Clamping Down for the Winter
After it became clear that our attack was indefinitely postponed, we decided that enemy nuisance raids and patrolling could be subdued even more if we carried out a few large scale raids ourselves. We had not done this before because it would have compromised the probable lines of advance of our attack in the main battle.
The first of these raids was carried out on the 18th by the Faughs and I give you their account of how it was done and one or two other anecdotes of life at this time.
“We decided that night that it was time to attack Tamagnin as there was no immediate prospect of the higher plot coming off and it was high time that suppressive measures were applied to the Paratroopers. D Coy were to do the job while Ray Titterton ran a diversion at 166. Their plot was to approach Tamagnin and form up in the low ground in the rear while CSM Storey ran a support group with PIATs close in and Bert Parish was responsible for fire suppression on the higher ground overlooking the house. The warriors reached the Start Line down below safely and began the assault with a dozen PIAT bombs, phosphorous grenades and SMGs. The Bosche retaliation was immediate but Bert and his boys shot with great effect inflicting numerous casualties and suppressed most of the fire. Dick Unwin succeeded in capturing and bombing out the first house, but Reg Beaver was pinned down about thirty yards from the second. A second attack was launched and some of them, including Pat Howard and CSM Storey, reached the second building, which was barricaded. The Bosche then started to swarm down from Antrim Ridge to join in the battle, so Pat had then to fight those lads as well as those in the houses, many of whom had shouted that they wanted to surrender. Bert Parish now became the covering force and effectively fought the counter attack to a standstill. The Mortar DFs were called down and fell all over the area. Against a numerous enemy in the open, it can only be assumed that they inflicted heavy damage. They certainly put an end to the counter attack. The wounded were then collected while Bert continued to engage the enemy. He covered the retreat, withdrawing section by section. L/Cpl Prendrey, as usual, performed prodigies in getting the wounded back. By 1am, all were in. The Bosche were then mortaring our line of retreat. Bert came in with the last having put up a magnificent show. He had just started to walk in with the CO (John Horsfall) when a bomb dropped beside them. Bert was killed instantly and CSM Payne and the CO wounded. Bert was an irreparable loss, having shown himself to be one of the very best officers we have ever had. During the raid, he was giving a running commentary over the assault telephone like a Radio Commentator at a Cup Tie. It was the funniest thing we ever heard. Our casualties that night were three officers, two Warrant Officers and nine others wounded.
Other activities went on on our mountain besides dealing with the crafty Teuton. B Coy’s pigs, for example. Maginess had long had his eye on them and, for nearly a fortnight, Norman Bass had a vehicle and butcher ready against the time of their apprehension. Those animals were, however, definitely pro Nazi and resisted all attempts at capture, keeping to forward slopes by day, only returning at night. In spite of confident predictions of success by Normal Plymen and CSM Davidson, no results were achieved, though twice, they got a rope round one of them. The uproar on each occasion must be recorded in the Intelligence Log of the 3 Para Regiment. Results were not achieved until the idea of peaceful apprehension was discarded in favour of straight forward assassination by bullet, so the Doctor, James Millar, being an expert in these matters, was put in charge of the operation.
The Pioneers during this period had been working hard under Sergeant Cross DCM, mainly on the mule track, which was one of the knee deep variety. One night, however, they did a particularly good job by lifting all the known mines on our front – a good night’s work – another night, they did an offensive sweep most of the way to Tamagnin looking for mines.
We got rum issues frequently during this period and on rum nights, there was usually a rum ceremony at Battalion HQ when the boys came to draw. I think we will remember best CSM Payne’s nightly haggles with the Adjutant, which was always highly entertaining. Some of the patrols had a pretty hard time, particularly those that lay up all night in exposed places. They needed their rum in the morning. Conversation items between Battalion HQ and Brigade were: ‘We still have received no authorisation for rum issue’…’None has been sent.’ …’Tell the Brigadier it’s raining.’…’Do I have to take your word for it that it’s raining.’….’The Cat looked wet when it came in just now.’
We had some new supporters during this time – Captain Arrowsmith and Leonard Cattrel of the Medium Artillery, who were both delightful company and Dickson of the 4.2” Mortars in place of our Shillelagh. He was a bitter man, hardly ever being allowed to fire his infernal machines owing to ammunition shortages. Finally there was John Young, who commanded the attached Vickers Platoon, a great enthusiast, who fired his weapons on any and every possible occasion and provocation. He and Bert Parish had a dispute one night as one of his guns was sited so that it cleared the heads of Bert’s forward posts by what seemed like a few inches – Poor Bert was pinned down in his trench until the evening ‘Schwerpunkt’ was over.”
The raiding party was eminently successful. The sickening thing was the casualties. Bert Parish was a most promising lad and his death was a bad blow. I was very worried about John Horsfall too. It was the second time he had been wounded. I had spoken to him on the telephone after he had been hit and gathered that it wasn’t very serious. He said he would look in the next morning on the way to the ADS. I was surprised when he came hopping up the stairs with the aid of two sticks and it wasn’t long before I realised he was in no shape to do that sort of thing. He was more shaken than he would admit and most people would have been content to arrive on a stretcher. I insisted on his departure by this means. I was very worried, too, at the possibility of losing John as a CO. He had reached a very high peak of excellence in command of the London Irish during their long advance in the summer and was just the sort of person one wanted to keep the Bosche in his place. His enthusiasm in this respect was a great inspiration. I knew perfectly well that I should come up against the business of his trying to get back long before he was fit and warned him accordingly. Murphy Palmer, who had been Adjutant of the Faughs before the war and during the campaign in France in 1940, was fortunately on the spot as Second-in-Command of the London Irish and he, at once, took over command of the Faughs.
We were able to do quite a lot of air strafing as we had a “Rover David” on the divisional front. I described how this organisation was used during the break through from Cassino. The “man in blue” sat on the top of the hill and directed his aircraft with great accuracy at anything we wanted beaten up. The Americans were doing a lot of this kind of thing too, on our left flank. It all helped to keep the Bosche in a state of suspended animation as he thought it was the softening up before some big attack.
Another thing which I have not referred to up till now was our use of searchlights to help night movement. This had been going on ever since we returned from Egypt. Unless there was a mist, they were splendid and removed a lot of the horrors and dangers attendant on night driving on bad, narrow, slushy, mountain roads. They could also be used to aid patrols at night. They were to play an important part in our battle if it had come off.
On 23rd December, the first serious fall of snow occurred and more fell the next night. We were more or less snow covered until about the 26th January and some very low temperatures were recorded at night. The rum issue rule was that if it was either raining or freezing, rum was to be had. We got through quite a lot during this period. Skis, sleighs, and snow shoes were available in small numbers. We didn’t make any tactical use of these, though I was fully expecting the snow shoes to become essential for any cross country movement. We got a certain amount of value out of the skis and the sleighs for tobogganing, on the mountain behind Battalion Headquarters. Generally speaking, the ground was too precipitous to use the normal aids for getting about in snow.
It was decided that Christmas Day would be celebrated by nobody firing a shot unless the enemy fired first, which we guessed he was very unlikely to do, or unless he started any funny games. No fraternisation would be tolerated at any price. The result of this was an entirely quiet Christmas Day throughout the front. It was a lovely bright day with snow on the ground and we amused ourselves as best we could. I visited the Skins and Faughs in the morning and saw all the chaps one could see without walking about under enemy observation. General Mark Clark and General Kirkman, our Corps Commander, sent us Christmas messages. The London Irish were able to do their Christmas in style at San Martino but other battalions had to have a rather abbreviated form pending the time they would go to San Martino themselves for delayed Christmas festivities. Brigade Headquarters never came out of the line so we had our party where we were on the right day. There was a general feast for all the lads at Brigade Headquarters and both the General and I visited them during their dinner. We had a dinner party at Brigade Headquarters in the evening, which was livened up by the Faughs’ pipers, who had been playing on the hill tops during the day and by singing our usual songs of the Irish Brigade.
On the 26th, just before dawn, and to signify the resumption of hostilities, the Skins collected a couple of prisoners from the standing patrol of 3 Para Regiment. Their story was that they belonged to the standing patrol, which later tried to encircle one of our patrols. They alleged that they had lost their way and got taken prisoner. One of them had a blanket with him – whether his intention was to pay us a permanent visit or not was rather hard to say.
On this day, the London Irish came back from San Martino and the Faughs went out. They celebrated their Christmas in good style on the 29th.
In the evening, we picked up an intercept from 2 Para Division indicating that the Bosche intended to fly over our area that night and that their people were to put up white verey lights ever ten minutes in aid of the performance. We spotted some verey lights but the aircraft did not come our way. This sort of thing happened on one or two other occasions but nothing much came from it.
The weather was so cold at this time that even the fast running streams from the mountains were freezing hard on their surfaces. Plenty of rum was required to keep the circulation going. Winter clothing was very useful and quite good. String vests, of all the unlikely things, were found to be most effective in keeping the cold out. I believe they are much patronised by Arctic explorers.
On New Year’s Eve, we somehow drifted into quite a riotous party at Brigade Headquarters. I remember I was rung up after midnight by the General, who, overcome by the thought of many previous Hogmanies, was celebrating in Highland style at Divisional Headquarters. After exchanging the compliments of the season, he invited me to listen to rival music being played down the telephone by a piper of the Argylls. One or two members of the 8th Argylls had drifted into our party, feeling homesick I suppose and feeling that if they could not find a Scottish party, an Irish one was probably the next best thing. As the night went on, the telephone idea caught a hold and I believe that Corps and Army were rung up to be reminded that a New Year had started. At midnight, the Bosche also decided that something was necessary to mark the occasion and he fired off everything he had straight into the air. It was a magnificent display of fireworks and much appreciated by both sides.
Raid on Casa Tamagnin
On 1st January, the Faughs came up and relieved the Skins for their Christmas break. For the first time, the Faughs occupied the right hand battalion sector along the road. Up till now, they had always gone back to the hill top so that they would be in their right place if the battle was ordered. As there seemed to be no further prospect of this, there was no need to go on with the complicated shuffle of keeping each battalion in the same sector on relief.
On the 3rd, the London Irish carried out a most successful and daring daylight raid on Casa Tamagnin. It was the same place that the Faughs had had a go at before but the technique was so different that there was no real risk in doing the same thing twice. The reconnaissance and preparation of this raid was daring and skilful to a degree. At the risk of repetition of one or two things, I include here the London Irish account of their most successful exploit:
“Casa Tamagnin consisted of two houses on the side of a steep spur, which projected at right angles from the Battalion main line of resistance, some thousand yards towards the enemy. Spurs ran parallel to this, one on each side.The spur to the right of the Tamagnin spur was higher and included Pt 342 and a subsidiary spur known as Antrim, both of which were occupied by the enemy. The spur to the left was known as Black Ridge and included Pt 312, which was always occupied by one of our standing patrols at night. All those spurs led down to a deep gully on the other side of which were strong enemy positions on the Muiano–Cereto–Anzellara–Pt 297 ridge.
Casa Tamagnin had always attracted attention as being a strong enemy outpost and patrol base, round which several patrol clashes had occurred in December. Pt 342 was also the scene of clashes. In mid December, an attempt to raid the house did not succeed in clearing the enemy, due to the strength of the southern house and a rapidly laid on counter attack by the enemy. The northern house was actually entered but the enemy remained firm in the other although PIATs were used on it. Field artillery could not hit the house owing to crest clearance but, about Christmas time, it was found that mediums could hit it, fire being directed by the Air OP from our own main line of resistance, the house could only be seen from exposed positions in the left Company area and from the left Company area of the Battalion on the right.
From 27 December onwards, preliminary patrolling was carried out, mostly by moonlight, to learn all possible about the habits of the inhabitants of the house. A standing patrol was sent out every night half way down the Tamagnin Spur and once stayed out as a sniper patrol until midday. Black Ridge and the gully between it and Tamagnin were explored and the avenues of approach were examined. The only lines of approach not explored were the direct one down Tamagnin ridge and the approach by the track from the west. Sniping and observation was carried out all day from the left Coy area. Finally, a reconnaissance patrol went and lay up for an hour at night 15 yards north of the northern house, using the route around the end of the Tamagnin spur. The Battle Patrol officer, Montgomorie, commanded all the important patrols. Full moon was on the 29th December.
As a result of these investigations, the following facts were gleaned:
– Two sentries sometimes were posted on the end of the spur above the house, backed up by wide awake men, who sometimes smoked in the windows of the house.
– Although smoke was sometimes seen coming from the northern house in the mornings, the southern house appeared to be most occupied.
– At approximately 1100 hours, a man was often seen in the eastern windows of the southern house, sometimes showing someone else the lie of the land.
– Antrim was fairly strongly occupied.
– Southern house had much straw in it showing through the cracks.
– The ground floor windows of northern house were open, while those of the southern house were sandbagged or blocked by bales of straw.
– There were two trip flares and one booby trap on the approach from the north within a short way of the houses.
There was a considerable amount of cover in scrub on the way down the gully between Black Ridge and Tamagnin ridge and there was a ditch like gully in dead ground from Antrim extending from a few yards of Tamagnin to the owner of the spur. It was in this latter gully that the trip flares and booby traps were found.
On night 31 Dec–1 Jan, no noise was heard in the house from a range of 15 yards.
Based on this information, a plan was made.
The intention was to set fire to the two house at 0830 hours on 2 Jan. It was to be accomplished in the following manner. At 0400 hrs, the main body and two covering parties were to move out into position. The main body and two covering parties were to move out into position. The main body consisting of one officer, one sergeant, two corporals, two bren numbers, two PIAT numbers, six riflemen, two stretcher bearers and one No 38 set operator moved into a laying up position at the “Corner” (the lower end of the Tamagnin spur). One covering party of one Sergeant, two bren numbers and a 38 set operator moved into a covering position half way down the Tamagnin spur from where an excellent view of the southern house, the top half of the northern house and the open ground between Tamagnin and Antrim was to be had. The Sergeant was armed with a sniper’s rifle. The other covering party consisting of one officer, two bren numbers and a wireless operator moved into positions during the night before on Black Ridge where they enjoyed a good view of the other side of the houses. The officer carried a sniper’s rifle. The task of those covering parties was to keep the entrances and windows to the houses covered with accurate fire in the event of fire being opened on the main body. Similarly, a section of MMGs on the Lucca knoll covered the open ground south of Tamagnin. A single MMG was to be in position on the Rim by dawn to cover the house at Point 166 in case of trouble from there. The remainder of the guns of three MMG Platoons were to be ready to neutralise Antrim and the houses on the Anzellara ridge in case of trouble. A medium gun was to engage Casa Cerete at 0815 hrs as if normal housebreaking were in progress. A medium also shelled Tamagnin on the afternoon of 1 Jan, scoring four direct hits. A few rounds of field artillery were to be fired on to the Anzellara ridge to keep OPs down. Thereafter, they were to be ready to smoke Cerete and Muiano. The Bttn 3” mortars were to fire six rounds HE on to Antrim at 0815 hrs and, thereafter, be prepared to fire HE or smoke onto Antrim. All these items of fire support were normal procedures which the enemy had been accustomed to during the previous four days. Main body and covering parties were to remain perfectly still and quiet until 0800 hrs when an assault party from the main body consisting of one officer and six men were to creep up to the farm; leaving the remainder of the main body in a covering position near the Corner.
On the way out in the early morning of 2 Jan, the main body ran into a booby trap near our own lines made by a previous unit and suffered four casualties in the assault party. The operation was postponed until the following morning.
On the morning of 3 Jan, the raid took place on the exactly the same plan. It was a bright sunny day after a very cold night. All parties got into position safely and, at 0815 hrs, the assault party approached the northern house, which they entered by a low door at the end of the house farthest away from southern house. Up to this house, no sounds or sign of enemy occupation had been heard or soon, except a noise which might have been a tin being thrown away at about 0730 hrs.
No enemy were found in northern house but a “mousehole” was found leading to the second house. The patrol commander investigated this hole leaving a covering party of four in northern house and proceeded through it towards southern house. He discovered an entrance in the southern house opposite the mousehole, partially blocked with beams and straw banked up apparently to the roof. There was only room for one man to wriggle through at a time. A sound of stirring in the straw behind this entrance was heard and the patrol commander therefore returned to the northern house, collected two incendiary grenades, warned the covering party he was about to fire the southern house and threw the grenades into the straw in the southern house. The straw caught immediately and an uproar of shouting ensued in the house. Within two minutes, the flames had reached the far end of the house drowning all other noise. Some 25 enemy poured out of the house mostly from a window at the side nearest Antrim. So quickly did the house catch fire that it is almost certain some enemy were burned. The enemy were mostly unarmed and ran hard for Antrim followed by a scorched cat. One was killed by the Tommy guns of the assault party, while more are believed to have been hit by the MMGs on Lucca, who had an excellent shoot and who got sniped later very accurately for their pains. The survivors on reaching the small gully short of Antrim were very accurately engaged by the 3” mortars.
The assault party commander then set fire to the northern house and called on the wireless for smoke. During this time, running commentaries on the 38 set were being given on progress by the right covering party and the MMGs on Lucca. The left covering party only had a fleeting glimpse of the enemy before smoke from the burning house obscured their view. On the call for smoke, the covering fire programme was put into action. Muiano and Cerete were smoked by the gunners, a mixture of HE and smoke was put down by the 3” mortars on Antrim and the MG from the rim fired on Pt 166. The assault party rounded the Corner about 0930 hrs and when about level with the right covering party, the covering party on Black Ridge was ordered in. Shortly afterwards, the progress of the main body up in the gully, without interference, was such that the right covering party was also ordered in. The only enemy action encountered was one Schmeisser and one rifle wildly fired from the party that ran out of the house, an MG 42 firing a few un-aimed bursts from Antrim and the sniper sniping at Lucca already referring to. No enemy DF or harassing fire came down in or in front of the Battalion area. The PIAT was not fired. All parties returned without casualties by 1030 hrs.
It is felt that certain lessons are brought out by this operation. They are merely the normal ones in connection with a deliberate raid:
– Thorough reconnaissance by day and by night for several days before the raid was made by the personnel taking part with a study of air photographs and thorough briefing.
– Surprise achieved by a silent approach at breakfast time from positions gained in the dark. The Germans believe all British attacks of any sort take place at night preceded by heavy weapons preparation.
– Effective covering fire plan, offensively by snipers and Brens and defensively by smoke, if plans had miscarried.
– Accustoming of the enemy to the use of the same types of fire on the same places as were actually used in the operation.
– The patrol was sent out on the very next night after their misfortune on the booby trap in the same way as airmen are sent up in a new plane as soon as possible after a crash.
The degree of success achieved was not allowed for, the covering fire having too great a proportion of a defensive quality. Otherwise, the whole party of Germans might have been destroyed. It will be remembered though, that the information was to fire the house.
Order of withdrawal of covering parties and laying of smoke organised centrally from an OP with wireless and telephone communications.
Extra covering party of one platoon was ready to go out at short notice.”
Continuing in the Mountains
On 4th January, I went back to stay for a night with the Skins at Castro San Martino and join their Christmas party. On the next night, I visited the Divisional pantomime at Castel del Rio. This pantomime was absolutely first class. Although an all male cast, it compared very favourably to many a professional show at home.
On the 7th, there was a little more snow and any patrol movement became an extremely difficult matter. Both sides had snow clothing now. Consisting of a sort of white overall worn on top of everything else. A Bosche patrol, so clad, arrived within fifty yards of Pt 156 on the 8th but was seen off by the Faughs, leaving blood stains behind them on the snow. Our air reconnaissance was able to get a great deal of information about occupied enemy localities and supply routes by photographing tracks through the snow but I don’t think it really added very much to what we already knew.
About this time, I decided that it would be some satisfaction to the men who were continually performing some gallant or outstanding act if we published their names in Brigade Orders. I also intended to give a simple certification to each man, recording the fact that their names had been so published. The trouble was that the allotment of “Mentions in Despatches” was very small and it took from nine months to a year for the London Gazette to publish the award.
We felt that this simple token could not be thought by anyone to infringe the general awards and would give COs some way of giving early recognition to good work, which did not quite come up to the standard of an immediate award.
I enclose, at the end, a copy of the certificate and a list of those published to date in Brigade Orders for outstanding work.
That the idea was sound was encouraged by the fact that the Divisional Commander decided, about two months later, to institute a similar arrangement throughout the Division. His object was the same as mine but he hit on the excellent plan of allowing anyone who was awarded the Divisional “Mark of Merit”, to wear a small piece of braid under that their divisional sign. He also decided to make it retrospective to the beginning of October, when we returned from Egypt.
I then made our publication of names in Brigade Orders retrospectively to the same time and that automatically carried on award of the Divisional “Mark of Merit”.
On the 11th, I was told quite unexpectedly that I had been allotted an air passage for a fortnight’s leave at home. It was the beginning of a new scheme for Lt Colonels and above to go home on leave. It was thought, and probably rightly, that if they could be spared for the two and a half to three months required for the ordinary sort of leave, they might as well be dispensed with altogether. Johnny Preston GSO1 of the Division took my place; Bala Bredin went from the London Irish to do a turn at GSO1 and Jimmy Stewart, who had just returned from commanding the West Kents, took over command of the London Irish.
I left the Brigade on the 12th for Florence and an aeroplane to take me home. I saw John Horsfall in Florence on my way. He was still using a stick but had mended from his wound quite well. It was clear, however, that he was not fit enough to return to the Faughs and an offer of a job as GSO1 Training provided the right sort of change for him for the time being.
The story here is taken on by my staff.
On the 13th, our acting Brigade Commander went off early in the morning to visit the London Irish and the Skins. It was snowing at the time and, to the surprise of one of his staff, he accepted Colonel Bredin’s suggestion that he should visit Fitz’s Company at Sasso and Lucca. Despite the handicap of heavy mackintosh clothing, in addition to white snow clothing and some two feet of snow, the ascent went off quite smoothly. The snowfall cleared quite suddenly just as we were being welcomed by Fitz and the acting Brigade Commander was rewarded with a very clear view of Tamagnin. He then went on to visit the Skins before returning to Brigade Headquarters.
On the 13th, the London Irish reported that the culvert had been blown up, although no one had heard any noise of the explosion. Considerable controversy started amongst the battalions concerned as to when this deed had been perpetrated. It was not settled until some air photographs arrived which showed a large black object covering the snow around the culvert. The “I” Boys said that this was a cloud of smoke and that the photographs had been taken at the actual time of the explosion. By some proofs of higher mathematics, they were able also to tell us the height of the smoke cloud. The fact that the photographs were taken at 11.15 on the morning of 11 January made this difficult to believe. In broad daylight, it could not have escaped our notice.
Brigade Headquarters was surprised one morning to find the snow covered ground dotted with dormant bodies. On close investigation, those proved to be Americans from 85 US Infantry Division, who were coming up to relieve 1 British Division on our left. The DDA and QMC was heard to state that many of his problems would be solved if any of our warriors could be induced to do the same thing when in transit.
Close contact was quickly established between the Brigade and our neighbouring Yanks. The Reserve Platoon of the Left Company of the Faughs, who occupied Bazzano, shared slit trenches and section positions with II Battalion, 338 Regiment, US Army, who were on their left. This wise measure, which was extremely popular with all concerned, prevented any possibility of unhappy incidents occurring at night through either passwords being muddled or our Allies, because of their helmets, being mistaken for Bosche. It also produced a quick demand for shaving kit to be sent forward by the Yanks in this area. Cooperation was likewise cemented by the hospitality of the Faughs to the Second-in-Command of the 85 US Division when he was visiting their area. Rum and a dash of tea preceded his departure to the skirl of pipes. A small bottle of rum was to be noticed in his hand.
On the 17th, Brigade Headquarters entertained the officers of Headquarters 338 US Regiment to dinner. Paddy Bowen Colthurst produced a team of Indians from the affiliated mule company to cook and serve the meal. The Americans took this strange form of waiting at table and cooking as a matter of course; they neither asked questions nor showed surprise.