Through the Hitler Line.
The next day, the 18th May, was more peaceful. 36 Brigade were to go through us to see what could be done with the Hitler Line. Our only task was Colin Gibbs and F Company of the Irish Rifles, with some tanks, doing a sweep on our own flank. Some equipment was destroyed and a few Huns shot, otherwise nothing of note occurred.
The B Echelons had had a pretty hairy time throughout this and lost a number of vehicles from shellfire. In fact, everyone was involved in this battle. However, those excellent battalion administrative teams produced everything that was wanted without fail.
Pioneer Platoons had done a good job of work in mine clearing during the last three days. Fortunately, AP mines had not come up in any way to expectations.
The main feature of this day was the capture of the Monastery by the Poles. This was a great relief to everybody; our right flank had been a big worry. It gave such excellent observation to the Germans.
My next HQ, about half a mile from Piumarola, was about the deepest and best thing I have ever seen. It was magnificently furnished, electric light fittings, ventilation shafts and everything else one could want. Some very big shot must have lived here. Even a block buster would not have done it much harm. There was a booby trap in one of the neighbouring dug outs but we spotted it before any harm was done. On the whole, there were not many booby traps. The Hun had had plenty of other things to think about – a speedy departure being one of them.
That evening, the 18th, I held an ‘O’ Group cum bottle party in the ex Hun General’s subterranean palace.
Our job the next day was to cover the north flank of the Division’s thrust towards Aquino and the Hitler Line and the hills dominating Highway Six and the railway. It was wet the next morning and with mud and mined tracks, it took a bit of time for everyone to get into their new positions. Fortunately, no fighting was required to do this though shelling was distinctly unpleasant. The Irish Rifles’ gunners, Paul Lunn Rockliffe and John Lockwood were both wounded, which was a bad blow to the battalion. During the morning, Frank Wood of the Irish Rifles took a very good patrol from H Company across the railway to make sure all was well.
It had been misty for the first part of the morning.
John Horsfall’s description of what he saw when the mist cleared is worth repeating here:
“The mists cleared and the view to say the least of it was awe inspiring. Just in front of us was Piedimonte perched up and being slammed by our heavies and burning fiercely. Hanging miles up over our heads was the monstrous mountain mass of Monte Cairo. Talk about domination. Monte Cairo, of course, we know from the Castellone days when we were south east of it. Here we were due west and at the bottom of it.
The mountain, itself, is most impressive and had the same atmosphere of sinister foreboding as Longstop, only on a larger scale to the south of us was the black mass of Monte Cassino and perched on the top of the monastery, looking white in comparison, and very strange and silent. One got an inward satisfaction of seeing it thus and looking at it from the north, after having set so close on its other side for so many weary weeks. It was odd seeing it quiet when, in the past, there was always a pall of smoke over it, dotted by the red black burst of our shells.”
Smudger Maxwell, Second-in-Command of the Skins, had arrived yesterday to take over command. During the evening of this day, elements of my old 12th Brigade decided that they were going to attack the Skins. I could not quite make out what was happening when Smudger Maxwell called me up on the ‘blower’ to say that he was being attacked by some “bare arsed barbarians”. After some questioning about who these people could be, I began to see the light and asked if he referred to those who dress themselves in the same way as my Brigade Major. He confirmed that they were. It was Brian Madden and his Black Watch. With some difficulty, but without any untoward incident, we managed to fend them off and indicated the general direction in which they might expect to find Germans. I do not believe they found any, which must have been discouraging for them. We have often fought the English, but seldom the Scottish, and I was glad not to have broken a good record in this respect.
During the next couple of days, the Faughs enjoyed almost uninterrupted peace, but the Skins and the Irish Rifles both had some unpleasant shelling. I was about to call them up to see if Smudger was in. He had just taken a header out of the window and dived into some lower room to avoid a 170, which was threatening to come in at his window. Rollo Baker was there too playing this sort of hide and seek game. They told me it was no place for Brigade Commanders and, anyway, they did not want to see me. I was quite easily discouraged from the visit.
On the 20th, everyone had a grandstand view of the ferocious battle for Piedimonte, which was being fought desperately by the Poles on the other side of Route Six. This battle distracted the Germans’ attention from us for a day or two. That evening, we were able to pull out the Skins and the Faughs, to make room for the Indian Division coming up to our right. They were able to get into houses to make themselves comfortable. The Irish Rifles had to remain where they were until the next evening, then they were relieved by 56 Recce Regiment. The 11 and 36 Brigades at this time were ahead of us facing Aquino Aerodrome and the Hitler Line.
The Divisional Commander came to see me on the 22nd to talk about possible ways and means of attacking Aquino. On this day, we made our first contact with Lieut-Colonel Purvis and the 11th Canadian Armoured Regiment. These were a magnificent lot of chaps. Their Squadron Commanders and Troop Leaders lost no time in visiting the battalions to whom they were affiliated and getting down to drinking parties with them. This is the way real co-operation is born and with this regiment it grew into very fine proportions.
In the meanwhile, the war was going very well. The Poles had cleared Piedimonte and were swarming about on Mount Cairo. The Indians had come up on our right flank between the Poles and ourselves; the Canadians, who had relieved the Indians on our left, had captured Pontecorvo on the 23rd. The French had done simply magnificently and had come right through the mountains liquidating Ausonia and San Giorgio and coming down on the River Liri well to the west of those places. They had put in the bag all those Huns and all the guns in Ambroglio, Appolinare and Vallamaio. I had a particular spite against those Germans. They had been shooting at me in one way or another since December. The Americans on their left had done equally well. Gaeta and Formia on the coast had fallen and they too were now striking across the mountains in the general direction of Frosinone. The thing was looking promising. On the 24th, the Canadians had reached the River Melfa.
Just about this time, we had another of those most unpleasant night raids. I had just gone to bed in my caravan when the business started. Brigade HQ was very much in the open. We were beyond the range of Bosche guns and had forgotten about aeroplanes. Their technique was to drop flaming onions and then AP bombs on anything that they saw. I think the thing that saved us was that we were tucked under the few trees that were about in order to get a bit of shade during the day. The only safety precaution I could take was to lie under my caravan.
When I got there, I found Rollo Baker was already underneath his car a few yards away. There was quite a lot of competition for the underside of my caravan, but I managed to get a place all right. We had a magnificent view of the proceedings. The bombs fell in every direction but nothing nearer than about 300 yards from us. The Irish Rifles had one or two unfortunate casualties, but I think Divisional HQ got it worse than anyone else. The ADMS, who was a bit slow getting out of his caravan, in spite of his powerful frame, was unable to force a way among the congested ranks beneath it.
Towards Ceprano.
The next day, the 26th May, we started off to the wars again. It was interesting driving through the much vaunted Hitler Line, which had been turned so quickly. There was nothing wrong with it either. It was a maze of earthworks, anti-tank ditches and all the rest of the paraphernalia. That fine outflanking movement, which the French did and the very determined thrust through Pontecorvo by the Canadians was what really put paid to it. The leading elements of our Division had done little more than sit and look at it.
We were in the process of changing our Armoured Regiment at this juncture. It was rather an awkward moment to make the change. As I have said, the success was dependent on the various people getting to know each other personally, and there was not much time to do this. Our new Regiment was the 3rd Hussars, commanded by Peter Farquahar. I knew him well, as he had been my JUO at Sandhurst and often kicked my bottom. He took the reversal of the situation well and did everything that mortal men could do to help us. The Regiment had only fought in the desert before and the difficult going in Italy was about as different a problem for his point of view as anything could be.
The Faughs had had the best time so far and so they led off with the London Irish second and the Skins last.
I give you here the Faughs’ account of the next day:
“On 26th May, we embussed and motored up ACE Route, through Aquino and along Route Six to the Melfa River, where we got out because one feels rather naked in a TCV when under shell fire. Then started a long march due west from Route Six across country to Ceprano. The Guards were fighting for Monte Piccolo and Monte Grande to our north, and our task was to by-pass this resistance which was preventing the capture of Arce and to meet up with the Canadians in the Ceprano area.
So off we set. D Company led the way to the first bound and B Company went through until contact was made with our Maple Leaf cousins. This advance was not opposed except by the closeness of the country and the presence of several natural anti vehicle obstacles, the latter, however, being easy meat to Ronnie Denton and his boys. We halted that night round a road junction five miles from Ceprano, where we took over positions from the Irish Regiment of Canada.
One incident remains fresh in my mind – that of a Canadian standing at the junction calling ‘Canadian Irish, this way, English Irish that way.’ It was at this location that we were heavily shelled with a large percentage of wounded and dead amongst Bttn HQ. Such is war, however, and only serves to emphasise that forward of Division, you aren’t safe anywhere.”
We eventually concentrated the remainder of the brigade in the Coldragone Woods and a very unhealthy place it was too. The Germans had their OPs on Monte Grande and had all the tracks taped. These two mountains were the key to this area and to Arce beyond them. At one time, it looked as if we might get dragged in to assist the Guards Brigade in the task of capturing them. I was anxious, therefore, to get on and away from there.
To return for a moment to the Faughs’ advance to Ceprano. They really had a rotten day of it. A major battle was being waged on their right, they did not know what was to their front or left. The going was terribly difficult.
The tanks put up a magnificent show keeping up with them. Imagine their feelings when they eventually reached the road, which was their objective, to find a large notice stuck on a tree – ‘Heart Route’. The Canadians had been there before them. I set off in a tank with Colonel Purvis to see the Irish Rifles and I anticipated it would take about the same time to get to the Faughs. I picked up the CRE here and we all went on together. It was as hair raising a drive as I ever want to do in a tank, not on account of the enemy, but the ground. It was a good hour or more before we reached the Faughs and it had got dark.
What with one form of hold up and another and my wireless going out of order, I was not in my silkiest humour by the time I reached the Faughs. This was made worse by not being able to find anyone when I got into their area and I started ‘giving tongue’ in no uncertain manner. I had noticed, just before reaching their HQ, a few burning objects that looked as if they had recently caught fire, but what I did not realise was that they had just sustained some very heavy shelling that had knocked out a lot of very useful chaps. A tank makes such a noise that one does not hear quite a lot of exciting things. Anyway, I was duly contrite when I discovered the state of affairs, and gave them the form as far as I could.
It was dark by now so we abandoned the tank and started back in a borrowed jeep. It was a long and tricky drive across country with goodness knows what between us and our destination. We lost ourselves once or twice but eventually ran into one of Ronnie Denton’s bulldozing parties. These chaps thought nothing of playing about on their own in no man’s land. They showed us the way home when we thought we were finally lost. It was well after midnight when we got in and people were beginning to wonder what had happened to us.
The next day, the 28th, we started our move towards Ceprano, the Faughs still in the lead. The bridge by which they were going to cross the Liri was not all it was supposed to be and so there was a long hold up. However, they were in position the other side of the Liri, north of Ceprano, by 8pm, having met no opposition other than mines. Norman Bass was temporarily put out of action by one of those. The Skins were moved into the Faughs’ late positions in order to step up a firm base in case anything went wrong. Early next morning, the Irish Rifles and Brigade HQ joined the Faughs without any untoward incident. Later on in the day, the Skins came over too.
On the morning of the 29th, our last squadron of the Canadians changed over with the 3rd Hussars, who were now complete.
Hill 255.
We were given the task of striking north at once to capture Strangolagalli. As soon as the Faughs had changed their armour, they started probing forward. The country, during the next three days, proved to be worst tank country we had ever met. It was a very hard test on an Armoured Regiment trained in the desert. The work they put in to getting their tanks across this abominable country was most praiseworthy.
(NA 15685) Original wartime caption: A German field gun destroyed by the blast from one of our shells.
With the best will in the world, things were going pretty slowly with both infantry and tanks. Opposition was quite considerable, nebels and mortars were very active. The Faughs eventually reached their objective to the south of Strangolagalli about midnight, having done very well after a hard day’s fighting.
After making sure of their midday meal, I directed the Irish Rifles on to the high ground to the Faughs’ left flank.
Here is their CO’s own account of it:
“Progress was very slow for most of the day owing to the difficult tank going. We were then given the dual task during the afternoon of acting as back stop to the Faughs and also thrusting forward through the hills to their south ie coming up on their left flank. The difficulty here was the entire absence of tracks and the route was passable for no vehicles of any kind. The dominating feature for many miles was Hill 255 – about two miles south of Strangolagalli. E Company, under Mervyn Davies, was sent off in the middle of the afternoon to act as a probing force, and they accomplished their very difficult cross country approach by 6pm when they ran into Bosche in strength on 255 itself.
Accordingly, they took up positions about 600 yards south of the hill to await us. The Faughs, meanwhile, launched their attack on Strangolagalli at dusk, which released the rest of us for 255 and we set off on foot at 3pm. Mike Everleigh and his Hussars were just told the plot and asked to help if they could. We eventually reached Mervyn after an arduous hike across the hills by 10pm. The trip was uneventful except for being Nebelwerfer-ed several times during the first part.
We found Mervyn and his boys established in a farm on the end of a spur, which was a very good view point in the moonlight. The attack was laid on for midnight with E Company doing the main assault while G Company cleaned up the north flank and H Company supported the attack from the nearby houses. I, in the meantime, got busy on the artillery plot. E Company duly waded in at midnight behind a 20 minute concentration by the Divisional artillery.
They went off their bearing slightly but it was rather advantageous than otherwise for they came up on the flank of the Bosche’s main positions and were behind them before the opposing team realised it. When they did, a fierce hand to hand struggle broke out which lasted about a half an hour. The Bosche eventually ran for it. A special word of praise here is due to the 17th Field. The concentration was perfect and fell heaviest where the German trenches were thickest and the Bosche were only half dug in. The 17th Field had had no time to range and they had only moved into position in the late afternoon. Furthermore, they only had half an hour in the dark to lay their shoot on. It was decisive. We had no casualties. There were at least eight dead Huns on the objective and many signs of other casualties. They had abandoned most of their weapons and a lot of other equipment. By 2am, the whole area was consolidated and we had linked up with the Faughs, while our patrols probed north. The latter ran into a number of Bosche and heard a lot of enemy vehicle movement.
In the meantime, the difficulty was getting our vehicles and finally Ivan Yates got through with jeeps by a route, which must have taken him almost through the Bosche lines via Route Six. Finally, however, we linked up with S Company, who came through Strangolagalli via the Faughs.”
Later in the evening, I moved the Skins up to the right rear of the Faughs and sent a patrol into Strangolagalli to see what the form was. They found it unoccupied. Apart from quite a fair amount of enemy opposition during these few days, our chief headache was an engineering one. Pushing roads through was an absolute headache and their rate of progress really governed the speed of the operation. I never fussed about this because I knew quite well that Ronnie Denton and his lads would always be working at top speed. It was just absurd to hustle them. All I wanted was the best possible estimates of time required for a task at frequent intervals. This I got and, on it, based the plan.
San Giovanni.
Our task for the next day, the 30th May, was to turn east and advance on Ripi. The Irish Rifles was best placed to lead and it was also their turn. The Skins were to follow and the Faughs were to remain in reserve. It was obviously only a one battalion task anyhow.
(NA 15653): Major General C.F. Keightley, Commander 78 Division ( right) discussed the situation with Brigadier T.P.D. Scott, DSO., Commander, 38 Irish Brigade, and other officers.
The Irish Rifles’ objective was San Giovanni, and to do what they could about Ripi afterwards. They had put an extremely good show during the previous night and their tanks were having a hell of a time getting after them. However, this seemed in no way to detract from the high standard of the performance, they put up in the forthcoming battle. Here is their own account of it:
“We were then briefed to take over the lead with our objective Ripi some six miles ahead. Mike Everleigh had arrived on foot with a promise of the eventual arrival of his tanks so we made our plot together on the top of 255, which incidentally the Bosche started to hot up at the same time. As it was, we saw quite a lot of movement in front of us, including a tank.
The squadron arrived at 1130 after spending fifteen hours en route. It was a magnificent feat their getting at all across those hills and everyone thought they were attempting the impossible.
Zero was at noon and at 1205, the leading tank went up on a mine effectively blocking the only route. It took the Pioneers an hour to clear the minefield and make a diversion and then the battle started in earnest. E Company probed forward covered by two troops of tanks and after the first thousand yards ran into Huns in strength on either side of the road and mostly in buildings. Ian immediately brought down a series of ‘Monkeys’, while Mike got busy with his tanks plastering each locality and building.
In half an hour, the opposition was suppressed and quite a lot of Germans killed while others bolted. Two or three SPs joined but one was hit before it could do much damage and the other silenced by artillery fire. H Company was then sent in to clean up north of the road to Ripi and E Company then took the lead. They got forward another two thousand yards troubled only a lot of inaccurate sniping. In San Giovanni, however, they ran into a whole packet of trouble as it was strongly held, so a full scale attack was put in. F Company broke into the centre of the town from the west while E and G got in the south end and some pretty ferocious street fighting developed, which lasted for over two hours, with our chaps working from house to house and the 3rd Hussars working in very close support. E Company finally overcame one strong point by setting it on fire with 77 grenades so that the garrison had to jump out of the windows – in another, F Company shot down twelve Germans in one room.
The Bosche made several attempts to destroy our tanks with their Bazooka rockets without success, one such party being blown to bits completely by a 75 shell. The town was taken at dusk and it took about an hour to sort ourselves out after the considerable confusion. After that, we pushed on to Ripi establishing patrols in the town and taking up positions about 800 yards south west of it. The opposition had been either destroyed or had fled for we had no further trouble except for mild mortaring.
Between 80 and 100 Bosche were killed in this battle, fifteen prisoners were taken, two AFVs destroyed and a third damaged, and a very large number of MGs etc. Our own casualties were fifteen wounded.”
During this day, the situation on our right was most obscure. There might or might not have been Indians in the distant hills. On our left, the 36 Brigade were forging up astride Route Six towards Torrice with the Canadians on their left. The Fifth Army were still going great guns and had swung up far ahead of us. The Anzio Bridgehead burst out about this time and two portions of the Fifth Army were aiming at a union. It was a sound move doing nothing from Anzio until our advance was within striking distance. The Bosche were kept uncertain about what we were going to do there and a lot of his reserves were contained cheaply.
In the evening, the Skins moved up to a concentration area behind the Irish Rifles with a view to taking up the hunt the next day. That night, Ripi was found to be unoccupied. Next day, we were told to strike north from Ripi parallel to the advance of 36 Brigade on Torrice. The advance on this day, the 31st, was characteristic of what the country can do. A few well sited craters blocked the only road through the hills. To find an alternative track was the very devil. It was very difficult country and the most that could be expected of tanks was support from one crest to another. The Sherman has an excellent gun and it can do its stuff very well indeed at 4,000 yards. The Skins met practically no opposition at all and, by 9pm, had clamped down firmly with their tanks harboured behind them.
That night was quiet and the war seemed to be drifting on. Some ‘Long Toms’ started up behind Brigade HQ, but this was really the only nuisance.
Mines were a serious business in this locality. AP as well as anti tank. That morning, I had a track carefully swept which I was bringing Brigade HQ along. I was going ahead myself about half past six to see the Skins. When I came back, I found a white scout car had been blown up where Rollo Baker and I had passed not long before. Paddy, too, luckily spotted a mine in his path just in time on another track. I do not quite know what he was doing there. I suspect he was on some rather doubtful expedition.