ALTHOUGH the big German attack was expected in March, 1918, the exact day and hour when it should be launched was not known. The night of March 20th-21st was quiet. This was not unusual as, with the exception of aeroplane bombing raids and an artillery bombardment early every morning, the enemy had of late refrained from great annoyance in the forward positions at night. The world, however, woke up at 4.15 a.m. on the 21st to excessive noise of shells and guns. Alert sentries sent up the S.O.S., and our artillery soon replied. “The usual morning strafe,” said someone, and snoozed down into his blankets again. His composure was short-lived, however, for the enemy fire increased in intensity, and gas-shell was fired in particularly heavy concentrations; heavy trench mortars joined in with a nasty, thick, methodical bombardment of our front line posts and sapheads, long- range guns sent high-bursting shrapnel over the headquarters and villages miles behind the line. The staffs turned out – in pyjamas first – and telephones were soon busy. It was soon realised that this was no ordinary bombardment, and that at last the great attack had come.
The 47th Division, part of the Vth Corps (Lieut.-General Sir E.A. Fanshawe), had relieved the 2nd Division in the La Vacquerie sector on March 19th and 20th. The 141st Brigade took over the left front on the night of the 19th-20th, and the 140th Brigade were to hold the right front from the night 20th-21st. The 142nd Brigade was in reserve. On our left was the 63rd (Royal Naval) Division (Major-General C. Lawrie), also in the Vth Corps. On the right was the 9th (Scottish) Division, temporarily commanded by Brigadier-General H.H. Tudor. This division was in the VIIth Corps (Lieut.-General Sir W.N. Congreve, V.C), and formed part of General Sir Hubert Gough’s Fifth Army.
The important factor in these dispositions was that the 47th Division was on the extreme right of Byng’s Third Army, and the task of defending the flank of the army fell to the 47th.
The front line which the Division took over was on Welsh Ridge, the left sector of it being on the reverse slope. Observation was bad. The reserve line was on Highland Ridge, some 2,000 yards behind, and from this an excellent field of fire was obtainable. Between the two ridges was the narrow Couillet Valley, which, with its steep sides, was a regular gas-trap. Here the troops of the 2nd Division in support had suffered severely from gas-shell on March 18th and 19th.
Thus it happened that, on the very day when the German offensive began, the 2nd Division, which had suffered heavy casualties and was comparatively weak in strength, went into Corps Reserve, while the 47th Division, which was not only stronger in numbers and fresher, but had for the past week or two been undergoing special training as a counter-attack Division, took its place in holding the line.
According to orders, the command of the La Vacquerie Sector was to pass to Major-General Sir G.F. Gorringe, our Divisional Commander, at 6 a.m. on March 21st, but in view of events, he assumed responsibility for the front at five o’clock – after the bombardment had started, and before the scheduled time for taking over had arrived. The divisional relief was not yet complete. We had the 2nd Divisional Artillery still with us, and only part of the Machine-gun Battalion had been relieved. This state of things was inconvenient, for misunderstandings and delay may often arise when units are strange to one another. Throughout the whole of the next anxious days the work of the 2nd Division units with us was excellent and deserving of the greatest credit; their loyalty and eagerness to assist and obey orders of commanders strange to them (our C.R.A. and O.C. Machine-gun Battalion took over command during the day) left nothing to be desired.
Our own artillery, whose wanderings are briefly described elsewhere, left the Division on March 21st, and moved northwards. They were not restored to it until May 22nd. The field artillery covering the sector held by the 47th Division at the opening of the attack consisted of the two brigades of the 2nd Divisional Artillery – the 41st Brigade R.F.A. under Lieut.-Colonel Barton, and the 36th Brigade R.F.A. under Lieut.-Colonel Goschen, the 34th (Army) Brigade R.F.A. under Lieut.-Colonel Parry, and the 87th Brigade R.F.A., from the 19th Divisional Artillery, under Lieut.-Colonel Peel. The 36th Brigade, R.F.A., was transferred to the 63rd Division on the night of March 22nd-23rd. On March 23rd, the remaining three brigades were affiliated respectively to the 142nd, 140th, and 141st Infantry Brigades, and acted in conjunction with them during the greater part of the retirement.
Meanwhile, our men in the front line were having a horrible time. It was not, apparently, the enemy’s plan to launch a massed attack on our front. He seemed to rely on the main attack farther south, assisted by strong and continual pressure on our immediate front, to force us out of our positions. The bombardment grew more intense, and by nine o’clock we had suffered heavy casualties. The gas-shell was especially deadly, and for hours our men had to wear their masks, and while thus handicapped, continually to repel the enemy’s fighting patrols. Later in the day the enemy advanced under a smoke screen, and only after repeated efforts and wearing our troops down by trench-mortar fire and gas did he succeed in gaining one or two isolated positions in our front line. Local counterattacks by the 18th and 19th Battalions drove back the enemy, who had in some places reached our second-line trench – a very fine piece of work after the drubbing they had received from the enemy’s guns and mortars.
Reports received showed that the enemy had made progress on our right and had occupied the front-line system of the Division on our right. On the left the 63rd Division had had similar experiences to our own, and had also held their ground. Farther north, Doignies had been lost, and it became evident that if more progress were made against the corps north and south of us, the 47th and 63rd would be forced to fall back. The 4th R.W.F., the Pioneer Battalion, had been ordered up to Metz from Lechelle, and the remainder of our Machine-gun Battalion, which was back at Rocquigny, had come forward into reserve. Such was the situation in the evening. The Division could well feel proud that the front was still intact, especially in the light of the terrific bombardment. Reports showed that, in spite of a day under continual fire, the men were still confident and in good spirits.
During the night the situation on our flanks became worse. At 7.48 p.m., the 47th and 63rd Divisions were ordered to leave their front line and take up a position along the Highland Ridge, in accordance with the prearranged plan of the Third Army.
This withdrawal under the nose of the enemy was made unknown to him and without mishap. The signal service had remained good throughout the day, the buried cable being the strength of the system.
Eleven prisoners had been taken, and these stated that the objectives of the attack were unlimited. So we were to expect another hard day.
The night was quiet. Hostile artillery was evidently busy taking up new positions, and firing was spasmodic. As soon as daylight appeared, the enemy crept cautiously forward, only to find the position vacated. Strong patrols were pushed out down the southern slopes of the Welsh Ridge to discover our whereabouts, and many endeavours were made to reach our positions, but our machine-guns, Lewis-gun posts, and snipers had been well placed, and all day the enemy was prevented from crossing the Couillet Valley. Our position, and the fine obstinacy of our men, gave us an opportunity of inflicting heavy casualties.
Again and again the Germans tried without success to get across to Highland Ridge. The situation gave encouragement to the infantry, who had no doubt of their ability to hold the position indefinitely. But south of us things were going badly. As early as 7.30 a.m. the Divisional Commander realised the danger on our right flank, caused by the withdrawal of the 9th Division. During the morning the situation became more and more dangerous, and this was represented to Vth Corps. By midday the 9th Division was already back on its second system {i.e., our Metz Switch system) and an extension of our right was necessary. The R.W.F. were ordered to occupy the Metz Switch on the right of the 142nd Brigade. The situation was becoming an anxious one. The right of the 140th Brigade was already in the air, although the position of the Pioneer Battalion formed an echelon, and thus prevented the enemy from cutting in behind our front system. During the afternoon things on our right grew still worse. The Fifth Army were rapidly falling back, and at 4.10 p.m. a Staff officer from the 9th Division reported that they were leaving their second system at 4.30 p.m., and in the evening intended to retire behind Fins.
This, of course, made our Highland Ridge position quite impossible. Orders had been issued for a withdrawal that night to the second system, which the 142nd Brigade was to hold. The 141st Brigade was to pass through and concentrate west of Metz, and the 140th Brigade was to occupy the Metz Switch as far as Fins, so as to form a long defensive flank, and, if possible, get into touch with the 9th Division. This difficult operation was very successfully carried out, and considering the continuous pressure of the enemy and the uncertainty of the situation of the 9th Division, was a very creditable performance. Mention, however, must be made of the splendid stand made by the 18th Battalion on the Highland Ridge. As soon as dusk fell the Germans attacked from Villers Plouich. The London Irish stood calm and, by rifle and machine-gun fire, beat off the enemy, who left many dead and wounded before our trenches. A second attack was launched. This, too, was unsuccessful. A third and a fourth time the enemy attempted to reach our position, but each time he was repulsed with great loss. The men of the 18th, anxious to convince the German he was trying an impossible thing, counter-attacked and cut off the hostile attacking party, and then proceeded to annihilate it. Seven Germans were spared and brought in as prisoners. Not one escaped.
It was clear by the evening that not only must we give up the ridge, but the second system was also rendered untenable, and as soon as the 140th and 141st Brigades were in their allotted positions the 142nd returned to the trenches covering Metz, known as the Metz Switch. The Divisional frontage was now 8,000 yards. The trenches were only half dug, and there was little wire. The artillery were moving to new positions, and a protective barrage during the night was out of the question. No sooner had all preparations been made to defend this long line than the 9th Division reported they would have to leave their position in front of Equancourt before daylight. This left the 47th Division holding a four-and-a-half-mile front from Metz (inclusive) to Fins (exclusive), with an exposed right flank, and the enemy advancing in a north-westerly direction. Should the enemy succeed in turning the flank, the disaster would be incalculable. By 10 p.m. the Germans were in Fins. A Company of the Pioneer Battalion (now under the command of Brigadier-General Kennedy of the 140th Brigade), hastened to strengthen the end of the line; No. 11 Motor Machine-gun Battery, which had that day been attached to the Division, was sent there, too, and, with the help of an additional section of our own machine-gunners, covered all the western and northern exits of the village. The map (No. VIII) shows the position at 10 p.m. on March 22nd, and illustrates how the Division changed front and defended the right flank of the Third Army that night on the line of the Metz Switch. The 99th Brigade of the 2nd Division was placed under the command of the 47th Division at 10.30 p.m., and ordered to advance from Ytres and reinforce our right. This brigade never reached or established connection with the 140th Brigade on this line of defence, however. It was very much reduced in strength, having suffered heavy casualties in the gas bombardment a few days earlier.
Communications had become worse, as we were getting off the front network of telephone lines, and much had to be done by means of runner and despatch-rider. During the day much visual signalling had been done, the 140th Brigade keeping up communication all day with the Metz exchange by this means. The 15th Battalion, on the extreme right, had an anxious and heavy task to perform, and the fact that no Germans filtered through the gap throws great credit on the way in which the patrols and machine-gunners did their work that night. One of the officers attached to the 140th Brigade Headquarters (Lieutenant H.A. Gilkes, M.C.) went out alone to Dessart Wood and brought in two German prisoners, a piece of work typical of this gallant young officer, who won the rare distinction of three bars to his Military Cross.
All the other services of the Division were also in the picture. The Field Companies, R.E., which were working all over the divisional area when the attack started, were, after many difficulties, now concentrated behind the Metz Switch.
A little note in the official records reads: “A.D.M.S. reports communication established with all battalions. Aid-posts all clear by 4.30 p.m.” Those who were with the Division on March 21st and 22nd and the following days know that to get the wounded dressed and away to safety on such occasions implies hard work, continuous devotion to duty, and the highest efficiency.
Not one machine-gunner was idle; all were in position along and immediately behind the Metz and Dessart Switches. The artillery no sooner took up a position to support the infantry than the situation changed, and guns had to be moved. All through the night and day guns were moving from position to position, laying out the lines of fire, only to find when all was ready that new situations necessitated new moves. A good deal of firing was done on the enemy roads at night, but the constant changing presented combined firing programmes.
It is well to pause here, for after that night the nature of the operations changed. From now on the fighting was more open. Co-ordination became more and more difficult, communication more hazardous. Up to this point we had been prepared to defend for a long period every position taken up. It was known that the enemy had penetrated the Fifth Army front, but how far he had progressed was not known. One expected at any moment to hear that the limit of retirement on our right had been reached. Each successive position to which the 47th Division had been ordered to withdraw had been organised in depth with a view to defence, and there we had been prepared to stand. But the operation was vaster than we knew, the enemy’s success more penetrating than we could have imagined, and from now on the task of the Division was not to hold definite positions to grim death, but to keep the enemy’s advance in check, and at all costs to prevent him striking in behind us, thereby cutting off our troops and subsequently rolling up the flank of the army to which we belonged.
The 142nd Brigade, acting as rearguard to the Division, withdrew during the night 22nd-23rd to the Metz Switch, having the 63rd Division on their left and two companies of the R.W.F. on the right. Dawn of the 23rd found the 140th Brigade with its right flank exposed, and a nasty gap had been made more dangerous by the further retirement of the 9th Division from Equancourt to Manancourt. The Germans were now seen west of Fins; their machine-guns were thus able to enfilade our right battalions. The situation was again growing impossible, and the withdrawal to the Green Line (an old line of German trenches running east of Etricourt and Ytres) was inevitable. The 141st Brigade was ordered to occupy this line with two battalions; the third battalion, with the R.E. Companies attached, were to face south and form a connecting-link between the Green Line and the right of the 140th Brigade. The 140th and 142nd Brigades were then to fall back to the high ground west of Ytres and covering Lechelle. The enemy had evidently realised the situation, and now made desperate efforts to get through the gap and behind the 140th Brigade, and it was due to the prowess of the 15th and 18th Battalions and R.E. Companies that he was prevented from doing so. Heavy fighting took place. The enemy advanced, supported by trench-mortar, machine-gun, and artillery fire; close fighting ensued, in which one company of the 15th was surrounded and, unfortunately, never extricated. The R.E.’s, under the fine leadership of Major S. G. Love, D.S.O., proved that they were as good fighters as they were engineers. There is no doubt that the frustration of the enemy’s plan of rolling up our line from the position to which he had penetrated on our right rear on this occasion saved the Division and the right of the Third Army from disastrous results.
Meanwhile, the enemy had not confined his efforts to this sector alone. All along the Metz Switch, determined attacks were launched. The line was not strongly held owing to the length of front the Division was occupying. Heavy casualties, too, had further reduced our powers of resistance. A very determined onslaught was made on the position held by the 23rd Battalion near the Metz Cemetery. Dense masses of Germans had been seen at eight o’clock advancing a mile away. Machine-guns opened fire, and even at this range inflicted many casualties. The (two companies of the R.W.E. which were on the right of the 23rd had been ordered to reinforce the exposed flank of the 140th Brigade, thus leaving a gap of 300 yards between the 23rd and 21st Battalions. The attacks of the enemy prevented this gap being filled, although gallant attempts to do so were made by the 21st Battalion, who suffered thereby many losses. The 23rd Battalion threw out a defensive flank and prepared to withstand the enemy. The vacated trench was soon occupied by him, and he proceeded to open heavy lire on our men. Captain Brett, who commanded the 23rd Battalion in this position, sent a fighting patrol along the trench to try and get in touch with the 21st, but the enemy was in too great numbers, and well supplied with bombs.
The Germans continued to advance, but still the 23rd Battalion held on, and prevented the enemy from getting possession of this piece of high ground on the right flank. This state of affairs lasted until the zero hour for the prearranged retirement of the 142nd Brigade arrived. The defence of the Metz Switch by the 23rd London Regiment under Captain Brett stands out in the history of the retreat as one of the most gallant and determined examples of refusal to give way before strong and well-nigh overwhelming attacks. Four waves of the enemy attacked the trenches; counter-attack followed attack; our artillery supported with continual heavy fire, and the Germans lost heavily. When the hour arrived for the 23rd Battalion to withdraw from the trenches, they did so in their own way, in their own time, and unmolested by a defeated and disheartened foe.
In the afternoon the 140th Brigade retired from the Dessart Switch to the high ground east of Lechelle, but leaving some men on the right of the front in the Green Line. Near Lechelle they were joined by elements of the 99th Brigade, of the 2nd Division, who then assisted in checking the enemy’s advance from the south-east.
These troops of the 140th Brigade who had withdrawn were collected at Four Winds Farm about 2.30 p.m. on March 23rd. As they were being got into line across the Lechelle aerodrome the enemy attacked the troops of the 9th Division south of the Rocquigny-Manancourt road and forced them back. The Berkshires, of the 99th Brigade, who were on the right of the 140th Brigade, were also compelled to fall back, but halted on the continuation of the line held by the 140th. The enemy advanced over the ridge from the direction of Etricourt, but was stopped by the small force which had been collected on the aerodrome.
This force consisted largely of odd headquarters details, and totalled about 300 men from different battalions of the 140th Brigade, of which the greater part was still in the Green Line. It stood firm in its position in the open near Four Winds Farm until 7.30 p.m., when the enemy attacked under a heavy barrage and drove our troops back. It was here that Captain R. de Saumarez, who had recently been appointed Staff Captain of the 140th Brigade, was killed while passing up ammunition. The troops were reformed in the valley near Lechelle Wood and withdrew to the Rocquigny area.
The 142nd Brigade retired from the Metz Switch area, but were closely followed and harassed by the enemy. Near Vallulart Wood the brigade made a stand, but the enemy were in great strength, and our men, tired after the strenuous fighting in the morning, were forced to fall back on Ytres. All day the artillery had been in action, covering the infantry’s withdrawal. Batteries “leap- frogged” back to new positions west of Ytres. The heavy trench-mortar batteries had buried their weapons, and the personnel were now used as runners and observers, and worked on temporary lines of defence.
It was a hard day, March 23rd. On our left, the 63rd Division was also holding the enemy, and touch was always maintained, but on the right there was ever danger – for the Fifth Army continued to retire faster and farther, ever widening the distance between our junction with the 63rd Division on our left and the left of the 9th Division to the South.
The enemy again remained quiet during the night, except for spasmodic artillery fire. As the 141st Brigade had been ordered to take up a new line east of Le Mesnil, it was essential that the 142nd Brigade should fall back to the west of Ytres. The 23rd Battalion had already proceeded westwards, and the 22nd and 24th Battalions were about to follow, when the startling rumour reached them that the Germans were in Bus. A hurried consultation between the commanders took place in Ytres, and it was decided to make for Rocquigny via Bertincourt, and so to circumvent Bus. It might mean cutting a way through the German line, for it looked as if these two battalions had been cut off. Advanced guards were thrown out, and all through the night the men marched, expecting at any moment to run into the enemy, anxiously approaching first Bertincourt then Barastre. It would not have surprised them if enemy machine-guns had opened on them at any point; the Germans might have been anywhere about them. But they got through without mishap, and Rocquigny was entered at 7 a.m. of March 24th. It is still a mystery how the Germans got into Bus that night. That they were there, there is no doubt, for reports came from many sources that our troops had been fired on from the village. The only explanation is that an enemy patrol must have filtered through from the south-east. But, however simple the explanation now, it does not diminish the tension and anxiety of that eerie march through the night of the 22nd and 24th Battalions.
For three days the troops of the 47th Division had been fighting and marching, digging and manoeuvring without ceasing. From now on, the operations were of a still more open nature. The men adapted themselves well to the new conditions, and Lewis gun and rifle fire were very effectively maintained throughout. The men were still unshaken, but tired. There had been no sleep; food had been eaten when and how it could. Casualties had been heavy, and many men had become separated from their units. The consolidation, therefore, of a definite line of defence was a practical impossibility.
Dawn of March 24th found the 141st Brigade in line by Le Mesnil. The 140th had withdrawn from Lechelle Aerodrome, where they had harassed the enemy’s advance from Etricourt. The 142nd were marching into Rocquigny. Divisional headquarters was at Combles and moved early to Les Boeufs; the 9th Division was back at Bouchavesnes, thus leaving our right still exposed. We were in touch with the 63rd Division on the left, and the 17th Division was reported to be coming up to fill the gap between us and the 9th Division.
The Germans wasted no time after darkness had disappeared, but advanced in some strength towards St. Pierre Vaast Wood, and, meeting with no opposition, pushed on to Combles and thence in the direction of Morval. A glance at the map will show the precarious position of the 47th Division, and will account for subsequent events. Massed attacks were made against the position round Mesnil where the 141st Brigade offered a stout and well-maintained resistance. Fighting was severe, hand-to-hand encounters taking place in Loon Copse. The 51st Brigade (17th Division), which had arrived about 6 a.m. on the right of the 141st Brigade, was forced to retire, and the enemy advanced round our flank on Rocquigny. The 21st Battalion of the 140th Brigade, and the 20th Battalion of the 141st Brigade, under Lieut.-Colonel F.R. Grimwood, still held on, however, and kept the enemy at bay east of the village all the morning. Attack after attack was repulsed with a vigour that must have surprised the enemy, and it was not until 2 p.m. that most of our men left the village. Lieut.-Colonel G. Dawes, D.S.O., M.C., commanding the 21st, with a few headquarter details, remained in Rocquigny until 3.30.
The remains of the 20th Battalion held the line in front of Rocquigny alone after the rest of the 140th and 141st Brigades had left. The enemy were round their right flank and in the village behind them, but the 63rd Division were holding the line to the left, and they decided to protect the right flank of that division as long as they could. The 20th manned both front and rear of the shallow trench and were heavily engaged, suffering many casualties. The Battalion was under direct artillery fire from Mesnil. At 4 p.m. the 63rd Division unexpectedly retired, and the 20th Battalion were left practically surrounded. They then fought their way back towards Le Transloy, but were under close-range fire from three sides and very few of the battalion reached Le Transloy at dusk. Lieut.-Colonel Grimwood and his Adjutant were entirely cut off and captured. The remnant of the battalion from Le Transloy joined the 141st Brigade at High Wood.
The advent of the 51st Brigade on our right eased matters considerably, and it was no doubt due to its presence and resistance that the rest of our Division was able to get away safely and reassemble by Le Transloy.
Meanwhile, the advance on Morval threatened the Les Boeufs-Guinchy Road, along which all the divisional transport was moving. The R.E. Companies and Pioneers under Major Love and Major J.H. Langton, 4th R.W.F., were ordered to defend this road until the transport should have passed. Here the Germans received another surprise, for our men, admirably placed, took advantage of the targets offered, and hundreds of the enemy were mown down by rifle and machine-gun fire. The Motor Machine-gun Battery joined this gallant force later on, intensified the resistance, and increased the slaughter.
The 34th (Army) Brigade R.F.A., which was under the orders of Brigadier-General Whitley, our C.R.A., supported this rearguard, and got some good shooting over open sights at the enemy as they attempted to advance from Morval and from Leuze Wood.
All the transport was withdrawn in good order. Too high praise cannot be bestowed on the spirit of men who had fought for three days, who had fought over some fifteen miles of country, and yet who were still ready, indeed anxious, to dispute every inch of ground. The speed with which the enemy came up towards Les Boeufs prevented our infantry forming a line of resistance near Le Transloy, and orders were sent from divisional headquarters that the retirement must be by Gueudecourt to High Wood, thence in the direction of Albert. The officers commanding brigades had, however, realised the urgency of such a movement, and were already taking their troops in that direction. Meanwhile, the enemy pressed on towards Flers, and urgent orders were sent out that the infantry must make a still wider detour to Eaucourt I’Abbaye, thence to Bazentin. These orders were, unfortunately, delayed owing to the Germans being in possession of the only road eastwards. Brave efforts were made by despatch-riders, now the only means of communication, to get through. Major W.F. Bruce, D.S.O., M.C., commanding the Signal Company, went out himself to take the messages, and the 140th and 141st Brigades received the orders. Major Bruce, however, had the bad luck to be taken prisoner in his efforts to reach the 142nd Brigade. The G.O.C.’s 140th and 141st Brigades had conferred, and previous to the arrival of the divisional orders had decided that the retirement must be by way of Martinpuich. The 142nd Brigade made for High Wood, where remnants of the battalions arrived at dusk after a trying march. Brigadier-General V. T. Bailey and some of his staff were captured in the vicinity of Flers. The general himself was wounded, and the brigade-major, Captain H. Peel, D.S.O., 8th London Regiment, was killed.
When night fell the tired troops of Brigadier-Generals Kennedy and Mildren arrived at the woods above Bazentin-le-Petit. Lieut.-Colonel Maxwell assembled the remaining men of the 22nd, 23rd, and 24th Battalions in High Wood. Here also were the R.E.’s and Pioneers who had done such brilliant work in the afternoon. Major-General Gorringe and his staff were at Contalmaison, and everyone set to work to reorganise, to get food and ammunition to the troops, and to prepare one more check to the enemy’s advance.
High Wood! The words will bring poignant memories to many in the 47th Division. An ironic joke of Fate, surely, to send us back through High Wood. Our troops passed the cross erected there to those brave fellows of the 47th who had succeeded in 1916 where others had failed, and many vowed that we would have no peace till High Wood had been wrested again from the hands of the Germans.
The desolation of the Somme country was in keeping with our feelings. Feet were sore with marching over rough country; stomachs were yearning for nourishment; mouths parched; bodies tired with a heavy, numbing fatigue; these things produced a desolate feeling akin to the quiet sorrow of the surrounding country. It was a sharp, cold night. A brilliant moon shone overhead, and one shivered after the heat and toil of the day. German aeroplanes had been flying low all the afternoon, firing machine-guns on the retreating infantry, and bombing the transport and areas where men assembled. A convoy of ration carts loaded with hot drink, food, and ammunition was organised at the Contalmaison crossroads, and, escorted by the Motor Machine-gun Battery, it moved forward towards Bazentin. The rumble of wheels was the only sound to be heard. Occasional Verey lights reminded us that the enemy was very near; where, exactly, no one knew – nor did one worry, for what was uppermost in the mind then was food and sleep. Food there was – for the convoy got through safely – but very little sleep.
The Germans remained quiet all night. The troops in High Wood were withdrawn to the west of Bazcntin-le-Petit, and there the whole remaining force of the Division was organised, and took up a strong position to meet the further attacks of the enemy. This force was placed later under the command of Brigadier-General Kennedy.
During the morning of the 25th, a determined attack by the enemy was repulsed with rifle, Lewis-gun and machine-gun fire. After this, the Germans did not press home their attacks, and General Kennedy’s force held the position all day. In the afternoon many Germans were seen in and about Bazentin Wood, and we were able to inflict many casualties. On our right, the 17th Division had taken up a position covering Mametz Wood and Montauban, and successfully resisted the enemy’s attempts to move forward. There was – the first time since March 21st – no need for us to fear a big outflanking movement from the right; we were at last able to face east, and we knew whence to expect the attack. This fact alone caused a great feeling of relief to all commanders, for all had had sharp experience during the last few days of being attacked from all directions.
During the day, Major-General Gorringe had collected many stragglers from all units and divisions and formed them up along the railway west of Contalmaison. This force was given over to Brigadier-General Mildren, who organised it, and occupied a strong position east of La Boisselle. This was to be the next line of defence if the enemy forced us from the Bazentin position.
Our left flank now became exposed. Touch was lost with the 63rd Division, who were already retiring across the River Ancre, and to cover the flank, the R.E. Companies and Pioneers, with No. II Motor Machine-gun Battery, were posted to prevent an advance from the north-east. The good news now reached us that the 12th Division was coming up in support, and in the late afternoon these fresh, strong troops came swinging up the La Boisselle Road. The 37th Brigade was the first to arrive, and immediately went out to extend our left flank towards Pozieres. But here things had not gone well.
At 6 p.m. the enemy entered Pozieres, but not before the ammunition dumps there had been set on fire by the 37th Brigade, and during the evening ammunition exploded all over the area where the village had once been, and a great fire lit up the surrounding country. The retention of Pozieres was necessary if we hoped to hold on to our Bazentin position, and on General Gorringe’s orders the 37th Brigade prepared to counter-attack, and so clear our left flank. These preparations were in progress when word arrived that the 63rd Division had decided to retire west of the Ancre, and their troops were already on the move. The operation was, therefore, cancelled, and orders were given to the 47th Division to retire during the night (March 25th-26th) to the other side of the Ancre. General Mildren’s force was to go first and take up a position below Bouzincourt, covering the crossings of the river. The 37th Brigade was to hold the La Boisselle position until General Kennedy’s force had passed; then it was to fall back and relieve General Mildren. This operation was successfully carried out, and at dawn the forces of Brigadier-Generals Kennedy and Mildren were relieved and entered Senlis and Bouzincourt.
An officer, writing afterwards, thus describes that last march back:
“We came out at 3 a.m. leaving a small rearguard to hang on till 4 a.m. We collected together and marched under the moon via Aveluy to Bouzincourt. It was an extraordinary experience. With want of food and sleep, everyone was dog- tired. Still we kept on slowly moving. We passed outposts of another division forming a protective screen. A great fire of an ammunition dump was burning on Pozieres Hill, and four more fires further back flickered in incandescent streaks. It was glorious to cross the Ancre River, and get once more among trees and unshattered houses. Slowly we crept on, and the cold, grey morning revealed us, unshaven and weary, marching on.”
Indeed, this was no ordinary relief. It embraced something more than the mere handing over of the battle-front to another division. It meant that at last the anxiety of having to protect the flank of the great Third Army was over. It meant rest, food, shelter, and – sleep.
The troops were now exhausted. Everywhere men slept – in stables, barns, beds, wagons, and even by the roadside. Wherever a man could find a quiet place, he slept, not caring where the other man was, or what was happening. There was, for the moment, no longer need to care. Many had not slept for six days. After the day’s hard fight was over there had been no rest. Night after night the troops had had to march back to the new position assigned them for the morrow’s fighting.
The casualty list was a heavy one. The total losses of the Division had been:
Officers. Other ranks.
Killed 16 166
Wounded 75 985
Missing 70 1079
Total . . . . 161 2,230
A more strenuous six days had never been endured by the Division. Against the will of everybody, the Division had been forced to retire. Every position taken up had been hotly contested. Had the operation been on a divisional scale, we could have held the Highland Ridge, the Metz Switch, the Lechelle position, Rocquigny and Le Mesnil, the Bazentin Ridge, the La Boisselle heights. But the German break-through north of St. Quentin made all our forward defensive lines impossible, and the wedge which the enemy was able to drive in behind us at Combles forced our further retreat.
The conditions under which the retirement was carried out, especially on the fourth day, prevented the collecting of all the wounded, and although the medical service did wonderful work under most difficult conditions, it was inevitable that many brave fellows were left. But no man who was admitted to an ambulance fell into the hands of the enemy.
The scarcity of roads and the impossible country of the Somme “prairie” made the retirement of artillery and transport especially difficult. The guns and firing battery wagons had to be taken on the roads, where quick movement was hampered by the transport of all other units. But the batteries missed no opportunity of coming into action. There were even times – at Morval, Bazentin, and Pozieres, for example – when the fire became concentrated or evenly distributed along the front at will.
The 47th Division may well be proud of the part it took in the retreat, one of the most difficult and nerve-racking operations it was called upon to carry out in the whole war. The task on the right of the Third Army was not an easy one, for the way in which, time after time, the troops had to change front and beat off flank attacks made it doubly difficult.
After the operation, Major-General Sir George Gorringe, the Divisional Commander, who all through set a splendid example of coolness and determination to resist, wrote an inspiring message to the troops. After briefly reviewing the operations, he said:
“No words of mine can adequately express to you my admiration for the gallantry, determination, and endurance of all ranks during the above trying ordeal. We have lost many gallant comrades, but the magnificent spirit of the Division remains, and those of us still left must fight on with determination and now hold on at all costs to the Sector allotted to us, from which, please God, there will be no withdrawal. I thank you one and all for your loyal and untiring energy, with which you have earned out all the above difficult operations; it has been a trying ordeal, but you have come through it with enhanced credit and honour, and have done your duty to your King and Country in a manner beyond all praise.”
The Division’s respite was a brief one. It was destined to be tried in the fire once more before being given a chance to recuperate and make good its losses. From Senlis the Division moved, on March 26th, to the Louvencourt area, the 140th Brigade, Pioneers, Machine-gunners and Engineers being in Louvencourt itself, and the other two infantry brigades in the neighbouring village of Vauchelles-les-Authie.
In order to ensure that the enemy should not penetrate the Vth Corps front. General Fanshawe decided that the 47th Division should take up a line in rear, running through Vadencourt, Harponville, Lealvillers, and Louvencourt, through which the troops then holding the front line could retire in case of necessity. This line was to be held in depth, the bulk of the 47th Division being disposed in the southern half, since the 2nd Division, holding the northern sector of the Corps front line, was not expected to be heavily engaged.
This defence line was occupied on the morning of March 27th, but in the evening it was considered safe to withdraw the troops to billets at Toutencourt and Warloy. That night each unit received a copy of Sir Douglas Haig’s famous order, and learnt that at last the withdrawal was to cease. The present line was to be held at all costs. Our backs were to the wall.
On March 28th, the 141st Brigade moved up to Senlis. The other two brigades, with the Machine-gun Battalion and the 11th Motor Machine-gun Battery (which left us a few days later) were concentrated in the deserted, but still almost intact, village of Warloy. Advanced Divisional Headquarters were also in Warloy and the rear echelon at Rubempre. Hopes of a longer rest, however, were dashed by the receipt in the evening of orders to relieve the 36th and 37th Infantry Brigades of the 12th Division in the sector in front of Bouzincourt and Martinsart on the following night.
The reliefs were completed by the 142nd and 140th Brigades by 2.15 a.m. on Saturday, March 30th. The Pioneers and Engineers also moved up from Harponville, where they had been working on rear line of defence to Senlis, with a view to consolidating the support line in rear of the 140th Brigade front.
Sir George Gorringe assumed command at 6 a.m. on March 30th of the front held by the 140th and 142nd Brigades. The enemy had succeeded in crossing the River Ancre and our line ran through Aveluy Wood, where it joined that of the 63rd (R.N.) Division, and up the slopes to the high ground east of Bouzincourt.
A few days of comparative quiet on the divisional front followed, but the shelling of the forward area, and especially of Martinsart and Bouzincourt, became heavier as the German artillery settled down on the other side of the Ancre.
During the night of March 31st, the 140th Infantry Brigade took over an additional piece of the front line from the 17th Division (Robertson) on our right. On the night of April 3rd a patrol of the 142nd Brigade blew up Black Horse Bridge over the Ancre.
The battalions were very much reduced in strength and the men weary. The 141st Brigade, however, had had a few days in which to reorganise and, on April 1st a composite battalion formed from the remnants of the 19th and 20th relieved the 15th Battalion of the 140th Brigade, as well as the left company of the 21st, in the line. The 15th moved back to Senlis for a few days’ rest before again returning to the line.
The artillery supporting the Division, under the command of our own C.R.A., consisted at this time of two Army Field Artillery Brigades, the 77th and the 48th. The latter, in the valley behind Bouzincourt, had many casualties from mustard gas.
Brigadier-General R. McDouall, who had returned to the Division to replace Brigadier-General Bailey, took over command of the 142nd Infantry Brigade on April 3rd.
The 12th Division had now taken over the line on our right. After a bombardment on April 4th, the Germans attacked them in two waves, but were repulsed with heavy losses. Information was received from the Vth Corps at midnight that an attack on the 47th Divisional front was expected to follow next day, and the brigades were warned accordingly.
On the morning of April 5th, the infantry of the Division was disposed as follows:
Right Brigade – 140th Infantry Brigade.
Left. Battalion – 20th London Regt. (with one company, 19th London Regt. attached)
Support Battalion – 18th London Regt.
Right Battalion – 15th London Regt.
Left Brigade – 142nd Infantry Brigade.
Left Battalion – 24th London Regt.
Right Battalion – 23rd London Regt.
Support Battalion – 22nd London Regt.
Reserve Brigade – 141st Infantry Brigade, consisting of the 17th, 21st, and 19th Battalions, London Regt., all concentrated in Senlis.
From this, it will be seen that in several cases battalions were not under the command of their normal brigade.
The storm broke soon after dawn. At 6.30 a.m. the enemy placed a heavy barrage on the left of the divisional front and this shelling quickly spread southwards. Soon the whole of the divisional front and the back areas were being shelled at intervals, special attention being paid to Senlis, Bouzincourt, and Martinsart. There was also some shelling of Warloy.
By 8 o’clock, the bombardment was intense, and the enemy had launched an attack with three divisions through the clouds of gas and smoke on the IVth Corps front. The attack came from a south-easterly direction. It was ascertained from prisoners taken during the operations that its objectives were Bouzincourt and Mesnil, thus including the fronts held by the 12th, 47th, and 63rd Divisions.
The attack fell first on the 142nd Brigade, whose left battalion (the 24th) was attacked at 7.20 a.m., and the other shortly after. Here the enemy met with some little success, forcing back the left flank of the 23rd Battalion, and contriving to get in behind some of our posts in Aveluy Wood, but his advancing masses were met with sustained rifle, Lewis-gun, and artillery fire which caused tremendous losses.
At 9.48 a.m. the 20th Battalion, on the left of the 140th Brigade, were also attacked, but held their ground. Owing to his success in the S.W. corner of Aveluy Wood, the enemy was able to enfilade their position and, as the right of the 142nd Brigade had been driven in somewhat, it became necessary for the 20th Battalion to form a defensive flank northwards towards Northumberland Avenue. Though every one of its Lewis guns was put out of action, the 20th held firm.
The whole line of the Division was now engaged, although no attack had yet been delivered against the 15th Battalion on the extreme right. About 10.30 a.m., the enemy, by a sudden rush, succeeded in breaking the line of the 142nd Brigade in Aveluy Wood between the two battalions, the left company of the 23rd being surrounded and almost annihilated after a desperate resistance.
Orders were given by the Brigadier to the 22nd Battalion, which had been in reserve, to counter-attack and to try to re-establish the line. The counter-attack was delivered by A and D Companies at 4 p.m., but failed to get back to the original line, for the battalion, which had suffered heavy losses, including eight officers, had no longer sufficient weight. Some ground, however, was regained and a continuous line established along the slope above the western edge of Aveluy Wood. A threatened gap between the 24th Battalion and the right battalions of the 63rd Division, which was also exhausted and holding its line with difficulty, was closed by reinforcements from the 22nd Battalion and two companies of Marines. By six o’clock the shelling, which had been incessant since early morning, died down.
General Gorringe decided that a further effort to restore the original line must be made on the following morning, and for this purpose he placed at the disposal of the 142nd Infantry Brigade the only battalion which remained in reserve – the 4th Royal Welsh Fusiliers. The latter were to be used in support of the remaining troops of the 22nd Battalion, who were to attack in a southerly direction as soon after dawn as observation permitted.
Orders to this effect, in confirmation of verbal orders by telephone, were sent to the 142nd Infantry Brigade at 9.30 p.m., but did not reach the brigade until 12.40 a.m. In the meantime, Brigadier-General McDouall had already discussed the proposed counter-attack with the commanders of the left artillery group, the Machine-gun Battalion, and the 4th R.W.F., and had decided to carry out the attack forming up along our own front line in front of the railway. This frontal attack was decided on as affording the simplest forming-up position for the Pioneer Battalion, who had no previous knowledge of the country. Orders to this effect were issued to the 4th R.W.F. by the Brigade.
A copy of these orders reached Divisional Headquarters at 4.15 a.m., and although they were not in accordance with the divisional orders mentioned above, General Gorringe decided that it was then too late to make any alteration, and that the attack should be carried out as arranged by the 142nd Brigade. Owing to the whole of the 22nd Battalion having been used, it was found necessary to carry out the counter-attack with the 4th R.W.F. only.
The Pioneers had been moved forward during the afternoon of April 5th from Senlis to a temporary position along the Bouzincourt-Martinsart road, where they were in support to the left brigade. Here they received at 10 p.m. a warning order from the brigade that they were to be prepared to attack at dawn. A hasty move forward was then made, and by 4 a.m. A and B Companies were assembled for the attack along the bank to the west of Aveluy Wood.
At 5.55 a.m. this desperate attack was launched by the Welshmen. As the official narrative states: “No troops could have deployed better or advanced more steadily under such intense fire, and the leadership of the officers could not have been excelled.” But the hostile machine-gun fire made progress impossible for even the most gallant troops.
Two platoons of A Company were able to hold on to one corner of the wood and to silence one enemy machine-gun by bombing and killing the crew, but no further advance could be made in face of the withering fire which came from the wood.
The casualties among the two attacking companies had been heavy, including 9 officers and 65 other ranks killed and 2 officers and 81 other ranks wounded. Lieut. N.I. Wilson, M.C., who led B Company, was hit twice in the first few seconds, but staggered on at the head of his men to the fringe of the wood, where he fell riddled with bullets.
During the same morning (about 10 a.m. on April 6th) the enemy renewed his attack on the junction between the 47th and 63rd Divisions. Here he not only made no progress, but lost heavily from our machine-gun line. The left company of the 24th Battalion took advantage of his discomfiture to make a sudden local advance, and captured two machine-guns and 21 prisoners of the 227th R.I.R., 107th Division. During this operation Lance-Corporal March, one of a patrol sent out by the centre company, went forward and personally entered into an engagement with a hostile patrol. He shot the officer commanding it and brought back his maps and papers containing information of importance.
In the evening, the enemy attacked on the right front of the 142nd Brigade, but were completely repulsed, and the line, as it then stood, was the high-water mark of the German advance north of Albert.
The 142nd Brigade, with the 4th R.W.F. and 20th London Regiment attached, were relieved that night by the 106th Brigade, 35th Division, and withdrew to Warloy and Senlis. The 140th Brigade remained in the line, without further incident of importance, until the night of April 8th, when they were relieved in the right sector by the 105th Infantry Brigade, and withdrew to Hedauville, marching thence to Acheux, where they “embussed” for Beauval – the first stage on the journey back to the rest area round Canchy, Le Titre, and the Forest of Crecy. Here the infantry was left to reorganise, refit, and train until the end of April.