the offensive, the Division was encamped in an area that was strewn with destroyed enemy tanks, guns and transport. This was a sight to which our troops had looked forward throughout the long winter in the Apennines and the early spring in Romagna; for this were the destruction of the enemy’s force.
This was Victory.