The Last Offensive – The Santerno Bridgehead, By the Commander of 38th (Irish) Infantry Brigade.
On the morning of the 10th, I held a final conference at Brigade Headquarters in Forli to go through the plan that appeared to be the most likely one for us to embark on. The grouping was designed to be appropriate to any variety of the plan that might be dictated by future events. The Brigade Group that we handled during the Santerno bridgehead phase was about the size of an Armoured Division. In addition to our own battalions, our armour included the 2nd Armoured Brigade (less the 10th Hussars), 4th Hussars, B Squadron 51 Royal Tank Regiment (Flails), C Squadron 51 Royal Tank Regiment (Crocodiles), an armoured assault troop RE, a dozen troop RE. The artillery under command was the 17th Field Regiment, 11 RHA, Z Troop 209 Self Propelled Battery, 254 Anti Tank Battery and the support of as much as the remainder of the Divisional artillery as we could use, which included a medium regiment. In addition, of course, we had our own 214 Field Company RE, 152 Field Ambulance and D Support Group.
The object of our operation was to pass through the 8 Indian Division’s bridgehead over the Santerno about Mondaniga, swing north between the west bank of the Santerno and the Scolo Fossatone and capture the bridge over the River Reno near Bastia, an advance of about 12,000 yards, Obviously, this was too deep an attack to carry through with the same units leading as there was no reason to suppose that the Germans would not contest every yard of the way from their well prepared positions. I, therefore, had three elements to undertake this task – a breaking out force, a mobile force to follow through and the reserve force for special roles. This mobile force was entirely mounted on tracked vehicles and should be able to maintain a uniform speed of cross country performance throughout all its units and sub units. The object of the mobile force, under command of Brigadier John Coombe, was to be ready to pass through the breaking out force as soon as that force had either shot its bolt or the going appeared to be favourable for the armour. I hoped to be able to pass this force through as soon as the breaking out force had cleared up to the bottle neck at La Giovecca. We had hoped that the speed of the final advance might bounce the River Reno bridge, which was our objective.
In detail, the group was as follows:
The Break Out Force.
1 RIrF 2 Innisks.
A Squadron Bays. B Squadron Bays.
D Support Group MMG Platoon. C Squadron 51 RTR (Crocodiles).
Reconnaissance Party RE. D Support Group MMG Platoon.
Scissors Brigade. Reconnaissance Party RE.
Bulldozer Troop RE.
Artillery in Immediate Support.
17 Field Regiment RA 11 RHA.
The Mobile Force (Kangaroo Army).
Headquarters 2 Armoured Brigade. Z Troop 209 SP Battery.
9 Lancers. Assault Detachment RE.
4 Hussars (Kangaroo). 2 LIR.
Reserves for Special Roles.
C Squadron Bays. D Support Group Mortar Platoon.
254 Anti Tank Battery. 214 Field Company RE.
SP Troop 254 Anti Tank Battery. 152 Field Ambulance.
Armoured Troop RE.
At 1300 hours on the 10th, we left Forli and concentrated, less the armour, south of Bagnacavallo. Our teeing up was really being done in stages. We had two assembly areas east of the Senio – one for the infantry and one for armour and we had a marrying up area near Lugo on the west of the Senio. It was necessary to assemble fairly near the Senio in order that we might start making use of the bridges as soon as they were ready. If possible, infantry and tanks should never cross an obstacle in the same place and so there was no objective in bringing them together until they had got across the river by their different routes. We got into our assembly area without incident and, in the light of the latest information, I issued verbal orders for the move to the wedding area west of the Senio where the tanks and infantry would join up, to start at 6 o’clock the next morning.
This move was without incident and slowly but surely, we gathered up all the bits and pieces that were to form our force. At 9 o’clock that evening, I head a coordinating conference in Lugo, checked over the plan and the tying up of all the Group and made provisional arrangements for the order of march forward. During this night, 8 Indian Division were to form their bridgehead over the Santerno and to link up with the New Zealand Division, who had already got troops across in some places but whose bridgehead was not yet formed.
One of the characteristics of crossing rivers is the conflicting and often contradictory information that one receives over the state of bridges. One person says a bridge will be ready in two hours, then it is put back to six, then someone else says it was ready half an hour ago. The next thing that happens is that something falls in. We had learned that the only way to overcome this is by direct communication to our own representative at the bridge site. Even that does not overcome the human factor of incorrect estimates of time required to complete a job. The main point was that we were in a good position to get across the Santerno bridge as soon as it was ready. Apart from a few harmless shells that were scattered across Lugo, we suffered no discomforts.
About half past eleven on the 12th, the Santerno bridgehead was beginning to look pretty good and bridges were expected to be ready sometime during the afternoon. The general advance on our northern flank was such that a variation to the original Divisional plan could be made. In the original plan, 36 Brigade were to sweep North along the east of the Santerno while we were on the West. It seemed unlikely that organised resistance East of the river would amount to anything very much and the wise alternative of switching 36 Brigade on to our left and merely using some of the Reconnaissance Regiment on the East of the river was decided upon. 36 Brigade were to strike out in a Westerly direction towards San Patrizio and Conselice and so give us more elbow room to jump off and cover our flank. To be of most value in this role, it was clearly necessary that 36 Brigade should move first and fortunately the lay out in the wedding area permitted this to be done without any difficulty.
They started off about 4 o’clock and were able to begin their attack that evening. We had also hoped to start that evening but congestion on the tracks and bridges and the shelling of our bridge delayed matters so much that we could not manage it. The attack was therefore postponed until dawn and the Faughs were told to maintain contact that night by patrolling. The Indians kept contact on the Skins’ front.
0630 hours on the 13th was the Zero hour for our breaking out force.
36 Brigade, in the meanwhile, had done well and gave us considerable elbow room on our left flank. The Germans must have been a bit foxed when we turned North that morning, as 36 Brigade’s advance would have made them expect the main thrust to be in a Westerly direction.
I left Main Brigade in the wedding area and established a Tactical HQ just East of Mondaniga with John Coombe, Margot Asquith commanding the Bays, Rupert Lecky commanding the 17th Field Regiment and with John McClinton as assistant.
I was very keen for the Faughs to set some elements of infantry and tanks across the Scolo Fossatone to cover the left flank. This was more easily said than done but fortunately, with the assistance of the Assault REs, we got them across. As the advance went Northwards to the bottle neck at La Giovecca, the frontage between the Santerno and the Fossatone narrowed down to less than a thousand yards. I felt it was important that we should be in a rather broader front that this if we were to have room to get the ponderous Kangaroo Army through the Gap.
The nature of the country was true to the form that I have previously described. Although not yet in leaf, the vines and trees restricted visibility to about 100 yards and provided excellent cover for small determined parties on both sides. Especially did it help the Bosche bazooka men. Enemy strongpoints were continually being met but, by the speedy and determined efforts of the tank cum infantry, they were soon deal with.
The strongest resistance was probably met about the line running East and West through San Bernadino. Elements of the 8th Indian Division were advancing on this place from the East but, even so, the Skins had a tough time in this sector. The Bosche were sitting tight in their holes and it took quite a bit of determined work to kill or capture them.
By about midday, both battalions were approaching the La Giovecca bottleneck and the moment seemed ripe to unleash John Coombe and his Kangaroo army.
It was a difficult job getting so many armoured vehicles through this thick country and to pass them through our foremost troops. I had arranged for recognition signals to be fired by verey pistol to indicate our forward positions to the approaching tanks, but even with this aid, they found great difficulty in determining friend from foe. Leading elements of the mobile force were beginning to take on the enemy by about 1330. I include here the London Irish account of this phase of the battle:
“The object of the Kangaroo army was to secure crossings over the Conselice Canal and, if possible, exploit to the River Reno, several thousands of yards ahead.
At first, little resistance was encountered. The Skins and the Faughs had given the enemy a good shaking and he was on the move back. Scattered enemy Bazooka men were met and one tank was lost through the fire of an anti tank gun but a number of prisoners were taken by G Company.
As the Conselice Canal was approached, the rivers opened out and H Company, with C Squadron of the 9th Lancers, came up on the left. Resistance was encountered in the village of La Frascata. This was immediately by passed but, as the leading tanks arrived at the canal, the bridge was blown up immediately in front of them. H Company, who had driven past La Frascata in their Kangaroos, speedily de bussed on the banks of the canal and, covered by the tanks, forced a crossing over the remains of the road and railway bridges, getting into the houses on the far bank so rapidly that few of the defenders managed to escape.
Meanwhile, G Company was clearing the area up to the canal bank on the right and E Company was ordered to clear La Frascata and assist H Company in holding and enlarging the bridgehead. The enemy had been surprised by the speed and weight of the attack. Few of them, not more than ten, had been killed but all three forward companies had taken numbers of prisoners. By 1830 hours, the total was eighty.
The bridgehead was firmly established by 1200 hours and Companies were dug in for the night. Sappers were building a bridge over the canal, the armour was in leaguers and plans for the following day were being made. A large increase in the number of wrist watches possessed by H Company was noticed.
Early on the 14th, before dawn, patrols from E Company were feeling their way up through Lavezzola towards the River Reno. At first light, they were followed by the armour in two columns, one due North along the axis of the main road and the other sweeping round to the right to avoid the minefield that were known to exist in the Lavezzola area. The whole area was heavily mined and the houses booby trapped in the northern half of the village but luckily the German mine warning notices were still in place and not a single casualty was caused to either tanks or infantry. The flails had a great morning exploding mines.
The Reno was reached at 0940 hours, about 30 prisoners having been taken. These included eight taken in the act of laying further mines. Both the road and rail bridges over the river were gone but sufficient rubble still remained to allow foot soldiers to cross dry shod. Reconnaissance was carried out and a plan evolved for two platoons of E Company to cross and form a small bridgehead. This took place at 1230 hours without resistance and under cover of smoke, but while the platoons were advancing North from the river they were heavily counter attacked and most of them over run. No assistance could be given by the tanks owing to the high floodbanks and the absence of a bridge. Positions were now taken up on the next bank and further reconnaissance carried out with a view to making a deliberate crossing.
At this time, 56 Division, who had landed on the southern shores of Lake Comachio were still several thousand yards East of this attempted bridgehead and the enemy was therefore very sensitive to a threat from their southern flank. It was however, decided to hold positions on the southern bank of the river for the night and eventually the battalion was ordered to maintain their static positions for the next two days. A point of special interest which arose at this time was that the 1st Battalion, London Irish on the left flank of 56 Division was, for the first time in this war, sharing a common piece of the front with this battalion and, on the first night, one of their patrols crossed the Reno and contacted G Company.”
On the evening of the 13th, the Skins clamped down about La Giovecca and the Faughs were spread out on the West of the Fassatone watching the flank. Both battalions had fought magnificently during the day and had had a long and anxious period moving up for the battle. We captured two officers and one hundred and fifty seven ORs mainly from 362 Division during the day’s work.
On the 14th, the London Irish were the main participants as already described by them. The Skins had a day off and the Faughs were patrolling out in the West. Brigade Headquarters were established at La Palazzina about half way between the Skins and the London Irish.
Partisans appeared in this area. They proved a mixed blessing. There were two types, those who put on their arm bands and slung their muskets round their shoulders after the Bosche had pulled out and those who did fight genuinely, many of whom had fresh wounds. The second variety were extremely helpful and had detailed maps and drawings showing enemy positions and minefields, which later proved to be very accurate. They all, however, had one big failing, common throughout Italy. Once having allowed them to start taking, nothing would induce them to stop. They held non-stop meetings throughout the day, which were soon referred to as “Partisan O Groups”. These meetings resembled mobile arsenals, for all the men and also the women carried at least four weapons and were festooned with bandoliers, grenades, knives and every sort of “what have you”. Bala Bredin CO of 2 LIR enlisted a platoon of these scoundrels, from which he was expecting great things but I never heard much more about them. As well as the partisans, some odd members of the Cremona Gruppo got mixed up in the proceedings – I suppose they had friends in those parts.
On the 17th, the Faughs sent patrols to clear up the marsh lands up to the Sillaro river. The enemy was holding the far bank in some places and had strong points in houses. That evening, this clearing up job was taken over by 36 Brigade and the Faughs concentrated.
36 Division, in the meanwhile, had come up level with us on the North of the Reno and had passed across our front towards Bastia and Argenta so were able to start bridging operations across the River Reno. It was estimated that the bridge would be ready for our further advance by midday the following day and we were accordingly placed at four hours notice to continue the advance the next morning. Not only had our part of the battle gone according to plan – which is a very rare thing to happen – but the whole of the Army Group was moving according to schedule too.
Everything was looking very promising, but the big battle of the Argenta Gap, on which the whole success of the 5 Corps advance depended, still lay above us. Some regrouping took place at this stage and we lost a good deal of our force. The Bays were to join 11 Brigade and the 9th Lancers were to be with us. The 2nd Armoured Brigade from now on remained directly under Division. The Crocodiles, Flails and Assault REs also left us as all those sort of things would be playing a big part in the dense minefields of the Argenta Gap.
2 Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers – Outflanking Argenta.
On 16 April 1945, 2 Innisks concentrated in La Giovecca. A Brigade ‘O’ Group was held at 1430 hours and plans for the breakthrough at Argenta were made. The plan was for 38 (Irish) Brigade to pass through the Lancashire Fusiliers as soon as they had secured their bridgehead over the Fossa Marina Canal. This obstacle was the largest canal that ran from Argenta in a northeasterly direction across our front. The RIrF were to go first and advance in a NNW direction; 2 Innisks were to follow them and to swing west. Zero hour was to be first light on 17 April. Each Battalion had its Squadron of Tanks (Queen’s Bays) and normal supporting arms. The whole move was designed to outflank the town of Argenta on the east and then cut Route 16 north of it. The plan, if successful, would seal off the town and open a way through the gap.
The CO issued his orders. The Battalion would advance on a two company front, ‘C’ and ‘D’ Companies forward. ‘A’ Company following ‘C’, and ‘B’ Company following ‘D’. Each Company had its own troop of tanks and the leading Companies each had an Artillery FOO.
Due to difficulty experienced by the Lancashire Fusiliers in crossing the Fossa Marine, our advance was postponed until 1200 hours at which time a firm bridgehead across the obstacle had been formed. Our 7 hours in the assembly area had been enlivened by a grandstand view of the MAAF bombing of the town of Argenta only 1,000 yards away on our left front.
Punctually, at 1200 hrs, ‘C’ and ‘D’ Companies moved forward.
‘D’ Company’s first objective was a group of houses on the right flank, which was being held by the enemy as strong points. These houses were taken by 17 Platoon without loss to themselves in spite of considerable MG fire and sniping from the left. Immediately after this, a very heavy mortar ‘stonk’ was put down by the enemy, which completely pinned the remainder of the Company to the ground. ‘D’ Company’s own description of this is given below:
“The Platoon Commander led one section into a ditch, the section crowded and the Section Leader, sensing an approach of a slight panic, climbed out of the ditch with his Caubeen at a rakish angle, lit a cigarette, glared down at his men and, with supreme contempt in his voice, said, ‘You Bloody fool, for Jesus sake, learn how to behave.’ The shells did not seem to worry him at all, nor his men after that.”
In the advance to Route 16, north of San Antonio, a total bag of two Officers and 18 OR were taken prisoner. In some farm buildings just short of Route 16, the enemy had his main force, together with a Tiger Tank. Our guns gave excellent close support but, in spite of scoring several direct hits on the buildings, the Tiger continued to pump round after round into the Company position.
To return to ‘D’ Company’s account:
“The two leading Sections were making great progress and had managed to get within about 100 yards of the house without being spotted. When they were, the enemy fired everything he had at them and the right hand section was completely pinned down and any movement attracted fire. A shell landed right amongst the left hand section wounding every one of them. A smoke screen was put down and the platoon was withdrawn, having suffered 1 killed a 15 wounded.”
From the left rear, the houses in Argenta continued to give trouble and the Company Commander decided to consolidate and set out a patrol to contact 5 Northamptons. The Company consolidated in the area of the railway line. The patrol found the Northamptons in Argenta but without Tanks and they reported enemy Tanks in the town.
‘C’ Company, meanwhile had continued their advance without very much incident. At 1445 hours, however, ‘A’ Company, who were following ‘C’, were subjected to a very heavy concentration of shells from A/Tk and SP Guns.
‘A’ Company’s account of this states:
“Our leading tank was knocked out and, 5 minutes later, the No 2 Tank was set ablaze by A/Tk Gun fire. Things were looking very bad indeed but it never put us off the job we had to do. In simple words, it made us want to get to grips with the Bosche himself. 7 Platoon was moved up the road leading to the level crossing. A Tiger Tank commenced firing AP Shells at the Platoon causing 25 casualties.
‘C’ Company was ordered to attack these Guns from the North West. They were eventually dealt with and the advance continued. ‘C’ Company Commander reported that Route 16 was under observation by his leading troops but they would not get on to the floodbank immediately west of the road because of heavy enemy small arms fire. They had met considerable resistance from Tanks and SP guns and the close of the day’s fighting found two enemy tanks destroyed and two 15 cm SP guns abandoned.
During the night, patrols from both ‘C’ and ‘D’ Companies discovered the enemy were holding the floodbank in great strength, but it was considered by both Company Commanders that a full scale attack under a barrage would carry the objective.
All night long, a vigilant watch was kept by All Ranks: the enemy occupied the houses in Argenta to our left rear as well as being in strength to our immediate front.
At 0600 hours on 18 April, ‘D’ Company again continued their attack. This time, the objective was to cut Route 16. The village of San Aontio was to be cleared by 16 Platoon and the farm buildings, which had given so much trouble the previous day by 18 Platoon. In reserve was 17 Platoon. To return to ‘D’ Company’s narrative:
“The Tanks made straight for the farm firing everything they had, with 18 Platoon followed by 16 Platoon finding it hard to keep up. Nothing happened for the first 200 yards, then the Boche opened up with Spandau fire. Our tanks kept up their fire and kept him pretty well subdued. When 18 Platoon got within 100 yards of the farm, as one man, the whole Platoon swept into the house, taking 12 prisoners. Here 16 Platoon swung left straight for San Antonio. They moved into this village with such speed that the enemy were taken completely by surprise and never had a chance to make any sort of stand. They ran out of the houses and made for the Reno Floodbank. The Company Commander forestalled them in this by sending 18 Platoon straight on and swinging them left across the road to cut them off.”
‘D’ Company had taken three other houses in rapid succession; 66 prisoners, killed 11 of the enemy and knocked our one Tiger Tank. Amongst the prisoners was the Commander of the enemy Battalion responsible for the defence of the area and two other Officers. The Company was now firmly established at a large white house, situated on Route 16 near the Reno floodbank. What was more important, Argenta, was now definitely cut off.
In the early afternoon, the CO decided to attack the floodbank and capture a house 400 yards forward of ‘D’ Company’s FDLs. This attack was to be done by ‘B’ Company.
At 1700 hrs, ‘B’ Company, supported by flamethrowers, attacked the flood bank west of Route 16. The Company carried its objective and it was then discovered that the bank was not the actual Reno floodbank but another artificial bank running parallel with Route 16, whilst the Reno floodbank swung west with the line of the river and was actually 300 yards west of this bank.
The house, which was the Company’s final objective was attacked under cover of the smoke from the flamethrowers and taken at the cost to the enemy of 16 wounded. The flamethrowers were withdrawn and 12 Platoon were left to mop up the area. When the smoke cleared, it became obvious that the enemy were on the Reno floodbank in great strength and 12 Platoon found themselves being heavily attacked by 300 enemy and a Tiger Tank. It later transpired that this force had formed up for a counter attack on Argenta. Overwhelming superiority in numbers plus the difficulty in obtaining adequate artillery support close behind the floodbank, forced this Platoon to withdraw to the bank nearest the road, where they were in a far better position to hit back at the enemy coming across the open ground between the two banks. 11 Platoon hastily went to their assistance, only to find themselves heavily engaged from their right by an enemy Company and two Tanks. 10 Platoon was sent to join the 12 Platoon on the bank, which was to be held at all costs.
The Battle, by this time, had become hectic and as 12 Platoon reached the bank safely a heavy artillery concentration was put down on the enemy force advancing across the open ground, inflicting many casualties. ‘B’ Company had now so many targets to engage that ammunition very soon ran short. !1 Platoon had inflicted so many casualties on their particular enemy force that the Tanks hoisted a Red Cross flag, picked up their casualties and the force withdrew. This left 10 and 12 Platoons resorting to firing off Verey lights and 2” Mortar smoke at the enemy trapped in the artillery barrage falling in front of them. Carriers with ammunition were rushed up and by 2000 hours the enemy had withdrawn.
Meanwhile, an attack by the Commando Brigade from the south west was being planned. Their attack was preceded by a heavy artillery barrage. At 2130 hrs, this barrage commenced. Two troops were firing out of line and their round fell on ‘D’ Company. Repeated requests to the artillery to correct this met with answer that there were far too many guns engaged to locate the offenders and the programme must continue. ‘D’ Company had to “grin and near it”. Fortunately, the casualties were slight. The great thing was, however, that the Commando attack was successful. At 2300 hours, an LO from this Brigade reported to the Battalion Headquarters that the west bank of the Reno was clear of enemy. The Argenta Gap was now fully opened and the armour could pass through.
The Battle of the Argenta Gap proved to be the turning point of the whole campaign. If the Inniskillings had failed to achieve all they did, it might have altered the whole course of the big operation of destroying the German Army south of the Po.
2 London Irish Rifles – ‘Kangaroo Army’.
This is the story of the part played by the 2nd Battalion, London Irish Rifles, in the advance of the 8th Army from the River Po resulting in the destruction of a good part of the German Army in Italy.
During these operations, the Battalion, which was mounted in Armoured Troop Carriers, known as ‘Kangaroos’, of the 4th Hussars, formed with the 9th Lancers a powerful mobile striking force under command of the Second Armoured Brigade.
It all really began on 9th April when, after a long and dusty drive, searching all the concentration area east of the Senio, representatives of the battalion found 9th Lancers at cocktail time and opposite numbers were introduced to one another. During this “get together”, a tremendous barrage could be heard to the west and, at 1900 hrs, the appearance of a thick black cloud of smoke on the horizon showed that the flamethrowers, our own included, were putting a final touch to the softening up process of the Senio defences, before the New Zealand and the 8th Indian Divisions went into assault in this way, our “engagement” to 9th Lancers and 4th Hussars took place.
The “marriage” was performed two days later just north of Lugo in territory cleared by the 8th Indian Division between the Rivers Senio and Santerno. It comprised the superimposing of first, squadrons of the 9th Lancers and then the Kangaroos, on the company areas.
Before proceeding further with this narrative, a word should be said about the organisation within this peculiar private army. Each company, together with its allotment of eight Priest Kangaroos, were stocked with reserve ammunition and 48 hours rations, thus making the force completely independent for a given period, if necessary. In the same way, Battalion HQ was mounted in eight Kangaroos, including two for medical purposes and two for reserve ammunition. At all times, it moved in the closest liaison with Tac HQ and Armoured Regimental HQ. In addition, at various times, the force included an armoured squadron of the 4th Hussars, some ‘Flail’ Shermans for mine clearance, Sherman ARCS, Churchill flame throwing ‘Crocodiles’ and the inevitable and priceless Sherman bull dozers.
The force, which was under command of the armour, comprised in total 100 major tracked vehicles. The difficulties of controlling such a force as this were readily overcome by the means of the excellent wireless communications provided in all armoured vehicles.
To return to our story, early on the 13th April, 2nd Battalion Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers broke out of the 8th Indian Division’s bridgehead over the River Santerno and advanced in a northerly direction. Following up, the Battalion crossed the Santerno to a concentration area in readiness to pass through, Orders to do the latter were received at midday but it was not until 1330 hrs that the leading Squadrons were out in the open with only the enemy in front. It was found that, on all occasions, great difficulty was experienced in getting through the mass of vehicles which accumulated behind our own FDLs.
The line of advance was due northwards through a thousand yards wide corridor hemmed in on the right by the Santerno River and on the left by the Fossatone Canal. The country was typical of that experienced right up to the banks of the Po; perfectly flat, with orchards and farm houses at regular intervals and the occasional small village. The only variety of terrain came from the varying widths of the numerous canals and rivers.
Our advance to the River Reno is written by the account of the Brigade Commander. It was followed by a pause during which the 56th Division on the north bank of the Reno fought westwards towards Bastia.
During this holding period of two days, the only noteworthy occurrence was the posting from us of RSM Girvan MC, who had been with the battalion throughout its fighting existence.
56th Division, having pushed on westwards opposite us, the battalion crossed the bridge, which had been constructed over the River Reno early on the morning of the 17th and once again “married up” with the tanks and Kangaroos, which had gone over the previous evening. The rest of the day was chiefly noteworthy for a remarkable series of conferences, which went on at Brigade HQ to decide the proper moment to unleash the Kangaroo army once again. At this time, the battle for the Argenta Gap was in full swing.
At first light on the 18th, the force moved forward into battle. This was an unforgettable move. Through the orchards north of Argenta, in the narrow gap between lake and canal, moved a mass of armour, all passing over one bridge that had been constructed over the main water obstacle. Wrecked vehicles, equipment and enemy dead strewed the route, whilst machine gun fire from a position in Argenta, already surrounded, cracked away on the left flank.
The usual difficulty was experienced in breaking through our own FDLs but, by 1000 hrs, we were in the open and the tanks were engaging SPs and Mk IVs. A ‘Kangaroo’ was hit by an AP shot and some trouble was experienced from Boccaleone and Consandalo on the left, neither of which had been captured but the weight of armour and Mobile Infantry was beginning to make itself felt and the advance continued with prisoners streaming in.
At about 1700 hrs, the tanks, which had been used to solve the jig saw puzzle of finding a way across the maze of ditches, discovered an intact crossing of the Fosso Benvignante and very soon they and the infantry were over and infesting the area between this and the next obstacle. As it was now late in the evening, this took the enemy completely by surprise and an Officers Mess, a battery of 15 cm guns, a battery of 88 mm guns and numerous smaller AA and A/Tk pieces together with approximately 200 prisoners were overrun. This, all in spite of the enemy’s attempts to hold us by close range firing over open sights. By the light of numerous burning houses and, with a sense of complete victory, the battalion moved to its final area for the night in the vicinity of Palazzo and Coltra, having already three intact bridges over the next canal in its hands.
At 0400 hours the next morning, patrols from G and R Companies went forward two thousand yards in an attempt to capture bridges intact over the Fossa di Porto west of Portmaggiore. All bridges were found blown but positions were established on the near bank and, by first light, they were joined by the never failing armour. At 1100 hours, F Company was ordered to go to the assistance of 56 Recce Regiment in clearing the Germans from Portomaggiore. They rejoined the Battalion late in the evening. During all these major operations, prisoners were continually being taken in groups of ten or fifteen.
It was decided during the morning to make a bridgehead over the Fossa di Porto at 1430 hours. This was done by G Company to a great accompaniment of smoke, HE and the flame throwing ‘Wasps’. Fourteen prisoners were taken. H Company, on the right, followed suit as soon as GCompany’s bridgehead was established and cleared the village of Porto Rotta.
The success of these operations led to the decision that the main Divisional axis was to pass through Porto Rotta and the Battalion was therefore ordered to enlarge its bridgehead in order that a crossing for tanks might be prepared by Sappers. This was done at 2200 hours the same evening and was supported by timed concentrations from the Divisional Artillery. All objectives were taken by 2300 hours. Twenty enemy were captured and one SP Gun was “brewed up” by the concentrations. Our casualties were five wounded.
Under Mortar Fire, the RE bulldozed a crossing over the two canals comprising the Fossa di Porto and, by 0200 hours on the morning of the 20th, 11 Brigade had begun to pass through in a north westerly direction. Not until late the next night was the threat removed from the left flank, thus H Company was not released from guarding this flank until the morning of the 21st.
Early the same morning, the now familiar process of “re-marrying up” with the tanks and ‘Kangaroos’ once again took place and, at 0900 hours, the force moved off over the Fosso Bolognese, picking up H Company on the way. The direction was north-westwards towards a bridgehead which had been established, after heavy fighting by the Skins and Faughs, over the Canal south of Montesanto.
Here, after a short and unpleasant wait in an assembly area where the RMO was wounded by a shell, which burst in a tree above his ‘Kangaroo’, the forces moved through the Inniskillings going due north over very open country to the west of Voghenza. As before, some difficulty was experienced in discovering the exact locations of our own FDLs.
Continual opposition was met from well sited SPs and tanks, often situated behind ground of farm buildings and the companies were called upon several times to de bus and mop up enemy bazooka men and Spandau posts. The RAF, as always, was putting in magnificent work, the “cab ranks” flushing or destroying several SPs and tanks ahead of the leading squadrons.
As evening approached, the resistance stiffened more and more. Fire from enemy tanks increased and F Company dealt with several pockets of enemy troops, some of whom were sited up trees. Some “Uncle” targets were put down by our guns on points of resistance but the force was now rapidly running out of the supporting range of the artillery. A definite feeling that we were out on our own with no friendly troops on either flank became very noticeable. Reports of “lots of Krauts on our right” or “can see Ted transport moving out of range on the left” began to come in.
Light now began to fail. A quick conference was held and it was decided to carry on to the final objectives. These objectives were the bridge at Cona and Quartasena,
A most unorthodox battle followed. By the light of the moon and burning farmhouses, the tanks, escorted by E and F Companies, attacked Quartasena and Cona respectively. Both columns were soon involved in a most chaotic battle in which tracer flew in every direction.
Quartasena, the approaches to which were continually being mortared, contained three enemy tanks and several strong parties of bazooka men and machine gunners. After two of our tanks had been knocked out, the enemy withdrew and escaped in the darkness over the bridge. This bridge, our objective, was captured intact.
In Cona, an even more complex battle developed. The enemy had a 15 cm gun sited 100 yards over the bridge, firing with open sights back onto the bridge and down the village. It was backed up by the usual groups of machine gunners and bazooka men. At the second attempt, F Company rushed the bridge, having been nobly backed up by the tanks, who were having a most uncomfortable time nosing their war round in the dark. A firm bridgehead was captured and H Company were rushed up in their ‘Kangaroos’ to reinforce F Company. By 0100 hours on the 22nd, the situation at both bridges was satisfactory. Almost 60 PW were taken during the operation besides quite a few enemy killed. Several trucks and a 15 cm gun fell into our hands, while an enemy lorry laden with artillery ammunition was hit at short range, while trying to escape by one of our tanks.
By now, the battalion was extremely tired, at least half of it having been on the go for over 72 hours. At 0600 hours on the 22nd, the Lancashire Fusiliers arrived up and relieved us. During the day, we all just slept but, at 1900 hours, orders were received of a possible job as right flank protection to 11 Brigade, who were doing a push that night. This task we were not called upon to perform, much to the relief of everyone. The following day was again celebrated as a day of rest and reorganisation.
At 2000 hours, the battalion was warned to move in its ‘Kangaroos’ to a concentration area on the right flank of a bridgehead that had been established over the Po di Volano near Fossalta. It was thought probable that the rest of the Irish Brigade would need reinforcements in their attack up through Tamara and Saletta.
After waiting in this area until 1100 hours the following morning, the Battalion role was suddenly changed. The 9th Lancers were called up to rejoin us and, at 1330 hours, the private army moved forward in two columns through the rest of the Irish Brigade in a movement designed to sweep the area between the River Po and the numerous canals running east from Ferrara and the Po immediately north of it. We moved forward through a maze of ditches and canals, the leading squadrons, aided it is true by air reports as to where bridges were or were not blown, doing a splendid job of work in finding a way through and, at the same time, keeping a sharp look out for the enemy.
By 1600 hours, opposition started to crop up and both G and E Companies did jobs of clearing enemy rear guards covered by our own tanks. Prisoners were now being taken in large numbers. At 1800 hours, reports came in over the air stating that enemy tanks could be seen in larger numbers than before. Between then and darkness, an exciting action was fought during which 7 Mark IVs were knocked out by the 9th Lancers for the loss of only one of their own. The advance had gone so quickly that S Company carriers started to come under enemy AP fire from the right flank – a most undesirable situation.
As darkness fell, the tank action continued over a wide area, while the Companies, in their conspicuous ‘Kangaroos’, tried their best to keep out of the armoured battle. Every farm for miles seemed to be burning and confusion seemed to reign. A decision to continue the advance by moonlight was again taken but, at 2200 hours, orders were received that the general direction of the advance was to be changed a full hundred degrees. We were now, when just short of our original objective, ordered to make straight for the Po at a point NE of Ferrara, where the Germans were reported to be evacuating their rearguards by pontoons.
A fire plan was laid on and, by 0130 hours, G and F Companies were feeling their way northwards with their respective tanks moving well behind. This complete change of direction during the hours of darkness was accomplished with very little difficulty in spite of the fact that we were still on contact with the enemy. As G and F Companies moved forward, the mass of armoured vehicles, belonging to the combined armoured-infantry HW, leaguered in a field only a mile or so north of Ferrara and waited for the two Company columns to report their progress. They met with only minor opposition and, by dawn, were on the banks of the Po in the midst of an extraordinary collection of abandoned and burning vehicles left behind by the enemy.
They included six more Mark IV tanks and a large number of lorries. Many Germans, who had either left it too late or could not swim, were rounded up.
Thus ended the fourth and longest advance made by the ‘Kangaroo Army’. The force settled down into billets in farms on its final battlefield south of the Po and perhaps its final battlefield of the war. The total bag for the force is shown separately at the end of this narrative.
A very great feature of this series of operations was the cooperation and mutual trust between armour and infantry, a feature without which these successes would not have been possible.
The effect on the enemy of the full weight of this cohesive force thrusting on a narrow front and disgorging infantry rapidly at centres of strong resistance was disastrous every time as the force swung into action. Due appreciation must also be made of the fact that openings and opportunities for the force to be use were made on all four occasions by hard fighting on the part of the remainder of the Irish Brigade.
Bag of the operations carried out by the Kangaroo Army for the period 13th to 25th April 1945:
7 Officers, 2 MOs and 870 ORs were taken prisoner.
Tanks – 12 brewed.
1 captured intact.
6 self brewed.
Armoured Cars – 2 destroyed.
SPs – 1 overrun.
6 destroyed,
1 self destroyed
Guns.
150 mm – 4 overrun.
1 destroyed.
105 mm – 2 overrun.
4 destroyed.
149 mm – 2 overrun.
88 mm – 4 overrun.
7 destroyed.
75 mm A/Tk – 1 destroyed.
20 mm – 2 overrun.
12 destroyed.
Mortars – 2 (large) destroyed.
Miscellaneous.
Half Tracks – 1 overrun.
2 destroyed.
Transport – 29 destroyed and overrun.
Horses – 8 captured.
Alsatians – 2 captured.
Ponies/Traps – 2 Captured.
1 Royal Irish Fusiliers – The Destruction of the Enemy South of the River Po.
At five o’clock on 23rd April, the Battalion commenced moving forward to an assembly area just south of the Bailey Bridge being constructed over the Po di Volano near Fossalta.
Enemy resistance was stiffening and he was increasing his defence of the canal barriers in the path of our advance. It was essential for the Hun to make an all out effort to keep us from cutting his last escape route to the landing stages at Zocca and Ro on the River Po. There was a large number of Huns – the remnants of 76 Panzer Corps – in the pocket east of Ferrara still to get out and cross the Po. This night was to be their last chance.
As the 1st Battalion, London Irish Rifles had managed to get into Tamara, the final objective of the Brigade was the village of Saletta. The Inniskillings were to go first and push due north after capturing the town. The Battalion was ordered to follow the Inniskillings turn north west in Saletta and advance up the road to the village of Ruina, just short of the River Po.
By early morning on the 24th, ‘A’ and ‘B’ Companies were advancing slowly but surely up the road to Ruina. The opposition became stronger and stronger until the enemy finally succeeded in halting the advance of the Companies on the Canale Fossetta, just over two thousand yards from the Po. During this advance, ‘B’ Company demolished a 75 mm A/Tk gun with a PIAT. The main point of resistance was from the main bridge, where the road crossed over the canal. Here, A/Tk guns, SPs, tanks and infantry held up all our attempts to push on or by pass them. These enemy positions were bombed and strafed by aircraft, shelled continuously and subjected to all types of fire during the afternoon, but still the enemy held on, keeping open the escape route to the Po.
During the late afternoon, the London Irish , as part of the Kangaroo Army, advanced away to our left to try and reach Po and cut off the enemy.
Before dawn on the 25th, an all out assault was made on the canal and the bridge was captured intact. After that, it was a swift advance up to our final objectives and ‘C’ Company reached Ruina about 1000 hours. Soon after that, the Companies occupied Borgo Mola and Gesniti on the banks of the Po and immediately commenced searching for all the Huns, who had missed the last boat across the Po. By late evening, over a hundred prisoners had been captured by the Battalion.
A few more prisoners were rounded up the next day but the attention of every man in the Battalion was centred on the flood banks of the Po. Here was to be found a scene of utter devastation and destruction, proving beyond all doubt that a major victory had been achieved in destroying the enemy on the banks and to the south of the Po. Tanks, guns, armoured cars and all makes and types of cars and lorries littered the floodbanks and approaches of the Po. All the men in the Battalion had a marvellous time attempting to make some of these cars go and those that were intact provided endless amusement during the dew days the Battalion stayed in its present positions.
Total victory was now achieved and the Faughs could rest on their Laurels.