Training in Scotland
On June 7 1942, the 2nd Battalion went by road to Scotland, a three-day journey of three hundred and thirty miles, which was accomplished without a vehicle casualty, a great tribute to the transport-maintenance section. The new camp was in grand countryside, six hundred feet above sea level, and was the best-tented encampment in which the battalion had been.
The White Triangle of the 1st Infantry Division came down, and the Mailed Fist of the 6th Armoured Division took its place.
Within a few days of settling down in Scotland a Battle Drill cadre was formed, under Captain JD Lofting, and the battalion went through a strenuous battle-inoculation and assault course. When mobilisation was nearing completion, the officers’ roll of the battalion was:
Lieut-Colonel Sir William Starkey, Bt., Commanding Officer.
Major J McCann, Second-in-Command.
Major CAF Gibbs, OC Headquarters Company.
Captain JD Lofting, OC H Company.
Captain SM Ekin, OC F Company.
Captain H Henderson, OC E Company.
Captain J Grant, OC G Company.
Captain LJ Samuels, Medical Officer.
Captain TL Laister, Adjutant.
Captain DW Conroy, Transport Officer.
Captain VJA Lillie-Costello, Administration.
Captain RG Cockburn, Carrier Platoon.
Lieutenant D Aitkenhead, Quartermaster.
Captain JP Carrigan.
Lieutenant CRM Heaps.
Lieutenant M Tasker.
Lieutenant WFH Cooper.
Lieutenant JD O’Rourke.
Lieutenant D Kirkham.
2nd Lieutenant HE Rawlings.
2nd Lieutenant W Bowker.
2nd Lieutenant CE Kinch.
2nd Lieutenant EHE Beechey.
2nd Lieutenant MJ Goldstone.
2nd Lieutenant NW Dorrity.
2nd Lieutenant K Neely, Signals Officer.
2nd Lieutenant BC Stigant.
2nd Lieutenant PJ Gibbons.
2nd Lieutenant FE Fletcher, Mortar Platoon.
2nd Lieutenant AG Lees.
2nd Lieutenant RT McKenna.
2nd Lieutenant VWL Pottinger.
2nd Lieutenant JM McGranahan.
2nd Lieutenant TWH Wilson.
2nd Lieutenant R Hardwick.
RSM H Reid.
On the strength, but away from the battalion, were: Major WD Swiney and Captain BA Tebbitt, both at the 6th Armoured Division Battle Drill School. Of the 2nd Battalion London Irish Rifles that were at Chelsea when war broke out, the only officers remaining were: Lieut-Colonel Starkey, Major McCann, Major Gibbs, Captain Lofting, Captain Conroy, Captain Laister, Captain Ekin, and Captain Cockburn.
By that time Lieut-Colonel Starkey’s normal three years of command had elapsed, and a new Commanding Officer was appointed. He was Lieut-Colonel JB Jeffreys, from the 1st Battalion Royal Ulster Rifles. He assumed command on June 26, 1942.
Sir William Starkey had earned the respect of all who had served under him. Apart from those few of the 2nd Battalion who had a few years’ service behind them, he had raised from the environs of Chelsea a motley crowd of untrained men – actors, clerks, painters, lawyers, artists, journalists, accountants, tradesmen, all men from diverse stations in life – and turned them into hard, virile soldiers, ready and eager to meet the enemy on any terms.
There was a change, also, at brigade headquarters, Brigadier The O’Donovan, MC, relinquishing command. He was succeeded by Brigadier Nelson Russell, DSO, MC, from the 6th Battalion Royal Irish Fusiliers.
In a farewell message Brigadier The O’Donovan said:
“I want all ranks to know how sorry I am to leave them. There is much for the Brigade to ‘try-out’ and learn, and the time may be short. But there is a feeling of friendship and goodwill throughout the Brigade, coupled with a fixed and cheerful determination to conquer in spite of everything, which should make it invincible.
“With each of you individually I would say ‘good-bye and good Luck.’ and I am, confident that when the opportunity offers the Irish Brigade as it now exists will cover itself with glory.
“Good-bye.”
Training for the 2nd Battalion in July and August 1942 was particularly hard. They had to become accustomed to their new role in an armoured division. At a divisional camp at Douglas, tanks, gunners, and infantry got together on a company-squadron basis, and this enabled one to meet the other and for each to learn something of the other’s problems. An exercise, “Dryshod,” was held in which, on paper, the hills south of the Clyde were divided to represent the English Channel. Agricultural towns became ports, the hills were in theory washed away to become the sea, a sea over which the infantry marched and the tanks rode.
There were long forced marches in all weathers, and the battalion lived as closely as possible to conditions of real war. The purchase of food in the towns and villages through which the men passed was forbidden, and they all learned to live “hard.” Above all, “Dryshod” was a great test in staff work, which was carried out smoothly and efficiently.
From Greenock to Algiers
The exercise ended and the London Irish began to receive new equipment of all kinds: guns, carriers, mortars, and the rest. Embarkation leave followed and then came a hectic period of cleaning and packing.
On November 10 the battalion embarked at Glasgow in HMT Duchess of York. When the troopship was out in the Clyde and among a vast convoy, news was received of the Allied landings in North Africa. Everyone knew then whither they were bound, and that it was likely that the 2nd Battalion would be in battle first, although the 1st Battalion had already gone overseas.
The senior officers were given an outline of the progress of the landings, and maps of Algeria and of Tunisia were studied. Eleven days after embarking the lights of Tangiers were seen in the moonlight. Coming from a blacked-out Britain the lights seemed strange and almost unreal to the troops. The short voyage was without incident, and on November 22 Algiers came into view.
The tall, white buildings stood out sharply in the great bowl of the Algerian capital, rising steeply one thousand feet above the sea. As the convoy entered the harbour an air-raid warning was sounded. A smoke screen was swiftly laid by ships of the Royal Navy, and anti-aircraft guns went into action. Fortunately, no bombs were dropped and the raiders flew away.
With the bagpipes leading, the 2nd Battalion went ashore in full marching order. The staging area was fifteen miles from Algiers, near Maison Carree, and the march through the streets of Algiers, up the steep, tortuous hills to Kouba, was one of the most tiring the battalion had up to then endured.
Algiers was raided that night by German and Italian bombers, and the defensive fire was an awe-inspiring sight. From every degree of the compass a riot of tracers sped towards the raiders.
A very dry summer had passed, and the arrival of the London Irish in North Africa coincided with the start of the rainy season. Two days after landing a downpour began which lasted three days. The bivouac area in a vineyard rapidly became waterlogged, and no one could keep dry. Better quarters were found in a factory, and being out of the rain no one complained of the large brown rats which scampered about all night.
The journey towards the front was made in cattle-trucks, and for two days the battalion clattered through the snow-capped mountains of North Africa to Bougie. In that tiny but attractive port the battalion received all its transport, which had been sent separately from the United Kingdom. Trucks, carriers, staff cars, all had come through unscathed.
The next move was by road to Teboursouk. The battalion crossed the mountain range to Setif, three thousand five hundred feet up in the Atlas Range, and as it grew dark, they reached Constantine, the great Byzantine city. The journey was resumed to Souk Aras and finally to Teboursouk, near the ancient ruins of Dougga, which once had a prosperous population of eighty thousand.
The London Irish were now in the battle area, and their first task was to hold the heights overlooking the main road from the west to Teboursouk and Tunis. Intelligence reports showed that the Germans were building up their forces rapidly on the Tunis side of Medjez-el-Bab, while Allied troops were up against stiff opposition at Tebourba.
Gradually the battalion got ready for its first battle in the Second World War. As the Commander of the Irish Brigade, Brigadier Nelson Russell, DSO, MC, recorded, the only real training for battle is real fighting, and the brigade, newly out from Britain, were short of that training and had much to learn. They began to learn in a hard school, for from the first they were opposed by crack German troops, all seasoned fighters, and young volunteers of the Hermann Goering Division of Paratroopers. It was pleasant subsequently to recall that after the mauling they received from the Irish Brigade, one of their foremost formations, the Koch Brigade, went into involuntary liquidation.
Tunisia proved to be a country of strange contrasts. There were many miles of fertile plainlands, such as the Mejerda, the Goubellat, and the Bou Arada Plains, which were interspersed by vineyards and olive-groves, and in places thick with cork trees. The plains were separated by rocky and precipitous hills, either bare rock or covered with thorny brushwood.
The landings in North Africa by a light mobile force had gone well. The spearhead, a small, gallant force consisting of only two infantry brigades, a Recce Regiment, the 17/21st Lancers, a company of the Rifle Brigade, and a squadron of the Derbyshire Yeomanry, had raced on towards Tunis.
At Tebourba, less than twenty miles from Tunis, they met stubborn resistance, and so they sat back to hold what they had won and to wait for assistance.
And while they waited the enemy, too, were building up. The spearhead was very glad to see the arrival of the 6th Armoured Division. By the first week in December, the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers were in a supporting position on the Medjez-Teboursouk road, west of Tunis. The London Irish were in a back-stop position on the Le Krib-Bou Arada road to the south about twelve miles away. The Royal Irish Fusiliers, the third member of the Irish Brigade, had not yet arrived.
The war in Tunisia had become fluid. There were several well-defined areas, notably on the direct lines of approach to Tunis and Bizerta in the north, where the Germans were in strong force and were well dug in. In between there were large gaps, practically uninhabited by either army, or which were lightly patrolled by both sides.
F Company, under Captain Ekin, went off to an area of the Robaa-Pont du Fahs road with a general order to dominate it by offensive action. They did well and had one or two cracks at the enemy, learning more thereby in a week than they could have done in a year’s training in Scotland. Their trip lasted a week, and one morning they laid a trap for two German armoured cars that were known regularly to go up and down the road near El Aroussa. Unfortunately, local natives gave the show away, and the Germans reversed a few yards from the mines laid by the London Irish party, who were waiting in ambush nearby.
For the rest it was a digging-in time, with Bren bursts now and then at ME 109s which tried to interfere with things. In such a bout the Inniskilling Fusiliers lost their Commanding Officer, who was wounded. When a new Commanding Officer, Lieut-Colonel CHB Allen (Royal Ulster Rifles) arrived, Major J McCann, of the London Irish, joined him as his Second-in-Command.
Preparations by the enemy continued and more of the empty spaces in the Goubellat Plain were filled. To meet this potential threat the London Irish and the Inniskillings went forward from what had been considered to be reserve positions. In the words of the Brigadier, everything now was “in the front window.”
From Goubellat to Bou Arada
By December 20 the Irish Brigade was complete with the arrival of the Royal Irish Fusiliers, and plans were made for an attack on Tunis just before Christmas. Heavy rain came churning the ground into thick mud and slowing down movement, so the operation was postponed. For two or three weeks the Irish Brigade remained in the vicinity of the Mahmoud Gap, an opening between the hills leading to the Plains of Goubellat and the main road to Tunis. Battalion frontages were large, and it was not unusual in those days for one battalion to have to look after a front of five to six miles.
The Goubellat proved to be the brigade’s war nursery. It was there that most of them heard the first zip of an enemy bullet, the quick cracks of a Schmeisser, and the whine of a German shell. They realised in that quiet way so typical of the British soldier that someone else meant business and that they were shooting to kill.
Strong fighting patrols from the three battalions went out at night in search of the enemy. There was a belt of “no man s land” about three or four miles wide between the trenches dug by the Irish Brigade to the west and those of the enemy to the east. To the north was the village of Goubellat and in between were small French farms and several deep wadis.
Every week saw an improvement in the technique of fighting, and several spirited encounters took place. During this initial patrol period Captain I Grant took a party of London Irishmen ten miles behind the Bosche lines and convincingly disturbed the equanimity of an enemy headquarters. The patrol was out for thirty-six hours, and in a brief but sharp action they inflicted casualties on the enemy. Unfortunately, Captain Grant and a few of his men were wounded and taken prisoners. The others got back safely.
In addition to long patrols there were several minor skirmishes on a company level, one by the London Irish and two by the Royal Irish Fusiliers. These battles disposed of small bodies of the enemy who were getting too inquisitive about the brigade’s affairs, notably about its strength and positions.
Three weeks of excellent war experience passed very quickly. Patrols proved themselves very business-like; they knew what to do, the best way to do it, and the weapons to use for the job. The machinery, from a brigade to a company level, was oiled and running well and everyone was waiting for the strenuous days which they knew were ahead.
During this Goubellat Plain period, from December 15, 1942, to January 12, 1943, the weather was extremely bad, and the employment of armour was out of the question. Three out of five days saw heavy rain. The troops in their slit trenches were often up to their knees in water, and the roads were nothing but mud-tracks and quite unfit for men or machines. There was no alternative, they had to be used.
Rations, water, and ammunition managed after very hard work to reach most battalion headquarters on wheels, but thereafter it was a two- or three-mile carry to company areas in the hills, with no tracks at all. It was a strenuous time for the quartermasters and all the transport drivers. Usually it meant a fifteen- to twenty-mile drive in the darkness with no lights from a supply-point to battalion headquarters. Vehicles slid, skidded, and bumped over tracks which were only recognisable by their ruts two feet deep. This went on night in, night out, all through the North African winter. It was one of those things that had to be done to be realised, and in fact was accomplished only because high authority in its wisdom changed an issue of sand tyres to ordinary tyres plus chains!
The heavy reinforcements which the enemy had obviously received made the Bou Arada and the Goubellat Plain danger areas, particularly with the battalions of the Irish Brigade stretched to fantastic lengths. The Bou Arada Plain was about twenty-five miles long, varying in width from five to ten miles. In the middle was the El Aroussa-Bou Arada-Pont du Fahs road, one of the main routes to Tunis. In the north it was bounded by salt lakes and marshy country near Pont du Fahs. North of Bou Arada there was hilly country, later to become famous as Hen House, One, Two and Three Tree Hills, and – most famous of them all – Grandstand. Between Bou Arada and El Aroussa was a great mass of precipitous wooded mountains called the Djebel Rihane. To the south was an irregular line of hills between Pont du Fahs and El Aroussa, the most notable probably being the Djebel Mansour.
The valley of Bou Arada and its hills were destined to be the home of the London Irish and the rest of the Irish Brigade for eight weeks. It saw two attacks on the enemy, two vicious counterattacks, and was the scene of many local encounters, with exploits of great gallantry.
On January 11 H Company of the London Irish watched the Lothian and Border Horse pass through their lines and go down the Roman road towards Goubellat to sweep the plain where it was reported a Hermann Goering Regiment had started filtering down from the hills. It soon became apparent that the tanks had got into difficulties, and artillery support was called for.
About noon H Company was ordered to attack two distant farms in order to form a screen to prevent the damaged armour from falling into enemy hands, to rescue the crews, and also to hold the position until the tanks could be withdrawn. The approach was a long one, of nearly four miles across country almost without cover and under plough, which made the going very heavy. Orders were to attack the first farm at 1510 hours after a ten minutes’ bombardment by the twenty-five pounders of the Ayrshire Yeomanry. Good time was made over the rough ground and all went well until a flight of German aircraft passed overhead. They were a mixture of ME 109’s and Stukas, and as they spiralled down the riflemen extended out. The enemy flew off without dropping any bombs or firing machine-guns, apparently mistaking the London Irish for their own troops!
Meanwhile the gunners got on with their task and the London Irish advanced steadily. H Company were still about five hundred yards away when heavy automatic and rifle fire was directed on them from Sidi Nasseur on the right. Major JD Lofting detailed a platoon to cover that flank with fire, but unfortunately the Platoon Commander, Sergeant J Wilson, became a casualty before he could give out his orders, and the flank remained unprotected for about fifteen minutes. Then the riflemen advanced, singing “You are my Sunshine” at the tops of their voices, and the attack went in. Their determination apparently broke the nerve of the Hermann Goering defenders, and they retired at the double, leaving everything behind them.
18 Platoon was then ordered forward to take the second farm, followed by 16 Platoon, leaving 17 Platoon to cover the weak flank and keep down the fire which had reasserted itself from Sidi Nasseur. Lieutenant PJ Gibbons led two sections round the left of the farm, while Major Lofting took the right-hand section. By doubling and crawling they got well up and engaged the enemy with rifles, grenades, and bayonets. German resistance was heartened by the presence of three close-support guns firing over open sights down the road about three thousand yards away. A gallant attempt to cross the road under the heavy enemy fire was made by 18 Platoon, and some managed to do so. But several men fell, including Sergeant R Hogan, who had displayed great leadership and courage. The platoon kept up the pressure and, assisted by their own machine-gunners, the Besa fire from the tanks, and concentrations by the gunners, they succeeded in forcing the Germans to evacuate the second farm. As a result the recovery of the tanks was carried out without molestation.
H Company held on until relieved about three hours after dark by G Company, when they returned to their old positions, bringing back a quantity of enemy weapons as booty. Thus ended the first London Irish attack of the war. It was successful.
The next phase of activity was on the part of the enemy. It became known that they had concentrated strong forces on Two Tree Hill, a feature north-east of the Goubellat-Bou Arada road and from which they might sweep down in a drive south of the latter village, which was held by two companies of French Colonial troops.
Orders were given for a combined infantry and tank attack to drive the Germans off the hill and thus relieve the threat. The Inniskilling Fusiliers were given this task, their first major battle. The effort was handicapped by heavy ground caused by a night of rain, and they met a more powerful enemy than might have been expected. Their gallantry and resolute fighting were of no avail and the plan was shown to require a much heavier onslaught. The whole brigade, therefore, were directed to destroy the German position on Two Tree Hill, and the help of the gunners of the division was given. The stage was set for a dawn attack. Whether or not the enemy knew that something was afoot is not known, but the brigade plan was forestalled by one day, the Germans themselves launching an attack at 6am.
The guns had been concentrated stealthily for the Irish Brigade’s operation, and the infantry had been brought up without the enemy’s knowledge. The result was that when the Bosche advanced they found infantry where no infantry was thought to be and got a most unexpected blast from seventy-two guns! The Germans were blown and shot to bits, and in addition they lost a large number of tanks.
They took several days to recover from that shock, while at brigade headquarters great satisfaction was felt that the three battalions and supporting arms had passed through their first big ordeal with such coolness and steadiness. For about five days there were small off shoots of this battle. There were frequent raids on enemy positions, several small attacks, sometimes with tank assistance. They were all more or less indeterminate affairs, staged really to probe the Bosche lines and to worry them. The enemy also were often on the prowl and gun and mortar fire was fairly consistent. Stuka attacks were frequent and the brigade suffered a few casualties almost daily.
Then another Battle of Bou Arada approached, a bloody affair in which the London Irish distinguished themselves, but with grievous losses. The night of January 16 had been spent just outside El Aroussa, and the next night the battalion moved into the plains to the west of Bou Arada. Another move was ordered, but no sooner had the battalion finished digging in than they had to move once more. In fact the London Irish moved four times in four nights, and everyone became tired. On the morning of the 19th, they marched in extended line across the open plain via Bou Arada. Their job was to guard the brigade’s one line of communication, the lateral road from Bou Arada to Grandstand.
The enemy had been quick to see this weakness in the brigade’s dispositions, and they occupied a hill, Point 286, only one thousand yards from the road. From there they could observe, shell, mortar, and machine-gun the brigade’s lifeline. It was an unpleasant situation, and the London Irish were ordered to remedy it by driving the Germans off the hill and prevent its re-occupation. Instructions came at midnight and there was no time for a reconnaissance beforehand. The plan was for the battalion to form up on the lateral road at about 0330 hours on the 20th. G Company were to lead and occupy Point 279, a lesser hill adjacent to Point 286, and F Company were to follow and establish themselves on the reverse slopes of Point 279, while H Company were to make a detour on the left and attack Point 286 from that flank. Support from the gunners, mortars, machine-guns, and anti-tank guns was arranged, though the attack was to be made without any preliminary bombardment as it was thought the hill was not held in strength by the enemy, who would thus not be warned of the impending attack and send up reinforcements.
At 0440 hours G Company advanced on to Point 279 and, meeting no opposition, continued towards Point 286. F Company moved on as well but started to attack Point 351 to the left instead of Point 286. Here the Germans were strongly entrenched, and 10 and 12 Platoons were held up, while ix Platoon managed to get forward and took six prisoners, although they themselves were forced later to withdraw. Major BA Tebbitt, commanding G Company, realised as he led his men up the slopes of Point 286 that he had over-shot his objective, and he returned to Point 279. It was now 0730 hours, and daylight. F Company also returned to Point 279, where they re-formed to attack their proper target.
They moved towards Point 286 round the back of Point 279, with the object this time of attacking the hill from the right. There was a hail of machine-gun and rifle fire as the company approached Point 286. The two leading platoons went forward, covered by G Company firing from the forward slopes of Point 279. The enemy were seen running from Point 286, and F Company went in at the point of the bayonet.
No sooner had they reached the summit of the hill and found that the enemy infantry had abandoned it, than German tanks and armoured cars were seen ascending the eastern slopes in a counterattack. German mortars bombarded the hill, but the men of F Company stood firm and the enemy cars and tanks were held off.
Continued enemy fire took its toll and the gallant company suffered heavy losses, including Captain Ekin, their commander, and Lieutenant Vic Pottinger, both of whom were killed. Lieutenant A Cowdy was left in charge of the company, which was so reduced in strength that they were withdrawn. E Company were warned to take over the positions on Point 286, and while the company “O” group were receiving orders, a mortar bomb dropped in one of the trenches, fatally wounding Captain JP Carrigan and two signallers.
The enemy by this time had occupied Point 286, and a further effort to drive them off had to be made. Led by Captain JV Lillie-Costello, E Company bravely stormed the slopes. Some managed to reach the crest, but others were forced down to folds in the ground to gain cover from cunningly laid automatic and mortar fire. Lieutenant Josephs and his platoon held on, but the officer and most of his men were wounded. Several were killed.
The Germans had given up some ground, but they had not been driven off the hill. They bombarded the forward slopes of Point 279 where G Company were in the open, valiantly trying to help their comrades with supporting fire. Their losses impelled G Company back to cover in a wadi behind the hill, where they were joined by the staff of battalion headquarters, and the men of E Company who had survived the attack.
The Commanding Officer reported the situation to brigade, but the Brigadier emphasised the importance of securing Point 286, and a further attack by the London Irish was decided upon. The attack was made by H Company, and no sooner had it got into its stride than the battalion area was dive-bombed by Stukas, and simultaneously H Company were heavily mortared. Their Commander, Major JD Lofting, was wounded, and their Second-in-Command, Captain H Henderson, was killed. Men were falling fast, and the Commanding Officer ordered the company back. Some had managed once more to gain the summit, but it was impossible to hold it in the intense enemy fire.
Then word came that the Germans had been seen withdrawing yet again from Point 286. Major WD Swiney, Second-in-Command of the battalion, went forward with all that remained of H Company. They went up as unobtrusively as possible, a section at a time, and despite continuous mortaring, they occupied the hilltop. They remained there for the rest of the day, gaining such cover as they could on the bald, rocky hill, where the ground was so hard that they could not dig in. Firing died down in the afternoon, and desultory shelling and mortar fire was the only sign of enemy activity to break the uneasy silence of the battlefield.
The London Irish had gained their objective, but at a crippling cost. Nearly all the officers had been killed or wounded. F Company had no officers left, and losses in non-commissioned officers and men had been extremely high.
That night the battalion medical officer, Captain LJ Samuels, who had done great work during the day, organised the cooking for the men. Food was prepared in a small culvert under the Goubellat-Bou Arada road and sent up to the companies. Men of E and F Companies were on Point 279, H were on Point 286, and the rest in the wadi below Point 279.
Shortly after midnight a runner came in from E Company and reported that German tanks were climbing the slopes of Point 279, with infantry in the rear. The Germans overran the posts on Point 279 and fired for all they were worth into the wadi where battalion headquarters were quartered. In the darkness all communications within the battalion were disrupted. The companies were scattered and the fighting became very confused. The Germans seemed to fire wildly in all directions and kept up a demoniacal yelling as if to bolster up their own courage. They withdrew as suddenly as they appeared, and the tanks moved smartly after them. At daylight the position was once more normal. The London Irish were on Point 286, and the enemy had gone.
Final casualties in the Battle of Hill 286 were: six officers and twenty other ranks killed; eight officers and seventy-eight other ranks wounded; six officers and one hundred and thirty other ranks missing. Many of the latter were confirmed later as having been wounded and taken prisoner. The Divisional Commander and Brigadier Nelson Russell visited the battalion after the battle and thanked them for the part they had played in a vital operation.
Later the Brigadier recorded officially as follows:
“The London Irish Rifles were a fine battalion, first-class officers and non-commissioned officers and good men all keen as mustard. They had been working together for three years. They possessed a good ‘feel’ and were proud of their battalion, as they had every right to be.
“They attacked with great spirit and after hard fighting drove the enemy off Point 286. But then came the trying time. It was practically impossible to dig in on the hard rocky slopes, and all through the day they were subjected to heavy artillery and extremely accurate mortar fire. This fine battalion refused to be shelled off the position. What they had they held. But at heavy cost.
“I never hope to see a battalion fighting and enduring more gallantly. Nor do I want to witness again such cruel casualties. .
But the job was done. The Bosche had been driven off Point 286. Our Line of Communication with Bou Arada was safe. The London Irish had restored a situation which was more than critical.”
For the next three or four weeks the situation remained more or less static. The brigade occupied Points 286 and 276, Grandstand and Stuka Farm. The enemy held El Barka, Mehalla, and One, Two, Three Tree Hills, and W Hill. Contact with the Germans varied from three hundred to a thousand yards. Everyone was under constant mortar fire, which brought a few casualties.
There was no relief and that was the trying part of the situation, and no one realised it more than the Brigadier. For some seven or eight weeks the brigade had been in contact with the enemy, the men living in slit trenches in rain or sun, eating and sleeping with no relief. There were no other troops available, because First Army at that time was stretched to the limit. The only thing that could be done was to change over one front-line battalion with another front-line battalion, which did not give a great change of scenery.
But the brigade proved itself a first-class fighting machine. Mid-February saw much movement and change to meet German thrusts in the Kasserine. The result of that was to leave a scratch force in the Bou Arada Plain, to be known as “Y Division,” and consisting of the Irish Brigade, a Paratroop Brigade, a French battalion, and artillery. Brigadier Nelson Russell was placed in command, and one of the first things he did was to form a reserve of a squadron of Churchills, a squadron of the Derbyshire Yeomanry, and the Royal Irish Fusiliers. The remaining battalions were already stretched over a wide area, and the respective commanders disclaimed all responsibility for forcibly extended fronts.
The danger of the Djebel Rihane was obvious. It was a great mass of wooded, precipitous mountain country to the left and rear of the brigade. It could conceal two army corps but had no real tracks, so supply would be a problem. If the enemy could get there and maintain himself, the Irish Brigade, and indeed the whole of Y Division, would be in a predicament. The enemy would be behind the infantry positions and could look down on the gun lines. That weakness was apparent to all.
On February 26 the storm broke. The Germans began a thrust on the Bou Arada front and made their main effort on the left flank and rear, in the area of Stuka Farm and the Djebel Rihane, with three battalions of crack troops, old enemies of the brigade, young paratroopers of the Hermann Goering Division, plus ten Panzers.
The London Irish held extended positions west of the Goubellat-Bou Arada road, occupying a series of hills at platoon strength.
On the left were 9 Platoon on Flat Top Hill, with 8 Platoon on Mosque Hill in the rear. 7 Platoon were on Hadj, with battalion headquarters behind, while 13, 14, and 15 Platoons held Booby Trap, Steep Hill, and Castle Hill respectively on the right centre. 11, and 12 Platoons were in the area of Stuka Farm and Point 329, and 4 Platoon were on Carrier Hill, north of Stuka Farm.
The enemy attacked at dawn from higher hills to the north. They started on Hadj, but they could not penetrate the wire and 7 Platoon held them. As the fight went on a carrier delivering rations to another platoon returned to Hadj and as the gap in the wire was opened, the carrier was ambushed. A grenade killed the driver, and a mechanical transport corporal was captured. Realising there were no mines in the vicinity, the enemy leapt over the wire and advanced on 7 Platoon. The riflemen remained steady under the threat and returned fire. The Germans were forced to cover behind a few trees in the area, and from there harried 7 Platoon by constant sniping. The fight went on for nearly three hours.
G Company, on the neighbouring hills, was attacked at the same time. At first light 15 Platoon saw a line of steel helmets along the wire in front of their positions on Castle Hill and promptly opened up. This platoon, under Sergeant Teague, fought well during the day, and although they were forced to withdraw slightly the enemy did not succeed in pushing them off Castle Hill. F Company held posts round Stuka Farm by day and went on the forward slopes of the hills by night. They were still on the forward slopes when the German attack went in and Major Gibbs thought that the farm had been captured by the enemy. He shouted to 12 Platoon to go and reoccupy it.
Sergeant Johnson took one section to the left, and Captain Galloway with the two other sections moved round to the right. By this time Carrier Platoon on Carrier Hill had been overrun, and the enemy established an observation-post there. This enabled them to mortar 12 Platoon advancing towards Stuka Farm.
This platoon found that after all the farm had not been taken by the enemy and that a few men from company headquarters were holding the fort. They joined forces and staved off enemy attacks for the rest of the day, a gallant effort. The Germans forced their way into one or two rooms and threw a few grenades, but they were soon put to flight.
During this period of the attack Corporal H Butler and Rifleman C Cook, from the Intelligence Section, did some very good work from an observation-post on Flat Top Hill. They spotted about eighty Germans advancing on the plain towards Hadj. The enemy disappeared and then came into view again in the valley alongside Flat Top. They stopped to eat their rations and had a smoke, blissfully ignorant of the fact that they were being observed. As they moved off into a gully that ran beside Hadj, Corporal Butler directed artillery fire on to them, causing many casualties. He also caught a third enemy platoon going in the same direction, but unfortunately the wire to the gunners’ observation-post was cut, and further communication was impossible for the rest of the day.
G Company had a tiring morning. 15 Platoon were still holding the enemy on Castle Hill, but the two other platoons lost Booby Trap and Steep Hills after a fight, and the Germans also managed to occupy Rear Hill. A counterattack on the latter was made soon after midday and the position was regained. The force which made this successful effort consisted of CSM Girvan, Provost Sergeant Gardiner, Bugle Major Chubb, Cook Sergeant Bridgeman (ACC), men from the Ack-Ack and Pioneer Platoons, all commanded by Major DW Conroy and Captain Osborn, both of whom were wounded in the attack. The casualties on the whole were light, but unfortunately Sergeant Gardiner was killed. In the late afternoon B Company of the Royal Irish Fusiliers, who had been sent up to help, put in a counterattack in the area of Stuka Farm. They were aided by three Churchill tanks, and not only did they retake the positions, but they released some men of F Company who had been captured.
When darkness came, 15 Platoon and G Company headquarters took over Rear Hill and the gunners opened up in strength on the enemy posts on Castle Hill. A German deserter had given information that a hundred and fifty enemy held positions there and they were heavily blasted.
Intermittent fire went on through the night and just before dawn the enemy withdrew. At first light a terrific barrage was brought down on Hadj, and when E Company followed up with an attack, they found the enemy had fled, leaving over eighty dead.
This series of well-planned and perhaps desperate attacks by the Germans, part of a large-scale plan, was made by the Hermann Goering Jaeger Regiment, supported by troops of the 33rd Marsh Battalion. They fought well, but much of their failure to drive the London Irish off the vital group of hills was due to the support the battalion received from the gunners. The Ayrshire Yeomanry, who supported the London Irish, were splendid throughout the battle, in which the battalion bore the brunt of an attempt to break the British line. Everything considered, the London Irish casualties were light.
While this struggle had been going on the enemy had pressed equally hard and determinedly on the left flank. Two German battalions, supported by Panzers, broke through the southern end of the Mahmoud Gap, and headed for El Aroussa by the direct route via Steamroller Farm. They reached a point eight miles behind Y Division’s headquarters and made direct for the line of communication.
The situation was unpleasant, and the division’s reserves were called in, including two companies of the Royal Irish Fusiliers who assisted in clearing up on the Irish Brigade front. The Derbyshire Yeomanry was sent to delay, and nine Churchills and the remainder of the Faughs to destroy, the German Panzers and infantry advancing on El Aroussa and divisional headquarters.
A series of non-stop counterattacks on the Irish Brigade sector and close support by the gunners partly restored the situation there by nightfall. In the back area on the left flank there were some exciting moments. It was estimated at divisional headquarters that it would take the nine Churchills about two hours to reach the right place to block the German advance.
The Yeomanry set out to delay the Panzers on a six-mile stretch of road through the hills and, in the words of Brigadier Nelson Russell, they were splendid. They laid mines, put down smokescreens, shot their two-pounders when they could, and imposed all possible handicaps and delays on the enemy. Meanwhile the Churchills lumbered on to the carefully chosen “spot” where it was thought they would have the Panzers on toast. But it was also the last possible tank position in that part of the country, and it was vital that they should not be late.
And so ten Panzers and nine Churchills converged at right angles, quite unseen to each other. The Panzers did not know about the Churchills, but the Churchills did know all about the Panzers, which was a powerful advantage. It was anybody’s race, and it was followed with considerable suspense from divisional headquarters. The Churchills won. They reached the vital “spot” with three minutes to spare. The time was short but sufficient. Three minutes later saw the death of six Panzers, while the distant onlookers could count twenty. It was an inspiring sight and was modestly described by the Churchills’ commander as a “piece of cake.” “It was only made possible by the best squadron of Yeomanry I have ever seen in action,” commented Brigadier Nelson Russell later.
The remaining Panzers withdrew and the enemy infantry thought it healthier to go with them. They dug themselves in round Steamroller Farm, where they still remained a threat. On the whole, the day had gone well.
The danger even yet was that the enemy might be reinforced speedily and threaten either the Bou Arada or the Medjez lines of communication. Assistance fortunately was at hand. I Division was reinforced by a Guards Brigade, an American Combat team, a battalion of Churchills, and enough anti-tank guns to blow up all the Panzers in North Africa. Thirty-six hours later the Bosche at Steamroller Farm wondered what had hit them, and those few who could still move withdrew rapidly.
The German thrust was held and the danger passed.
From Beja to Tunis
‘Y’ Division was disbanded by March 16, and the London Irish moved to the Medjez sector. They had suffered heavily in the attack of January and had borne the brunt of the German offensive in February. Only two of their original officers remained. On March 8 Lieut-Colonel TPD Scott (Royal Irish Fusiliers) took over command of the battalion from Lieut-Colonel JB Jeffreys. Major APK O’Connor became Second-in-Command, and other changes were: F Company – Major JW Dunnill; H Company – Captain BH Westcott; Headquarters Company – Captain HM Findlater. A week later a large draft of officers and other ranks joined the battalion, mostly from the 70th Battalion Royal Ulster Rifles.
By March 27 the London Irish had arrived at a rest area, and then it was announced that the Irish Brigade would leave the 6th Armoured Division and come under the command of the 78th Infantry Division.
Plans were laid for a final push towards Tunis, and the first step was allotted to the 78th Division. The Irish Brigade, with a battalion of the Hampshire Regiment temporarily displacing the London Irish who were being re-formed, was given the tough task of capturing Djebel El Mahdi, a difficult, pear-shaped lesser mountain about four miles long and rising in a gradual slope to one thousand four hundred feet.
The attack succeeded, as did the rest of the divisional scheme. The Oued Zarga-Medjez road was clear, and preparations were made for the second phase, to open the route to Tebourba by attacking Longstop, Tanngoucha, and the Djebel Ang. Tanngoucha was the most formidable of a group of rocky, steep hills which began five miles from Medjez. In a space of about two miles were the mountain villages of Toukabeur, Chaouach, Kelbine, and Heidous. The latter was perched on top of a rock which had steep sides fifty feet high. Between the villages were narrow paths passable to goats but which were bull-dozed into tracks for vehicles. To the east and west of the villages was a jumble of bare, rocky hills, with no tracks at all; and beyond Heidous, the last northern village, was nothing but wild, uninhabited country.
One brigade of the division got a foothold on Tanngoucha after suffering heavily in their initial attack. Until they were relieved by the Irish Brigade, they held on grimly to a massive crag known as Bettiour in the middle of the foreground below Tanngoucha.
Just over two thousand feet high, Bettiour commanded all the hills immediately around it. A great ledge fifty feet high rose gaunt and bare on the top.
All the rocky features had one thing in common. Their summits, with stiff approaches, were surmounted by long rocky “dragon’s backs” about twenty to forty yards wide and with steep sides twenty to sixty feet deep. The enemy had spent considerable time and care in preparing their positions among these rocky fastnesses. They regarded their defences as their “Siegfried Line,” but it had a variety of other names among the British troops.
To this scene came the London Irish, fresh, fit, up to strength, and once more full of fight. They needed to be so, for they entered upon two weeks of the hardest and most bitter fighting of a hard campaign, in which little quarter was given or asked.
It was thought that the capture of Tanngoucha would cause the fall of Heidous and The Kefs, a series of outcrops of Tanngoucha. The first attack, made by the Skins, met with some success until it was discovered that mules carrying ammunition and other supplies had been machine-gunned. The Skins had to withdraw just before daylight.
While it was agreed that the capture of Tanngoucha would probably result in the fall of Heidous and The Kefs, the unsuccessful effort by the Skins revealed that from those two flanking positions the Bosche could oppose the main attack. A full-scale action, therefore, was planned by the Irish Brigade. The London Irish were to tackle Heidous, the Skins, Tanngoucha, and the Faughs were to attack The Kefs. It had to be a night attack in each case, as in daylight the advancing infantry would have been shot down like rabbits by the Bosche concealed among the rocks.
On the evening of April 15, the London Irish slowly climbed up through the hills to take over positions on Bettiour and Mahdouna. An enemy counterattack was in progress and E Company took over from the East Surreys amid much firing. The enemy attacked Bettiour, where a grenade duel took place in which a few casualties were caused to battalion headquarters and H Company.
During the whole time that the London Irish were on Bettiour they were subjected to spasmodic mortar fire and long-range shelling. In the next few days it grew in intensity, the German mortar teams becoming unpleasant experts in landing their bombs right on the edge of the enormous ledge that sheltered battalion headquarters, and flying rock splinters hit several men, including RSM G Irish.
On the nights of April 15 and 20 patrols were sent out, the prime object being to discover the best routes to Heidous and Sandy Ridge, a large round hillock behind Heidous.
These patrols, commanded by Lieutenant Rowlette and Lieutenant O’Rourke, made no contact with the enemy and gained the required information. Reconnaissances took place for the attack on Heidous, and the next night patrols under Lieutenant Stokes and Lieutenant Howells had a look round the approaches to the north and south of the village.
The plan was now ready for the final push in the mountains by the 78th Division, preparatory to the break-through by the armour along the Medjez road to Tunis. The preliminary operation was necessary in order to clear and remove the threat to the Tebourba road. The Irish Brigade was to capture Tangoucha and the village of Heidous, and 36 Brigade to capture the famous fortress of Longstop Hill which commanded the road.
The Commanding Officer gave out his orders for the attack on Heidous during the afternoon of April 22. It was in two phases. First, F Company were to clear the village itself, supported by G Company, whose task was to take a small feature on the right; second, E Company and H Company were to clear Sandy Ridge, east of Heidous.
At a quarter to six that evening the horizon and in fact the whole sky became lit up by hundreds of gun flashes as a terrific artillery preparation went down on Heidous, Tanngoucha, and Sandy Ridge, as well as the heavy gunners’ support for the attack on Longstop.
F and G Companies gradually made their way down the rocky and precipitous slopes of Bettiour, and F Company, under Major Dunnill, marched on a compass bearing to a forming-up position on the outskirts of the village. Heidous, or “Hideous,” as the men called it, was about a mile from Bettiour and divided into an upper and a lower village. For days it had been shelled until not a single building remained intact and most of the houses were just heaps of rubble.
It was an eerie sight at night with odd fires burning among the ruins. 10 and 11 Platoons started to advance along the edge of the village and came under heavy machine-gun fire and were also harassed by snipers. They pushed on slowly, but contact with company headquarters, and with the reserve platoon, was lost. Major Dunnill then received word that his forward platoons were held tip and he gave orders to Sergeant Norman to take the reserve platoon to the right and to try to infiltrate into the village from there. A forward section of Lieutenant Rowlette’s platoon managed to get into the lower village and sent a message reporting their progress. A force of what remained at company headquarters was formed under Major Dunnill, and they all moved off, led by Corporal Palmer, who had brought the message and knew the way back. Unfortunately, owing to the darkness or to a mist that suddenly developed, the party lost their way. As they moved through the edge of the village a machine-gun opened up and Corporal Palmer fell mortally wounded, his well-intentioned task unfulfilled.
Major Dunnill and Rifleman Whiteside, his runner, went back along the main wadi at the bottom of the village and then clambered tip the steep rocky slopes at the southern end. As they went over the crest another gun opened up and the rifleman was hit. Major Dunnill silenced the enemy gun with his Bren.
Throughout this time G Company were engaged on the small rocky hill south of Heidous, but so far nothing had been heard of them. They were out of touch by wireless and had sent no message to F Company.
Captain Thornton, commanding G Company, went into Heidous to find out the situation. He met Lieutenant Rowlette, but soon he walked into a fixed line, fell wounded in the legs and was afterwards taken prisoner.
Major Dunnill, who had been wounded in several places, went back to headquarters to give the Commanding Officer the general situation. Acting on his information E Company was sent to Heidous to support F Company. It was about three o’clock in the morning when they arrived outside the village and took tip positions. The moon was up, and the Germans were silhouetted against the skyline manning their guns. The approach was far too steep for any surprise attack. By now there was no sound of firing and everything had a strange, uneasy quietness. A section of G Company met E Company but could not offer any information, and it was apparent that F Company had either withdrawn or had been captured. Of the rest of G Company nothing had been heard.
Dawn came. Major JD Lofting brought E Company back to Bettiour rather than reinforce failure and take on a task that might prove disastrous in casualties. It became known afterwards that the three platoons of G Company did in fact get their objective, but receiving no further orders withdrew at dawn. Those that remained of F Company who had not been killed, wounded, or captured lay low until early morning. Lieutenant Rowlette and Lieutenant Hughes feigned dead, sprawled over a slit trench with one or two others while a German officer stood beside them viewing the situation. “Jock” Hughes was so tired that he began to snore. Their hearts jumped into their mouths but luckily the German made off. As they looked over a wall to see if the way was clear, they saw a German soldier standing against an eighty-eight-millimetre gun. Each of them looked in turn and quickly ducked out of sight. They had another look and then they realised that the German was dead. He had been killed outright and the gun held up his body. The two officers crawled away at dawn and reached the battalion on Bettiour. Eventually thirty men of F Company got back from Heidous.
By this time the Royal Irish Fusiliers had reached but not occupied Point 622 and the Inniskillings were on the lower slopes of Tanngoucha. So, the Irish Brigade hung on, with the Inniskillings half-way up Tanngoucha, where they dug in, grimly refusing to withdraw a second time. The Royal Irish Fusiliers had captured The Kefs, but could not quite make Point 622 slightly higher, and the London Irish, after a hard and gallant fight, had failed to take Heidous. Something was going to crack, but the Irish battalions were determined that it was not going to be the brigade, though all knew that little assistance could be expected as the rest of the division were all heavily engaged. But three Churchills of the North Irish Horse became available. It was not tank country, in fact it was scarcely fit for mules, but somehow, they managed to get up and forward. It was decided that the Faughs and the tanks would attack on the left flank, and so worry the defenders of Tanngoucha, that the Skins, from their half-cock position, could take immediate advantage of any signs of weakness.
And so it happened. The Faughs, with the help of the tanks which fired all they got- solid shot at the fissures in the cliffs, Besas at machine-gun nests, and high explosives at everything – reached their objective. The Skins then charged with a roar and up went the white flags. Tanngoucha had fallen.
That night, too, the London Irish took Heidous. E Company occupied it and also searched Sandy Ridge and the valleys and wadis alongside. 9 Platoon found Sergeant Norman, a platoon commander in F Company, lying wounded in the ruins of a house in Heidous. From him it was established that most of F Company, including Captain Thornton, and a few men of G Company had been taken prisoner. Sergeant Norman had been left behind by the Germans as he was too seriously wounded to be moved. He died later in hospital.
In this way the “Siegfried Line” of Tunisia was cracked, but even with the fall of the fortresses of Tanngoucha and Longstop the job was not finished. The Irish Brigade advanced farther into the hills along a deep valley that led them into the heart of the great kefs that looked down majestically on to the Medjez Plain.
They had to follow tip the enemy as quickly as possible. The Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers cleared the hills on the right, the Royal Irish Fusiliers those on the left, and brigade headquarters, with the London Irish, followed. After three days’ fighting, and clearing three miles of country, the brigade came to a stop. It had reached country almost impossible to any but mountaineers.
Two days later the Irish Brigade was recalled to south of Medjez. They had been fighting hard and continuously for a month and had had heavy casualties. Every man in each battalion who could fight had been in action; rifle companies, pioneers, carriers, anti-tank gunners, signallers, shoemakers, and cooks – everyone had done his share.
The key to the whole area undoubtedly had been Tanngoucha, and after the German defences had fallen the Brigadier went over them and found them a series of cunningly conceived fortresses. He confessed that he was unable to discover how the brigade had succeeded in storming them. The Corps Commander, too, inquired: “How on earth did they do it?” and the Brigadier replied frankly: “I’m damned if I know.”
One thing was certain, he commented later, it could only have been done by the very best troops, with first-class junior leaders.”
The stage was now set for the final thrust, and the 78th Division was given the task of covering the concentration of forces for the last drive towards Tunis. The assembly of forces was uninterrupted, and the attacks went in with great success. By the evening of May 7, it was known that our armour had reached the outskirts of Tunis and in some places was fighting in the city itself.
The division then had to clear up Tunis, which meant the end of a job well done.
From a rise outside the port, Tunis glistening in the early sun looked calm and peaceful. Its minarets and mosques towered above the palm-trees and nothing less war-like could be imagined. But in swift contrast which marred the beauty of the scene, there came along the main road a motley crowd of prisoners. They streamed along in thousands – dirty, bedraggled Italians, smarter-looking but more depressed Germans. There were soldiers, sailors, and airmen, and they submitted passively to direction to hastily set up compounds. The London Irish debussed at the entrance to Tunis with orders to clear up the dock area. The Skins had to clear the rest of the town, while the Faughs took a wide sweep and entered Tunis from the south.
The troops were loaded with bombs, PIATs, mortars – all set for street fighting. But there was no street fighting, the Bosche had no fight left in him. Instead, the people of Tunis went mad with delight at their deliverance. It was a day which the men of the Irish Brigade will never forget.
The three battalions pushed their way through the town and blocked the narrow strip of road to Cap Bon, about three miles outside Tunis. Prisoners streamed in in their thousands.
After a few more days of desultory fighting in tidying up the approaches to Cap Bon, the campaign was over. G Company of the 2nd Battalion remained in Tunis, guarding hospitals and prisoner-of-war pens, rounding up stragglers, and in other duties.
Towards the end of May a Victory Parade was held, in which the battalion took part. It marked the end of one period of the war and the beginning of another. But it was inevitable that the magnificent scene, with the cheering crowds, the massed bands, the marching men and aircraft zooming overhead, made those who saw it or who took part think that perhaps the end of the whole war was just round the corner. Many bitter months of fighting were however ahead, and for this the 2nd Battalion, after a brief rest, started intensive training. Lieut-Colonel TPD Scott left the battalion to take up an appointment as Brigade Commander. Joining the battalion in March 1943, he successfully overcame a very trying period brought about, no doubt, by the constant re-formings in the early days of Africa. His place was taken by Lieut-Colonel H Rogers, previously Second-in-Command of the Royal Irish Fusiliers.
General Montgomery inspected the battalion one evening just before Lieut-Colonel Scott left. The 78th Division had been transferred to the Eighth Army, and the reason for the Army Commander’s visit was that he might see the new men under his command.
He found the battalion fit and ready for its next task.
PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE ARMY COMMANDER TO BE READ OUT TO ALL TROOPS.
July 1943.
“The time has now come to carry the war into Italy, and into the Continent of Europe. The Italian Overseas Empire has been exterminated; we will now deal with the home country.
To the Eighth Army has been given the great honour of representing the British Empire in the Allied Force which is now to carry out this task. On our left will be our American Allies. Together we will set about the Italians in their own country in no uncertain way; they came into this war to suit themselves and they must now take the consequences; they asked for it, and they will now get it.
On behalf of us all I want to give a very hearty welcome to the Canadian troops that are now joining the Eighth Army. I know well the fighting men of Canada; they are magnificent soldiers, and the long and careful training they have received in England will now be put to very good use – to the great benefit of the Eighth Army.
The task in front of us is not easy. But it is not so difficult as many we have had in the past, and have overcome successfully. In all our operations we have always had the close and intimate support of the Royal Navy and the RAF, and because of that support we have always succeeded. In this operation the combined effort of the three fighting services is being applied in tremendous strength, and nothing will be able to stand against it. The three of us together – Navy, Army, and Air Force – will see the thing through. I want all of you, my soldiers, to know that I have complete confidence in the successful outcome of this operation.
Therefore, with faith in God and with enthusiasm for our cause and for the day of battle, let us all enter this contest with stout hearts and determination to conquer.
The eyes of our families, and in fact of the whole Empire, will be on us once the battle starts; we will see that they get good news and plenty of it.
To each one of you, whatever may be your rank or employment, I would say:
GOOD LUCK AND GOOD HUNTING IN THE HOME COUNTRY OF ITALY!
BL MONTGOMERY, General
SICILY
The invasion of Sicily was a well-planned and boldly executed operation in which the sea, air, and land forces each played a vital and successful part. It was an operation which the Italians, at any rate, did not think could possibly succeed. The first landings by sea and air were made where they were least expected, and so surprised were the enemy that on the first day the landings were practically unopposed.
Sicily, an island about one hundred and sixty miles wide and about ninety miles from north to south, is about half the size of Ireland. It is high, mountainous country intersected by deep gorges with rivers running swiftly between precipitous cliffs. Along parts of the coast are narrow plainlands, but except the Catania Plain on the eastern side there is no really flat country in the island. Mount Etna, eleven thousand feet, is the highest of a rugged group of mountains.
The Sicilians, a hardy mountain race, appeared intensely to dislike the Italians, and Mussolini in particular. Throughout the island small villages of ancient stone houses, perched amid the mountain peaks, formed a series of fortresses. They were designed to be impregnable in the Middle Ages with the primitive weapons of those days. In fact, as the Sicilian campaign progressed, they proved to be difficult obstacles when defended with modern weapons.
The British Eighth Army, fresh from their triumph in North Africa, landed on the beaches of the east coast of Sicily, south of Syracuse, the ancient city founded by the Corinthians several centuries before Christ. The port, scene of stirring battles between the Athenians and the Syracusans, was captured and was quickly made ready to receive the reinforcements which followed up behind the assault troops. The historic old city had escaped devastation.
The next objective was the Catania Plain and its spacious airfields, thence east and west of Mount Etna, to converge again in the neighbourhood of Taormina. The American Seventh Army landed on the south coast near Gela and proceeded towards Palermo and Marsala on the west side of the island.
Montgomery’s plans went with a swing. The Eighth Army pushed northwards up the coast until stiff resistance was met outside Catania. The Americans made impressive progress against less stubborn opposition. Palermo and Marsala fell, and the western half of Sicily was almost cleared up.
There were about three German divisions in the island, and they were reinforced by several paratroop brigades fighting as infantry. They were all picked troops and they put up a desperate, stubborn, but hopeless fight with skill and determination. There were four hundred thousand Italians there, too, but they did not seem to function much as soldiers. They surrendered in thousands.
Forsaken by the Italians, the Germans found that their best friend was the country, which could not have been more suitable for a defensive battle. The first impetus of the invasion over, the enemy recovered from his surprise and regrouped his forces to meet the main Allied thrusts. The Allied troops had been fighting in difficult country in an oppressive and tiring heat, and it was necessary that the original invaders should be rested and that new men should go forward.
A new co-ordinated plan was prepared to overcome the reorganised resistance of the Germans. There was, of course, no breaking of contact and no relaxation in the pressure by the British and American forces on land and in the air. Fighting continued in each sector, but advances were made with a view to preparing for the final push.
The 50th Division had been on the first assault, and 168 Brigade, with the 1st Battalion London Irish, began to reach the island three days after the initial invasion.
The 78th Division, in which was the 2nd Battalion London Irish, landed on July 26-27. The 78th Division had now left the First Army and was making its first appearance with the Eighth.
This was the first time that the two battalions of the Regiment had been in the same theatre of war since leaving England.
The plans for the final push were roughly that the Eighth Army should proceed along the eastern side of the island, capture Catania and Regalbuto, and encircle Mount Etna by the inland road through Aderno, Bronte, and Randazzo. The American Seventh Army should cover westwards of Regalbuto to the north coast and advance on Messina by the two northern routes.
The 78th Division was on the left flank of the Eighth Army and became a connecting-link with the Americans. The 50th Division was on the right flank, fighting its way up along the east coast.
The time had now arrived for what became known as Montgomery’s left hook. The Americans were pressing in the west, and the time had come for a strong blow in the centre. To the troops came the following message from their leader:
EIGHTH ARMY – PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE ARMY COMMANDER TO BE READ OUT TO ALL TROOPS.
1. The Allied Armies landed in Sicily, on Italian soil, on 10th July, magnificently supported by the Royal Navy and the Allied Air Forces, and are to-day in possession of the whole island except for the north-east corner where the enemy is now hemmed in.
2. I want to tell all of you, soldiers of the Eighth Army, that this has been a very fine performance. On your behalf, I have expressed to the Commander of the Seventh American Army on our left the congratulations of the Eighth Army for the way the American troops have captured and cleaned up more than half the island in record time. We are proud to fight beside our American Allies.
3. The beginning has been very good, thanks to your splendid fighting qualities and to the hard work and devotion to duty of all those who work in the ports, on the roads, and in the rear areas. We must not forget to give thanks to “THE LORD MIGHTY IN BATTLE” for giving us such a good beginning towards the attainment of our object.
4. And now let us get on with the job. Together with our American Allies we have knocked Mussolini off his perch. We will now drive the Germans out of Sicily.
5. Into battle with stout hearts. Good luck to you all.
BL MONTGOMERY, General,
Eighth Army.
SICILY JULY 1943.
From Centuripe to Maletto
The key position in the German defence line across Sicily was Centuripe, a village perched on the top of a formidable line of steep hills. Its precipitous sides gave it an almost impregnable position. The lesser hills round it were well defended by the enemy and it was necessary for them to be mastered before Centuripe could be tackled.
The 78th Division got together for a drive towards Catenanuova and to capture Centuripe. The country between the two villages was wild and extremely rough. Great rocky crags, similar to those among which the 2nd Battalion had fought in North Africa, covered the one mountain road between them.
The Irish Brigade had to take Centuripe, and the scheme was for a silent night advance to be made with heavy gun-fire available at call. The 6th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers and the Royal Irish Fusiliers were given the main tasks, and the 2nd Battalion London Irish were ordered to make a dangerous flank secure.
On the evening of August 1, the battalion moved to a lying-up area in the wadis below the foothills of Centuripe. No transport was able to get forward and that meant that all ammunition, food, and other supplies had to be man-handled. That was a considerable problem and made the operation very tiring and tedious. At noon next day the London Irish went forward to a line behind the 6th Royal West Kent Regiment, who were fighting in the hills behind Centuripe, and in the August haze they could see the village resting lazily and sleepily on the summit of the long, vast hill. The job of the London Irish was to take three commanding hills, Points 704, 611, and 703, behind Centuripe. It was not known in what strength they were held by the enemy.
It was hoped that most of his attention would be to the main battle and that he would have little time to look after his ‘‘back door.”
G and F Companies crossed the start-lines after a fifteen minutes’ warm-up by the gunners, and they were soon on Points 704 and when G Company had made good their task, H Company moved on to take Point 703. They had been unlucky on the start-line and had had some casualties. Theirs was a more difficult job and they had to face machine-guns from the hill and from the sides. G Company helped in silencing the enfilade fire, and when darkness came the London Irish consolidated on the ground gained. This third hill still held out and the decision had to be made whether to wait until it had fallen, or to carry on without delay and rely on the preoccupation of the enemy with the left-flank attack. The latter course was taken; the Royal Irish Fusiliers put in their assault towards the north and rear of Centuripe, and the Skins, who throughout had been in close contact with the enemy on the frontal sector, obtained a foothold on the southern edge of the village after a heavy barrage. The Royal Irish Fusiliers pushed through the northern end. The fighting was stubborn and hard, and many good fellows were lost, but just before dawn on August 3 Centuripe fell to the Irish Brigade, and this success caused the whole German line to Catania to crack. The operation had been a tough one, in difficult country and against a dogged enemy, and chief credit for the success was due to the Skins, who bore the brunt of the fighting and fought with fine spirit and determination.
There was no respite after Centuripe had been captured. The Irish Fusiliers mastered heights beyond the village, and the London Irish, marching through Centuripe, reached rising ground overlooking the River Salso. The transport had difficulty in getting down the winding road from Centuripe because of a large crater which took the sappers twelve hours to fill in and also because the enemy, far from being finished with, scattered mortar bombs and shells in the area.
The Salso had to be crossed. There was an ugly gap about one hundred feet wide in the bridge, and no repair material could reach the riverbank until the road crater had been made good. Bulldozers were up quickly, but work could be done only at night, owing to the German fire. The Royal Engineers succeeded, however, in doing a magnificent job and the gunners were soon stepped up to help the troops.
Three patrols each a platoon strong went out from G Company to locate enemy posts and to mark out approaches for the crossing. They discovered that the Salso was only a few inches deep and, getting over safely, they penetrated as far as the River Simeto, which ran northwards from a bend in the Salso to the west. Lieutenant O’Connor’s patrol went to a blown bridge over the Simeto on the main Centuripe-Aderno road; Lieutenant I. D. White and his men went to a viaduct a little to the north, and Lieutenant Lyness’s patrol reached Carcaci, a small village to the west of the Simeto. They met no enemy between the two rivers and got back with information vital for further progress.
Patrols went out again next day, and Sergeant Donaghy and his men of F Company reported some machine-gun posts, but it was apparent that there was no strong, organised defence along the riverbanks. Actually, when the London Irish and the Royal Irish Fusiliers attacked at 1500 hours on August 4, there was no German opposition in strength at all. What little there was, came from a few snipers and machine-guns left behind to harass the advance. The London Irish quickly reached high ground on the far side of the Salso, and at night E and F Companies got to the Simeto. Supporting arms were rushed up, and at daylight it was seen that the other bank was strongly held by the Germans. Sharp exchanges of fire took place during the morning, and the mortars had a busy time keeping the heads of the enemy down on the far bank. At first light E Company occupied the village of Carcaci and pushed one platoon down to the riverside, and at the same time battalion headquarters, with H Company in reserve, moved up to the railway station. Plans were made to gain a bridgehead. The river was fast flowing, and deep in many places. Where it was not deep, smooth boulders and rocks rested on the riverbed, making a foothold precarious. The banks on both sides were steep, rising at times nearly a hundred feet. That held by the enemy was covered in dense undergrowth, affording only a few good approaches, which were well covered by snipers and Spandau posts. It was honeycombed with caves, in which more Germans were hidden.
The attack was timed for 1500 hours, but during the morning a party of Germans, about fifty strong, were seen trying to work round the left of the battalion. They were scattered by fire from E Company and the heavy mortars of the Support Group. Later a Canadian force came up on the left and completed the discomfiture of the Germans, who disappeared as fast as their legs could carry them. E Company also sent patrols to try to cross the river, but they were unable to get very far owing to the vigilance of the enemy. They succeeded, however, in pin-pointing many positions.
With the artillery booming in support the crossing was made by the London Irish and the Royal Irish Fusiliers, with the Skins held in reserve. F Company got over and made for a small hill with an isolated yellow house standing nearby. H Company tackled another hill on the left. Both features were hardly discernible on the ground and were a few hundred yards from the river. As they scaled the steep slopes from the river the foremost platoon of F Company found themselves in a bottleneck among the undergrowth and bushes, and many men fell. Lieutenant Allen, who had recently joined the battalion from the 8th Battalion Royal Ulster Rifles, was killed, while leading his platoon, by a sniper who fired at point-blank range. The German died soon afterwards.
The third platoon of F Company moved round to the right and after a sharp encounter found themselves facing the yellow house. It was a strongly built stone building, and Lieutenant K Daly, with Sergeant S Kelly and a handful of men, fought their way in. There was a sudden counterattack, and to avoid being cut off by a more powerful force the small party withdrew back to the rest of the platoon. Gradually, with the enemy rushing all available men forward, the three platoons of F Company, with very little cover in open country, had to pause. They held tight under a rain of fire until, with the help of reserves from the Skins, the building was blasted at short range and stormed.
H Company had similar experiences but lost more men from sniper and machine-gun fire. They had an even more difficult advance up the north bank of the river and were forced to proceed in single file. The leading platoon, under Lieutenant Michael Clarke, went forward clearing snipers and Spandaus, while 18 Platoon disposed of enemy groups which were harassing the company from the protection of a viaduct on the left. In a gallant attack on a well-defended German post several men, including Lieutenant Howells, the Platoon Commander, were killed but the enemy were silenced.
Throughout this hard battle G Company and the supporting weapons of the battalion gave all assistance possible from the south bank of the river. As dusk approached, two platoons of G Company moved across the river with reserve ammunition, mortars, and machine-guns for the immediate support of the two other companies. By darkness the bridgehead was secure, and the Germans withdrew during the night.
In the morning a fighting patrol from the London Irish located the enemy half-way up the hills on top of which was the next objective, the much-bombed town of Aderno.
That, however, was not an Irish Brigade task, for the two other Brigades of the 78th Division went through, leaving the Irish Brigade to bathe in the cool waters of the Simeto, upon which they felt quite justifiably they had some claim.
From the afternoon of August 1 to nightfall on August 5 the Irish Brigade had advanced twenty-five miles and had had three exceptionally tough fights – Centuripe, Salso, and the Simeto. But everything had depended upon the sappers. The way they got their material forward and overcame all obstacles was magnificent. The brigade and the London Irish in particular were very well served.
The battalion spent five days resting by the Simeto, by which time the rest of the division had captured Aderno and Bronte, and were holding the hills on the far side of the latter town. The crossing of the Salso and Simeto Rivers and the fall of Aderno had cut all the German lateral communications west and south of Mount Etna, and caused the fall of Paterno, Santa Maria, and Biancavilla.
Refreshed by their stay by the river, the Irish Brigade took up the running. In front of the hills behind Bronte was a long stretch of low ground, very thickly wooded and full of terraces and narrow stone tracks. In the distance, jutting out against the skyline, were three prominent features. The first was Mount Macherone, the second Capella, and the third a long ridge called the Sperina. The first two hid the small village of Maletto. The Irish Brigade were ordered to take these hills and Maletto, with the assistance of the 8th Argylls. The plan was for the Scots to take Mount Macherone and to make good the London Irish start-line, the Irish Fusiliers to take the Capella and Maletto, and the London Irish on the right flank to take the main feature, Sperina, and another peak just behind called Monte Maletto. On August 11 the battalions moved to a forward area south of Bronte, and there they said good-bye to their motor transport, which had worked valiantly since the landing and had negotiated with skill and coolness hazardous mountain roads and tracks, with their giddy bends, stiff climbs, and perilous descents.
The London Irish changed over to pack transport, because if the country already traversed was unsuitable to a mechanised army, that which lay immediately ahead was even more so.
The Battle of Maletto was to be a night advance followed by an attack just before dawn, preceded by a heavy artillery barrage. Late on the 11th, light bombers gave Sperina and Capella a sound and accurate bombing for three-quarters of an hour. At 2100 hours the London Irish left on the approach march to the start-line. That night advance through absolutely impossible country proved to be a most difficult operation. Major Kevin O’Connor, who was acting Commanding Officer, owing to Lieut-Colonel Rogers being on the sick-list, realised on his reconnaissance that the march would not be easy, but it was far worse than he or anyone else had conceived. There were thick, high walls, rocky tracks in close-wooded country with innumerable bushes, thick undergrowth, and steep terraces every few yards. All these were awkward obstacles, making advance by compass very difficult indeed. In addition, man-handling ammunition, supporting-arms, and the rear link No. 19 Wireless sets was by no means easy. The advance consequently took much longer than had been estimated. In that treacherous ground the battalion inevitably became split up. By 0400 hours two platoons of F Company and two platoons of G Company were in the forming-up area, under Major JD Lofting. The acting Commanding Officer was forward with the remaining platoons of those companies, and he ordered the attack to proceed.
Zero hour had been at 0230 hours, when the artillery had laid their barrage. Gunfire had in fact ceased an hour before the London Irish were ready for their attack and as dawn was breaking the utmost speed was necessary. The platoons advanced towards their objectives, meeting heavy enfilade fire from the right. It was here that Sergeant McCrory, a first-class man and a very good platoon commander, was killed.
Due to the dash and courage shown by the leading platoons, ably led by Lieutenant HND Seymour and Lieutenant JD White, the attack went well. Before long a total of thirty prisoners had been taken, hut the position was not an easy one. The Germans were still holding wooded ground to the right rear and keeping up continuous fire on the London Irish. At 1030 hours F Company were ready to attack, and they went across the bullet-swept ground to take their objective on the right of Sperina. Here something went wrong, because it was intended that they should sweep round to the right and on the way mop up the enemy who were making life unpleasant for the forward companies. They did not carry out this plan but went straight for the hill, which they took despite heavy mortar and machine-gun fire. Why the plan partly miscarried will never be known, because Major J Fitzgerald MC , F Company Commander, was killed while crossing the open country below the hill. A delightful personality and a fearless officer, his death was a great loss to the battalion.
The Royal Irish Fusiliers in the meantime had captured Capella and Monte Maletto and cleared the village. The Skins, too, had come out from reserve and made a long, slow journey over lava country to tackle enemy forces causing trouble on the right.
The enemy’s general position became untenable after this battle. By eight o’clock in the evening firing had died down and as darkness came the enemy evacuated their lines, leaving patches of “S4” mines to hamper our progress. That night the Irish Fusiliers were relieved by a Scottish battalion, and they went forward with the main Maletto-Randazzo road as their axis. The Skins continued their protective move on the right, and the London Irish, leaving one company to hold Sperina, assembled to support quickly either the Faughs or the Skins.
The Irish Fusiliers thrust forward with the help of the gunners, and by 0830 hours they had not only hit the enemy hard but had chased them in the darkness five to six miles. A detour had to be made to avoid American shelling, and then at 0930 hours on August 13 they made contact with the American 1st Division. Though German resistance was limited to a few ambushes, the Faughs’ line of advance was thick with Teller and “S” mines, which made the going hazardous in the darkness and took frequent toll of a battalion determined to complete the task given to it.
The fall of Maletto and the rapid approach to Randazzo started the Germans on their last hurried rush to the sea.
This phase of the fighting left the Irish Brigade half-way along the long slopes of Mount Etna, between Randazzo and Maletto. They were several thousand feet above the sea, and the nights were cool and pleasant. The main characteristic of the country was lava dust, a fine, reddish-brown powder which seemed to penetrate everywhere and everything. For days the troops had marched, fought, and rested in this dust, which covered them from head to foot, and they yearned for the blue waters of the Mediterranean where, from pleasant, shaded sands, they could clean themselves.
The 2nd Battalion rested near Patti, a very good spot less than fifty yards from the sea, with shady olive- and fruit-trees. In the distance the peaceful Lipase Islands turned thoughts to things other than war, to pre-war and perhaps post-war holidays. Gaily coloured fishing boats sailed to and for, and on the horizon, Stromboli poured out its clouds of smoke.
Six weeks were spent in these pleasant surroundings. Training was resumed, and new drafts arrived to bring the battalion once more up to strength. It was necessary that everyone should, once again, be fighting fit, because another and grimmer task was ahead—the invasion of Southern Italy and the forcing of the back door into Hitler’s European fortress.
From Taranto to the Moro River
The invasion of southern Italy began on September 3, 1943, with the Eighth Army crossing the Straits of Messina and landing in the heel and toe of Italy. Then followed the 5th Army’s assault in the Gulf of Salerno. It was a success, but a slow and costly one. When the landing was planned there were no German troops in the Salerno area, and the 5th Army might have driven across Italy, cut off the German divisions in the south, as well as pushing north to Rome. As it was, the enemy were prepared for the landing and a bitter struggle followed.
Good progress had been made by the two Armies by the time the 2nd Battalion London Irish sailed from Messina to Taranto on September 24. The short voyage was uneventful, and Taranto harbour in those early days was an extraordinary sight. It looked small and insignificant on approach, but on passing through a canal underneath an ancient swing-bridge the vast inland lake was revealed.
Here were at anchor all that remained of Mussolini’s Grand Fleet, and they looked very shiny and new, having spent most of their time in harbour and not venturing far because of the ever-vigilant Royal Navy which, despite air and submarine attacks, retained control of the Mediterranean throughout the war.
After camping for five days outside Taranto, the battalion moved south of Barletta and prepared to make a further move north by sea. The transport, carriers, and anti-tank guns went by road.
Here were at anchor all that remained of Mussolini’s Grand Fleet, and they looked very shiny and new, having spent most of their time in harbour and not venturing far because of the ever-vigilant Royal Navy which, despite air and submarine attacks, retained control of the Mediterranean throughout the war.
After camping for five days outside Taranto, the battalion moved south of Barletta and prepared to make a further move north by sea. The transport, carriers, and anti-tank guns went by road.
The invasion of southern Italy continued steadily but slowly. Along the Adriatic coast it was particularly slow, because the Germans were blowing up every bridge, culvert, and road, and as there was a bridge almost every half mile along the only main road of the coast the German plan to delay the Eighth Army worked only too well.
To prevent further delay and to expedite the invasion it was decided to land a force at Termoli, farther up the coast, and thus force the Germans to give ground in the south. The Irish Brigade took part in this move, and when they sailed from Barletta on the morning of October 5 everyone looked forward to a pleasant sea cruise with maybe a few quiet days at Termoli. But those days were not so quiet, for the reason that Termoli was well garrisoned by the Hun.
When the craft carrying the brigade arrived off Termoli harbour at 2230 hours on October 5, they were shelled from the shore. The gunfire had more of a nuisance value than being an accurate bombardment. Commandos carried out the initial assault, followed by 36 Brigade, and then after a day or two the three Irish battalions landed.
The Commandos and 36 Brigade had been strongly counterattacked by tanks and infantry, and the invaders could make no progress beyond the town. The London Irish were ordered to capture a cemetery and a small hill about three-quarters of a mile from Termoli. H and E Companies carried out the attacks, and both objectives were taken after a spirited fight, in which Major Bill Westcott, commanding H Company, was wounded.
Operating with the 78th Division at this stage was the 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade, and a troop of the Three Rivers Regiment was attached to the battalion. They were absolutely first-class in every attack, and there was not a building, haystack, or suspicious piece of ground that did not receive their whole-hearted attention whenever an opportunity came.
The rest of the Irish Brigade made progress on the left, and then for twelve days they all remained outside Termoli while plans were made to widen the bridgehead.
There was intense patrol activity, which gradually reached Petacciato, eight miles from Termoli, while engineer parties removed the mines which the enemy had laid in the vicinity. Much useful information about the enemy and the surrounding country was obtained by the patrols. One, a battle patrol led by Lieutenant Douglas Seymour, killed a couple of suspicious looking “civilians” who were found to be Huns in disguise and belonging to the 1/64 Panzer Grenadiers whom the battalion had met earlier in Sicily.
Sergeant H Donaghy, MM, and his patrol ambushed an enemy truck as it was returning to the German lines after delivering supplies to the forward troops. They fired heavily on the vehicle, wounding one of its occupants, but did not manage to stop it.
Petacciato, a small village on the top of rising ground on the north side of the River Sinacra, had to be taken to provide a jumping-off ground for the next major assault – the crossing of the River Trigno.
A battalion attack on a two-company front was planned, F Company on the right and G Company on the left, with E Company protecting the forming-up position and H Company in reserve. A squadron of the 44th Royal Tank Regiment was in support. At 0100 hours on the 19th a barrage opened and the attack began. F Company pushed forward; the leading platoon with Major Gibbs, brushing aside all opposition, arrived in the town five minutes after the barrage had lifted. They found the enemy still recovering from the effects of the bombardment, with most of them hiding in the houses and other buildings. They had “gone to ground.” Among them were the gun-crews of the seventy-five’s guarding the roads into the town, but most of the enemy managed to escape, as the task of systematically clearing each building was a slow one.
Later, Lieutenant O’Connor, with the leading platoon of G Company, advanced to the southern end of the village, clearing a few machine-gun posts on the way, and by dawn the rest of G Company, who had been held up by enfilade fire, succeeded in occupying the southern half. F Company also moved up during the early hours, and Petacciato fell. The battalion suffered no casualties in the actual attack, and nineteen prisoners were taken.
The next obstacle was the River Trigno, about seven thousand yards from Petacciato. On the whole it was shallow, about five feet in its deepest part, with odd sandstone patches in mid-stream. It was wide, with scrub and cover on the south side, and thickly wooded on the opposite side. The main bridge across it was still intact, but the problem whether or not a charge had been laid was not cleared up until the sappers with a platoon from E Company went down and after a short scrap with German rearguards reported that it was safe, so far as they could tell, but a thorough inspection was impossible.
An attack went in at once, led by the Royal Irish Fusiliers, and as soon as they reached the bridge it was blown up and a few culverts in the vicinity as well.
A small bridgehead was formed by the Faughs and for four days in very bad weather the London Irish waited by the river for the next move. During a temporary break in the clouds, they were bombed and strafed by a few F.W. 190s, but not much harm was done.
About four thousand yards beyond the Trigno was the small town of San Salvo, which nestled comfortably on the top of a long hill. The London Irish and the Faughs were ordered to take the town, while the 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers were to tackle the railway station by the side of the hill.
The attacks were made at night after a preliminary bombardment, but heavy rain made the conditions appalling. From behind the protection of dense minefields the Germans fired into the confined space of the bridgehead. F Company had a bad time. The leading platoon, with 2nd Lieutenant Marmorschtein at their head, was caught between the enemy defence fire and a minefield and had heavy casualties. The platoon tackled a German machine-gun post very bravely, but the platoon commander and most of his men were lost.
It was no use going on under those conditions. The Faughs were having a bad time too and possibly were suffering heavier casualties. They lost their Commanding Officer, Colonel Butler, that quiet little man with an indomitable spirit who was greatly liked throughout the brigade. They had also lost two Company Commanders, Major Paddy Proctor and Major Dennis Dunn, both from the Regiment. The London Irish lost Major Geoffrey Phillips, wounded, and many good chaps, especially non-commissioned officers.
The attack had been repulsed and so the two battalions, both badly mauled, got back to the bridgehead.
The next morning in the woods alongside the Trigno the battalion suffered a great loss. Major Kevin O’Connor, the Second-in-Command, was killed by a shell when he was supervising the bringing up of supplies. Fearless, a charming and delightful personality, he was held in high esteem by everyone. The great work he did for the battalion he loved so much will live after him. The cross on his soldier’s grave beside the banks of the Trigno bears the simple epitaph ‘‘A Gallant Gentleman.’’
All that very wet day, October 28, the battalion remained on the defensive, frequently shelled by the enemy, who had amassed scores of guns. The attack on San Salvo went in again on the night of November 2-3. This time the Skins were to do it in conjunction with 36 Brigade.
They went in and this time the enemy, faltering under a terrific bombardment, lost ground and San Salvo fell.
The 2nd Battalion went out of the line while the two other brigades of the 78th Division swept on to the Sangro, along the north bank of which the enemy had built powerful defences. It was a good defence-line, with the ground forming several natural intermediate outposts. There was the river itself, fast flowing from the incessant rain and the melting snow on the hills. It was deep, with an average width of one hundred feet. The exact distance could not be accurately determined because the flow and height of the torrent varied overnight. During the day the river might be fordable, but after rain had fallen it would rage along, flooding its banks, and become not a hundred feet, but a hundred yards, wide.
Uncertainty was an additional handicap and, with the river, formed a weighty obstacle to an early advance. There was also a wooded escarpment about a thousand yards from the river and fifty feet high. This, curiously enough, offered an advantage to the attacker, because it gave complete cover from the main ridge above on which the main defences were built.
Most of the surrounding country was plough-land, thickly wooded in parts and with small, knobby hills. Towards the summit of the ridge there were wide terraces. Altogether it was bad country for tanks, and three towns, Mozzagrogna, San Maria, and Fossacesia, formed main bastions in the defences on the summit of the ridge. On the other side it gradually sloped down to the east coast and the Adriatic.
The first task was to destroy the perimeter defences along the escarpment, and this was accomplished by the two other brigades. Then came the main attack on the Winter Line, and the Irish Brigade was ordered to smash the right half along Fossacesia Ridge, supported by the 4th Armoured Brigade, while the 8th Indian Division was to smash the left half.
Plans were prepared in great detail, and orders were discussed on a cloth model with the majority of the German defences pinpointed. In the meantime, Mitchell bombers gave the ridge a thorough pounding.
On the night of November 20, the battalion moved forward from Casalbordino, carried on the tanks of the 44th Royal Tank Regiment. As dawn came rain started to fall and the tracks and fords leading down to the Sangro became impassable. The battalion was due to cross the river the following night, but the attempt had to be postponed as the tanks could not go on. The morning dragged as further orders were awaited, and then they were told to concentrate near the village of Paglieta. This proved to be a very gruelling cross-country march up hill and down dale, across rain-sodden plough-land and along narrow uneven tracks. Plans were again changed and three days later the London Irish were back at Casalbordino waiting for the weather to clear.
Conditions improved in a few days and when the London Irish once more reached the Sangro they crossed and found the tanks waiting for them. That night the attack on Mozzagrogna and San Maria, the left bastions of the Winter Line, was made by the 8th Indian Division. It did not altogether succeed, and to meet a confused situation plans were hurriedly readjusted. The Irish Brigade and the 4th Armoured Brigade were ordered to tackle San Maria and Li Colli, a hill to the right of the town, and then sweep through the defences of the ridge to Fossacesia.
At dawn on the 29th the 6th Royal Inniskillings and the City of London Yeomanry advanced on San Maria and Li Colli. The opposition was formidable and tank progress was slow. It was nearly dark before they had successfully completed their tasks. Meanwhile, the London Irish and the 44th Royal Tank Regiment had left the comforting shelter of the escarpment and moved forward a mile. Their object was to reach the San Maria – Fossacesia road and to smash the German defences up to and in Fossacesia.
This phase was to go in at 0830 hours next morning, and the plan had divided the German defences into seven blocks each eight hundred yards deep and four hundred yards long. All available artillery was to bombard the opening line for half an hour and then concentrate for ten minutes on each block in turn. As soon as the guns lifted from a block a squadron of tanks and a company of the London Irish were to enter it and clean up any enemy who had survived. The last three blocks in the plan were each two hundred yards deeper, so that the whole village of Fossacesia would be in the fire plan.
Squadrons and companies worked together as follows: A Squadron and F Company; B Squadron and H Company; C Squadron and G Company; while E Company was kept in reserve in the first stages and would be available to clear the northern part of the village if necessary.
Except for the fact that the tanks, which had to go forward by road through Mozzagrogna to the start-line, were delayed by a German counterattack on the 8th Indian Division, the preliminary moves were made without difficulty. Zero hour, however, was put back an hour to 0930 hours.
The guns opened fire to the second and the attack went in in waves as arranged. It was completely successful, and by 1300 hours the ridge and Fossacesia had been cleared. The artillery had demoralised the enemy and this, coupled with the appearance of tanks and infantry from a completely unexpected direction, finished them off. Their defence fire was all prepared for a frontal assault and when put down was many hundreds of yards from our troops. Much material and many prisoners were captured at a cost of only two killed and eight wounded. It was a triumph for planning and organisation.
The Faughs completed the clean-up down to the sea, while the London Irish battle patrol mopped up the scattered farms and buildings. In the close country their work was hard, but prisoners were brought in all afternoon and evening. Some gave themselves up, others were found in wells, dug-outs, underground tunnels, in fact in every conceivable hiding-place. At one stage battalion headquarters was close to a large dug-out, which was explored by Sergeant Oakley. A party of Germans lurking in the darkness inside shot him and a guard was immediately clamped down on the shelter throughout the night. A German was caught trying to escape, and he revealed that a lieutenant and twenty men were still below. These men would not respond to calls to come out and surrender, even when the sappers started to dynamite the entrances. Later a bulldozer was brought up to block all the exits to the dugout, which became the Germans’ grave.
After the capture of Fossacesia, the 2nd Battalion moved on, and a patrol from E Company found the bridges between Fossacesia and Rocca still intact, and Major Peter Grannell and G Company went forward to seize them and prevent demolition. Rocca was duly occupied, but the delaying tactics of the enemy held up a further advance a mile and a half north of the town.
Here a bridge had been blown, and a deep ravine with precipitous sides had to be crossed before a protective screen could be placed to cover the repair work. During a morning reconnaissance, Major Lofting of E Company was wounded, and later Lieutenant Gentle, who had taken over the company, was hit by shrapnel and Lieutenant Wilson took command.
There was a sharp fight to force the ravine and the high ground beyond, and when eventually a bridgehead had been made the London Irish were relieved by a Canadian battalion and switched to the flank to clear an area down to the River Moro. This was done after several minor scraps. The battalion was firmly established along the line of the river by December 4, and though they were heavily shelled and mortared they felt secure. The Sangro Battle was over, and the enemy had scuttled back five miles since the attack on his Winter Line had begun. The Irish Brigade, ably supported by the veteran 4th Armoured Brigade, had had a good, successful fight and they went to the back areas to rest.
At the end of 1943 Lieut-Colonel Ian Goff took over command of the 2nd Battalion from Lieut-Colonel H Rogers. Major HEN Bredin, DSO, MC (Royal Ulster Rifles), had earlier joined the battalion as Second-in-Command.
From Campobasso to Castel di Sangro
Christmas 1943 was spent by the 2nd Battalion in the lower Apennines. The battalion was scattered among the mountain villages of Pietra, San Marco, and the town of Campobasso, where they spent the nearest approach to a peace‑time Christmas that was possible.
The festive season was short-lived. On December 27 they started a move which eventually brought them into the line again in the hills near Montenero. New Year’s Eve came, and with it a blizzard which those who experienced it will never forget. The snow fell all day, gradually getting thicker and thicker. At 1600 hours G Company came across a German patrol, some forty strong, and a sharp encounter ensued. But visibility was so bad that little could be seen of the effect of the fire or of casualties to the enemy. They eventually retired and disappeared into the blizzard. At night the snow was three to four feet deep, and the next morning permission was given to withdraw the forward companies to Montenero.
In front of the village was a row of mountains, fierce and for-bidding, on an average three thousand to four thousand feet high and extending for some eight miles. Montenero rested in a hollow overlooked on all sides, the country below the mountains being broken by odd spurs and isolated hills thick with Turkish oak. Perimeter defences were formed on the ridge‑tops and supplies were sent up on mules. When snow fell it made life on the hills impossible for more than one night without proper snow‑clothing. Progress was considerably reduced, and while the battalion had to combat new enemies in chills and frost‑bite, the heavy snow cut the supply‑lines, for even mules were unable to get through.
So severe were the conditions that some of the guns up by Rionero were completely covered by snow, and there was no shelling from the Allied side during that short period. It appeared that the Germans suffered similarly.
At length the snow stopped and the weather cleared. There followed a period of vigorous patrolling, with one company occupying a forward hill and another in support on the flank or in the rear. The Germans were entrenched on higher ground-on the far side of the River Sangro, and they frequently sent out patrols to test our strength and positions.
On January 19 they carried out a surprise raid on the forward-platoon areas. The first indication of trouble was some rather un-pleasantly accurate shelling. One shell made a direct hit on 7 Platoon headquarters, and all the section commanders were wounded. Shells also fell along the mule‑track to Montenero and cut the signal lines from company headquarters to battalion headquarters.
The men dived into their slit trenches for cover from the gunfire, and as soon as it stopped 7 and 9 Platoons of E Company were rushed at short range by two parties of Germans, each twenty strong and armed with Schmeissers, rifles, stick grenades, and bayonets. 9 Platoon was completely overrun, and all the men were killed or captured. 7 Platoon had a stiff fight, and in a mix‑up the platoon commander, Lieutenant Mosley, and four other ranks managed to get away. The Germans tried to stop all other movement in the forward‑company areas with well‑laid machine‑gun fire, but a counter‑attack led by Major Davies, Officer Commanding E Company, and Lieutenant Bird, of the reserve platoon, was successful, and the 7 and 9 Platoon areas were cleared. Six of the enemy were killed and one captured.
In this engagement the London Irish had five killed, fifteen wounded, and twenty‑nine missing.
After this, brigade headquarters agreed that the two forward companies should again be withdrawn to Montenero and this was done. By this time some snow‑clothing had been issued to the battalion which enabled the company on counter‑attack duty to lie up all night and keep reasonably warm. But snow blocking the roads held up supplies from time to time, and hard‑scale rations had to be issued. For one day only half‑rations were consumed, but the deficit was made up by roasting two, oxen, the fresh meat of which was a welcome change from “M and V” All through the battalion’s term in Montenero communications were difficult. The wireless sets never worked well in the snow‑covered hills, and signal lines were broken almost once a day, and line parties, well escorted, had to go out. All these small jobs which needed escorts drained the pool of man‑power. It was necessary to keep the troops going at full pressure in order to maintain any measure of security. Added to the rigorous conditions, this made the men really tired.
On the night of January 25 to 26 the battalion was ordered to evacuate Montenero in order that the line might be straightened slightly. What the civilians of Montenero thought when they woke up next morning and found everybody gone will never be known. But it is pretty certain they did not appreciate the heavy shelling the Germans gave the village after the London Irish had left.
In February 1944 the Irish Brigade moved to the Cassino sector which, with its famous monastery and the vast bulk of Monte Cairo towering in the distance, had long held up the Allied advance towards Rome. At this time there were several changes in command. Brigadier TPD Scott, CBE, DSO, who had relinquished command of the 2nd Battalion London Irish Rifles in the previous July on promotion to command 12 Brigade, returned to lead the Irish Brigade. Brigadier Nelson Russell, who had fought with the brigade for nearly eighteen months, had had his health undermined and he was ordered into hospital.
The 2nd Battalion London Irish Rifles was then commanded by Lieut-Colonel Ion Goff, with Major HEN Bredin, DSO MC, as Second-in-Command, but the latter became Commanding Officer of the 6th Battalion Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, and was succeeded by Major J Coldwell-Horsfall, MC.
Cassino
An attack on Cassino and the Monastery was impending by the 4th Indian Division and the 2nd New Zealand Division, with the prior support of a colossal air bombardment. This, of course, depended on the weather, and as there was almost constant heavy rain the project was delayed. The role of the Irish Brigade and the rest of the 78th Division was to exploit the break-through when it had been achieved. When St Patrick’s Day came the Irish Brigade were at four hours’ notice to move, but fortunately the Brigadier had made a secret pact with the Divisional Commander that nothing short of a calamity would cause the Irish Brigade to be moved before late on the 18th of March!
The day was observed with traditional ceremonial, and Major-General CF Keightley, CB, OBE, the Divisional Commander, sent a message to all ranks in which he said: ” If the whole Army fights with the same spirit and gallantry with which you have done in the past year, then the Bosche will soon be exterminated. I am confident that next St. Patrick’s Day will see this extermination complete and your return home with all the honour which will be due to you. In the meantime, let us fit ourselves for our last battles. May they be short and successful.”
The General was not far out in at least one of his prognostications.
The attack on Cassino had begun late on the afternoon of March 15, and with the gaiety of the St. Patrick’s Day celebrations there was a latent, uneasy feeling of the lull before the storm. The expected storm did not break just then because the brave efforts of the New Zealanders and the Indian Division did not succeed, though backed up with one of the heaviest poundings from the air Cassino had yet endured. Still, five days after St. Patrick’s Day, the 2nd Battalion London Irish had a closer view of Cassino when they took over posts on the Rapido (Gari) River, south of the Monastery.
The river, a tributary of the Garigliano, ran straight across the Liri Valley from Cassino to Ambroglio, and it was on either side of this river that the opposing armies in this sector sat. Since the previous December some parts of the front had not changed at all. There had been a limited success by 10th Corps near the mouth of the Garigliano in January, and the French and Americans had advanced in December and reached the neighbourhood of Cassino. The French had done magnificently in the mountains north of the Liri Valley and had got up, behind Cassino and the Monastery on to Monte Castellone and Monte Belvedere, each over two thousand feet high but which were almost dwarfed by the might of Monte Cairo behind them. Those two vital positions had been taken in order to facilitate the operations against Cassino and the Monastery, which with Monte Cairo remained in German hands. The Monastery was undoubtedly the key position. It completely dominated the French line of communications from their minor mountain fastnesses. It also dominated Cassino and the Liri Valley below.
In the whole area, the Germans enjoyed unpleasantly good observation over the Allied positions though there was a fair amount of cover by the riverside, where the ground rose gradually from fifty to a hundred feet on each side. From above, the Monastery looked down on everything. It was an awesome sight, its medieval magnificence and splendour reduced to a gaunt, jagged skeleton, often obscured by rising ground mists or enveloped in the foggy brown swirl from smoke bombs. The London Irish were soon to get another view of the Monastery, this time from the north. Extensive regrouping had been ordered to prepare for the next offensive which, it was hoped, would lead to the long-awaited fall of Rome.
The battalion was sent up to relieve the French on Monte Castellone, which was in effect one of the lower foothills of Monte Cairo. Three companies were perched almost on the crest of Castellone, and the fourth was in reserve. Every fourth day one company was relieved. Supplies were brought up the mountain paths by mules. A Echelon was eight miles away in the Rapido Valley, and the supply-route was under frequent shell and mortar fire. Warning notices: “Shell Trap-no Halting” were hardly necessary because no one who had any regard for his life dallied on the way. One stretch, despite its bumps and holes, became known as the “Mad Mile” and along it jeeps and trucks broke all records. The Quartermaster, Lieutenant Aitkenhead, and all the company quartermasters earned the highest commendation for the way the battalion was unfailingly supplied. The London Irish bakery was warmly praised by the Brigadier for its supply of appetising cakes and other small luxuries sent daily to the riflemen on the summit of Castellone.
The men were shelled and mortared constantly and there were several forward-patrol brushes with the enemy, but on the whole their stay on Monte Castellone from March 31 to April 25 was uneventful. Pioneers worked particularly hard in laying minefields or building fresh mule-tracks because the animals had great difficulty in climbing the steep slopes in the intense darkness, and many precious pack-loads tumbled down the hillside.
The next phase was handing over the position to a Polish battalion. They came with their own mule trains, with Italians as muleteers. The old hands of the London Irish yelled orders in Urdu and Hindustani, which the Indian-trained mules seemed to understand even if they did not obey. But then there came an international babble in Italian, Polish, English, and German, it provided a little diversion even though it added to the obstinacy of the mules and prolonged the agony of the change-over.
The beginning of May found the 2nd Battalion in the village of Formicola, in one of the prettiest valleys in Italy, about ten miles north of Caserta. Everything was green, crops were sprouting, the dark red clover was in bloom, and even the nightingales were singing. The guns were at least thirty miles away, as also were the barren, stenching slopes of Monte Cairo.
The Irish Brigade moved on May 10 to a concentration area at Presenzano, off Highway Six, south of Mignano, in readiness for the next move.
It was while they were at Presenzano that one of those minor tragedies inevitable in war occurred, this time on the domestic front. A nice fat goose had wandered fearlessly into the London Irish camp. It came with a strange confidence and faith, as if the London Irish were old friends. While admiring its temerity certain riflemen, with an utter lack of sentiment, could see nothing but a very tasty meal before them, a change from the “M & V” which reposed in tins on the cookhouse shelves. So the goose paid the penalty for its sociability, and while it was in the tender hands of the cook some medium gunners were heard inquiring whether anyone had seen their pet goose! An almost uncanny deduction led them to this particular London Irish cookhouse, and there they saw their regimental mascot nothing but a corpse, a corpse freshly roasted and a delight to the epicurean eye. It was an awful moment, and the gunners felt their loss keenly, because the goose had been their mascot since before Alamein. It had been the pet of everyone and had even turned out on parade! Filled with remorse at what in their ignorance they had done, the London Irishmen were prepared to sacrifice their dinner and offered the cooked goose back to its owners. But the idea was an outrageous one to the gunners, and with sad hearts they left the goose to its fate.
From Casa Sinagoga to Ripi
While in the concentration area future plans were revealed. The Big Push to Rome was to begin and it would be the prelude to the Invasion of Europe in Normandy. None of the previous attempts to break through the German lines at the Garigliano, the Rapido, and at Cassino had met with complete success, and the time had now arrived for an effort which MUST succeed.
The plan was to attack between Cassino Monastery and the sea on a frontage of about nineteen miles. Everything to the north was to be held as lightly as possible so that a big concentration of troops and supporting arms was available.
In the Liri Valley, Polish forces were to attack the Monastery from the north-west and to break through the mountains in a south-westerly direction with the idea of cutting Highway Six. This road was the enemy’s most vital artery, and it was known the Germans had orders to defend it at all cost. The 4th British and the 8th Indian Divisions were to force a crossing over the Rapido frontally. The Fifth Army, with the French and American Corps, were to strike up in a north-westerly direction, capturing Monte Maio and Ausonia, with the idea of turning the southern bastion of the Liri Valley between San Giorgio and San Ambroglio. The Americans were to strike north-west from the Minturno-Castelforte area. An effective deception plan suggested that the Canadian Corps were going to land on the Lido di Roma! It is thought that that deceived the enemy completely and that he retained invaluable reserves to meet the bogus threat. The Allied forces in the beachhead at Anzio were to postpone any further major attacks until the hoped-for advance from the south had got under way.
The 78th Division was to break through the bridgehead formed by the 4th Division, while the Canadian Corps were to do the same through the 8th Indian Division. After the Rapido, had been crossed these forces would smash through the Gustav Line, the 78th Division cutting Highway Six and linking with the Poles near PiedImonte and the Canadians going straight ahead towards Pignataro and Pontecorvo, which would link them with the successful French push.
That vast, ambitious scheme, if carried out, would cause the Cassino garrison to pull out or be surrounded.
GENERAL ALEXANDER’S CONFIDENCE
As the great offensive opened against the main German defences in Italy,, General Alexander, the Commander-in-Chief, in an Order of the Day to the troops said:
“Throughout the past winter you have fought hard and valiantly and killed many Germans. Perhaps you are disappointed that we have been unable to advance faster and farther, but I, and those who know, realise full well how magnificently you fought among these almost insurmountable obstacles of rocky, trackless mountains, deep snow, and in valleys blocked by rivers and mud, against a stubborn foe.
The results of these past months may not appear spectacular, but you have drawn into Italy and mauled many of the enemy’s best divisions, which he badly needed to stem the advance of the Russian armies in the east.
Hitler has admitted that his defeats in the east were largely due to the bitterness of the fighting and his losses in Italy. This in itself is a great achievement, and you may well be as proud of yourselves as I am of you. You have gained the admiration of the world and the gratitude of our Russian allies.
To-day the bad times are behind us and to-morrow we can see victory ahead. Under the ever-increasing blows of the air forces of the United Nations, which are mounting every day in intensity, the German war machine is beginning to crumble.
The Allied armed forces are now assembling for the final battles on sea, on land, and in the air, to crush the enemy once and for all. From east and west, from north and south, blows are about to fall which will result in the final destruction of the Nazis and bring freedom once again to Europe and hasten peace for us all. To us in Italy has been given the honour to strike the first blow.
We are going to destroy the German armies in Italy. Fighting will be hard and bitter, and perhaps long, but you are warriors and soldiers of the highest order who for more than a year have known only victory. You have courage, determination, and skill. You will be supported by overwhelming air forces, and in guns and tanks we far outnumber the Germans.
No armies have ever entered battle before with a more just and righteous cause. So, with God’s help and blessing, we take the field-confident of Victory.”
The initial part of the operations on the Rapido was begun by the 4th Division and the 8th Indian Division on the night of May 11, and on May 14 the London Irish and the rest of the Irish Brigade hit the trail northwards and assembled behind Monte Trocchio.
Here hundreds of guns joined in a bombardment of the German lines miles away. The enemy responded fiercely and so shells screamed overhead, passing both directions. A mass of men and vehicles were in the open, and as shells landed nearby from time to time there were a few casualties, though most of the men sought cover in slit trenches.
Smoke canisters were fired continuously to obscure the lower areas from the enemy high above in the Monastery, and thus much of their gunfire was wild and inaccurate through lack of observation. The concentration of men and material would have been a valuable target for enemy aircraft, but thanks to fine work by the Allied air forces complete air superiority had been achieved. Indeed, a programme of close-support bombing was carried out to help the infantry across the Rapido and beyond. A senior officer of the RAF occupied a post on top of Monte Trocchio overlooking the battlefield, and there he controlled his “cab rank” of fighter-bombers hovering about in the sky waiting for someone to give them a fare. When called for they pounced immediately on their prey. This co-operation worked excellently, and dive bombing proved nearly as quick as shellfire.
A bridgehead across the Rapido was forced, but it was a little precarious and barely a thousand yards deep. The country on the other bank was a mass of minor features and visibility was seldom more than five hundred yards and often considerably less. It was perfect country from the Germans’ point of view. A tributary of the Rapido called the Pioppeto ran in from the west near the brigade’s concentration area. Its bend to the north-east just before joining the Rapido entailed a bridging operation.
The London Irish crossed the Rapido by a bridge built by the sappers and dug in. Getting fighting vehicles and heavy weapons up was difficult owing to the state of the tracks, and many trucks and anti-tank guns had to be man-handled. The attack by the Irish Brigade began next morning. The Inniskillings and the 16/5 Lancers smashed their way a thousand yards into the Gustav Line. That was “Operation Grafton,” and the London Irish Rifles were to give the next punch, “Operation Pytchley,” which embraced a ridge between Sinagoga and Colle Momache. The third bound, “Operation Fernie,” was on a ridge dominating Highway Six itself, and that was the job of the Royal Irish Fusiliers.
After “Grafton” had been carried through successfully by the Skins, the London Irish while in their forming-up area came under heavy fire, which was also directed at the tanks of the 16/5 Lancers, their partners in the attack. Lieut-Colonel Ion Goff was wounded and died shortly afterwards, and there were about forty other casualties, including Major Geoffrey Phillips, and Lieutenant Ken Lovatt, the signals officer.
Losing their Commanding Officer at the commencement of what was likely to be one of their toughest battles was a great blow to the battalion. Lieut-Colonel Goff throughout the previous few months had handled the battalion with tremendous skill and energy. He had imparted much of his own personal ability and bravery to the men he commanded, and his loss was a sad one. It reflected the greatest credit on the 2nd Battalion that despite losing their trusted leader on the eve of a vital battle, it in no way detracted from the magnificent fight they put up. Lieut-Colonel Goff never doubted it would have been otherwise.
Major (later Lieut-Colonel) Coldwell-Horsfall assumed command, but owing to the very heavy shelling and the approach of darkness which would have made consolidation difficult,
“Operation Pytchley” was postponed until dawn next day, when it would be combined with an attack by the Lancashire Fusiliers on the right.
The London Irish planned to attack astride the road to Sinagoga, with a troop of tanks in support of each company, and with Pioneers following up to de-mine the road for the reserve tanks and the rest.
The battle began at 0900 hours, and the artillery salvos came down with a crash that made coherent thinking almost impossible. G and E Companies were held up for a while by heavy fire from Germans concealed in the cellars of houses. But the teamwork with the gunners was excellent, and many Germans were trapped in their dug outs by the shellfire and the riflemen went among them with the bayonet before they realised that the artillery barrage had passed on. In other places where the advance was delayed, the enemy posts were blasted to bits by high explosive from the seventy-fives of the Lancers. Many anti-tank gun crews were caught away from their guns by the barrage, and the Germans realised that fact when it was too late and were then unable to man them. Others, when they opened fire on the tanks, were shot down by the infantry.
One of the main sources of trouble was the left flank across the Piopetto, which was entirely open, and throughout the battle the London Irish were under consistent and heavy fire from machine guns, mortars, and tanks. The Lancers helped considerably by giving more than they got and by setting fire to several AFVs, as well as blowing up two ammunition dumps.
H Company, under Major Desmond Woods, eventually broke into the village of Sinagoga, where ferocious close fighting developed. This went on for over an hour, the Germans stubbornly defending the buildings with grenades, machine-guns, and Schmeissers. There was also a self-propelled seventy-five behind one of the houses which “sniped” at the supporting tanks.
Corporal JA Barnes led his section in an attack on this gun. He went forward alone, covered by his Bren gunner, and in face of intense fire killed one of the gun-crew with a grenade before he himself was killed, a most gallant act.
Shortly after this the garrison of the village started to surrender and by noon the whole of the objective was in the hands of the London Irish and the Lancers. G Company, in the meantime, was having a stiff battle with a local counterattack, but after about an hour this was cleared up. H Company on the left pushed on and seized a group of houses overlooking the river. This proved to be most valuable in neutralising the counterattack that came in from that side.
During the afternoon the attack developed with all manner of fire going both ways, but it never really progressed and finally fizzled out. The casualties of the London Irish in the attack were five officers and sixty other ranks. Lieutenant Mike Clark, MC, who was killed, was a very sad loss, as were Sergeant E Mayo MM and CSM F Wakefield. At least one hundred Germans were killed and one hundred and twenty captured.
The general attack continued and no serious opposition was encountered until the Fernie Line was reached and crossed. The London Irish supported a move by the Inniskillings to clear up the Piumarola area, which was strongly held by tanks and paratroopers. The only company that met serious opposition was G Company, commanded by Captain Peter Grannell since Major Geoffrey Phillips was wounded. They got involved with some paratroopers and a very large self-propelled gun, which to everyone’s delight was shot up by a tank. After a brisk scrap G Company asserted themselves successfully. E and H Companies got in without opposition, apart from shelling which never slackened until dusk, by which time the enemy artillery began pulling out. Over a hundred prisoners were counted coming back, mainly men of the 1st Paratrooper Division, and some old rivals of the Irish Brigade, the “Hermann Goering boys.” After dark, F Company landed a small German patrol from the north.
A great loss to the whole of the brigade during the fight was Colonel “Bala” Bredin, of the Inniskillings. He was shot through both legs, but remained in command until the final assault, propped up on the front of his jeep.
It was apparent that a complete break-through of the Gustav Line had been achieved. News came that French troops trained in mountain warfare had scaled the heights and captured Ausonia and the high ground overlooking San Giorgio beyond. A link-up with the Anzio forces had been made, and the 5th Army troops had overrun the strong point of Cisterna and smashed through the Lepini Mountains, threatening to trap the Germans still in the Liri Valley. A single Allied line now stretched right across Italy, and at its nearest point Rome was only twenty-five miles away. The famous Monastery of Monte Cassino had also fallen, and the Adolf Hitler Line had been reached at Aquino.
The next job of the London Irish was to get to Aceto and hold the north flank of the thrust to Aquino, and this was done. The battalion received some heavy shelling and casualties were caused, mostly to E Company.
After a few days in reserve, during which the general offensive continued to go well with the fall of Piedimonte and the smashing of the Hitler Line by the Canadians, the London Irish joined in the advance with a midnight attack on Hill 255, two miles south of Strangolagalli. This was carried out with the help of the divisional artillery. E Company did the main assault, with G Company cleaning up the north flank and H Company supporting the attack from near-by houses. After a fierce hand-to-hand struggle, the enemy ran for it. The battalion then took the lead, with the objective Ripi, six miles ahead. F Company probed forward, covered by two troops of tanks, and after the first thousand yards ran into the enemy in strength on either side of the road, mostly in houses. The opposition was quelled by artillery fire and by the tanks plastering each area and building. Many Germans were killed and others bolted.
H Company then went in to clean up the road north, and E Company took the lead. In San Giovanni they met some resistance and a full-scale attack was planned. F Company broke into the centre of the town from the west, while E and G Companies got through from the south amid bitter fighting. This lasted for over two hours, while the riflemen working from house to house and the tanks giving close aid. E Company finally overcame one strongpoint by setting it on fire with seventy-seven grenades, so that the garrison had to jump out of the windows. In another, F Company shot down twelve Germans in one room.
The town was taken by dusk, and the battalion pushed on to Ripi. The opposition had been destroyed or had fled and there was no further trouble except for mild mortaring. Between eighty and one hundred Germans were killed in the battle, and the London Irish had fifteen wounded.
That was the battalion’s last battle before the fall of Rome on June 4, forty-eight hours before the Second Front opened on the beaches of Normandy. The timetable decided upon by Supreme Command had been adhered to, but only because of a break in the weather, which had caused the Normandy landings to be postponed for a day!
The 78th Division had done an outstanding job in helping to break through the Gustav Line, and the Commander-in-Chief, General Alexander, and the Army Commander sent personal congratulations on the achievements of the Division during that period.
In a message to the Irish Brigade, Major-General Keightley said:
“I endorse these congratulations with all my heart. As the leading brigade of the division over the Rapido River, you set the speed of the advance of the division, and from that high standard you never looked back.
Each of your battalions has had its battle, and in each case the battalion objectives were gained and passed. This is a fine record and reflects the greatest possible credit on every officer and man who went through the battle….
During the last ten days this division formed the left pincer in the attack on the Monastery, and our successful and rapid advance was largely responsible for its capture. During this advance we have captured over four hundred prisoners, killed or wounded over three hundred enemy, knocked out or captured over forty tanks and self-propelled guns, and captured a considerable amount of equipment. In addition to this, it can only be guessed what effect this advance had on loosening up the French and Polish fronts by necessitating the rapid removal of reserves from their fronts to deal with our threat.
Such actions all help to hasten the end of the war, and all who have been through it may justly feel proud of the part they have played, whatever that part may have been.”
In forwarding that message throughout the brigade, Brigadier TPD Scott said:
“I can only add that everyone has done his job absolutely splendidly, just as I knew they would. The motto ‘It all depends on me’ has been most fully justified by everyone and remains the secret of success.
I cannot speak too highly of the magnificent spirit and fighting qualities shown by all of you during the first very difficult days of le advance that brought us here. More is yet to be done, and the Army knows that the Irish Brigade and all the magnificent fighters in its three famous battalions are certain to rise to any occasion.”
NEC ASPERA TERRENT
QUIS SEPARABIT
FAUGH A BALLAGH
Messages were also sent to the officers and men of the supporting arms of the brigade, in which Brigadier Scott said:
“We attribute a large measure of our success to the magnificent assistance and co-operation which you gave us throughout the recent battles.
Thank you very much.”
From Rome to Lake Trasimene
By June, Major Murphy Palmer had joined the 2nd Battalion as Second-in-Command, and other reinforcements included Captain Bill Hood, Lieutenant John Hunter, and Lieutenant John Barker.
The advance northwards went on speedily, and the London Irish reached Monte Oreste, thirty miles north of Rome. On the journey the battalion saw the incredible havoc wrought on the roads by the Allied Air Forces, with wrecked buildings and burned-out transport every few hundred yards. On June 9 a platoon from the battalion took over guard duties at Field-Marshal Kesselring’s old headquarters. It was an amazing place. The headquarters was in a series of tunnels burrowed out of the hillside. There must have been about a mile of them, and a car could comfortably drive through. The Germans had set fire to as much as possible before hurriedly departing, and the smoke below ground was almost suffocating. But the London Irish Quartermaster, Lieutenant Aitkenhead, and his staff carried out a most thorough search in the glare of a jeep’s headlights, and their efforts were not unrewarded. Wines and liqueurs of excellent quality graced the messes of the brigade for some time afterwards. The tableware, too, was of a high order.
On June 20 the gallop forward was resumed and by noon the battalion reached Colleno, fifty miles ahead. Orders were received to seize Civitella and the battalion had crossed the river and were in the town by 1530 hours. Apart from shelling by self-propelled guns there was no opposition. The enemy were posted in strength on several ridges which dominated the other side of the town, and in a night patrol men from F Company had a severe clash at Agliano, with several casualties to both sides.
An attack on Agliano was begun by F Company at dawn, with artillery, mortars, and Vickers in support. The Germans who survived the deluge of deadly fire fled. G Company then attacked La Torre, and the Germans were seen withdrawing all over the place and offering fine targets for the supporting arms.
Battalion headquarters was made comfortable in the Bishop’s Palace at Civitella, from which they had a bird’s-eye view of the rest of the battlefield. The next day the fight was resumed, and by 1000 hours the London Irish were established in Tordimonte Castle, which the Germans afterwards shelled.
The stage was set for the battle of Morrano, a ridge ten miles ahead, which some of the Warwickshire Yeomanry were attacking. Orders were given out round the banqueting table of the castle, the Commanding Officer occupying a fine gilt and plush throne. It was a dignified start to the operation.
Fire supremacy was established and German opposition gradually subsided and led by the Support Company and a platoon from E Company the battalion was soon on the ridge. That day they bad marched twenty-one miles with all weapons and ammunition.
The London Irish continued to move forward, and on June 18 went across the mountains in very bad weather to Monte Giove. The following day worse tracks led them to Tavernelle. In that area, on either side of Lake Trasimeno, the Germans had decided to make a stand and were holding a line in great strength from Chiusi and San Fatucchio, to the lake on the west side and Perugia on the east. After three days of exhausting fighting the other two brigades of the 78th Division had been finally stopped south of San Fatucchio, and the London Irish were given the task of breaking through at that point and striking as far north as possible.
The battle was set for Wednesday, June 21, and it was found that all possible lines of advance were visible to the enemy, who had a view rather like that looking down on a billiard-table. The plan was for the battalion to get into the rear of the town by flanking it from the west and then assaulting it from the north. That provided the best cover and was over good tank country. E Company had the task of getting into the town and F Company had to seize the higher ground to the north. Heavy shelling began as the forward movement started at 0730 hours, and both companies and supporting tanks ran into machine-gun fire from many directions. E Company, helped at point-blank range by one troop of tanks, blasted their way into the first block of buildings after very bitter fighting. Their casualties were heavy but most of the defenders were wiped out. F Company, in the meantime, were having a frightful battle at close quarters amid the growing corn. At the same time tanks reached their objective behind the town and started blasting it to bits. E Company gradually stormed house by house, while a German observation-post party in a church tower were killed by a direct hit from one of the tanks which blew out part of the tower and the spiral staircase below it. After nearly six hours, resistance in the town collapsed and H and G Companies, who had not been committed into the battle, went forward and cleared the area round the town.
Throughout the whole of the battle the support weapons performed prodigies. The Vickers platoon was in action in the San Fatucchio houses within an hour of its capture, while the mortar platoon lined up their weapons in the main street and square. The town itself was bombarded by the enemy with everything they could procure.
The Germans had by no means given up. H Company had a tough tussle with well-concealed strong points in a cemetery, and hand-to-hand combat went on even in the church itself. There was a German move here which was stemmed by the accurate support from the field gunners and the mortars. Even so, a fight with grenades and pistols raged along the cemetery wall for some time.
By four o’clock in the afternoon the cemetery area was firm and F Company then seized the crossroads to the north, while E Company tried to get a foothold on the Pucciarelli Ridge. At that stage all three companies had lost about a third of their strength, and tank losses, too, had been heavy. Lieutenant George Dunseath, of F Company, was killed when leading his men in a gallant charge across the corn against several German machine-guns. Progress was made by E Company towards the ridge, but after German counterattacks had been broken up by gun and mortar fire, the fighting grounded for the night. It had been a stirring but bloody day.
While these attacks had been going on the Brigadier received a telephone message from 11 Brigade in which the Lancashire Fusiliers paid tribute to the way in which the London Irish had gone in. “I think it is a rare thing for one battalion to praise another in a different brigade, and I think this one of the highest tributes that they could have received, especially coming as it did from such a fine fighting battalion as the Lancashire Fusiliers,” wrote Brigadier Scott later. The battle was not over, for the Germans remained in considerable numbers in and around the London Irish positions. They were fresh and very determined, and unlike many other Germans at that time fought till they could fight no longer. They were particularly strong in two big groups of buildings on Pucciarelli Ridge, between the London Irish and the Inniskillings, and while they held that vital bit of ground, not only were the London Irish very insecure, but any further forward move by either battalion was impossible.
The fight was resumed here at dawn. Only one platoon of G Company and three tanks could be spared, and there were about seventy Germans holding the place. The attack started with some spectacular shooting by the mortars and the field guns, and as the tanks crept forward along the ridge to blast the houses, Lieutenant John Gartside took his men in and systematically cleared the area, house by house, room by room. They repeated the process farther along, and a link-up with the Skins was made.
Meanwhile, F Company chased the enemy out of an important group of farm buildings north of the cross-roads.
The next day the Faughs launched an attack through the London Irish on to Ranciano, which they took after a hard struggle. They went on to Pescia, and then the Irish Brigade went out of the line for a rest.
Everyone in the battalion had been in the battles round Lake Trasimeno, including Quartermaster’s staff, clerks, and drivers, and in firing a record total of over four thousand rounds, the mortar platoon wore out most of their mortars. The battles throughout had been very hard; many of the houses and orchards were defended by the enemy to the bitter end. The cost of the London Irish success was not light, there being well over a hundred casualties, including many good non-commissioned officers, among whom were CSM Kelly and CSM D Long.
The battalion buried between ninety and one hundred Germans within its area and took one hundred and ten prisoners. The German wounded must have run into several hundreds, and several self-propelled and many guns and machine-guns and much ammunition and equipment were captured or destroyed.
The German strength against the London Irish attack involved six companies of 754 and 755 Regiments. Five of these were written off and after the Irish Brigade had finished, these two regiments, comprising five battalions, had to be amalgamated.
On leaving Lake Trasimeno it was felt, quite justifiably, that the London Irish, and indeed the whole Irish Brigade, had lived up to their name.
While in the Rome area, many officers and men of the battalion enjoyed visits to the Eternal City, and some were received by the Pope in the Vatican. The London Irish Rifles pipers and the bands of the two other Irish battalions in the brigade played in the precincts of the Vatican for His Holiness.
From Egypt to Monte Spaduro
There were several changes in personnel in the 2nd Battalion. Lieut-Colonel Bredin, recovered from his wounds, became Commanding Officer of the battalion, Lieut-Colonel Horsfall leaving to command the 1st Royal Irish Fusiliers. Major Colin Gibbs MC, Captain E Bird, Captain JD White MC, and Lieutenant P Giles were among a small party who left to take up appointments as staff instructors at various training establishments. Major-General Keightley left the 78th Division on promotion to command 5th Corps.
The Irish Brigade received a most severe blow when news came that the 6th Battalion of the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers was to be disbanded. They had played a key part in many battles in North Africa in the dark days of November 1942. Then the battle for Centuripe in Sicily, Termoli, the crossing of the Trigno and the Sangro in Italy had all gained battle honours for the regiment. Their place in the Irish Brigade was taken by the 2nd Battalion of the Inniskillings, and most of the non-commissioned officers and other ranks of the 6th were sent to the other battalions of the brigade as reinforcements.
As the 1st Battalion left Egypt advance parties of the 2nd Battalion arrived. They encamped near Quassassin and followed almost on the heels of the 1st Battalion at Sidi Bishr. They also enjoyed a rest with ample leave. New intakes arrived, and after a short period of training they went back to Italy. New officers joined the 2nd Battalion at Sidi Bishr, including Captain F Cave, and Lieutenants V Bryning, Walsh, EM Salter, and S Thompson.
The centre of gravity in the fighting seemed to pass to the Eighth Army front by October 1944. With a little more strength the Allied Armies might have accomplished more in the attack towards the River Po before the autumn and winter rains set in, but it was revealed by General Alexander afterwards that some American and French Divisions had been withdrawn from Italy for the attack on the south of France and this had weakened his forces. To drive the Germans from the Po Valley during the winter could hardly be expected.
Nevertheless, there was work to be done, and when the Irish Brigade returned to Italy they went to Monte Capello, an important height in the mountains between Florence and Bologna and looking down the Po Valley. The weather was most depressing, and for the first part of their stay the battalion had an uneventful time. A turkey farm was started at B Echelon, with an eye to the approach of Christmas. The turkeys were supplied by companies that had found birds willing to give themselves up in order to get fat on Army fare! When the battalion left Monte Capello the farm consisted of twenty turkeys and six fat geese. The London Irish moved to Apollinare on October 19 in readiness for the attacks by the division on Monte la Pieve and Monte Spaduro. Pieve had already fallen and the Royal Irish Fusiliers, who had preceded the London Irish, were on the edge of Spaduro. After a gallant but costly attempt the Faughs had been forced back by heavy counterattacks, and the London Irish were ordered to have a go.
The Pieve and Gesso Ridges were joined to the lower Spaduro feature by a narrow neck of knobs which fell sharply away on both sides to deep gullies. These knobs were numbered Point 401, Point 416, Spinello Farm, and Point 387. Then came a semicircular chain of knife-edged bumps leading to the main height of Spaduro.
The attack was planned for midnight on October 21-22, with the semi-circular chain and Point 287 as the objectives. F, G, and H Companies went forward with gun support, but unexpectedly heavy fire from Spinello on the right forced them to take cover in a wadi. Their position was seen by the enemy, and they were compelled to remain behind the reverse slope all day within a curtain of protective fire from our guns and mortars. A further attack was made in the afternoon with the help of E Company, who marched round to take the enemy from the left flank while F Company tackled Spinello. The effort nearly succeeded. H Company fought hand-to-hand up the slopes north of Point 387 but lost heavily in a counterattack. All the officers except the Company Commander, Major W Craig, were killed, and the platoons had to give up the ground gained. The crossfire from Spinello still caused trouble, and the strongly entrenched Germans there resisted all the efforts of F Company though one officer and a sergeant reached the walls of the farm before being killed. The decision was then made to withdraw H and F Companies to cover behind Point 416. With G Company giving covering fire this was done without more casualties.
It was clear that nothing could be done about Spaduro from that side until Spinello fell. The battalion had now been in the line nineteen days with a break of only one night and had done two major attacks. For thirty-six hours they had lived on haversack rations. Two of the companies had lost heavily, but Support Company and battalion headquarters had been lucky. Next morning a patrol, consisting of Lieutenant D Fay, MC, Sergeant Farthing, and two riflemen, went out to ascertain the strength and positions of the enemy in Spinello. By a most daring feat of arms, they captured a German on the outskirts of the farm and obtained valuable information. Immediately a plan was made for E Company to capture the farm area, which they accomplished with fire support. Later, as F Company went up to help hold off a counterattack, they passed into a minefield and two officers, Major RW Boyd MC and Lieutenant J Bruckmann, and two other ranks were killed. CSM Kelly DCM took over the company, and the farm area was held. That same night other battalions attacked Spaduro from the left flank and the height was finally captured. The London Irish took well-deserved credit for a part of this success because they had distracted the enemy’s attention and drawn most of their fire. The Divisional Commander and the Brigadier emphasised this point in complimenting the battalion later on its work. The London Irish losses were five officers killed (Major RW Boyd, Lieutenant S Thompson, Lieutenant V Bryning, Lieutenant J Bruckmann, and Lieutenant C Cramb). The last two were South African officers seconded to the battalion. One officer, Major Davies, was wounded just as the attack on Spinello was assured. Fourteen other ranks were killed and fifty wounded. Sergeant Farthing unhappily died of wounds.
The morning after the successful operations, G Company took over Point 387 from a company of the Inniskillings and found Sergeant Sye, who had been lying wounded for more than thirty-six hours. He had refused the aid of stretcher-bearers but finally had been unable to make his own way back. He died of his wounds the next day.
The London Irish went back to Apollinare to rest. The fighting on Spaduro had been as bitter as anything in which the battalion had taken part. The enemy had obviously been told that they had to hold Spaduro and did their utmost to obey orders. One of the outstanding features of the battle was the fine support given by the three-inch mortars and the Vickers machine-guns. On one day, October 23, the mortar platoon fired one thousand four hundred mortar bombs.
On coming out of the line the battalion had to reduce to three companies and bade temporary farewell to F Company, which had lost all its officers and was low in strength. A cadre of seven and a battle patrol of ex-F Company personnel under Lieutenant Montgomorie MC served to maintain the F Company tradition.
The battalion returned to the Spaduro area, doing tours of twelve days in and six days out of the line. The rains set in with an intensity that threatened to wash both friend and foe from the slippery, crumbling sides of the mountains into the swollen torrents below. Further operations were off until an improvement in the weather. During October eight inches of rain fell, and in November there were a further nine inches.
The administrative side of the battalion worked as it never had before. When the weather was bad, either mud or snow, it took six hours to get from the forward areas to B Echelon, about fifteen miles away at Firenzuola. Supplies were conveyed on mules, and some idea of the mud can be gauged from the fact that along one mule track could be seen the heads of many dead mules standing up in the mud where they had stuck, sunk, and been shot.
In mid-November the battalion moved north of the Sillaro River to hold sectors on the southern slopes of Monte Grande, part of the very last ridge overlooking the Po Plains. Their adversaries were the 1st Parachute Division, one of the best left in the German Army, and whom they had met before in Sicily and at Cassino.
No major incident disturbed the normal routine of shells, mortar bombs, and patrols. The battle patrol of F Company men, under Lieutenant Montgomerie, carried out a – highly successful raid in daylight on a farm occupied by a platoon of the enemy. Four Germans were killed and the rest put to flight. Reconnaissance and planning for this raid took almost a week, but it was accomplished without a casualty, and Lieutenant Montgomerie received a Bar to his MC. On another occasion Lance-Corporal Faizey distinguished himself by capturing a patrol of four Germans who tried to pass themselves off as Canadians.
The team of officers which led the 2nd Battalion through that undistinguished but hard winter were Lieut-Colonel Bredin DSO MC, Major G Fitzgerald (E Company), Major Ted Griffith (G Company), assisted by Lieutenant Gartside. Major Craig and later Major JD Lofting led H Company, the mortar platoon was under Lieutenant Ken Daly, and the medium machine-guns were under the command of Lieutenant Neale. Major GG Hall commanded the Support Company, Captain RG Cockburn Headquarters Company, Captain GE Cole was Adjutant, and Lieutenant D Aitkenhead was still the very able and energetic Quartermaster. The transport section was led by Captain Ivan Yates; Lieutenant John Barker was in charge of the pioneers, and Lieutenant Ken Lovatt was Signals Officer. Lieutenant F Lyness, the Intelligence Officer, took up a post as an instructor at the Central Mediterranean Training Centre, Benevento.
Lieut-Colonel Bredin left the battalion temporarily to act as GSO 1 at 78th Divisional Headquarters, and Lieut-Colonel JD Stewart, formerly Second-in-Command of the Royal Irish Fusiliers, took over. Lieut-Colonel Bredin returned six weeks later, and Lieut-Colonel Stewart became Second-in-Command. Major Mervyn Davies came back from hospital to command E Company, with Captain F Cave as his Second-in-Command.
At the end of January, the 2nd Battalion had a very acceptable rest in the Florence neighbourhood, after which they moved with the rest of the 78th Division over the mountains to the plains of the River Po at Forli. F Company was re-formed under Major Fitzgerald and Captain Desmond Fay before the battalion went into the line once more at the beginning of March.
As spring came, the battalion found that on the plains it had come into a new kind of warfare, a war of tunnelling, sniping, and periscopes, but with the luxuries of dry roads, houses, and good weather. The surprisingly dry spring was a good omen for the decisive battles to come, and the good fortune was deserved by the veterans of the Eighth Army who had had two grim winters in Italy.
From the Senio Floodbanks to the river Po
The 2nd Battalion also had a spell on the Senio flood-banks, where they were introduced to a type of warfare which had never been taught at the battle schools at home. The river was full of bends, which were helpful to both sides. At one spot it enabled a troop of Field Artillery to be deployed in such a way that the guns could be fired from the flank straight into the river with remarkable accuracy. But the bends also enabled the enemy to see everything that was going on behind our side of the banking.
It was essentially an infantryman’s war. The Germans in places were only ten yards away, and in the daytime sniping was the popular pastime. The marksmen had to be cunningly camouflaged and to fire at considerable range, otherwise they would have found difficulty in getting into position without being seen.
Anyone who unwisely poked his head over the banking in daylight, instead of using a periscope, asked for trouble. Some never did it twice. At night there were grenade duels and machine-gun and mortar “stonks,” which made life uncomfortable. The London Irish learned several good points very early. They learned not to throw grenades from established posts, but from places picked at random. They got to know, also, at what spots the German snipers fired and so avoided them.
The Senio was sunk well below the level of the ground, and below each flood-bank was a flat shelf about ten yards wide before the final drop into the river. The London Irish held the near side of the flood-bank, but in no place were they established on the inner or river side. German posts dug well in on the inner side dominated both sides of the river.
One such enemy post nestled in a bund, a form of flood-bank slightly higher than the rest and bulging in a semicircle from the river. The Germans felt secure in their post, and the London Irish decided it must be wiped out. A raid was carefully planned under the command of Lieutenant Salter. The only way into the bund was over the top, which was under constant enemy observation, or through a gap about fifteen yards wide in the centre. This gap was well covered by German snipers.
So, a tunnel was started into the bund at a point near where it joined the main flood-bank. The tunnel was dug very stealthily, and it was found to lead into an unused enemy dug out on the inner side of the bund. That solved the problem of hiding the tunnel opening from the vigilant Germans. The raid was planned for three o’clock in the afternoon, when it was thought the Germans might be relaxing. The operation began with twenty-five-pounder shells exploding accurately on the far flood-bank, with the intention of keeping the Germans under cover. The raiding party then filtered through the tunnel and lined the inner side of the bund and facing the German post. A covering party scaled to the top of the flood-bank and remained hidden until an assault party of a corporal, five riflemen, and two pioneers went over the top at a selected spot under the cover of a smokescreen. Inside a minute it was all over. Five Germans were captured; one killed and several wounded. While the pioneers hurriedly searched for mines, another section dug new protective earthworks, and the bund had new masters. For this highly successful and model action Lieutenant Salter was awarded the MC.
The flood-bank war had its amusing moments. Both sides introduced verbal propaganda in the other’s language. The Germans frequently inquired: “Why sit on the flood-bank with your wives in England?” They obviously did not realise the ambiguity of the question. From our side the enemy were told: “Why be fools and wait to be annihilated?” They were also warned to reduce the number of stretcher-bearers they were using. We suspected that post reliefs were being carried out under the protection of the Red Cross armlet.
When St. Patrick’s Day came the 2nd Battalion was out of the line, and a parade was held at Forli. It was notable for a display by the massed pipes and drums of the Irish Brigade and also the pipes of the 1st Battalion.
All was now ready for the main offensive, and in a Special Order of the Day to all troops the Supreme Allied Commander of the Mediterranean Theatre, now a Field-Marshal, said:
“SOLDIERS, SAILORS AND AIRMEN OF THE ALLIED FORCES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE.
“Final victory is near. The German Forces are now very groggy and only need one mighty punch to knock them out for good. The moment has now come for us to take the field for the last battle which will end the war in Europe. You know what our comrades in the West and in the East are doing on the battlefields. It is now our turn to play our decisive part. It will not be a walkover; a mortally wounded beast can still be very dangerous. You must be prepared for a hard and bitter fight; but the end is quite certain-there is not the slightest shadow of doubt about that. You, who have won every battle you have fought, are going to win this last one. Forward, then, into battle with confidence, faith, and determination to see it through to the end. God-speed and good luck to you all.
HR ALEXANDER, Field-Marshal,
Supreme Allied Commander.
The General Officer Commanding, Eighth Army, was now Lieut.-General Sir Richard L McCreery, and he sent a Special Message from his Main Headquarters. In this he said:
”The Eighth Army, which started the great tide of Allied victory at El Alamein, is about to strike a knock-out blow against the Germans in Italy.
Our Armies in Germany, and those of our Allies, have sent the enemy staggering back towards Berlin, but he is still fighting and he must not be allowed to use his Armies in Italy to form a garrison for a Southern German stronghold.
With the powerful aid of the Desert Air Force, which has been our partner in every victory, we will destroy or capture the enemy south of the River Po.
The American Fifth Army will be assaulting at our side, and the American Air Forces in Italy will bring their full weight to bear in support of our attack.
We have a unique opportunity to destroy the enemy in his present positions because, owing to lack of fuel, he is incapable of large-scale and Rapid movement. As in every battle, there will be hard fighting, and difficulties will have to be overcome, but 1 know that the Eighth Army will show how the job can be finished off quickly.
We must take every advantage of our overwhelming air superiority, our tanks and our artillery, and drive hard and deep with speed. From Tobruk to the Po Plains the brave soldiers of Poland have been fighting with us, and it is a matter of especial pride to our Empire Army that in this battle our gallant Polish Allies will be striking a decisive blow. The Eighth Army recognises and appreciates the part that gallant Italian forces are taking in the struggle.
Together we will all go forward to final victory. Good luck to You all.”
It was hoped to destroy the German armies south of the Po by a pincer’s movement, with the Eighth Army advancing on a general axis through Argenta, Ferrara, and Bodeno, and the U.S. Fifth Army attacking north through Bologna to the river near Ostiglia. The Fifth Army was then to drive towards Verona and cut off the whole of the enemy forces in north-west Italy. To enable the maximum use to be made of the Allied Air Forces, the attacks were to be on different dates, the Eighth Army going into action at least three days before the Fifth Army, which it was thought would draw off any enemy reserves from the Fifth Army front. The Eighth Army, after reaching the Po, was to drive north-east towards Venice and Trieste.
A part of the British plan was that before the main attack by the Eighth Army began, the 56th (London) Division, which was now back to full strength with the 24th Guards Brigade replacing the disbanded 168 Brigade, should outflank the German defensive lines on the Senio, Santerno, and Sillaro, Rivers, with the help of the 2nd Commando Brigade. That accomplished, the Army was to force the narrow Argenta Gap between Argenta and Lake Comacchio and destroy the bulk of the German armies before they could get back across the Po.
After the lower reaches of the Reno had been crossed, the main attack by the Eighth Army went in following a terrific air and artillery bombardment. Along the winding banks of the Senio, Wasps and Crocodile flame-throwers went forward and sprayed the enemy posts with fire. Seven hundred bombers overhead laid with great accuracy a carpet of fragmentation bombs about three thousand yards west of the river. The 5th Corps went across on the right and the 2nd Polish Corps on the left. The 2nd New Zealand Division attacked at a big bend of the Senio west of Cotignola and made a big wheel to the left. The 8th Indian Division went over south of Lugo. Both divisions, fighting with great spirit, reached the Santerno, and the 78th Division was then called in. It had been in reserve, and it moved forward between the New Zealanders and the Indian Division. 36 Brigade pushed on at night and a bridgehead over the Santerno, was secured.
Then followed a momentous battle, in which the 2nd Battalion London Irish played an important part. They became part of a “Kangaroo Army” which leaped forward with giant strides and added to the general demoralisation of the enemy. Under the command of Lieut-Colonel Bredin, the battalion was mounted in armoured carriers, known as “Kangaroos,” of the 4th Hussars, and with the able support of the 9th Lancers they made a powerful striking force which operated under 2nd Armoured Brigade.
Each company, together with its allotment of eight Priest Kangaroos, lived and worked with its own squadron of the 9th Lancers. The Kangaroos were stocked with reserve ammunition and forty-eight hours’ rations, thus making the force completely independent for a substantial period, if necessary. In the same way, battalion headquarters was mounted in eight Kangaroos, including two for medical purposes and two for reserve ammunition. At all times the force moved in the closest liaison with Tactical Headquarters and the Armoured Regimental Headquarters. In addition, at various times, the force included an armoured squadron of the 4th Hussars, some flail Shermans for mine clearance, Sherman “Arcs,” Churchill flame-throwing “Crocodiles,” and the inevitable but invaluable Sherman bulldozers. The “Kangaroo Army” was under the command of the armour and comprised over a hundred major tracked vehicles.
On April 13, the two other battalions in the Irish Brigade, the 2nd Battalion Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers and the 1st Battalion Royal Irish Fusiliers, broke out of the bridgehead forced over the River Santerno by the 8th Indian Division. They advanced in a northerly direction and, following up, the 2nd Battalion London Irish crossed the river in readiness to pass through the rest of the brigade.
Orders to do this came at midday, and less than two hours later the leading squadrons of the Kangaroo Army were out in the open, with only the enemy in front. The line of advance was due northwards through a corridor one thousand yards wide, hemmed in on the right by the Santerno River and on the left by the Fossatone Canal.
The country was flat, with orchards and farmhouses at intervals, and villages here and there. The only variety in the terrain was the varying widths of the numerous canals and small rivers.
The object of the first day was to secure crossings of the Conselice Canal, which formed a link in the bend of the Santerno before it flowed into the Reno on the right. If possible, the force had to exploit to the Reno, which ran north-westwards several thousand yards ahead. At first, little resistance was encountered. The two other battalions in the Irish Brigade had given the enemy a good shaking, and he was moving back. Scattered enemy bazooka men were met, and one tank was lost through the fire of an anti-tank gun, which itself did not long survive. A number of prisoners were taken by G Company. As the Conselice Canal was approached the defile widened, and H Company, with C Squadron of the 9th Lancers, came up on the left. The first serious bit of trouble was encountered in the village of La Frascata. This was rapidly by-passed, but as the leading tanks arrived at the canal the bridge was blown up immediately in front of them. H Company, who had driven past La Frascata in their Kangaroos, quickly debussed on the canal bank and covered by tanks, forced a crossing over the remains of the road and railway bridges. They got into the houses on the far bank so swiftly that few of the defenders managed to escape.
Meanwhile, G Company cleared the area on the canal bank on the right, and E Company was ordered to clear La Frascata and assist H Company in holding and enlarging the bridgehead. The enemy had been surprised by the speed and weight of the attack. Few of them, not more than ten, had been killed, but all three forward companies took a number of prisoners, about eighty altogether.
The bridgehead was firmly established by 2200 hours and the companies dug in for the night, while the sappers got to work in building a bridge over the canal.
In the meantime, the 56th (London) Division was pushing northwest parallel to the Reno through flooded country. One battalion of the Queen’s Brigade, loaded in amphibious Buffaloes, successfully passed over the flooded area. Menate fell to the Queen’s, and the Eighth Army were now closing on the vital bridge over the Reno at Bastia, the 56th Division moving from the east and the 78th Division from the south. On the night of April 13-14 a “right-hook” was made by the 24th Guards Brigade over the flooded country. The object was to outflank the Argenta Gap and to secure a bridgehead over the Marina Canal in the area of Chiesa Del Bando. The Germans by now were well aware that we were using amphibious vehicles and had rushed down reinforcements from north of the River Po. The Guards suffered considerable casualties on landing from their Buffaloes, but the movement was pressed home with great determination, and a firm footing was established south of the Marina Canal.
Early on the 14th, before dawn, patrols from E Company of the 2nd Battalion London Irish felt their way forward, up through Lavezzola towards the Reno at Bastia. At first light, they were followed by the armour in two columns, one due north along the axis of the main road, and the other sweeping round to the right to avoid the minefields that were known to exist in the Lavezzola area. In fact, there were mines almost everywhere in the vicinity, and in the northern half of the village all the houses had been booby-trapped. Fortunately, so swift had been our penetration that the German notices warning of mines were still in place and not a single casualty was caused either to the tanks or to the infantry. The flails had a great though noisy morning blowing up the mines.
The Reno was reached at 0940 hours, and thirty Germans were taken during the advance. Eight were caught in the act of laying further mines. Both the road and rail bridges over the river had been blown but sufficient rubble remained to allow foot soldiers to cross dry-shod. A reconnaissance was carried out and a plan evolved for a small bridgehead to be made by E Company. With the aid of a smokescreen this was done, but while the platoons moved on north of the river, they were forced back by a sudden counterattack. No assistance could be given by the tanks owing to the high flood-banks on the river and the blown bridges.
The 2nd Battalion decided to remain on the southern bank of the river for the night, and eventually static positions were maintained for two days.
For the first time throughout the war the two battalions of the London Irish now found themselves sharing a part of the same front, because the 1st Battalion, on the extreme left of the 56th (London) Division, was moving along on the right of the Kangaroo Army. One of the 1st Battalion’s patrols crossed the Reno and made contact with G Company of the 2nd Battalion.
During the short respite there were one or two changes in the 2nd Battalion. Major M Davies, who had been wounded three times, left to take up an appointment at Corps Headquarters, and Major F Cave took over E Company, with Lieutenant Mosley, now promoted Captain, as Second-in-Command. Mr Girvan, who had been with the battalion as RSM almost throughout its fighting existence, was also posted on promotion.
Two or three days of stubborn fighting were necessary at the Marina Canal before a crossing was forced, and finally Bastia was captured on April 16. The enemy withdrew to Argenta, towards which the 78th Division and the Queen’s Brigade of the 56th Division made steady progress. Early on the 17th the 2nd Battalion crossed a bridge which had been hurriedly constructed over the Reno at Bastia, and a brief halt was made while conferences were held to decide when to unleash the Kangaroos again.
The battle for the Argenta Gap now developed, and the 56th (London) Division, pushing north-westwards parallel to the Kangaroos, was heavily engaged. The Gap was a narrow strip about four thousand yards wide and four or five miles deep between the Reno and large flooded areas bordering Lake Comacchio on the right. Argenta was on the railway in the centre.
The decisive day was April 18, when at first light the Kangaroo Army went once more into battle. The intention was to by-pass Argenta to the east, and the move was unforgettable. Through the orchards north of Argenta, between the lake and the canal, passed a mass of armour all going over the one bridge at the main water obstacle. An impressive sight. Wrecked vehicles, masses of equipment, and enemy dead littered the route, while machine gun fire from Argenta, already surrounded, crackled away on the left.
There was some difficulty as usual in breaking through the congestion in our own forward areas, but by 1000 hours the 2nd Battalion was in the open and the tanks were firing energetically at enemy self-propelled guns and Mark IVs that were trying to make themselves a nuisance. A Kangaroo was hit by armour-piercing shot and some trouble came from two small villages, Boccaleone and Consandolo, but the weight of armour and mobile infantry was beginning to make itself felt. The advance continued steadily, with prisoners streaming in. The Germans were thus receiving a taste of medicine similar to that they inflicted on the Low Countries during their invasion in 1940.
A jig-saw puzzle confronted the tanks, and that was the maze of ditches that barred their path forward. But a crossing was found intact over the Fosso Benvignante and very soon the infantry was across and infesting the area up to the next obstacle. As it was late evening this success took the enemy completely by surprise, and an officers’ mess, a battery of eighty-eight-millimetre guns, and numerous smaller ack-ack and anti-tank pieces and about two hundred prisoners were overrun. The enemy tried to smash the advance by firing at close range over open sights, but their belated efforts failed.
In the light of numerous burning houses and with a not unjustifiable sense of complete victory, the battalion moved to its final area for the night in the vicinity of Piazzo Coltra, having captured three sound bridges over the next canal.
At 0400 hours, patrols from G and H Companies went forward two thousand yards in an attempt to seize further crossings over the Scolo Bolognese west of Porto Maggiore. The bridges were found to be blown, but they took up positions on the near bank and at dawn were joined by the never-failing armour.
F Company had a minor operation in clearing the enemy from Porto Maggiore and caught up with the rest of the battalion later in the evening. During this period prisoners were continually being taken in groups of ten or fifteen, indicating that the enemy had very little stomach for a fight. With smoke, high-explosive, and flame-throwers, G Company made a bridgehead over the Fosso Bolognese in the afternoon, and H Company followed suit and captured the village of Porto Rotta on the far side. The success of these operations led to the decision that the main divisional axis of advance was to pass through Porto, Rotta, and the battalion was therefore ordered to widen its bridgehead so that the sappers might get a crossing ready for the armour. That was done at 2200 hours and was supported admirably by timed concentrations from the divisional artillery. All objectives were taken by 2300 hours.
Under mortar fire the sappers bull-dozed a crossing over the two canals comprising the Fosso Bolognese, and early on the 20th the brigade began to pass through in a north-westerly direction. The Kangaroo Army, tanks and infantry, was again on the move. After heavy fighting the Skins and the Faughs crossed a canal south of Montesanto, and the Army continued over very open country to the west of Voghenza.
Opposition was met from well-sited self-propelled guns and tanks, mostly from behind farm buildings, and the London Irish were called upon several times to debuss and mop up bazooka men and Spandau posts. The Allied Air Forces, as always, put in some magnificent work destroying German guns and armour ahead of the leading squadrons.
While the Kangaroos were concentrating to move forward south of Montesanto, a heavy “stonk” came down and the London Irish regimental aid-post received a direct hit. Captain Rhys Evans, the Medical Officer, was badly wounded.
As evening approached resistance stiffened. Fire from enemy tanks increased, and F Company dealt with several pockets of enemy troops, some of whom were hidden in trees. The Kangaroo Army began rapidly to run out of the range of the supporting artillery, and a definite feeling that they were “out on their own” became noticeable.
Light began to fail as reports came in of German troops and transport moving on the left and on the right. A quick conference was held, and it was decided to carry on to the final objectives These were the bridges at Cona and Quartesena south-east of Ferrara. A most unorthodox battle followed. By the light of the moon and flames from burning farmhouses, the tanks, escorted by E and F Companies, attacked the two bridges. Both columns were soon involved in battle, and tracer flew in all directions. Quartesena, the approaches to which were being continually mortared, contained three enemy tanks and several strong parties of bazooka men and machine-gunners. After two of the Lancers’ tanks had been knocked Gut the German tanks withdrew and escaped in the darkness over the bridge, which was captured intact.
In the near-by village of Cona an even more complex battle developed. The Germans had a fifteen-centimetre gun sited a hundred yards from the bridge, firing over open sights back into the bridge and down the main street of the village. It was supported by the usual groups with bazookas and Spandaus.
At the second attempt, F Company rushed the bridge, and were backed up nobly by the tanks, who were having a most uncomfortable time nosing their way round in the darkness. A firm hold was made, and H Company was rushed up in their Kangaroos to give F Company support. By 1300 hours on the 22nd the situation at both bridges was satisfactory. In this operation about sixty prisoners were taken, several trucks, and a fifteen-centimetre gun fell into London Irish hands, and a German lorry laden with artillery ammunition was hit at short range by one of the Lancers’ tanks while it was trying to escape.
By now the battalion was extremely tired; at least half had been on the go for seventy-two hours. Everyone was well content when the Lancashire Fusiliers came along as a relief battalion and the London Irish had a good day’s sleep.
Elsewhere on the front the fighting had gone well, and the position of the Germans south of the Po appeared hopeless. The attack by the Fifth Army had flared up and the Allied Armies moved relentlessly forward like a mammoth steamroller.
On the Eighth Army front, the 6th Armoured Division passed through west of the 78th Division and took on the chase, while the .56th Division swept north-east. An American force, troops of the 10th Mountain Division, was the first to reach the River Po. It got there near Ostiglia during the night of April 22nd, beating the Eighth Army by a few hours.
A hold had also been obtained on the river near Fossalta, and the Kangaroo Army was called into action once again. With the rest of the Irish Brigade the London Irish had to sweep the wide area between the Po and the numerous canals running east from Ferrara.
The Kangaroos moved through a maze of ditches and small waterways, and the leading squadrons did a splendid job in finding a way through and at the same time keeping a sharp look-out for the enemy. They were aided considerably by air reports, which indicated where bridges were or were not blown. Soon opposition began to assert itself, but it came only from pockets of rearguards, and both G and E Companies, covered by tanks, did some clearing up. The Germans surrendered in large numbers. When reports came in from air reconnaissance that there were many enemy tanks ahead the Lancers at once got busy, and between that time and darkness in a series of exciting actions they knocked out seven Mark IVs for the loss of only one of their own.
The tank actions continued over a wide area as night came and the companies, in their very conspicuous Kangaroos, wisely did their best to keep out of the battle of the armour. Every farm for miles seemed to be on fire, and there was confusion everywhere. The advance continued by moonlight, but at 2200 hours an order was received to change its general direction a full hundred degrees. When just short of their original objective, the Kangaroo force was ordered to make straight for the Po at a point north-east of Ferrara, where the Germans were reported to be evacuating their rearguards by pontoon. This complete change of direction in the darkness was accomplished with very little difficulty, in spite of the fact that the force was still in contact with the enemy and it did not pay to be too bold by moonlight. G and F Companies moved forward but met minor opposition, and by dawn were on the banks of the Po in the midst of an extraordinary collection of burning and abandoned vehicles. They included six Mark IV tanks and a large number of lorries. Many Germans who had either left it too late or could not swim were rounded up.
Thus ended the fourth and last advance of the Kangaroo Army. Once the Argenta Gap had been forced, the battle became a rout, and even at the River Po there was virtually no resistance. The last “mighty punch” had sealed the fate of the German armies in Italy.
A great feature of the last series of operations in which the Kangaroo Army took part was the co-operation and mutual trust established between armour and infantry, a feature without which success would have been impossible. The effect on the enemy of the full weight of such a cohesive force thrusting on a narrow front and disgorging infantry rapidly at centres of strong resistance was disastrous every time the Kangaroo Army swung into action. Appreciation must be made of the fact that openings and opportunities for the force to be used were made on all four occasions by hard fighting on the part of the remainder of the Irish Brigade.
The advance from Palazzo Tamba towards the River Po was a gruelling time for the 1st Battalion, as a mass of plans and moves for attack were all the time being prepared, only to be changed at the last moment. The battalion was usually at one hour’s notice to move for a period of several days. The last real fighting was with enemy rearguards in the neighbourhood of a small village, Tamara, where the Germans put up a sharp and stubborn resistance before withdrawing during the night.
The battle south of the Po proved to be the last in Italy and, so far as the two battalions of the London Irish were concerned, their final engagement in the Second World War. The crossing of the Po, one of the largest rivers in Europe, was practically unopposed throughout its entire length, and a despairing last-minute stand by the Germans on the Adige Line, south of Venice, did not occur. The Line had been prepared for months and had massive concrete forts, minefields, and everything to enable the enemy to make a last stand before withdrawing, if they could, to the homeland.
Already the number of prisoners had reached a large figure, but it was not until the 1st Battalion had reached the banks of the Po that they were able to appreciate the full extent of the victory. Not only did they find thousands of Germans, including a Corps Commander and several other Generals, who had been unable to cross the wide river, owing to the effectiveness of the Allied bombing, but also a mass of abandoned equipment of every kind. Along the banks of the river were scattered the guns, vehicles, and other equipment of a whole army.
Soon it was realised that the Adige Line was useless to the enemy. They had nothing with which to hold it, and the Eighth Army went straight through it towards Padua and Venice, which was entered by the Queen’s Brigade of the 56th (London) Division on April 29. The Fifth Army, to make sure, made a swing round on the left and turned the Adige Line from behind.
The German armies in Italy had been defeated.
The two divisions, the 56th (London) Division and the 78th Division, had played a great part throughout the months of struggle in the Italian campaign, and complimentary messages were sent throughout the formations.
To the 5th Corps came this message from Lieut-General Sir Richard McCreery, General Officer Commanding Eighth Army:
“You have played a decisive part in this great Eighth Army offensive. You have driven the enemy north of the River Po in disorder. You have all shown a splendid determination and fighting spirit and a fine endurance in two and a half weeks of continuous battle. Your attack across the River Senio, so carefully prepared, succeeded so well that the enemy was unable to stand on the River Santerno. After capturing bridgeheads across this river, you exploited rapidly northwards -and, in combination with outflanking operations executed with great skill along the shores of Lake Comacchio, you succeeded in forcing the formidable Argenta position. The enemy was protected by extensive floods on both flanks, and by deep minefields covering the gaps; but you attacked him by day and by night and broke out into the open country towards Ferrara. This success was decisive for the whole plan of 15 Army Group.
Your subsequent determined and relentless advance to the River Po, both east and west of Ferrara, drove the enemy back over the river, with heavy losses in tanks, guns, mechanised transport, and equipment. Only remnants of his fighting units succeeded in escaping, and our aim to destroy the enemy south of the river has been largely successful.
All arms have played an equally important part in this great victory. Good leadership has resulted in the close co-operation between the infantry, tanks, artillery, and engineers, which is the secret of success.
I send my warmest congratulations to every man in 5 Corps. I know that you will continue a relentless pursuit to finish off the enemy and prevent him organising on any further defensive line.”
To Major-General Arbuthnot, of the 78th Division, the Army Commander sent a special message:
“My best congratulations on the splendid part the 78th Division has taken in these operations. A fine victory. The decisive part that your division played in forcing the formidable Argenta position was a splendid achievement. By night and day your brigades exerted relentless pressure on the enemy and succeeded in capturing this position of great strength. Fine co-operation between all arms, good leadership, and splendid determination and fighting spirit were shown. Your division have added further laurels to their great battle record in Africa and Italy. Well done indeed! “
And from Brigadier TPD Scott DSO, Commander of the Irish Brigade, came a Special Order of the Day, dated April 1945. In this, he said:
“About this time last year, the Irish Brigade was very highly commended for the successful smashing of the Gustav Line. We now receive the enclosed tribute from our Higher Commanders on this year’s battle.
Since we started in North Africa, I have never seen such magnificent form as each battalion is showing to-day.
Pride in a job splendidly done must be present in every platoon and section.
I am sure every Commander in the brigade from myself downwards must be equally proud of the fact that we have found ourselves second to none. Proved, too, our ability to deal a knock-out blow when we were really tired.
My very best congratulations to everyone.”
Messages were also sent to the regiments of the 2nd Armoured Brigade and other units in the brigade group, thanking them for their work and co-operation.
When the 56th (London) Division reached the Po the 1st Battalion London Irish went into reserve, and though they continued to move north there was no more fighting to be done.
On May 2 came the first German surrender. Army Group South-West, under General von Vietinghoff, surrendered unconditionally to Field-Marshal Alexander. The great news spread rapidly, and Very lights and tracers blended in a Victory display.
From the Commander-in-Chief came this message to the troops:
“After nearly two years of hard and continuous fighting, which started in Sicily in the summer of 1943, you stand to-day as victors in the Italian Campaign. You have won a victory which has ended in the complete and utter rout of the German armed forces in the Mediterranean. To-day the remnants of the once proud army have laid down their arms to you-close on one million men, with all their arms and equipment.
You may well be proud of this great victorious campaign, which will long live in history as one of the greatest and most successful ever waged.”
From Udine to Austria
The Irish Brigade, with the 2nd Battalion of the London Irish, also took the part of Balkan peacemakers. They had been ordered to move north to Udine, while the rest of the division surged into Austria. On May 7 the brigade passed into the Cividale-Caporetto area. Two companies, H and E, of the 2nd Battalion London Irish went to Caporetto and Plezzo, the idea being in a very friendly way to try to deflect the Yugoslavs back into their own country, or at any rate to keep them off the road which the Eighth Army had to use. That was achieved in good spirit, although the Yugoslavs were very persistent.
On May 8, at 1500 hours, the Prime Minister announced that the end of the war in Europe would be at midnight.
That was splendid, but the Irish Brigade were still too busy to do much about it, though the 1st Battalion was able to celebrate the historic occasion in Doberdo.
The next day the Irish Brigade moved into Carinthia. The main stumbling-block to the advance of the Eighth Army into Austria was the German columns retreating from the Russians. They blocked the roads effectively. Added to that there were parties of Yugoslavs trying to get to different places ahead of the Anglo-American forces and to set up some form of civil administration.
Usually, the British or the Americans got there first, and when the Yugoslavs arrived, they set up a sort of dual control with them. Any direct dealings with the Yugoslavs were always correct and punctilious on both sides. And as the Yugoslavs dashed about the country, any parties of Germans they came across were lucky to get away with their trousers! The task of the Irish Brigade was to contact the Russians, get some order out of chaos caused by the retreating enemy armies. and to disarm their assorted membership.
The London Irish took over responsibility in the area of Wolfberg, in the Austrian Alps, while the 27th Lancers successfully contacted the Russians at Korflach, a few miles to the north. Everything with our Soviet Allies was done most correctly and with the minimum waste of time, and the brigade concentrated on rounding up the S.S., who were moving about in some strength. They were the only enemy troops really worth bothering about, and they were given a special form of treatment all to themselves. They had to be eliminated as a force for all time.
To add to the general difficulties, including a shortage of interpreters in the various tongues, the terms of surrender laid down that the enemy were supposed to lay down their arms to the Allied Army against which they had been fighting. Everyone in that part of Europe had been fighting either the Russians or the Yugoslavs, and the trouble, so far as we were concerned, was that they were prepared to do anything rather than surrender to either of these Allied Armies.
Brigadier Scott, in his report on this period, explains in detail the difficulties with which he and the rest of the Irish Brigade had to contend. On one occasion he was ordered to disarm and to accept the surrender of twenty-one thousand Cossacks, who had changed sides when things had appeared to be going badly for Russia! There was also a Bulgarian Army in the country, and to these the Cossacks flatly refused to surrender. Their leader told the Brigadier that they would rather fight than do that. They would, however, surrender to the British. The Cossacks, all of whom were armed to the teeth, were disarmed, and they then complained that they would be attacked during the night by the Bulgarians. “I assured them that they would not and that I had an adequate guard to stop that,” records Brigadier Scott. “The adequate guard consisted of about eighteen men of the Royal Irish Fusiliers who were peacefully ‘brewing up in the middle of the party, not bothering their heads about any of the strange nations that were surrounding them. The amazing thing one discovered at this time was that one British soldier was quite enough to restore order and prevent one of these nations attacking another. The one thing nobody was prepared to do was to have a row with the British! “
Eventually the Cossacks passed through the Bulgarian lines with one man of the Royal Irish Fusiliers mounted on a horse at their head!
The Irish Brigade assisted in the temporary alignment of frontiers, which was carried out with great tact and without bloodshed, while the London Irish worked very hard in getting the Wolfsburg area under control. On their ration strength were: seven thousand men of the Laszlo Hungarian Division, two thousand belonging to the 2nd Hungarian Corps, one thousand six hundred SS men, seven hundred Croats, and four hundred Hungarian cadets! The London Irish captured the German Puppet Minister to the Croat Republic. He had, among other things, a bag of two hundred and fifty gold sovereigns as well as a very fine car.
The Brigadier’s greatest headache was caused by the approach of two groups of Croat soldiery, each reported to be a hundred thousand strong, and who were attempting to get past the Bulgarian and Yugoslav outposts and to lay down their arms to the British. Trailing along behind them were said to be half a million civilians-men, women and children-whose object it was to escape from the Tito regime. The remnants of a couple of German divisions were also on the road. There had been a clash between the three- Bulgars, Yugoslavs, and the Croats-and the problem was to get the Croats disarmed before there was a grave international “incident.”
The Croats refused point-blank to surrender to the Yugoslavs, while a Commissar from the latter Army refused to accept their offer even if it were made. His intention, he told Brigadier Scott, was to defeat the Croats on the field of battle. After some delicate mediation with the parties, in which the Croats sought an appeal to Field-Marshal Alexander, the Croatian Army laid down its arms to the Yugoslavs and were treated as prisoners-of-war, while the civilians were ordered to be fed and sent back to Croatia by the shortest possible route. The arrangements connected with the surrender and the evacuation were carried out by the Yugoslavs speedily and efficiently.
Commenting on these events, Brigadier Scott wrote:
“Nobody had the least idea what was going to happen next or where it was coming from. . . . It is when you are in a complete mix-up like this, where anything can go seriously wrong at any moment, that the British soldier really reaches his peak. By some unerring instinct he always seems to do the right thing. The chaps had supreme confidence in themselves, and it never occurred to them that any of these scallywags, who would cut each other’s throats without a moment’s hesitation, would dare to interfere with them. In this belief they were absolutely correct, and as long as a British soldier was knocking about the chances of trouble were at once reduced to a very great degree. The tremendous prestige of the British Army and all its representatives can only really be grasped when one sees its effect at first hand like this ! “
The Balkan troubles subsided as problems were dealt with on a government level. SHAEF took over some of the Irish Brigade’s commitments, and eventually Marshal Tito issued orders on May 20 that all his troops were to be out of Carinthia by 1800 hours the next day.
It almost looked as if the war was really over at last. July came, and the 2nd Battalion London Irish was by the Ossiacher Lake in the south-west corner of the Gorlitzen Alps. There were sports and diversions for everybody.
On July 6 the famous 78th Division held a Victory Parade near Spittal and towards the end there was a Two Minutes’ Silence for the fallen. The Last Post was followed by Reveille.
The march past was a moving occasion. It was the last time that all the old warriors of the Irish Brigade and the rest of 78th Division would parade together. They had reached the end of the long, hard road which began in Algiers in November 1942. Many stout hearts had fallen on the way.
The 2nd Battalion said good-bye to Lieut-Colonel Bredin DSO MC, who had commanded them during the final punch. He became Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General at divisional headquarters, and was succeeded by Lieut-Colonel John Horsfall, DSO MC, who had been Chief Instructor at the Central Mediterranean Training Centre, at Benevento.
The summer of 1945 was spent pleasantly by the 2nd Battalion around the Ossiacher Lake, carrying out frontier patrols, searches for Nazis, and other minor tasks. Just as the cold weather set in and winter sports were being organised, the order came to disband the battalion. It was a sad blow. Within a few weeks everybody had gone, a virile fighting unit ceased to exist, almost over-night. There was nothing left but battle scars, battle honours, and memories….
Most of the other ranks were posted to the 1st Battalion, which at that time was at Trieste. Others obtained their release.