Introduction.
The mine strewn beaches of Anzio and Salerno Bay, the mountain winter lines along the icy Sangro and snow Apennines, the “impregnable” Gothic Line, even the formidable Cassino Fortress, itself wee not be compared for one moment with this superbly situated and ingeniously exploited strategic strong point that the Brigade was destined to attack during the month of April 1945.
Such were the impressions we gained from the available reports on the notorious “Gap” at Argenta and, even sitting on the floodbanks of the Senio two weeks before the offensive of 1945 started, it was obvious these impressions were not over exaggerated. The probability that 11 Brigade would have to storm this vital point of the German defences in Italy was taken into account in the pre offensive planning so it was with eager personal interest that we studied maps and photographs of the area. From the maps, it was apparent the position would be ideal for defence, from the air photographs, it looked impossible of penetration. The natural barriers were considerable, the “improvements” carried out by the cunning enemy left one with but a single choice for the direction of attack. To the north and east of Argenta lay the “Bonfica di Argenta”, formerly part of the extensive Valli di Comacchio, which had been drained of water by endless patient toil and with the aid of expensive modern machinery. This area had become prosperous fertile farm land with numerous flourishing steadings controlling vast tracts of first class yielding soil. All this had been destroyed entirely by the enemy with typical Teutonic thoroughness – the dams and dykes were breached, the pumping stations smashed and the entire area re-flooded, leaving only the tops of the houses and the forlorn white streak of Route 16 on its high embankment, visible in all the watery desolation.
Similar measures and similar results existed to the south and west of Argenta town – here, if possible, the position was worse as the swamps and naturally waterlogged ground stretched to within 15 km of Bologna itself and, in addition, the Reno River, with its towering floodbanks, provided an effective tank proof obstacle for any attack originating from the west.
The gap between these two watery barriers consisted of a narrow funnel of dry land averaging 2 ½ miles in width throughout its length of 5 miles, based on the town of Argenta, itself. Inside this restricted area, the enemy had carefully built up his long planned defences to perfection. It was proved, during subsequent operations, that work on these defences had commenced as long before as the summer of 1943 and no pains had been spared to ensure that the soldiers defending the area would be provided with every possible chance of success. Each ditch and canal had been dug out on the southern side and methodically fortified with strongly revetted positions, numerous OP and HQ sites had been recced and earmarked, every culvert ad bridge was prepared for demolition, even booby traps were laid in position and sealed off. But most fantastic of all were the minefields – indeed, the whole gap was one single solid minefield – never before had we encountered such a concentrated piece of mining – in shape, the main field was triangular, with its apex at Bastia and stretching east for a distance of more than 3 miles. The mines here had been laid in peace conditions and the ground had since lain fallow – much to the annoyance of the surrounding Italian farmers. The mined areas were now completely overgrown and it was quite impossible to pick out the dangerous places. Before the offensive, however, a great stroke of luck, resulted in information being obtained from partisans as to the exact situation of the safe paths through this field, which contributed enormously to the success of the battles to come.
To the north lay further scattered fields between the Reno and the water to the east as far as the Fossa Marina – a 12 foot wide waterway running diagonally across the northern end of the gap and constituting the most continuous natural obstacle in the bottleneck.
So much for the Argenta Gap itself – now what was the reason for all the special attention in this particular part of the Italian countryside? Surely, if necessary, the main direction of attack from the south could completely by pass Argenta to the west, further up the Po Valley, therefore, why was there this need for special preparation?
The answer was this – the most important factor at stake during the battles south of the Po was to cut off and capture as many of the enemy as possible before they could cross the river Po and escape to the north. If Argenta was not attacked and the main drive put into the west, it would have to be so much farther west as to allow the enemy unrestricted access to first class Po crossings such as Pontelagoscuro, north of Ferrara, and others equally as good to the east. The enemy would probably be able to ferry over sufficient troops to organise resistance further north perhaps along the shortened line of the Adige and so delay our further progress more than was desired. Argenta had to be forced by attackers to get at the Ferrara Po crossings quickly and accordingly the enemy appreciated that a firm stand here was absolutely essential to allow the 10th and 14th Armies access to some of their main escape routes to the north. The proviso was that sufficient troops must be made available immediately after the opening of a Po offensive to man the Argenta defences. It was here that the enemy made his big mistake, in leaving too late the commitment of his reserve forces to the area – which enabled the Gap to be broken and the river crossings secured with consequent chaotic results for 76 Panzer Corps in particular – but all of this was not accomplished without a hard and bloody struggle.
Crossing the Reno and moving up to the mouth of the Gap.
At 0330 hours on the 15th April, the new Bailey bridge over the river Reno was proclaimed in working order. The Brigade crossed with the Surreys in the lead. At 1100 hours, just as the Surreys were ready to pass through 167 Brigade of 56 Division, the first counter-order arrived. 11 Brigade was to switch its axis to pass through 169 Brigade to the north. So it was not until dark that the Surreys moved up through the 2/7 Queens into the mouth of the Argenta Gap. Acting simultaneously with the Surreys, the Northamptons, to the west, passed through the left flanking positions of the Queens and were soon moving parallel between the Reno and the railway.
During the 16th, two tenacious strongholds on the Northampton’s front (in the area of Celetta) were summarily dealt with in a perfect example of infantry-aircraft cooperation. Fighter bombers were called in to help and six very bomb happy survivors of their attention were eloquent witnesses of the severely accurate bombing and strafing that resulted. Fifty PW were taken that day. Four or five were from the crack 29 Panzer Grenadier Division: the information they gave was of the highest significance. Their division had recently moved in a great hurry out of the battles north east of Bologna across the Po and had been directed to the Adige river defences farther north. Apparently, a last minute change in plans had resulted in a switch round of the Grenadier battalions to the south with orders to stem the flood at Argenta at all costs. The tanks of the Division were mainly left north of the Po, but the motorised infantry troops (some of the finest the Wehrmacht had produced) were now being recommitted, almost too late, opposite 11 Brigade. This step was a sure indication that the enemy were, at last realising their mistake and appreciating, fully, the significance of our drive through the gap – this was proof positive the battle to come would be a hard and bloody one, with no quarter asked for, or given.
By last light on the 16th, the stiffening of the front was obvious. The Northamptons on the left were right up to Argenta cemetery on the southern outskirts of the town with patrols probing forward to test the enemy defences – which were proved to be especially strong at the station and surrounding building. On the right, the Surreys were beginning to outflank the town from the north and were moving up to Fossa Marina, the 12 foot high tranverse tank proof obstacle, which the enemy had chosen for his all out stand.
This was the last and most difficult natural obstacle in the Gap itself, nearly everywhere, we were now through the worst mined areas and, if our advance was not stopped here, it would be the beginning of the end for the enemy. At dusk, forward movement was temporarily halted, as the Brigade Commander made his plan for the attack over the Fossa Marina. That this attack would have to be carried out by fresh troops on a battalion scale was a foregone conclusion and the Lancashire Fusiliers, until then in Brigade reserve, were quickly moved up and concentrated just behind the leading companies of the Surreys from, which position, they would be favourably situated to spring off and penetrate the Marina line.
The attack over the Fossa Marina and the final stages.
The line of the canal was held by II and III battalions of 71 Panzer Grenadier Regiment of 29th Panzer Grenadier Division – two of the hardest fighting then at the disposal of the German Commander in Italy. For support, they had approximately twenty to thirty self propelled and tank destroyer equipments and the usual artillery and mortar sub units from Regiment and Divisional resources. To attack them was the single infantry battalion of the Lancashire Fusiliers, backed up by the supporting arms already enumerated. 2100 hours was set as ‘H’ Hour and, exactly on the dot, the barrage opened with a soul shattering roar that seemed to shake the very atmosphere itself and lit up the flat surrounding farmland as if it were day. The vital consequences of the barrage were only discovered after the battle, when it was proved that the enemy had been surprised in the middle of a relief and many troops, who were moving up to the trenches, were caught in the open without cover and, as a result, suffered disastrous casualties, which affected subsequent operations.
As the barrage opened, the Surreys’ leading companies moved nearer to the canal banks and, from their firmly established bases, the Lancashire Fusiliers sprang forward at the main defence. Within twenty minutes, the Fusiliers were engaged in fierce hand to hand fighting with the fanatically resisting enemy – the fury of the struggle continued unabated for nearly forty minutes. By 2200 hours, however, it became evident that the terrific vigour of the attack was beginning to take effect and, shortly after, the news came through that one infantry company was across complete and in the process of beating off a series of hastily organised counter attacks. A second company forced its way over the waterway within another hour and soon the familiar signs of disintegration among the enemy ranks began to show themselves. Over forty PW had been taken and more coming in every minute – hundreds of dead were counted on the far banks and floating in the blood soaked waters of the canal itself.
Three of the Bays tanks had, by this time, also succeeded in crossing the canal by means of superhuman efforts on the part of an ‘Ark’ tank and the supporting Royal Engineers, who had established a serviceable bridge immediately behind the first infantry company to cross the canal, approximately 2 km north east of Argenta town.
The bridgehead won by midnight then was two companies strong and in depth measured nearly three hundred yards constituting a menacing salient right into the crust of the enemy fortress. Three strong counter attacks had been successfully beaten off and not an inch ceded to the enemy. At this stage, however, the bridgehead troops were pinned to the ground by an accurate and devastating counter barrage, which the enemy kept up for the remainder of that night. The Battalion Commander, Lt Col MC Pulford MC had, unfortunately, been wounded in the initial stages of the attack and Major JAH Saunders 2.i.c. took over for the rest of the battle – fighting the battalion with great courage and skill, which later won for him the award of the DSO.
When dawn broke, the fatal breach in the enemy line was still there and the road lay open for fresh troops to get at the vital inner defences. The enemy’s flanks, too, were beginning to show signs of wavering and, taking advantage of this, the Surreys quickly moved up a company on the left of the Lancashire Fusiliers to occupy the north eastern outskirts of Argenta itself.
The town, however, was still held strongly by part of III/71 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, as was proved by patrols from the Northamptons, which had attempted to infiltrate during the night.
But the main doors had been forced open and, that morning, the Irish Fusiliers and Inniskillings were passed through. At 1700 hours on the 17th, the Northamptons began the unenviable task of clearing up the enemy pockets in Argenta itself and, three hours later, were in full occupation. They found that their worst problem was the disposal of the numerous civilian dead, who lay piled in gruesome masses, mute testimony to the previous artillery and air bombardment and which had reduced the town to heaps of shattered rubble.
Trapped between the Northamptons in Argenta and the Inniskillings in the north, the Germans put in a counter attack, on the left forward company of the Northamptons. The attack was broken up by sustained fire from our infantry and gunners and the remnants of the attacking forces were taken prisoner. The much vaunted defences of the Gap had been irreparably smashed and the numerically superior enemy so knocked about that the remainder of that regiment of 29th Division was never again able to fight as an effective unit.
2 Lancashire Fusiliers – Night advance through il Quartiere.
By April 18th, Argenta had been cleared and the enemy was on the run. By their crossing of the Fossa Marina, 2 LF had played a large part in clearing a way for the armoured striking force and the Battalion now hoped to have a day or two’s rest. Companies had concentrated on the 18th, and mobile baths were arranged for the following day. However, late in the afternoon, orders were received to be ready to move at midnight. The Battalion was to move from the Argenta area, to Stazione di Consandolo with the proviso, “If you can’t there, get as near to it as you can “. 2nd Armoured Brigade and LIR were driving for the intact bridges across the Fossa di Porto, west of Portomaggiore; if the bridges were secured, the Battalion was to reinforce was to reinforce the LIR, if not, the Battalion was to remain under command 11 Brigade.
An advance party was sent ahead, under Major K Hill MC, to arrange a concentration area in the new location. The Battalion left Argenta at midnight, no longer a Battalion, but a Battalion group. Apart from the TCVs, there were the Bttn HQ vehicles, S Company, a Platoon of Kensington MMGs, a Platoon of their 4.2” Mortars and a troop of M10. Information regarding the roads was slight and, all that was known was that an armoured formation had covered the area. It was a strange journey, with fires blazing along the route and the sound of battle to the left rear, between Argenta and Consandolo on Route 16. Eventually, possibilities of flanking moves were explored. Only way round was found and this was blocked by a 3 tonner, which had collapsed through a bridge. The CO went to see OC, 2nd Armoured Brigade and instructed to have the Battalion ready for action by dawn. As it was impossible to reach the original location, another area was found where it was possible to get off the road. Breakfast was immediately prepared and consumed by dawn.
At first light, it was possible to recce a new route to the original concentration area at Consandolo St and the Battalion arrived there at 0600 hours. After a hasty night move, a battle was to be expected soon but it did not take place. All day, the Battalion remained on the alert and the CO was called to 11 Brigade HQ, to whose command, the Battalion had reverted. Several tentative plans were made: at one time, the Battalion was to cross the Fossa di Porto, at another it was to go through Portomaggiore. The day was perhaps the most exasperating, of many exasperating occasions. A sudden move in the night was followed by a seemingly endless period of waiting. In the late afternoon, the CO received orders to pass through a small bridgehead formed by the LIR across the Fossa di Porto. The Battalion was then to advance westwards along the bank, turning north along the road through il Quartiere and finally westwards again to the bridge over the Canale San Nicolo. The canal was to be crossed and the advance continued. No enemy worth mentioning were expected – possibly the odd chap. Such statements had been made before, in the history of the Battalion.
The CO, IO and OCs of D and B Companies went down to the river to visit the LIR forward Company, to obtain a view of the country over which the Battalion was to advance at night. Meanwhile, the 2.i.c. had recced an assembly area for the Battalion at Ripapersico. The CO’s plan was as follows: D, B, A, C Companies were to advance in this order with the axis as previously described. The advance was not to commence until a bridge had been completed across the Fossa di Porto, fit for all types of traffic. The estimated time for the completion of the bridge was midnight but, in fact, it turned out to be somewhat later.
The Battalion moved to the assembly area at dusk on the 19th, with squadron of tanks that had joined it in the morning. Owing to the lack of time, the O Group was held in the assembly area. The only light was found in the room occupied by the REs and they were somewhat disconcerted by the influx of people. By midnight, the Battalion was read to move ad waited only for the signal from Brigade to cross the bridge. A bridge had been made by bulldozing in the banks of the river, which is divided into two separate branches. During the bulldozing, the area attracted considerable harassing fire and there was some anxiety lest enemy activity should impede the crossing. The Companies crossed without difficulty, but some congestion was caused by the transport. Until the bridgehead could be expanded by the leading Companies, there was little room for the transport and tanks, which accompanied the Battalion and which were not likely to be needed before dawn. 1 Surreys were following immediately behind the Battalion and hence it was necessary for the Battalion to get clear of the bridge area as soon as possible.
At approximately 0100 hours, OC D Company, Major P Henshall MC, went forward to liaise with the LIR Company Commander on the far bank of the canal. He was informed on arrival that the enemy appeared still to be holding il Quartiere in some strength. On the strength of this information, a preliminary shoot was put down on il Quartiere and also on the canal bank along which the Company was destined to advance before reaching the village. About 2330 hours, D Company, the leading Company reached the first objective just south of the village. During this short advance, already 20 PWs had been taken and it, thus, seemed as if the way was not to be so clear of enemy as the Battalion had been informed. The tanks were unable to follow the Company up to this point owing to the presence of a ditch 10 feet wide and 6 feet deep, which had to be bulldozed in.
As the operation consisted of an advance guard and not an attack on a definite objective, a pre arranged barrage had not been included in the plan. The route of the advance was, however, covered by a series of stonks in depth, available on call. Once inside il Quartiere, the leading Company found the scene extremely grim. At first sight, the place appeared completely deserted but the Platoon, moving up on the side of the road soon discerned flitting shadows retiring from house to house. A heavy volley of fire broke out from all sides but it would seem that the enemy were in no fit state to stand and fight, his sole concern was to escape as swiftly and as soundlessly as possible.
Shortly before dawn, D Company had secured and cleared the area of the village, il Quartiere. As B Company passed through to continue the advance, a stonk of considerable intensity, unfortunately, descended in the Company areas. Some 500 shells fell and a number of casualties were caused, including an Officer, who was killed. A Company was temporarily disorganised and remained in Il Quartiere as reserve. Progress was maintained until the area of the road junction was reached north of the village.
The Squadron of tanks in support had crossed the obstacle at dawn and had been supporting the advance from il Quartiere. The road junction was obviously an enemy stronghold and all approaches were well covered by MG fire. Whilst fire from SP guns was discouraging activity on the part of our tanks. One enemy SP, or tank, nipped round the bend in the road and hit one of our leading tanks, making good its retreat before fire was returned by the tanks.
Several attacks by B Company were repelled during the morning and any approach to the road junction produced an intense volume of MG fire. Finally, B Company succeeded in outflanking the road junction and seized some buildings on the road to the west. With these buildings firmly held, it was possible to sweep down to the road junction. In this operation, the Bttn HQ of 98 Fusiliers Battalion and most of its staff was captured. Some 25 PWs were taken, including an Officer. The CO, however, was able to escape on foot.
To secure the left flank, C Company had been sent out to the flank from il Quartiere and had reached the line of the canal. Information was received that two Battalions of 38 Brigade were passing through in the night, along the original axis of the Battalion. 5 Northanptons were advancing along the axis of the railway line. To facilitate their advance, the Battalion was ordered to clear the area between the road junction north of il Quartiere and the road and rail crossing. This task was accomplished by D Company, with the assistance of a barrage, arranged by 322 Battery Commander, Major R Horne. The Battalions of 36 Brigade passed through at midnight and the operation of the Battalion was momentarily ended.
Casualties from enemy sources were not heavy but the stonk, which fell on the forward Company, inflicted a number of fatal and non fatal casualties. Two officers were killed and two other Officers were wounded on other occasions.
This advance by the Battalion had been particularly tricky. A number of factors had contributed to make the operation difficult. In the first place, the familiar sequence of night moves, followed by a day of alerted inactivity, and its consequent loss of sleep, had got on everybody’s nerves. Secondly, the time for the CO to formulate his plans had been far too short, so that final orders for the advance had to be issued in the Assembly Area. This lack of time was also a heavy burden on the artillery, as it gave them little time to work out their plans in detail. Thirdly, the change from Battalion to Battalion Group, greatly increased the responsibility of the CO and his staff. The anti tank and the support group platoons were under command of the Battalion and this widened the scope of any plan the CO had to make. Fourthly, only negligible opposition was forecast and this did not turn out to be the case. Fifthly, owing to the nature of the operation, an advance guard, as opposed to a set attack, less planning could be done before the operation commenced and more had to be left to planning as the operation developed.
1 East Surreys – The battle for, and leading up to, Lungurella.
The battle for, and leading up to, Lungarella started for the 1st Battalion, The East Surrey Regiment,when they had left Consandolo in TCVs for a forward concentration area near Ripapersico, arriving there about 2245 hours on 19th April 1945.
The Brigade plan for this action was for the 2 Lancashire Fusiliers, followed by the 1st East Surreys, to pass through the bridgehead over the Fossa di Porta, 2 LF were to strike westwards and the East Surreys northwards through Runco to Lungurella.
The present state of enemy opposition was stated to be light and disorganised. This report, however, proved to be quite groundless as will be seen from the bitter fighting, which took place before the Battalion succeeded in entering Lungurella a little over two days later.
At 0245 hours on the 20th April, the Battalion left their concentration area by march route but, due to the difficulties encountered by the 2 LF, were two hours late in crossing the Fossa di Porto. The order of march was A Company, followed by B and D Companies, with C Company in reserve. When dawn broke, Tac HQ and C Company were established over the canal but the rifle companies found themselves a little to the north and feeling extremely naked.
That morning was memorable for B Company, for shortly after first light, having taken up a position round a cluster of farm buildings about 100 yards in the rear of A Company, a heavy mortar bomb exploded on the roof of the barn, where breakfast was being served. Fortunately, most of the Company had already eaten their breakfast and there was only one casualty.
The Battalion was unable to continue its advance as 2 LF were encountering stiff resistance from the area il Quartiere in the form of sniper and MG fire.
Lt Col HMA Hunter MBE, who was commanding the Battalion, then formulated the plan of attacking in a northerly direction, thereby by passing the resistance to the east.
C Company was to secure a bridgehead over the railway running north west from Portomaggiore and D Company was to move up from the right and secure the road junction on the Runco – Portomaggiore road. This attack was to be preceded by the ‘Wasps’ in attacking a group of houses, just to the north of the start line, where it was suspected that there might be an enemy strongpoint.
At 1015 hours, the ‘Wasps’ reported their objective cleared and, immediately afterwards, C and D Companies commenced their advance. C Company, under the command of Major EH Giles MC, moving forward in open formation, secured their bridgehead and were soon joined by D Company. During the advance, both Companies were being continually harassed by snipers and AP shells that were being directed at the supporting tanks, but no casualties were inflicted.
Whilst exploiting forward from the bridgehead, 13 Platoon was ordered to attack a house on the right of the Company’s axis of advance from which heavy fire was coming. 14 Platoon were working round to a position to give them covering fire when all three Bren gunners were killed and Sgt Charlton seriously wounded. However, he led 14 Platoon on to a position from which they could support 13 Platoon and objective was captured.
Throughout the morning, the Battalion continued its advance with D Company right and C Company left but soon the position became very confused owing to the fact that Company Commanders were unable to say exactly where they were, due to the regular pattern of the ground, which was very flat with continual drainage ditches running at regular intervals across the axis of advance. From the banks of these drainage ditches, the enemy were harassing our troops with both sniper and Spandau fire. The position, during the afternoon, became even more confused with the conflicting reports as to the positions of the forward troops.
At about 1500 hours, C Company was forced to cede some of the ground it had gained during the morning, due to a heavy enemy DF that was brought down in the area of their leading troops and, as they were withdrawing to take cover in a ditch some fifty yards to their rear, were enfiladed by small arms fire, which inflicted several casualties. They were then counter attacked under cover of the enemy barrage and were again forced back to the ditch immediately to their rear.
It was during this counter attack that Lieut JF Louis, the platoon commander with the longest record of service with the Battalion having joined the Battalion in North Africa in December 1942, was killed by a burst of Spandau Fire. Lieut Louis was unfortunately not the only casualty and L/Cpl Morrish found that he was the only NCO present that still survived. He immediately assumed command of the platoon, although himself wounded and. rallying the platoon. led a counter attack, which completely caught the enemy unawares and enabled the company to continue their advance and capture Gobbia, their objective.
D Company was experiencing similar trouble for they found themselves pinned down in a ditch by ever increasing small arms fire. The leading Platoon Commanders, Lieut JWC Ledger of 17 Platoon and Lieut FGM Keiger of 18 Platoon, being unable to contact their Company HQ, as the 38 Set had been put out of action, decided in conjunction with the tank commander, that it was still possible to gain their final objective by covering the tanks forward in bounds. However, the leading tank got bogged in spite of using a Fascine and, whilst the other tank attempted to tow the first one out, both were bazooka-ed and set on fire, forcing their crews to abandon their tanks and join the infantry in the ditch.
Then, a heavy enemy stonk came down in the area – forcing both platoons to retire. At this stage, Major CP Genillard MC, who commanded the company, arrived on the scene, having crawled forward along under intense small arms fire. He proceeded to make a plan whereby 17 Platoon was to return to the position it had just vacated and support 18 Platoon on to the final objective. Here, 17 Platoon came up against some unexpected trouble, for it was found that a party of some ten to twenty Bosche had crept forward under cover of the stonk and were occupying the ditch, which 17 Platoon had just left. Major CP Genillard MC was then forced to withdraw 17 and 18 Platoons to the east to join 16 Platoon. This was accomplished under cover of smoke.
The casualties suffered by C and D Companies during the afternoon were – C Company, Lieut JF Louis and four ORs killed and nine wounded and D Company three ORs killed and one wounded.
During the day, C and D Companies had taken sixty five prisoners, quite apart from the many that have been killed. They were a strangely assorted collection, including many new identifications from 155 Division – a training and garrison division – never before committed in battle and only recently brought south of the Po to bolster up the morale of the seriously mauled Panzer Grenadiers. One prisoner was even dressed in civilian clothes, explaining himself by saying that he had been hiding for five days and was too frightened to attempt to escape in uniform.
At 2030 hours, A and B Companies relieved D and C Companies. By 2130 hours, they had attacked and captured Gobbietta and some farm buildings two to three hundred yards east of it.
Shortly before dawn, No 10 Platoon, commanded by Lieut LAS Harbourne MC, was ordered forward to seize a canal crossing north of the railway. The platoon, which was accompanied by Captain Booth, FOO of 132 Field Regiment RA, succeeded in occupying a farmhouse some eight hundred yards south of the canal but was unable to proceed any further. Later in the day, after the platoon had moved on, the roof of the house collapsed, killing some gunners, who had only recently moved in.
No 16 Platoon, D Company, with one tank in support had in the meanwhile gone through on the right flank and had, by 0500 hours on the 21st, without incident, advanced through Runco to within 150 yards of the canal running south of Lungurella. By 0700 hours, 16 Platoon was joined by the rest of the Company. It was obvious that the enemy had not expected such a rapid advance for, on the approach of daylight, a number of enemy could be seen furiously digging in on the opposite bank of the canal. Quick advantage of this was taken both by L/Cpl McNally of the Sniper Section, attached to D Company and the two forward platoons, for when the Battalion eventually crossed the canal, four dead Bosche were found all shot through the centre of the forehead.
It was not possible for D Company to get any nearer to the canal for, whenever they left their cover, they were met by heavy and accurate DF and Spandau fire. They were unable to see, however, whether the all important bridge over the canal leading to Lungarella was still intact. The enemy seemed to realise the importance of holding this bridge.
Tac HQ, together with Main HQ, was established in an excellent building to the north of Gobbietta. The only trouble about this house was that there was a dead horse in one of the downstairs rooms. How it ever got through the small door into the room will always remain a mystery. However, due to the possibility of Brigade HQ taking over the house, it was decided not to try to remove the swollen and already stinking carcass.
During the morning, B Company, with 12 Platoon leading – commanded by Lieut RR McLean – had been edging forward over open country, under every conceivable type of DF fire and had succeeded in occupying a large farm some four hundred yards to the south of the canal. At the farm were found nearly one hundred very panicky refugees. Shortly afterwards, the farm came under shell fire, causing the hundred refugees to flee in all directions, leaving an old man to die in the hands of the Company Runner.
From this farm, there was an excellent view of the ground leading up to the canal and a section of MGs were sited on the top floor to give covering fire. Lt McLean then led No 12 Platoon at the double and, in open formation, to the canal bank. This was carried out under heavy and sustained Spandau fire from the far bank and mortar fire from the area of Lungurella. The latter could be seen by D Company OP and was successfully engaged by 496 Battery of 132 Field Regiment RA. There was found a small bridge, partly blown and scrambling the canal. Five prisoners were taken in this farm, the sixth member having been shot by Lieut RR Mclean in a pistol duel.
When No 12 Platoon was finally established in the area of this farm, they were joined by the remainder of the Company and the advance was continued at Lungarella itself.
The resistance was indeed fanatical for not one of the ten positions that were encountered up to nightfall would give in, each having to be silenced in turn.
By nightfall, the opposition had so stiffened that it was found impossible to advance any further but B Company was now only five hundred yards from Lungurella. They were, therefore, ordered to dig in and await complete dark when A Company would attack through them and capture the bridge south of Lungurella. During this advance, B Company’s casualties had been negligible but they had accounted for some fourteen in dead and had now taken twenty eight prisoners.
Shortly after B Company had forced the crossing of the canal, Lt Col HMA Hunter MBE was ordered to return to B Echelon for rest, for he had not slept during the past three days and the strain was beginning to tell on him. The 2.i.c., Major ME Fisher MC, then took over command of the Battalion.
Throughout the afternoon, D Company had been lying up in the area of the farm seventy five yards to the south of the canal and just opposite Lungurella, engaging with both small arms and artillery anything they saw moving. It was apparent that the enemy suspected this farm as containing an OP for it was continually stonked by both artillery and mortars.
At about 1700 hours, after B Company had secured their bridgehead across the canal and were advancing on Lungurella. It was decided by Major ME Fisher MC for a platoon attack to be made over the canal to capture a group of buildings, which lay on the outskirts of Lungurella and, thereby, to divert the attention of the enemy from the main advance along the northern bank of the canal by B Company.
At this point, the canal was about forty feet wide and seven feet deep and the bridge, as it was shortly learned, had been blown and so could not afford a means of crossing. No 17 Platoon, D Company – commanded by Lt JWC Ledger – went forward to make the attack, supported by artillery and MG fire. They reached the bank without incident but, when Lt Ledger and Cpl Donovan started to move over the bank to make a recce for a crossing place, they were met with such withering MG fire from well dug in positions on the opposite bank that Cpl Donovan was wounded and Lt Ledger had great difficulty in getting him back to the safety of the bank.
It was apparent that daylight attack was not practicable and 17 Platoon was accordingly withdrawn to the area of the farm houses.
A night attack was then planned, to be undertaken by A Company, in which the Company was to attack through the firm base that was being held by B Company, on the far side of the canal and only four hundred yards from Lungurella, against repeated counter attacks.
At 2300 hours on the 21st, this attack, which proved to be the final phase of the battle for, and leading up to Lungurella, was launched. The attack took place in the full light of burning hayricks and farm outhouses and, by 2345 hours, No 7 and 8 Platoons had gained their last objective – the bridge across the canal leading to Lungurella. No opposition had been met and only two wounded prisoners had been taken. The enemy had fled.
At 0100 hours on the 22nd, B Company occupied Lungurella, without opposition, followed by C Company, D Company and Main HQ.
The REs immediately set about constructing a Bailey across the canal and, by 0600 hours, the bridge had been completed and the Battalion’s B Echelon was roaring across.
It was then learned that other troops of the Division had reached the area of Ferrara, principal objective south of the Po and so, the expected and hoped for rest after the past arduous 48 hours could not now be had for, within a few hours, the Battalion was once again on the move chasing the now exhausted and fast disintegrating enemy forces.
5 Northamptons – The Battle of Argenta.
On the morning of Sunday 15th April 1945, the Battalion moved to a concentration area at Castelleto, some 6,000 metres east of Bastia. Companies were warned to be ready for committal the following day and the men settled down to a day’s rest, some basking in the bright sunlight, others chasing guinea fowl in the hopes of an appetising supper. The Padre held a Church Service in a field close by at about 4 o’clock in the afternoon. At Battalion Headquarters, the Commanding Officer was unable to issue orders owing to the constant change of plan.
Finally, at 2250 hours, whilst orders were being issued to Company Commanders for an operation to take place on Monday 16th April, in support of the 1st Surreys, the Brigadier phoned up giving orders for an immediate advance to be made by the Battalion on Argenta, between the River Reno and the railway line in Portomaggiore, a frontage of about two miles: the Battalion was to capture Argenta, if possible, but was not to become involved and, if opposition became stiff, then close contact with the enemy was to be kept and advantage taken of any weakness that might develop.
Little information as to the enemy’s dispositions or to the disposition of the London Scottish about Bastia was available. It was known, however, that over about half of the 4,000 yards advance to Argenta, extensive minefields existed. The ground was flat, but covered with orchards vineyards and scattered trees with, on the left flank, the flood bank of the Reno rising 15 feet, affording ample cover for enemy snipers and MG posts. The ground could not be reconnoitred, but excellent aerial photographs were distributed down to company level.
Fresh orders were immediately issued, based on a simple plan – a controlled advance on a three company front by bounds.
The advance started about 0245 hours on Monday 16th April, the order of battle being – D Company right, moving along the railway line, B Company centre, A Company on the left on Route 16 and clearing the Reno floodbank and C Company in reserve.
A Company moved rapidly along the road and river bank for about 1.500 yards, where strong opposition was met on the edge of the main minefield and from beyond the Reno. When this opposition was finally overcome, A Company became the reserve Company, providing left flank protection.
B Company, in the centre, moved more slowly across open country and, just before dawn, after an advance of about 1,700 yards, came up against strong opposition covering the southern exits to the main minefield. Fortunately, at first, light tanks and ‘Flail’ tanks reached the Battalion and, though delayed by bridges breaking, managed to support B Company quickly. However, it was not until fighter bombers assisted that the opposition was finally cleared. B Company now pushed on up Route 16 towards Argenta. It was only possible to move on a very narrow front, on account of the thick minefields, which existed on each side of the road. It was an easy matter for the enemy to concentrate on the narrow northern exit of the minefield and B Company was unable to progress further than 100 yards from this exit as the ‘Flail’ tanks were withdrawn and could not clear mines to assist the company to manoeuvre
D Company on the right advanced slowly, meeting isolated opposition, until finally held at the south east outskirts of the town at about 1615 hours on Monday 16th April. C Company, in reserve, mopped up the area of the advance, capturing numerous prisoners. Tac HQ moved up to a more central position during the evening.
During the night 16th – 17th April, B Company kept the attention of the enemy drawn to the south, whilst D Company made efforts to enter the town from the east. These efforts were unsuccessful, the opposition, which was met, showing that the enemy was fully determined to contest the town.
The following morning, Tuesday 17th April, the enemy attempted to infiltrate into D Company’s area but were destroyed. This greatly improved the position. D Company was able to advance and capture the cemetery – a strategic point commanding the south east entrance of Argenta.