With the 5th Army.
We had been warned that afternoon that we would move to a forward concentration area in 5 Corps, now commanded by General Keightley – our old divisional commander – on 4th October. But events don’t often turn out the way they are intended. I was rung up at lunchtime next day by the GII at Division to say that our Brigade Group was required to move at 7 o’clock that night, not to 5 Corps at all, but to the 5th Army, somewhere in the centre of Italy. Somewhere in these beastly mountains again! He said he was the only person at division; everyone else was out “swanning” and couldn’t be found; and what did I think of it? I thought it was a pretty fast ball but reckoned that it could be done if it was really necessary. It started pouring with rain about this time, and it was the thought of the night drive for the whole brigade, over wet and difficult mountain roads that concerned me most. I rang up 8th Army and found out from the BGS that it was essential to leave as quickly as this, so there was nothing for it.
After giving a few quick orders for the Brigade Group to get under way, I pushed off with John O’Rourke and John McLinton on the long drove to 13 Corps. We got as far as Foligno and stayed there that night leaving again at 5 o’clock the next morning, just as the head of the brigade column was coming into the place. The brigade went on about another 10 miles and stayed at Incisa.
I got to 13 Corps at half past eleven, where the Corps Commander, General Kirkman, put me in the picture and gave me my orders. Our objective was to take over from the right of the American 88th Division in order to allow the Americans to concentrate their forces for a push on Bologna, while our division was to be directed on Imola. It was a determined effort to get out of the mountains into the plain before the winter closed down and rain made all the mountain tracks impassable. The 5th Army thought that this could be achieved with the addition of one fresh division to their forces. We were that division. I was given to understand that there was every prospect of achieving our object within a fortnight. The optimistic ‘I’ boys were still at it – the Bosche would soon pull out and all that kind of thing!
As I drove through the central mountains and over the main pass, I was filled with unbounded admiration for what the Americans had achieved in those parts. How they fought through such appalling country, prepared for all out defence, Goodness only knows! Sheer guts played a large part in it, but casualties had been correspondingly high.
General Paul Kendall was commanding the American 88th Division and I reached his headquarters that afternoon and made arrangements to take over from 351 Infantry Regiment in the area Monte Cappello to Castel del Rio, which was on the right of the Imola road as soon as possible. The American main axis through the mountains was appalling. Forward of their defensive Divisional Headquarters, I found a high viaduct had been demolished and two days heavy rains had made the diversion well nigh impassible for British transport. How unfavourably our transport compares with that of the American Army! They were getting it all right but I know perfectly well our two wheel drive vehicles would not have an earthly hope. They would inevitably stick on the track and cause an irreparable block against movement in both directions.
I stopped that night at Firenzuola, where the COs joined us during the night. Their arrival was greeted by an air raid – a poor sort of gesture, we thought, from the so called dispirited Huns. Next morning, the 4th, I went off with COs to the Headquarters of the 351 Infantry Regiment in Castel del Rio. The London Irish were to take over Monte Cappello and the Skins between the London Irish Rifles and the Imola Road in the Carsoggio Area.
I met Andrew Scott, commanding 1st Guards Brigade here. His troops were on Battaglia, a most unpleasant mountain on the far side of Cappello from us. He was completely cut off from 1st Division, to whom he owed some passing allegiance and said he would come under my command if I liked. I told him I thought it was quite immaterial whether I came under his command or he came under mine. Anyway, without bothering to define the situation any more accurately, we got out mutual arrangements pretty well under control and worked in great harmony from then onwards. We got considerable amusement out of various incidents that occurred, one way or another. He said his mules had “had it” and the guardsmen not much better, from the long hard climb up to his mountain.
I spent most of the next few days with General Kendall. He and his staff did everything to help. They gave us their six wheeled lorries to get our stuff across the diversion; cleared people out of houses for us – not that there was much scope in this matter; and looked after us extremely well.
At a conference that day, I expressed the opinion that until a bridge had been put across the viaduct, or some very lengthy work had been undertaken on the diversion it would be quite impossible to operate 78th Division offensively towards Imola. Construction of a bridge was then put under way. I believe it proved to be the highest Bailey bridge in existence.
On the evening of the 4th, our Brigade Group started concentrating in the area between Firenzuola and Scarporia. It was a most terribly difficult business to get any transport off that road through the mountains. Any flat places that did exist were apt to be bogs and it was still raining. By 6 o’clock on the 5th, the Brigade Group was complete – when I say complete, I mean it was stationery somewhere along the 20 to 30 miles of mountain road and I knew not where that somewhere was.
By the evening of the 5th, the Skins and the London Irish were on their way to take over their positions in the mountains that night and the Faughs had been ordered to take over the mountain on the left of the road the following night. Brigade Headquarters was at Valsalva to start with. We moved to a house half a mile south of Castel del Rio a couple of days later.
The administrative problems were already appalling. A day’s rations had been dumped into the river bank at Firenzuola, the only bit of hard standing that anyone could find. That night the river rose, and that was that. Mules had to be found from somewhere to get food and ammunition up to the London Irish. The snag about taking over from the Americans was that their ammunition wasn’t any use to us; one couldn’t take over what they were prepared to leave. There didn’t seem the least likelihood of ‘B’ Echelons being nearer to Firenzuola, a good two to three hours drive back along a shocking mountain road absolutely congested with the traffic of anything from two to three divisions. The sooner we got out of this muddle and into the plain the better for all concerned.
We had OPs from which we could see the plain 10 miles away. It was like looking at the Promised Land. A land full of houses and roads. We were in a precipitous country noticeably lacking in accommodation. The sight provided a great incentive.
Monte Cappello had been captured after a very stiff fight by the Americans and they were a bit apprehensive that we were holding it too lightly. Until we got some idea what the Germans’ intention were, I had one or two companies of Skins up there as well. However, it soon became apparent that the Germans weren’t interested in Monte Cappello but in Battaglia, about 3,000 yards to the east. The Guards were occupying this mountain and having a great deal of trouble up there too, both from raids, up to a company in strength and from shelling and mortaring.
On our front, there was little or no German artillery nearer than the Rio di Gaggio and its tributary, the Fortinone, which made a deep gorge between us and the Guards. We had excellent observation over the Bosche, whose positions were along the Gaggio towards Monte Taverna. We had patrols in that area both by day and by night. A G Company sniper of the London Irish bagged three Germans there in one day.
Looking at the ground ahead, it became obvious at once that a horrible cliff called the Vena del Grosso was going to play a large part in any future operations. This feature stretched across our front from Monte Maure through Tossignano to Monte Ponzola, a distance of about 8 miles, with a narrow gap at Tossignano through which passed the main road from Imola. The sheer face of this cliff, for some extraordinary reason, faced us, instead of out towards the plain. The most likely way of overcoming this obstacle seemed to be to turn its western end by capturing Monte del Acqua Salata, about 4,000 miles west of Tossignano.
Plan to capture Imola.
The Americans, in the meantime, were pushing up the road from Castel del Rio to Sassaleone and Monte Falchetto, side stepping hard to the left. To conform with this, the Faughs, on the evening of the 6th, had taken over the Codronco spur on the left of the Imola road. They were in pretty close contact there and the Germans at the eastern end of this spur were interfering with the American thrust northwards. I had now nothing up my sleeve and so, on the 7th, the 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers came up under my command in reserve behind Castel del Rio.
On the same evening, the Faughs launched D Company under Jimmy Clarke, along their spur to clear the enemy out of point 382 and so help the Americans on. They tried three times to get into the houses there but were held up by fierce machine gun fire and the very steep slopes, which had become so muddy and slippery from the heavy rain that it was almost impossible to get up them. They succeeded, however, in consolidating their positions not far short of the objective. During the next day, they subjected the enemy to very heavy shelling and attacked again at 8 o’clock in the evening. They found the enemy had withdrawn with the exception of two men, who had been left out as a listening patrol and didn’t receive orders to go. They gave encouraging stories of the damage inflicted.
In the meantime, the other two battalions had been having a fairly easy time. The London Irish had developed a greater keenness for daylight patrols. Looking towards the Germans one day on my way up to their positions, I was intrigued by what appeared to be a row of white dots moving along the track. Closer examination revealed a patrol, each member which had a large goose under his arm. The London Irish, with commendable forethought, were already collecting their Christmas dinner. A large pig, with ‘56’ – their tactical number – and a Battleaxe painted on it was also reported to be somewhere about on the front, but somehow or other, it saw the red light and made a getaway while the going was good.
On the 8th, our Divisional Commander held a conference to go into the ways and means of achieving our subject – the capture of Imola. The general plan was for us to seize the high ground on the right of the road as far as Monte Taverna and 11 Brigade to drive for Monte Pieve and Acqua Salata on the left of the road, thus turning the Vona del Grosso, with 36 Brigade probably following after them. One obvious snag for this was a gap of between six and seven thousand yards between those two efforts, with the consequent difficulties of artillery support and extremely difficult maintenance routes. The chances of being able to use tanks were remote, owing to the boggy state of the valley and the precipitous going on either side.
On the 9th, we reverted from command of 88th US Division to our own division. Andrew Scott and his guardsmen also came under command of the division, but they had a very tough time on Battaglia and wouldn’t be able to do much in the coming assault. The Americans had had great difficulty in sorting out two Brigadiers called Scott and trying to remember which of them commanded the Guards Brigade and which, the Irish Brigade. General Kendall finally gave it up as hopeless and referred to us as “Brother Andrew” and “Brother Pat”, with our respective commands called after us. All our dealings with the 1st Guards Brigade certainly worked on a very brotherly basis. We had fought with them before in North Africa and had changed places with them when we moved from 6th Armoured Division to the 78th. It was not altogether inappropriate that we should be thus mixed up.
The 8th Argylls were to come under command and also some Canadian tanks from the Three Rivers Regiment – who were old friends of ours – for the forthcoming operations. On the night of the 10th, the Faughs were relieved by the Recce and came into reserve in a rather inaccessible valley behind Monte Carnovalo. This was to be their assembly point for the next task, which was to pass through the Guardsmen on Battaglia and attack in the direction of Monte Taverna. The Argylls and the Skins were to do a flank attack behind the Gaggio, as a frontal attack on that precipitous gorge seemed to be out of the question. The London Irish were to remain on Cappello and were to be used to exploit in whatever direction appeared to be most favourable, probably Monte Taverna. 11 Brigade took over command of the sector on the left of the road, and the Faughs pulled out. 11 Brigade were making plans for their project on the west of the Imola road. I didn’t much fancy the look of our project but I thought the ground on their side looked even worse. Later events showed I wasn’t far wrong.
On the 10th, General Butterworth left the Division and Brigadier Arbuthnott, Commander 11 Brigade, assumed temporary command.
On the 15th, a change of plan was made.
The Spaduro battles
In order to carry out our attack on the right of the road, certain pre-requisites were necessary on the left so that we might launch our attack from the area of Filette in order to come at the Gaggio from behind. 11 Brigade had started their attack on the night of the 13th against the key position of Monte Pieve. The Americans had already captured Gesso, some 500 yards to the west of Pieve and had left it to us to clean up in a northerly and north easterly direction, while they struck out to the north west. Pieve was the dominating hill on the left of the road and on its capture depended all future operations as far as the division was concerned. The Bosche were holding it with considerable determination, which was hardly to be wondered at.
On the evenings of both the 13th and 14th, 11 Brigade were unfortunately unable to evict the enemy from this strongpoint. It, therefore, became almost impossible to clear the enemy from Filette and the spur running down from it from Pieve. Without that in our hands, our operation could not begin.
The original object of the division, when it came into this sector, was firstly, to release American units for a more concentrated effort towards Bologna, which meant everyone side stepping to the left and secondly, to open the Imola road. This side stepping to the left business, if were to conform, was beginning to make the Imola road project an impossibility. Either, we could side step to the left or plunge on towards Imola, but we couldn’t do both. As the American project was the main item, the Imola road was dropped and, consequently, our attack on the right of the road was dropped also. Everyone would have to swarm round to the left.
Another contingency on our attack down the right was that the 1st British Division should conform on the right of the Guards Brigade. There seemed to be little immediate prospect of their being able to do this. They were echeloned right back behind us with some extremely difficult mountains in front of them and a heavy engineering problem to open their route.
The decision, therefore, was now made not to open the Imola road but to concentrate on helping the Americans forward as occasion arose. We couldn’t do anything about moving left handed until someone relieved us in the Capello area on the right of the road. This was put in motion next day by a visit from GOC, 6th Armoured Division and Adrian Gore, commanding the 61st (Rifle) Brigade.
On the 17th, orders were issued accordingly. The Divisional objective was now to be Monte Spaduro. Pieve would still have to be captured before this could be done. The Faughs were to move the next morning under command of 36 Brigade to the area of Apollinare and be prepared to go on towards Spaduro as soon as 36 Brigade’s attack on Pieve was successful. The Faughs were in reserve as they were the only people, who could move quickly without relief. It was administratively impossible to get either of the other battalions up there within 24 hours of the Faughs.
On the 18th, the London Irish were relieved by 10 RB and concentrated in Castel del Rio that evening. The next morning, the Skins were relieved by 2 RB.
Bobby Scott, who was commanding the Skins, had to retire to hospital at this juncture, owing to carbuncles and John Kerr stopped into the breach again as he had done last May with the 6 Skins when Bala Bredin was wounded.
The 19th was the day on which things began to happen. I closed down the Castel del Rio area and moved up to Apollinare that morning. The Faughs had come forward under command of 36 Brigade to an area between Gesso and Pieve behind 36 Brigade’s attack.
Spaduro is a large feature blocking the expected view into the plains down in the Sillaro valley towards Castel del Pietro, a town on Route 9. It is a massive dark grey feature, with few light patches of colour, built rather like a horseshoe with a great re-entrant in the centre. The re-entrant is full of dark ravines and gullies, all grey and black and forbidding. Spaduro is about 3-4,000 yards from Gesso. There were immediate features between it and our present forward positions.
Leading down from Gesso are Hills 401 and 416 and then on down a narrow ridge, steep sided and almost sheer in places until 387 is reached. At the far end of Hill 387 are ridges on either side of it running parallel to Monte Spaduro. The ridge to the west, with Hill 387 and Hill 416, forms a massive bowl dropping steeply down into the Ronchi–Sassotello valley. The approach to Hill 387, along a narrow neck, is guarded by a house called Casa di Spinello. This approach was the key to the capture of Spaduro. It proved a hard one to turn.
It was an unpleasing feature – or rather, a series of features. Cold, black and devoid of cover, they present an uninviting spectacle. Desolation was accentuated by a few ruined shell torn houses. Stony, rugged, hard going for the infantry man, except along the tracks, which became appalling bogs. At the foot of these features, the Ronchi river winds through the grey hills down to the Sillaro river.
Slowly, but surely, the Americans were pushing northwards towards the Bologna road (Route 9) and, as a climax, captured Monte Grande, the last great feature in the path of their advance. The 78th Division was to capture Monte Spaduro and advance, in conjunction with the Americans, down the road to Castel del Pietro. As far as the division was concerned, Spaduro was the last large hill mass guarding all the other minor hills that form a sort of step ladder down into the plain. The Irish Brigade was ordered to capture Spaduro as soon as 36 Brigade captured Monte Pieve. While the Irish Brigade attacked Spaduro, 36 Brigade were ordered to capture Monte Acqua Salata, another bare crag of a feature south east of Spaduro and joined up to Pieve by a narrow causeway.
Why Monte Pieve was given up by the Huns will always remain a mystery. It was by far the best OP in area which, apart from dominating the surrounding countryside, had the added advantage of looking down the valley into that hive of industry – Castel del Rio. Why he did not shell the town more is another mystery. The surrender of this magnificent OP, which looked right down the valleys east of Spaduro and on to Acqua Salata and Monte Vorro, was the key to the attack on Spaduro.
This meant that the narrow neck down the Gesso ridge leading onto Hill 416 and then onto Spaduro was now clear. It also opened the way to Acqua Salata. There was no ground between Pieve and Spaduro that did not fall into this category and it was reasonable to suppose, therefore, that the Germans’ next position would be on Spaduro, with not more than outposts on the subsidiary ridge about 1,000 yards short of it.
When 36 Brigade found that the enemy had withdrawn from Pieve before their attack was launched, speed in getting after the Bosche before he hardened in his new positions was the dominant factor. There was no time to be lost. About two o’clock in the morning, the Faughs took up positions on Hill 416, which was to be the jumping off point for their attack on Spaduro.
The Faughs were told to ferret forward towards Spaduro in the morning mist, the morning of the 19th, as it was believed to be lightly held. The reconnaissance group was on Point 416 when the mist lifted. They were electrified to see a fat Teuton performing his toilet on the top of Point 387 – about 700 yards ahead. He was blissfully unaware that interested eyes were watching him and the reconnaissance group studied the surrounding countryside with considerable care, ruling out the idea of a swan forward that day. The general feeling was that the project was only a one battalion affair but I was not quite convinced of this, so told the London Irish to move one rifle company forward and their support company to form a firm base behind the Faughs.
Later events proved this to be a wise course. At 2045 hours, the attack went in. A Company under Maurice Crehan of the Irish Fusiliers of Canada, set off into the darkness followed by B Company of Dick Jefferies. One hour later, A Company had a foothold on the 387 ridge, undetected owing to their flank approach. Opposition on the crests was quickly overcome by A Coy’s swooping fire and a number of Germans surrendered and came out of their slit trenches. Others refused to give in and were shot in their weapon pits. Nevertheless, there was a considerable amount of enemy movement all around the lower slopes on either side of the ridge. The garrison of Spinello became active about this time and started shooting up A Company from behind.
B Company had pushed through A Company as soon as the latter were on the end of Point 362 and had no trouble for about 600 yards when they came to a group of buildings full of Huns. The leading platoon became involved in a close range gun fight in which a number of Huns were killed and a few taken prisoner. The company got into difficulty further along by running into an impassable cliff; it took an hour to find a crossing and an hour to negotiate it and by this time it was 0430. They continued to push on towards Spaduro and by 0515 were on their objective, having mopped up a party of Huns around the haystack just beyond Spaduro farm.
By 0545, it was obvious that both A and B Coys were in for a pretty heavy counter attack as one MG after another began to open up from the flank and in front. The Bosche were there in strength. The two companies were attacked simultaneously at 6am but the DF brought down was of no avail. Both companies fought stubbornly and heroically against superior odds and they fought to the end until they ran out of ammunition. Some of the final scenes saw many acts of gallantry and only a handful of men returned from each company. Both hills were a scene of great carnage and many enemy dead. The gallant Maurice Crehan and a handful of men were found later on, huddled together, riddled with bullets – dead; a final testimony of their fight to the last in gallant defence. German prisoners later said that forty of our men had been taken prisoner.
It was daylight and the trouble was now to get C Company, under Tony Morris, back. It was still intact. They had been sent up to help B Company on Spaduro but had not managed to get any further than the lower slopes of 387 and were effectively held up by the tough Spinello garrison. There was no possibility of their reaching Spaduro and they were in a very poor position to support A Company. Eventually, they were got out with the help of a smoke screen at about midday and came back to Hill 416 with the Battalion HQ of the Faughs.
The Faughs consolidated their positions and watched Spaduro. They left Spaduro alone that morning, watching the German stretcher bearers evacuating the wounded from the slopes.
The London Irish were told to take Spaduro the next night but it was decided to limit objectives to the first ridge running up to Hill 387, their left objective being the house called Casa Salara on the western slopes of the ridge. If this went according to plan, then another attack could be made on the final slopes of Monte Spaduro itself. There was only one other factor influencing the London Irish attack and that was the situation on the right. The attack on Acqua Salata last night in conjunction with the Faughs’ attack failed and this had serious repercussions on the positions on 416. It was decided that Acqua Salata must be taken before any further attempt could be made to take Spaduro; the dangers of getting caught on the approaches to Spaduro, with Acqua Salata still held, were considerable and the Hun could make himself mighty unpleasant.
The Argylls attacked Acqua Salata. They found it unoccupied except for a few odd Huns whom they took prisoner. This then made it all set for the London Irish.
They set off at midnight to take Casa Salara and Point 387. Here again, that pocket of enemy at Casa Spinello was not properly cleared up and the companies detoured to the left down the side of the bowl, unable to advance along the top of the ridge. Once down in the gullies, they were unable to get on to their objectives, meeting heavy opposition from Point 387 and the ridge that ran down towards Casa Salara.
Repeated attempts to get up produced fierce enemy reaction and, as dawn broke, after six hours fighting, the companies consolidated what gains they had, and lay up in the gullies. All day long, the enemy positions were shelled and machine gunned. The Faughs got up a couple of anti tank guns on to Gesso and blasted hell out of the Spinello house. This, too, came in for its share of shelling and mortaring. Incredible amounts of ammunition was fired into the enemy in a softening up process and, at five o’clock, the London Irish went in again.
They fought stubbornly and hard, but so did the Hun. He, unfortunately, had the advantage of the height and the steep, rugged loose rocked gullies, devoid of cover, were no advantage to the attacking infantryman. The London Irish were brought back at midnight, after another six hours of fighting, to Hill 416 and took up positions with the Faughs. It was useless battering one’s head against superior numbers and in impossible country. Early next morning, the Faughs came back to re-form, leaving the London Irish up on 416.
The next two days were just one big artillery duel. The Bosche shelling and mortaring our positions around 416, 401 and Gesso. Some of its heavy stuff as well – and we softening up the Hun defenders of Spaduro with everything in creation. Casa Spinello was practically flattened and the Faughs’ anti tank guns continued to do great work firing AP into the enemy positions there.
The third and final attack on Spaduro was timed for the night of 23rd/24th October. The plan was good. The Irish Brigade was to take Spinello first, then Point 387, the Casa Salara ridge and Point 362, just north of Point 387. The Spaduro feature was to be taken by two battalions of 11 Brigade. In all, four battalions were to do the attack. At midday on the 23rd, a patrol from the London Irish went down to Casa Spinello. After crawling on their stomachs most of the way and keeping below the crest of the ridge, they succeeded in getting up to the house. Lieut Fay, leading the patrol, surprised three Huns in a slit trench, killed one, wounded one and grabbed the other and got away below the crest without being touched, even though everything in creation opened up as soon as the patrol was spotted. This patrol of Fay’s was a magnificent performance.
The Hun talked. His information was invaluable. It included the defences of Spinello and a general set up of the enemy of the 387 ridge and the information was passed to the London Irish just in time. The idea was for the London Irish to take Spinello and do a diversionary attack on 387 starting at 1630 hrs; and for the Inniskillings to attack from the left flank at 2230 up the Casa Salara ridge – on to Point 362 and then down to 387 from behind. At the same time, 11 Brigade was to attack Spaduro, itself, from the left. Everything went like clockwork.
The London Irish got Spinello and held it against three counter attacks, taking 20 prisoners, but at a price. The garrison of Spinello fought like wildcats and to quote one of the lads, who took part, “They had to be exterminated one by one”. One Hun was down in a cellar shooting up through the floorboards and, for some time, proved an elusive customer. Eventually, the onslaught died down and, by this time, the Inniskillings were wending their way down the Sassatello valley to attack from the left flank. At 2230, the leading company made straight for Casa Salara and took it without any trouble. Meanwhile, the enemy took another house on the ridge called Casone and pushed on towards Point 362. There was a short sharp scrap here and ten prisoners were taken.
Another company was then passed through, attacking down towards Point 387 and meeting heavy opposition about half way down the ridge. A platoon attack, lasting about three quarters of an hour, saw this position in our hands after some fairly heavy fighting in which a number of Huns were killed. Twelve prisoners were taken here. By this time, it was well into the morning and at 4 o’clock, the last company was passed through to take the final objective, Point 387. Two platoons attacked fiercely, overrunning the positions with great dash and taking 25 prisoners, while the feature was engaged from the other end by the London Irish.
This saw the end of the Hun defence of Spaduro for, by this time, 11 Brigade had secured all of their objectives. The features that had been so stubbornly defended by the Bosche and so gallantly fought for by each battalion in turn, were now completely in our hands. It cost the enemy a total of 81 prisoners and some 100 killed and wounded.
The Rains Come
On the 24th, torrential rains effectively put a stop to further operations, blocking the roads and turning the battlefield into a sea of mud where it was difficult to stand, let alone fight or maintain a forward move over such country. That night, the Skins tidied up their front by occupying the eastern Casa Salara, which commanded a minor feature running down towards the Bosche road head about Piana Nuova. This place was rather a hot spot, stuck out some 600 yards in front of our main positions with the Bosche sharing the spur about 300 yards further on. This position was never actually attacked, but it was about the best ‘Aunt Sally’ the Germans had to shoot at when he felt annoyed about something we had done.
The Bosche was very lucky in having road heads leading right into his positions like this and that was the whole difference really between his set up and ours. The enemy positions were now fed by roads from the plain with ample gun positions and administrative facilities, while we were stuck out at the end of the appalling mule tracks, which were rapidly becoming impossible even to those redoubtable animals. It was about the worst maintenance problem we ever had to face and I think 36 Brigade were even worse off than we were. The only way of getting along was on the tracks on top of the knife edge ridges. For some reason, the rain didn’t drain off and those tracks became so bad that even mules used to fall down and drown in the mud. Near Gesso, several people were killed in minefields, where some slight digression was possible, but normally you had to stick to the track. I found a horse was the best way of getting about, but there were limits dictated by Bosche observation on where you could ride.
There was a good deal of German harassing fire from artillery all over the front but it gradually tended to die down as our offensive attitude began to fade. Tommy Arnott used to lend me a horse when required. Major Sir Thomas Arnott, 15/19 Hussars, a native of Co Dublin, whom I had last known in about 1926, was in command of our company of mules. His muleteers were Italian, as I imagine, were his mules. It was entirely due to Tommy’s tremendous energy, cheerfulness and example that the mule men kept going under those shocking conditions. Apart from the abnormal physical strain thrown on them, they lost quite a few officers and men from shelling and mines. One of Tommy’s British officers was killed in a minefield one night returning from delivering supplies. He was trying to dispose of a wounded mule. Tommy, who was also there, plunged into the minefield to rescue his officer and was most fortunate in coming out unscathed. It was a bad loss when Tommy’s mule company left us for a well earned rest a little later. He and they were splendid.
On the afternoon of the 24th October, 36 Brigade tried to reach Camaggio and Monte Maggiore, but unfortunately, owing to rain, difficult going and German resistance, they were unable to do this. It is not surprising that the enemy should hold this area strongly, as Monte Maggiore was the last really good OP for looking at the ground we now held.
The Faughs were out reorganising during this period under very uncomfortable and inadequate conditions in the area around Apollinare. 56 Recce Regiment, less one squadron, came under command on the 25th and we were able to carry out some minor adjustments to hold the front more economically.
The next few days were spent in a really hard struggle against rain and mud, and in trying to keep men from suffering exposure. The wet was appalling. There was more hardship suffered, I think, during that work than in any other during the winter. It was so terribly difficult to get any shelter for anybody. By skilfully switching men round into what little cover he had, John Kerr succeeded in establishing a divisional low record of sickness for the Skins during this period.
With casualties and sickness, the manpower situation was becoming acute. The powers that be would not make our strength up above 30 officers and 700 other ranks. We therefore had to reorganise on a three rifle company basis. The Faughs did this by 29th October and the others followed suit soon after. It was most unsatisfactory from every point of view.
On 26th October, 36 Brigade had another attempt at Camaggio but the rain started just about the same time as they did.
It became quite evident that, until the rain stopped, further operations would have to be cancelled. Not only was it almost impossible for infantry to struggle forward through the muck, but even if they reached their objectives, the business of getting forward feed and ammunition would be more than our present mule resources could stand. The enemy, meanwhile, had been building up pretty fast on our front and it became abundantly clear than he had no intention of budging. The Americans had been unable to get much forward of Monte Grande. They had for a short time established themselves at Vodriano but were unable to remain there.
Plans were still being made to push on. We hoped, when opportunity offered, to get to Monte Maggiore, Piana Nuova, Ortica and Point 362. We still had hopes of getting out to the plain. Those hills were becoming daily more detestable.
The chief factor about the ground, in my opinion, was that the present positions of the Americans and ourselves were good defensively and that any minor advance, which failed in the object of getting out into the plain tended to place us at disadvantage. We had far better observation than the Bosche. The physical difficulty of any other further advance on this ground would have to be seen to be believed. The hills were steep and devoid of cover. The gullies were deep and rugged. The only way of getting forward was usually along some knife edge where you would be compelled to advance on nothing stronger than a section front. Such places were easily defended. The country was sparsely inhabited and little shelter against foul weather was to be had. The grain of the country was, in the main, against us and abrupt cliff like hill faces confronted us. In any normal country, the steep side of a ridge would face the plain. Not so here. A Pole said to me, “I thought such country was only on the moon!”
There was the usual steady flow of German deserters coming in but that is really no indication of the way the Hun will fight when put to it. The things these deserters say have always been a mystery to me. They are quite prepared to tell you exactly where their positions are, which fox hole their friends are occupying, how and when their food comes up to them and a variety of other useful items of information. They will even go so far as to suggest minor alterations in our harassing fire that would make it more effectively. Such information as they gave, almost invariably proved to be entirely correct.
Another thing that was so annoying about this country was that, owing to its wet and precipitous nature, we were quite unable to use tanks. Those that did get up to Gesso in support of 36 Brigade’s initial efforts were irretrievably bogged down. I should not be surprised if they are there still. As tanks were the only things in which we were superior at that juncture, this was a very serious handicap to offensive operations.
When we first arrived at San Apollinare, there was a track, which most vehicles could get along, connecting it to the main third class road that ran from Castel del Rio, through Sassaleone to San Clemente and so down the Sillaro valley to Castel del Pietro. This rather doubtful track became utterly impassable after the rain. It was essential to maintain at least a jeep head at San Apollinare. Two brigades had their headquarters there and Tac Division was there also. That track, about a mile long, finally had to have logs laid on it throughout its length, ‘corduroying’ is the right expression, I believe. The trees to provide the material for this corduroy had to be cut in the high pass on the other side of Firenzuola – anything up to 6 hours away in a lorry. Metalling for any road had to be brought some distance and the tipper was doing well if it deposited four loads during the day.
It was a very slow and tedious process. Ronny Denton, temporarily elevated from his Field Company to CRE, worked out some sum by which he proved that the amount of work involved in building this road was equivalent in man hours to putting up a barbed wire fence or laying mines between there and Cairo – I don’t know how he arrived at this startling comparison but it wasn’t a bad way of bringing home the necessity for very careful consideration before ordering a project of this kind. Our so called main axis, the road between Castel del Rio and San Clemente, invariably shared by at least one other division, was also threatening to fall to bits and tremendous engineering commitments were necessary to keep this life line open.