Former member of 2 LIR Charles Ward has spoken about his experiences as a platoon\u00a0sergeant in Tunisia during the Second World War and the\u00a0major setback that the battalion suffered in its\u00a0attack on Hill 286 on 20\/21 January 1943.<\/p>\n
Charles, known as \u2018Pip\u2019 to his\u00a0comrades, was conscripted into the\u00a0LIR on 18 October 1939, a member\u00a0of the same cohort of recruits as legendary E\u00a0Company sergeant Edward (Eddie) Mayo MM. A\u00a0printer working in east London before the war, he\u00a0was surprised to find himself in a battalion with an\u00a0Irish connection as he had been born in Yorkshire,\u00a0moving to Kent in the mid 1930s and had nobody\u00a0from Ireland in his family.<\/p>\n
Ward retired five years ago after a successful\u00a0second career as a market gardener, and now lives\u00a0in Aylesbury with his wife Margaret, whom he first\u00a0met in Algieria in 1943. He left the London Irish\u00a0after suffering a knee injury in the spring of 1943\u00a0and transferred to the communications unit of\u00a0Special Operations Executive (SOE), where his future wife was also employed, and\u00a0they became engaged in Italy during the following\u00a0year and married in the spring of 1946.<\/p>\n
But that was after the bloody battle for\u00a0Hill 286. Its memory still moves Ward:\u00a0\u201cIt was crazy really,\u201d he says about the battle. \u201cYou knew \u2026\u00a0the enemy would throw everything at you.\u201d When\u00a0Charles recently returned to Tunisia, he was\u00a0appalled at the number of London Irish riflemen,\u00a0NCOs and officers buried at the Medjez el-Bab\u00a0Commonwealth War Grave Cemetery, many of\u00a0them killed on Hill 286.<\/p>\n
The attack on Hill 286 was probably the most\u00a0controversial event in 2 LIR\u2019s history, and an inquiry\u00a0was ordered into the losses it suffered and why they\u00a0occurred. 2 LIR\u2019s commander was subsequently\u00a0replaced by TPD Scott, an officer from the 1st Battalion, Royal Irish Fusiliers 1 RIrF).\u00a0Bitterness about the loss of life suffered on Hill 286\u00a0continued long after the war ended.<\/p>\n
2 LIR had left Glasgow on 10 November 1942 as\u00a0part of an allied expeditionary force supporting\u00a0Operation TORCH, the Anglo-American invasion\u00a0designed to take control of French North Africa,\u00a0then governed by the French Vichy regime. 38\u00a0(Irish) Brigade at this stage was part of the 6th\u00a0(UK) Armoured Division. Travelling by train and\u00a0truck, 2 LIR entered Tunisia on 7 December 1942. Vichy forces, after initially resisting the\u00a0Allied expeditionary force in Morocco,\u00a0had stopped fighting and its commanders\u00a0changed sides. However, Italian and German forces\u00a0had been hurriedly moved into Tunisia, and by the\u00a0start of December, it was evident that the Axis was\u00a0not prepared to give up Tunisia without a fight.\u00a0Its determination was reinforced by the need to\u00a0maintain a bridgehead in North Africa that could\u00a0support the Afrika Korps, which was retreating\u00a0through Libya towards the Tunisian border after a\u00a0decisive defeat at El Alamein at the hands of the 8th\u00a0Army in October.<\/p>\n
Historians say that the allies entering Tunisia\u00a0in the last two months of 1942 were always too\u00a0weak to drive Axis forces out of Tunisia. This is\u00a0substantiated by Irish Brigade accounts of their\u00a0first few months in Tunisia. They were often\u00a0responsible for huge areas of the front line, and\u00a0their supply lines were long and always irregular.\u00a038 (Irish) Brigade faced a German Army that was\u00a0large and well-equipped. It had strong defensive\u00a0positions and effective air cover. According to the Battalion\u2019s War Diaries,\u00a02 LIR were moved to an area around Bou\u00a0Arada, near Tunis, on 10 December.\u00a0Along with the 6th \u2018Skins\u2019, 2 LIR had the task of\u00a0holding territory encompassing ground rising to\u00a0almost 1,000 feet, with little natural cover and\u00a0interspersed with a few scattered farms. Most of\u00a0these were operated by French settlers who could\u00a0be expected to be sympathetic to the Allied cause.\u00a0However, the native Tunisian population was\u00a0neutral at best and there was little love lost between\u00a0the Arab and Berber peoples of North Africa and\u00a0French colonists, and allied troops suspected the\u00a0native people were spying for the Axis.\u00a0The war finally began in earnest for the 2 LIR\u00a0on 10 December after three years of training in\u00a0UK. With the weather deteriorating, the 2 LIR\u00a0found itself uncomfortably deployed on the west\u00a0side of the north-south road between Bou Arada\u00a0and Goubellat. At this stage, Lt Charles Reidy, a\u00a0celebrated London Irish forward and Irish rugby\u00a0international known as \u2018Elephant Man\u2019 because of\u00a0his height and strength, suffered a serious injury\u00a0and was hospitalised.<\/p>\n
On both sides of the road in the area, where the\u00a0LIR was operating, were hills that were named after\u00a0their height in metres. Overlooking the road from\u00a0the east was a pair of connected hills. The first was\u00a0named Hill 279 and the second was Hill 286, and\u00a0the main feature in the area was given a name of\u00a0its own because of its scale and command of the\u00a0surrounding area. It was called Grandstand and sat\u00a0north of Hills 279 and 286.\u00a0As persistent rain turned the valley into a\u00a0quagmire, 2 LIR had the miserable task of trying\u00a0to locate an elusive enemy and denying them the\u00a0capacity to interrupt the flow of trucks along the\u00a0north-south road. Christmas was celebrated but\u00a0dinner was prepared from standard compo rations.\u00a0The weather was truly dreadful, with continuous\u00a0rain and associated mud making driving difficult\u00a0and walking almost impossible.\u201d Photographs at the time show a treeless\u00a0landscape dominated by low hills with\u00a0no cover apart from scattered outcrops\u00a0of rock. 2 LIR\u2019s first serious encounter with the\u00a0enemy was precipitated by the conditions in the\u00a0valley. Tanks had got stuck in the mud and H\u00a0Company supported by G Company was given\u00a0the task of retrieving them. It was decided to do\u00a0this in daylight and the operation required driving\u00a0German units from farm buildings in the area.\u00a0The London Irish instantly attracted the attention\u00a0of German machine gunners and artillery, and as\u00a0a result the operation failed and G Company was\u00a0mauled, losing two experienced and respected\u00a0sergeants: John Hogan and James McLoughlin.\u00a0Important lessons were learnt by the men in the\u00a0battalion. For example, NCOs stopped wearing\u00a0chevrons.<\/p>\n
The rifle companies were regularly on the\u00a0move, often at night, and as the month progressed\u00a0supplying and feeding the LIR became an\u00a0exhausting process for the battalion\u2019s colour\u00a0sergeants. CSgt Edmund (Rosie) O\u2019Sullivan\u00a0recalled in his own memoirs: \u201cI seldom slept, as my\u00a0nights were spent supplying my company and the\u00a0days involved scrounging anything that was needed\u00a0for my lads …. I remember on the night of 18\u00a0January … falling asleep from complete exhaustion\u00a0while visiting the company … When I awoke, I\u00a0discovered my bed had been a sack of sharp pick\u00a0heads.\u201d<\/p>\n
The whole of the battalion had been on\u00a0the move on 18 January and that day\u00a0the Faughs and the Skins, the other two\u00a0battalions in 38 (Irish) Brigade, held off strong\u00a0German attacks against their positions near to\u00a0Grandstand Hill. Further deployments were\u00a0ordered on 19 January as efforts were made to\u00a0quell German activity on the east side of the road\u00a0to Bou Arada. That night, the battalion received\u00a0orders to move across the road and take Hills 279\u00a0and 286, from which German units were firing on\u00a0British personnel and material in the valley. The\u00a0battalion\u2019s war diaries show that it was instructed\u00a0to move at 4.20am on 20 January, and F Company\u00a0was ordered to take 286, but took the wrong route\u00a0and instead captured Hill 351, which was lightly\u00a0defended. This left G Company on its own to take\u00a0286, which it did by 7am. But the enemy reacted\u00a0strongly, firing from hidden positions on nearby hills and calling down mortars and shelling on\u00a0the exposed London Irish units struggling to dig\u00a0foxholes, as 286 was mainly comprised of barren\u00a0rock.<\/p>\n
Ward told the Irish Brigade website about his\u00a0memory of G Company\u2019s attack on 286 and the\u00a0terror of crossing open ground during daylight\u00a0to take up positions ahead of the attack in the\u00a0afternoon of 19 January.\u00a0\u201cWe had to move over from one side of the\u00a0road to the other side of the road.\u201d Ward said. \u201cAs\u00a0we moved across the road, we got shelled and we\u00a0dropped into a wadi. I was leading my section along\u00a0the wadi when suddenly a voice said \u2018run\u2019. I just said\u00a0to the men \u2018come on\u2019.\u201d Ward\u2019s platoon hurried forward \u201cWe\u00a0ran down the wadi, got round a\u00a0corner and I heard a shell explode\u00a0behind,\u201d he said. \u201cGoing back, I found three men\u00a0wounded, lying in the wadi. I patched them up the\u00a0best I could and waited until the stretchers came.\u00a0Then I continued to the forming up point ready\u00a0for the attack.\u201d<\/p>\n
\u201cThis was all in broad daylight,\u201d said Ward.\u00a0\u201cIt was crazy really. You knew you would be half\u00a0way across and the enemy would throw everything\u00a0at you.\u201d He also recalls the preparation for their\u00a0assault, \u201cDuring that night, everyone assembled\u00a0including our Bren Carriers, You could hear them\u00a0forming up.\u201d This, of course, was of tremendous\u00a0assistance to the Germans.<\/p>\n
\u201cThe attack went in very early the next morning\u00a0and we went to the first hill,\u201d Ward said. \u201cAnd then\u00a0to the second hill and nothing happened. It was on\u00a0the third hill (286) that all hell broke loose.\u201d\u00a0\u201cWe holed up in a large depression in the\u00a0ground, being shelled constantly,\u201d said Ward \u201cThe\u00a0Royal Artillery FOO ordered me to go up to the\u00a0top of the hill to identify from where the shells\u00a0were coming. I could see they were coming from\u00a0a farmhouse about half way down on the plain\u00a0behind the hill.\u201d\u00a0\u201cSo I got back and discovered a shell had fallen\u00a0where I had been lying and left one or two injured,\u201d\u00a0said Ward. \u201cThe artillery officer got the medical\u00a0people to pick up the wounded and we then\u00a0decided that there was no future in staying there\u00a0and ordered a smoke screen. So we all withdrew\u00a0and dropped into another wadi.\u201d G Company, which had lost several\u00a0officers and NCOs, had been ordered\u00a0to withdraw from 286. Meanwhile,\u00a0F Company was ordered up the hill to take their\u00a0place. To their horror they saw a tank and armoured\u00a0cars heading in their direction as the Germans\u00a0launched a counterattack. Hit by mortars, shelling,\u00a0tanks, armoured cars, machine guns and Junkers\u00a0bombers, F Company, which was in the open with\u00a0no armoured or air support, was in a hopeless\u00a0position. After also losing officers and NCOs,\u00a0the company withdrew westwards to the forward\u00a0slopes of 279.<\/p>\n
Despite these losses and clear evidence that the\u00a0Germans were ready to meet them, the London\u00a0Irish were ordered to make another attempt to take\u00a0286. E Company was then ordered up 279 and\u00a0towards 286, but it, too, suffered heavy losses in\u00a0the advance and retired out of enemy fire into the\u00a0wadi at the base of the hill, which had already been\u00a0occupied by the recovering G Company.\u00a0The CO held an O Group meeting and now\u00a0decided to send H Company, the only rifle\u00a0company that hadn\u2019t been in action up to this stage,\u00a0onto 286. Despite being shelled and mortared and\u00a0suffering heavy casualties, H Company finally\u00a0took the hill and reported at 11.45am that the area\u00a0was clear of enemy troops. E and F companies\u00a0were then ordered to climb 279 again to take up\u00a0positions in support of H Company, dug in around\u00a0the peak of 286.<\/p>\n
The battalion had taken its objective, but the\u00a0gain was modest, easily reversible and had been\u00a0very costly. First encounters often lead to high\u00a0levels of casualties particularly among junior\u00a0officers and NCOs keen to inspire their men, and\u00a0indeed on 20 January, the battalion lost many\u00a0irreplaceable officers and NCOs. To an extent\u00a0that few realised, most of 2 LIR was exhausted\u00a0and in total shock. Elements were effectively\u00a0leaderless, and could break totally if further\u00a0German pressure came, as would now happen.<\/p>\n
O\u2019Sullivan\u2019s account of the condition of E\u00a0Company that evening supports this view: \u201cOur\u00a0normal convoy was prepared and we made our way\u00a0to where the battalion was situated. I discovered\u00a0what remained of my company on Point 279,\u201d he\u00a0wrote. \u201cThere was no company commander and\u00a0the second in command, Capt Joseph Carrigan\u00a0aged 31, had been killed. Lt Rawlings, Sgt Billy\u00a0Allen and two corporals had been wounded. An\u00a0officer and SNCO had refused to advance and were\u00a0under arrest. It was a shambles. There seemed to be\u00a0no order or discipline.\u201d<\/p>\n
\u201cThe colour sergeants were called to the\u00a0commanding officer where we received a dressing\u00a0down for not bringing prepared food instead of\u00a0cold rations. This was complete nonsense as we had\u00a0been unaware of the situation. We left immediately\u00a0for the supply base to rouse the cooks and make\u00a0a stew. This was put in large dixies which were\u00a0packed in insulated containers. The supply convoy\u00a0reassembled and proceeded to Bou Arada and back\u00a0to the scene of the battle.\u201d While O\u2019Sullivan was preparing hot\u00a0food for the battalion, the London\u00a0Irishmen on hills 279 and 286 were\u00a0trying to get some rest and yet remain fully alert\u00a0as night fell. Thick high clouds made the darkness\u00a0impenetrable, and quiet descended over the\u00a0battlefield. But it was not to last.\u00a0At 1am on 21 January, Germany infantry\u00a0supported by tanks now attacked the battalion\u00a0from two directions. Units of the enemy came\u00a0around the northern edge of Hill 286 and attacked\u00a02 LIR on the slopes of 279 and into the wadi at its\u00a0rear. Meanwhile, further German forces advanced\u00a0up the reverse slopes of 286, and along its crest,\u00a0firing and howling as they went. According to candid eyewitness accounts of the attack, there\u00a0was complete chaos across the whole battalion.\u00a0Men and vehicles were captured and taken away.\u00a0Sections, platoons and companies disintegrated\u00a0in the din and darkness, and some riflemen and\u00a0their leaders facing tanks and infantry on two sides\u00a0simply ran.<\/p>\n
\u201cThere were machine gun and tracer bullets\u00a0everywhere,\u201d Ward says about the panic caused by\u00a0the German night attack. \u201cWe received the order to\u00a0get out. We ran as fast as we could.\u201d<\/p>\n
By the time the enemy retired at 4am, the\u00a0London Irish were in serious difficulties. Some\u00a0believe it was saved from total destruction by the\u00a0decision of Lt Col Scott, commanding officer of\u00a01 RIrF, to move armoured vehicles behind 2 LIR,\u00a0and from where they were ready to counter the\u00a0Germans when their attack began. After the extreme difficulties of the\u00a0preceding two days, the battalion was\u00a0now ordered into defensive positions,\u00a0west of the Goubellat to Bou Arada road. The\u00a0official LIR history, which was written soon after\u00a0the war, states: \u2018Final casualties in the Battle of Hill\u00a0286 were: 6 officers and 20 other ranks killed; 8\u00a0officers and 78 other ranks wounded; 6 officers and\u00a0130 other ranks missing. Many of the latter were\u00a0confirmed later as having been wounded and taken\u00a0prisoner.\u2019 In actual fact, the number of deaths stated\u00a0here were underestimated as 47 London Irishmen\u00a0are included in the CWGC\u2019s roll of honour for 20-\u00a021 January alone. The official record further states:\u00a0\u201cMany of the latter (missing men) were confirmed\u00a0later as having been wounded and taken prisoner.\u201d<\/p>\n
The scale of the damage done to the battalion can\u00a0be measured by the fact that the battalion received\u00a0almost 200 reinforcements on 23 and 24 January.\u00a0O\u2019Sullivan\u2019s account of the battle is more\u00a0penetrating. He described the two-night attack on\u00a0points 279 and 286 as a total disaster. In hindsight,\u00a0it is perhaps fairer to say that it was the result of\u00a0a combination of factors. This was the battalion\u2019s\u00a0first serious engagement, and it was exhausted by\u00a0operations on the previous three nights, and the\u00a0LIR had encountered some of the German army\u2019s best troops. However, the tactics were questionable:\u00a0all four rifle companies were used instead of one\u00a0being held in reserve. The attack in full daylight\u00a0on the morning of 20 January was insufficiently\u00a0supported and exposed to bombing and there was\u00a0no effective system of early warning of German\u00a0counterattacks.<\/p>\n
The last word, however, must go to Ward,\u00a0possibly the last eyewitness of the battalion\u2019s\u00a0torment 69 years ago. \u201cIt was barmy really,\u201d he said\u00a0about the attack on Hill 286. We had effectively\u00a0warned the Germans we were coming. It was a\u00a0crazy thing to do.\u201d<\/p>\n
(Courtesy of the Irish Brigade website irishbrigade.co.uk and the ‘Emerald’).<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Former member of 2 LIR Charles Ward has spoken about his experiences as a platoon\u00a0sergeant in Tunisia during the Second World War and the\u00a0major setback that the battalion suffered in its\u00a0attack on Hill 286 on 20\/21 January 1943. Charles, known as \u2018Pip\u2019 to his\u00a0comrades, was conscripted into the\u00a0LIR on 18 October 1939, a member\u00a0of the […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"parent":17580,"menu_order":1,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-2008","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.londonirishrifles.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/2008","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.londonirishrifles.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.londonirishrifles.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.londonirishrifles.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.londonirishrifles.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2008"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/www.londonirishrifles.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/2008\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3037,"href":"https:\/\/www.londonirishrifles.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/2008\/revisions\/3037"}],"up":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.londonirishrifles.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/17580"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.londonirishrifles.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2008"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}